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Ethnic Differences Among Israeli Jews: A New Look

by U.O. SCHMELZ, SERGIO DELLAPERGOLA, and URI AVNER

ISRAEL'S JEWISH POPULATION is made up of immigrants and their descendants from all over the world, most of whom came to the country only in the last few decades. Within this societal mosaic the meeting of the two major origin groups of Jews—Asian-African and European-American—is of particular significance and has attracted widespread attention by researchers.[1]

During the early statehood period, the two groups exhibited strong dif-

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Note: The research reported in this study was carried out under the auspices of the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. All statistics were derived from published or unpublished data compiled by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics or from computer files deposited by the bureau with the Hebrew University's Data Bank. Numerous special tabulations were made from these files. The responsibility for the findings rests exclusively with the authors. U.O. Schmelz wrote the introduction and the sections on immigration, population size and structure, residential distribution, interethnic marriage, and fertility; Uri Avner wrote the section on education; Sergio DellaPergola wrote the section on voting behavior and the conclusion. Benjamin Anderman, Zvi Richter, Nitza Genuth, Judith Even, and Arin Poller ably assisted in preparing this study.

[1] In the vast literature dealing with the problems discussed in the present study, see the following general works: Carl Frankenstein, ed., *Between Past and Future* (Jerusalem, 1953); S.N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants* (London, 1954); Judah Matras, *Social Change in Israel* (Chicago, 1965); Moshe Lissak, *Social Mobility in Israel Society* (Jerusalem, 1969); *Mizug Galuyoth—The Integration of Immigrants from Different Countries of Origin in Israel* (in Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1969); S.N. Eisenstadt, Rivka Bar Yossef, Chaim Adler, eds., *Integration and Development in Israel* (Jerusalem, 1970); Michael Curtis and Mordecai Chertoff, *Israel: Social Structure and Change* (New Brunswick, 1973); Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1977); Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (London, 1978); Ernest Krausz, ed., *Migration, Ethnicity and Community, Studies of Israeli Society*, 1 (New Brunswick and London, 1980); Moshe Lissak and Nurit Ronel, eds., *The Ethnic Problem in Israel—Continuity and Change* (in Hebrew), *Megamot*, 25, 1984; Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, *Israel Population: The Challenge of Pluralism*, *Population Bulletin* 39, 1984; Shlomo Deshen and Moshe Shokeid, eds., *Jews of the Middle East: Anthropological Perspectives on Past and Present* (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv, 1984); S.N. Eisenstadt, *The Transformation of Israeli Society: An Essay in Interpretation* (London, 1985); Alex Weingrod, ed., *Studies in Israeli Ethnicity* (London, 1985); Peter Y. Medding, ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 5 (New York, 1989).

ferences in many areas: demographic patterns and family organization, educational attainment, occupational skills, consumption patterns, degree of religiosity, and so on. The impact of these objective differentials was exacerbated by the existence of psychological barriers, such as the perception by each group that the other had "a different mentality" and the accumulated resentment of Asian-Africans toward the dominant European-Americans over initial absorption difficulties. At the same time, a broad diversity prevailed within each of the major groupings with respect to country of origin, mother tongue, and societal background abroad. Later arrivals among European Jews did not show the strong commitment to social experimentation and change that was evident among European immigrants of the pre-1948 period.

This diversity notwithstanding, there existed strong commonalities among Israel's Jews, in particular a shared Jewish heritage—the ancestral religion and history, some international contacts in matters of rabbinical learning, and the perennial experience of minority status in the Diaspora, which had recently been underscored by the Holocaust in Europe and nationalistic violence against Jews in Arab lands. Most of the immigrants in their countries of origin had been town-dwellers with urban occupations, and the Jewish men, at least, had been better educated than their non-Jewish counterparts. In addition, most Jews arriving in Israel shared the feature of being destitute refugees.[2]

In Israel itself, the members of the two origin groups were brought closer together by such existential factors as smallness of the country, residential proximity of many people of different backgrounds and characteristics, dependence on the same institutions, such as schools, and the impact of common legal obligations, especially compulsory military service. Another unifying factor was the emergence of Hebrew as the *lingua franca* of a population made up of Jews of diverse mother tongues.[3] Commonly shared experiences, often under conditions of war and national emergency, have served as powerful unifying bonds. Moreover, unlike in the early period of the state, most Israeli Jews are now native-born, and their proportion is growing.

The ethnic factor has shown itself to be a key dynamic element of Jewish society in Israel. The coexistence, interaction, and interpenetration of the main origin groups, as well as the changes which their members have experienced personally and intergenerationally, are major themes of Israeli social history. At the same time, the actual processes of evolution in each origin group as well as the differences between groups have tended to vary a great deal in different spheres—a point that is often not appreciated.

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[2] U.O. Schmelz, *Jewish Refugee Immigration to Israel 1932–1980*, Hebrew University, Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, Occasional Paper no. 8, 1989; a Hebrew version was published earlier.

[3] U.O. Schmelz and R. Bachi, "Hebrew as Everyday Language of the Jews in Israel—Statistical Appraisal," in *Salo Wittmayer Baron Jubilee Volume*, vol. 2, American Academy for Jewish Research, 1974, pp. 745–785.

This study will concentrate on the analysis of origin differentials in selected subject fields. The aim is to elucidate the empirical patterns of these differentials and their transformations over time, to document the prevailing diversity, and to contribute to the in-depth analysis of the selected subject fields. Viewed overall, the investigation of these evolutionary patterns sheds light on the main challenges and problems involved in the task of contemporary nation-building by Israel's diverse Jewish population.

Background

Prior to the Holocaust, world Jewry consisted of several principal groupings, differing in geographical location, sociodemographic, and sociocultural characteristics—particularly the degree of modernity—as well as in modes of Jewishness and religiosity. The bulk of European Jewry lived in Eastern Europe, one of the less developed regions of the continent, where it was subject to strong economic and nationalistic pressures. Previously this had been a traditional Jewry of the Ashkenazi type. However, two powerful trends made for change: in the Soviet Union, the Pale of Settlement and the *numerus clausus* were abolished, giving Jews opportunities for geographical relocation and careers in the framework of a Communist regime; in the East European countries outside the USSR, modernization and industrialization advanced during the interwar period. Central and West European Jewries, with the exception of some recent immigrants from Eastern Europe, had become so modernized that they anticipated and actually exceeded the demographic dynamics currently characteristic of both the general populations of highly developed countries and the contemporary Diaspora. They exhibited negative population growth, low levels of Jewishness, and frequent mixed marriage. The recently established Jewish populations in the Americas, South Africa, and Australia were striking roots in these surroundings and setting out on the road to their remarkable present success in the economic and social spheres. The age-old Jewries of the Middle East and North Africa shared in the cultural and material stagnation of their countries of residence, most of which, in the mid-20th century, were just experiencing the early stages of sociodemographic change. Finally, the Jewish population of the Land of Israel (Palestine) during the Mandatory period was still of modest size, mostly of European provenance, with its majority ideologically oriented toward Zionist pioneering.

The Holocaust wiped out most of European Jewry, whether traditional or modern. The remnants from Europe—excluding for a considerable time the Soviet Union—and the Jews of the Islamic countries made up the bulk of the immigrants to the new State of Israel. Most came as refugees.

The dominant societal constellation in the early phase of the State of Israel resulted from the meeting of three sectors: the preexisting *yishuv*, new immigrants from Europe, and new immigrants from Asia-Africa. The latter two groups were newcomers, but conditions had changed utterly for the old-timers (themselves mostly foreign-born) as well. Since the old-timers and the immigrants from Europe had the same background, in sociodemographic terms the picture was reduced to the coexistence of two main origin groups—European-American and Asian-African. The two groups differed sharply in most respects.

Contents of Study

This study will analyze the ethnic dimension among Israel's Jews in the following areas:

Immigration. In the first four decades of Israel's existence the contribution of the two main origin groups has been roughly equal in terms of the number of immigrants to Israel. However, the potential for Jewish migration from Asia and North Africa is now almost exhausted. Any substantial future *aliyah* will have to come from Europe, the Americas, South Africa, or Australia.

Population Size and Structure. The changing proportions of the two main origin groups will be traced up to the point where they reached the approximate numerical balance that prevails at present. Asian-African Jews have drawn close to European-American Jews with regard to age structure.

Residential Distribution. In Israel's early period, marked dissimilarities arose between the origin groups with regard to both territorial dispersion and individual areas of residence within towns. However, in many of the newer housing areas and among the better educated, these dissimilarities have been greatly reduced.

Interethnic Marriage. Increasingly frequent marriages in which husband and wife are of different origins are a prime mechanism for the integration of Israel's Jewish population.

Fertility. The previously high mortality of Jews who lived in Asia-Africa was rapidly reduced after their arrival in Israel. Processes of demographic convergence have resulted in similarity of nuptiality and fertility patterns between the main origin groups in Israel.

Educational Attainment. Striking differences between the origin groups, by sex, prevailed among immigrants in the past. Great progress in education is a general feature of Israeli society, but there are still differences in the highest educational levels reached by the young of the main origin groups.

Voting Behavior. Ethnic voting patterns have shown considerable shifts in recent elections. In the political sphere, Asian-African Jews have become increasingly prominent.

Conclusion. A final section will summarize salient findings and briefly discuss their implications.

This study focuses entirely on behavioral patterns; it does not discuss policies relating to the ethnic situation or the psychological aspects. The analysis is based on statistical data, which are presented in tables in an appendix following the text.

Concepts and Terminology

In keeping with the usage in Israel's official statistics, foreign-born Jews will be divided by continent and, where feasible, by country of birth, and the Israeli-born by father's continent or country of birth. The Israeli-born whose fathers were also born in Israel are not further subdivided. From this division according to continents/countries of birth a classification by origin is derived, grouping together persons born in a certain continent or country with the Israeli-born whose fathers were born in that same continent or country. "European origin" thus means the natives of that continent and the sons or daughters born in Israel to European-born fathers.

Israeli origin consists only of the Israeli-born whose fathers were also born in the country. Thus, each foreign-origin group comprises more persons than the corresponding category by continent or country of birth, because the respective Israeli-born are likewise included. In contrast, the Israeli origin group is much smaller than the total number of Israeli-born, because it includes only those whose fathers were also born in Israel but not the Israeli-born of foreign paternity. The advantages of this approach are the objective and immutable[4] nature of a person's own and paternal country of birth throughout his/her lifetime. It should also be mentioned that countries are classified in their entirety. Hence, the Soviet Union together with its Asian territories is included in Europe, while Turkey is included in Asia despite Istanbul's location in Europe.

In Jewish sociological writing on Israel, as well as in popular literature, an origin division of the Jews according to *edot* (communities) has often been made, primarily into Ashkenazim and Sephardim, but also a variety of Eastern, or Oriental, communities. In fact, however, there is no generally accepted classification of *edot*. Confusion prevails between narrow use of the term "Sephardim," signifying descendants of exiles from Spain and Portugal, and its wider use embracing all non-Ashkenazi Jewish communities. There is thus excessive room for subjective and inconsistent personal responses when individuals are questioned about their *edah*. This is all the more true among the offspring of interethnic marriages, who are quite numerous in Israel.

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[4] Except where changes of frontiers occurred. In this case the current boundary division is reflected in the statistics.

Use of the loosely applied terms "Western" and "Eastern" to denote the origin composition of Israel's Jews disregards the geographical realities of the Diaspora. While the expression *edot hamizrah* ("Oriental" communities) is often employed in Hebrew as a generic name for Asian-African Jews, it is understood to exclude the Sephardim. The majority of so-called Western Jews actually come from the eastern portion of Europe, while the most numerous subgroup of allegedly Eastern Jews is the Moroccan community, which hails from the western corner of North Africa and whose very name in Hebrew, *ma'aravim*, signifies "people of the west." At any rate, the considerable body of Balkan Sephardim were sociodemographically Europeans at the approach of the Holocaust, while the Jews of South Africa are Ashkenazim.

When the Asian-African and European-American origin groups are compared in this article, particularly in the statistical tables, two situations are distinguished. The term "major groups" indicates that the Israeli origin group has been omitted from the data presented; "dichotomous groups" is used when the members of the Israeli origin group have been included and divided according to ultimate origin abroad.

Time Perspective

The analysis presented here will be confined to the period of Israel's statehood, from 1948 onward. In fact, it will often start only from 1961, for two reasons: by then most of the Holocaust survivors and the early Asian-African immigrants had arrived in the country, creating the initially striking origin differentials that will be followed up here; in addition, the detailed population census conducted in Israel in 1961 provided the first major reading of the situation that had arisen.

From one perspective the four decades since 1948 may appear a substantial period of time, considering that the great majority of Jews now living in Israel either immigrated or were born after the establishment of the state. From a different perspective, however, the four decades are but a short time span. Since the focus of this study is on origin-group differentials, it should be realized that those immigrants who arrived in the first years of statehood as young children are now only in their 40s. Even the adolescents and young adults of the period of mass immigration, who clearly remember the hardships of their early absorption, are now aged about 60 and may still be in the labor force. Consequently, their permanent characteristics, such as amount of schooling received abroad, may continue to affect the overall summaries for the existing Jewish population. Moreover, such persons still exert direct social influence.

In terms of the future, it should be recognized that the four decades under review constitute a large proportion of the period for which it is possible at all to investigate the differentials between the main origin groups with relative certainty. As noted, official statistics divide the foreign-born according to region of birth and the first generation of Israeli-born by father's birth region. However, the Israeli-born whose fathers were also born in the country are not subdivided. They amounted to only 8 percent of all Israeli Jews in 1972, but more than 21 percent in 1988. Unless a large wave of immigration arrives in the future, their proportion is bound to increase rapidly.

Furthermore, marriages involving couples in which one is of Asian-African origin and the other of European-American origin already constitute about a quarter of current marriages. The proportion of new matches between spouses from different countries of origin is even greater. The offspring of such marriages will be of mixed origin and will appear in the official statistics as follows: if the father is foreign-born, according to his birth region, while that of the mother will remain unrecorded;[5] if the father is Israeli-born, in that category whose origin is unspecified. Obviously, the specification of origin cannot be a simple and unequivocal matter when each parent and perhaps as many as 3–4 grandparents stem from different countries. Due to further growth in the proportions of persons who are of mixed parentage or who have been many generations in Israel, study of the subject based on statistics of the existing type will become increasingly inconclusive.

Sources

This study chiefly uses data from the official statistics of Israel; the few exceptions are duly noted. The official statistics in question consist of population censuses as well as statistics on immigration, vital events, school and university studies, parliamentary elections, and so on. Four national population censuses have been held so far in Israel: 1948, 1961, 1972, and 1983. In the main, reference will be to the last three, because the earliest census essentially reflected the situation prior to the mass immigration that quickly changed the size and composition of Israel's Jewish population and launched the processes that are examined here. Moreover, the 1948 census did not divide the Israeli-born by father's country of birth, a fact that is necessary to establish the origin composition of Israel's Jews.

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[5] The origin division of the Israeli-born in the official statistics (and also here) is determined according to only one parent, the father. There are practical reasons for this method. The underlying demographic assumption is that the total offspring of origin-mixed Jewish marriages are divided rather evenly according to the respective origins of fathers and mothers.

IMMIGRATION

Approximately 90 percent of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine during the Mandatory period whose country of provenance was recorded came from Europe.[6] Even if some adjustment is made for unrecorded cases, the European proportion remains as high as 88 percent.[7]

Table 1 reviews the course of immigration into the State of Israel according to previous continent of residence.[8] It shows strong variations over time both in the overall volume of immigration and in the geographical composition of the immigrants. The figures relate to gross immigration, without deducting any individuals who emigrated from Israel. (See Appendix for tables.)

The first few years of the new state (May 1948–1951) witnessed a major influx of 687,000 Jews as compared to 650,000 who lived there when independence was proclaimed. The first newcomers arrived primarily from Europe, as displaced persons or other survivors of the Holocaust. Soon, however, the proportion of Asian-Africans rose and by 1951 became preponderant, in part because of a ban on Jewish emigration from the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe during Stalin's last years. For the whole of this brief period the percentages of arrivals from Europe and from Asia-Africa were virtually balanced. A striking feature in this situation was the transplantation to Israel of the overwhelming majority of certain Diaspora Jewries, the outstanding instances being Iraq (123,300 persons during 1948–1951), Yemen and Aden (48,400), Bulgaria (37,200), and Libya (30,900). By the end of 1951 the Arabic-speaking countries of Asia had been nearly emptied of Jews, and the potential subsequently remaining in this continent for migration to Israel was limited. Most of the large immigration of Asian-African provenance that continued in the following dozen years actually came from North Africa, especially from Morocco and Tunisia.

After a relative lull during 1952–1954, when African Jews predominated among the comparatively few arrivals, a second, though far more modest, immigration wave—165,000—came during 1955–1957. It comprised an African majority, but also included many Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe during the post-Stalinist thaw and after the abortive Hungarian uprising of 1956.

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[6] Including less than 2 percent classifed under America and Oceania.

[7] U.O. Schmelz, "Mass Aliyah from Asia and North Africa: Demographic Aspects" (in Hebrew), *Pe'amim*, no. 39, 1989, p. 19f.

[8] For May 1948–1950, according to continent of birth.

The years 1958–1960 saw another reduction in the number of immigrants, with a majority of arrivals coming from Europe. A renewed rise of the wave during 1961–1964 brought 228,000 persons to Israel, including most of the Jews who had until then remained in Morocco, as well as numerous Romanians.

The mid-1960s were a watershed in Israel's immigration history in that they marked the termination of the great exodus of Jews from Asia and Africa, where comparatively few Jews remained. After a few more years (1965–1968), another tide of immigration ensued during 1969–1974. There were two main tributaries: Soviet Jews who, in limited numbers, were allowed to leave for the first time in more than 40 years; and Jews from North America, Latin America, Western Europe, and elsewhere, who, in the optimistic atmosphere following the Six Day War, decided on *aliyah* (immigration) in larger numbers than before.[9] This tide terminated, however, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

In the following years (1975–1988), small, and on the whole decreasing, annual numbers of Jewish immigrants came to Israel. An interrelated phenomenon was the exit of Jews from the Soviet Union, holding Israeli visas but actually heading to other destinations. The immigration of some Iranian and Ethiopian Jews did not make up for the falloff elsewhere.

The data in table 1 report on the absolute numbers of immigrants. If their relative numbers per 1,000 Jews in Israel are considered, the declining trend of immigration is more strongly emphasized. Since the total of Jews in Israel has grown markedly, the same absolute number of immigrants corresponds now to a lower immigration rate than in the past. In the peak year 1949, when 240,000 Jews arrived, the rate of immigration was 266 per 1,000 of Israel's average Jewish population (including the Israeli-born) in that year. Relative to the number of Jews already living in Israel at the beginning of 1949, the increment was, of course, even greater: 316 per 1,000. In contrast, for the average of recent years (1985–1988) the yearly immigration rate was only 3 per 1,000.

The data in table 1 are, as noted, gross immigration figures. By deducting emigration of Jews from Israel, the net total of external migrations is obtained. In the past, most emigrants were the backwash of recent immigration. Today, when the majority of younger Jewish adults in Israel are native-born, they also constitute the majority of emigrants. During the 40 years 1948–1988 a gross total of 1,800,000 immigrants arrived, while the net total of external migrations of Jews to and from Israel amount to about 1,400,000.[10] In the mid-1980s the annual net balance of external migrations of Israel's total Jews was barely positive.

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[9] In 1969 a special visa category of "potential immigrants" was created in order to encourage *aliyah* from Western countries. These persons are included in the figures of table 1, but remigration has been considerable among them, especially among those coming from the United States.

Jewish immigration to Israel, like many international migration streams, presents a wavelike pattern, with shorter spells of highs and lows in the first two decades of statehood and longer ones afterward. During 1948–1951 there was a massive wave of immigration, but ever since, the long-term trend has been sloping downward. This is because of—as noted earlier—the gradual exhaustion of migratory potentials in Asia, North Africa, and the Soviet satellite countries, and also because of the lack of enthusiasm of Jews from Western countries, particularly the United States, for moving to Israel.[11] As for the future, sizeable potentials for further immigration exist in the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and in the Western countries, on the other. The great changes now occurring in the USSR, which include more liberal emigration laws, compounded by the new regulations in the United States restricting the entry of Soviet Jews, are now producing another wave of Jewish migration from the USSR to Israel.

During the whole period 1948–1988, a modest majority of the gross immigration came from Europe and America. The difference between this percentage (56) and that of the arrivals from Asia-Africa (44) would be reduced if only net immigrants were considered, since emigration, including remigration, has been relatively larger among European-Americans than Asian-Africans. Hence *aliyah* of the two main origin groups has been roughly balanced during the state's first 40 years. However, the time-bound character of this balance should be appreciated. If the perspective were widened to include the whole of Zionist immigration over the last hundred years, a considerable European majority would result. Similarly, since any further immigration of considerable size can only come from the Soviet Union or the Western countries, the proportion of European-Americans would rise accordingly.

Jews from the Americas and Oceania amounted to only 9.5 percent of gross immigration during 1948–1988 and have been concentrated in the last two decades. Their share among net immigrants was even smaller, because of particularly strong remigration.

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[10] The figure includes children born abroad to returning Israelis; see Central Bureau of Statistics (hereafter, CBS), *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1989, p.39.

[11] Sergio DellaPergola, "Aliya and Other Jewish Migrations: Toward an Integrated Perspective," in U.O. Schmelz and G. Nathan, eds., *Studies in the Population of Israel in Honor of Roberto Bachi*, *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, vol. 30 (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 172–209; idem, "Mass Aliyah—A Thing of the Past?" *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 51, 1989, pp. 96–114.

The distribution of Israel's foreign-born Jews by period of immigration—which indicates their duration of residence in Israel—changed in the course of time. The passing of the years added new immigration waves, while deaths, some emigration, and the arrival of new immigrants reduced the absolute or relative numbers of veteran residents (table 2). By 1988 only 13 percent of the foreign-born had arrived before independence. The period of mass immigration and its immediate aftermath (1948–1954), which had accounted for more than half of all foreign-born Jews in the 1961 census, made up scarcely a third by 1988.

Because of the changing geographical composition of the immigrants, Jews born in the various continents are differently distributed according to immigration periods. The European-American-born have been the most veteran group, in keeping with the situation in the Mandatory period. However, since the late 1960s, they have also comprised an above-average share of recent immigrants. Among the Asian-born, large proportions came in the period of mass migration, and among the African Jews, many arrived around 1960. In the not too distant future, the Asian-African-born, especially the former, will constitute the most veteran of the continental groups among Israel's foreign-born Jews.

Table 3 displays the distribution of the foreign-born by principal countries of birth and immigration periods as of 1983.[12] It shows the heaviest concentration of pre-independence arrivals among Jews born in Germany and Austria, most of whom arrived before World War II. The relatively strongest concentrations of immigrants are from those Diaspora countries whose Jews participated in the mass transfers of the time: Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Bulgaria (the latter lumped together in the table with Greek Jewry, which in Israel is chiefly represented by Holocaust survivors). Two-thirds of Moroccan Jews arrived around 1960. In 1983 the majority of Soviet Jews living in Israel were relative newcomers; the same was true of Jews from the "other Europe" (Western Europe), the Americas, and the "other Africa" (mainly South Africa and Ethiopia).

POPULATION SIZE AND STRUCTURE

Origin Composition

During the Mandatory period, the Jewish population of Palestine grew rapidly—from less than 60,000 at the end of World War I to 650,000 by May 1948. Among the foreign-born, those from Europe (and America) constituted 68 percent in the census of 1931 and 85 percent in that of November 1948.

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[12] Data on the distribution of foreign-born Jewish residents in Israel, by provenance and immigration period, have been officially updated since the 1983 census only on the continental level but not according to individual countries.

The total number of Jews in Israel jumped from 650,000 in May 1948 and 717,000 in November of that year to 1,404,000 at the end of 1951; it has grown gradually since then to 3,659,000 at the end of 1988. This amounts to a 5.6-fold growth during slightly more than 40 years, or an average annual growth rate of 44 per 1,000. However, the rate of annual growth has slackened strikingly over time, as immigration has shrunk. Concurrently, the relative importance of external migration balance vis-à-vis natural increase as a factor in Jewish population growth has declined (table 4).

The changes that have taken place in the composition of Israel's Jews, by region of birth and origin, since the beginning of statehood, are documented in tables 5–7, by absolute numbers and percentages. At the time of the census of 1948, 35 percent of the country's total Jews had been born there. Mass immigration reduced this proportion to 25 percent at the end of 1951. It has grown ever since, exceeding half the Jewish population as from 1975. By 1988 it had reached 63 percent (table 6). The number of Israeli-born whose fathers were born in the country amounted to 107,000 in 1961. It rose to 786,000 in 1988. Correspondingly, the proportion of this group among all Israeli-born increased from 15 to 34 percent over the same years, and its percentage among the country's total Jews from 5.5 to 21.5. The share of Israeli-born rose between 1961 and 1988 as follows: all Jews—from 38 to 63 percent; European origin group—from 33 to 44 percent; Asian-African origin group, from 35 to 61 percent (see lower part of table 7).

The absolute number of foreign-born rose dramatically in the first two decades of the state, due to strong immigration. It did not increase much in the census interval 1972–1983, and it has declined in recent years because of the paucity of new immigrants as well as deaths and some emigration. The proportion of foreign-born among Israel's total Jews declined from 65 percent in 1948 and even 75 percent in 1951 to 37 percent by 1988. Among all foreign-born Jews, the share of Europeans and Americans dropped from 85 percent in 1948 and 63 percent in 1951 to 56 percent in the census of 1961. Since the 1972 census, the share of Europeans and Americans has maintained itself at about 55 percent, with limited fluctuations. Thus a small majority of Europeans and Americans has prevailed among the total of foreign-born Jews in Israel during the last three decades (table 6).

Considering the Israeli-born whose fathers were born abroad, a majority (54 percent) of the fathers were from Europe-America as late as 1961. Since then the initially high fertility in Israel of the large body of post-1948 immigrants from Asia-Africa has made itself felt: 58 percent of Israeli-born Jews with foreign-born fathers originated from Asia-Africa in 1972 and 61 percent in 1983–1988. Grouping together the foreign-born and the Israeli-born of foreign paternity,[13] one finds an analogous picture: a majority of European-American origin up to the 1961 census, a majority of Asian-African origin as from the 1972 census.[14]

To distribute the whole Jewish population dichotomously into two major origin groups according to geographical origin from Asia-Africa or Europe-America, the fast-growing category of Israeli-born with Israeli-born fathers needs to be divided. While this is not done in the official population statistics, there are birth statistics starting from the early 1950s that specify, in cases where the newborn's father is himself Israeli-born, the birth region of the paternal grandfather. The origin proportions of foreign-born grandfathers of the newborn have changed markedly in the course of time: from about two-thirds Europeans and Americans until the early 1970s to about 45 percent in the mid-1980s.

Only a few numerically limited subgroups remain indeterminate according to origin and thus subject to conjectural distribution: persons born in the country before the 1950s;[15] those born afterward whose paternal grandfathers were already Israeli-born; and infants whose paternal grandfathers' region of birth failed to be recorded. These were all assigned to the two origin groups on the strength of the amply documented fact that the majority of the Jewish population of Palestine toward the end of the Ottoman period, and even more so in the Mandatory period, originated in Europe, and that a marked fertility differential between the origin groups developed in Palestine only in the early Mandate period. By use of this procedure the following percentages of total Israeli-born with Israeli-born fathers were assigned to the European-American origin group: 1961 and 1972—about two thirds; 1983—60 percent; 1988—56 percent.

The division of all Israeli Jews according to the two origin groups is obtained by combining the foreign-born, the Israeli-born with foreign-born fathers, and the Israeli-born of Israeli paternity. In fact, it consists of the weighted averages of the respective shares of each origin group in these component subgroups. The overall percentages of European-Americans, as shown in the section "origin, dichotomous" of table 7, were (in rounded figures): 1961—56, 1972—50, 1983—50, 1988—48. The resultant finding is thus a rather balanced distribution of Israel's Jews according to the two main origin groups during the last two decades. At ages 15 and over, the dichotomous origin division in 1988 turned out to be 50 percent for either group; at ages 18 and over the proportion of Asian-Africans was slightly below half. Thus, despite the common assumption to the contrary, the Asian-African origin group does not at present constitute a clear majority of Israel's Jews. Insofar as this belief is based at all on the inspection of statistics, it can be rationalized only by disregard of the Israeli-born of Israeli paternity (whose ultimate origin is not apparent from the official data but can be reconstructed; see above).

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[13] As from 1984 the number of Israeli-born with foreign-born fathers has exceeded that of foreign-born Jews.

[14] The percentages of persons of European origin among all Jews of foreign origin were: 1961—55.2, 1972—48.2, 1983—47.5, 1988—46.3.

[15] Persons born in the country before 1950 amounted, in 1988, to only 9.6 percent of all Israeli-born or 6.0 percent of total Jews.

In terms of the near future, it should be noted that official population projections exist for Israel until the beginning of the 21st century. However, they do not provide the breakdown of children to be born in Israel during the projection period (from 1985 onward) by father's region of birth. Information on this matter was omitted because of the difficulty of making assumptions about the extent of new interethnic marriages and the number of children expected therefrom. Accordingly, tables 5–7 present data as of the year 2000 only for persons aged 15 and over. In order to permit relevant comparisons, analogous data for ages 15 and above are also given as of 1988. The medium version of the projections, shown here, assumes a zero balance of external migrations by Jews to and from Israel, in approximation to the situation of the mid-1980s.

According to these projections, at ages 15+ the total number of Jews in Israel will grow by 20 percent, the Israeli-born by 58 percent, and the Israeli-born with Israeli-born fathers by 153 percent, whereas the number of foreign-born will go down by 17 percent. According to the percentage distribution of the 15+-year-old Jews in the year 2000 by birth region, the share of all Israeli-born will rise from 49 to 65 percent, that of Israeli-born of Israeli paternity will increase from 9.5 to 20 percent and the Israeli-born of foreign paternity from 40 to 45 percent, while the total of foreign-born might drop from 51 to 35 percent. No marked changes would occur, according to these projections, in the continental distribution of the Israeli-born with foreign-born fathers and of the foreign-born themselves (table 6). However, due to the strong increase of the Israeli origin group, the proportion of the other origin groups—Asian-African and especially the more aged European-American—would be reduced (table 7).

As indicated, if the 15+-year-old Israeli-born with Israeli-born fathers are divided dichotomously, as of 1988 the total comprises equal shares of Asian-African and European-American origin.[16] By the year 2000 the Asian-African share might increase somewhat to 52 percent, because of a 25-percent growth in the absolute number of this origin group as compared to only a 16-percent growth of the European-American group, according to these projections.

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[16] As compared to nearly 52 percent of Asian-African origin among the Jews of all ages in 1988, since this origin group is younger than the European-Americans; see below, particularly table 13.

Two points should be added that go beyond the formal projection results: (a) Assuming that the external migration balance of Israel's Jews until the year 2000 will be nil, as was done in the projections, the origin composition in all ages together (including 0–14) will give a somewhat larger surplus to the Asian-African group than is shown in table 7 for ages 15+. Such a moderate surplus is already found for all ages in 1988, and its somewhat augmented continuation would be due, under the now prevailing conditions of rather similar fertility in both origin groups, to some majority of Asian-African origin among those in the most reproductive age groups during 1988–2000 (cf. table 13). (b) Hypothetical immigration potentials from the Diaspora are now located almost exclusively in Europe, America, South Africa, and Australia. A substantially positive migration balance would therefore strengthen the European-American origin group. Indeed, it might reverse the origin proportions in Israel's Jewish population that have of late leaned somewhat in the direction of an Asian-African surplus. According to the dichotomous computations, the surplus of Asian-Africans in 1988 amounted to approximately 120,000. This difference, as well as the effects mentioned in the previous paragraph, might be reduced or cancelled by not unrealistically large figures of future immigrants and their anticipated natural increase in Israel.

Thus, the main finding of this analysis is the existence and probable persistence in the near future of an approximate numerical balance between the two main origin groups of Israeli Jews.

Only continental birth or origin groups have been considered so far. Table 8 gives a succinct picture of the population evolution from 1961 to 1988 according to principal countries of birth or origin, including but distinguishing between two generations—the foreign-born and the Israeli-born offspring of foreign-born fathers. This breakdown provides a sense of the changes that have occurred both chronologically and intergenerationally. The three leading birth countries of the foreign-born in 1961 were Poland (17.2 percent), Romania (12.9), and Iraq (10.3); in 1988, Morocco (14.6), USSR (13.5), and Romania (12.0). Natives of Morocco and the USSR recorded rises above 60 percent in their numbers in Israel, though the greatest relative increases actually occurred with regard to countries with much smaller numbers of Jews in Israel. The three leading countries of origin among the Israeli-born with foreign-born fathers in 1961 were Poland (19.6), USSR (12.6), and Iraq (10.0); in 1988, Morocco (19.3), Iraq (11.3), and Poland (10.1). The advance of the Moroccans to first place according to origin reflected both their strong participation in the immigration flow of the early 1960s and their initially high fertility; the number of

Israeli-born with Moroccan fathers increased more than fivefold.

Table 8 also indicates the percentages of Israeli-born among Jews whose fathers were born in the various countries. These percentages rose in accordance with fertility and/or duration of residence in Israel. The first factor partly accounts for the high percentages found among Yemenites in both years, though they were also a group of comparatively long residence in Israel. The operation of length of residence in Israel is evidenced by the considerable percentages of Israeli-born in 1988 among Jews originating from European countries that were significantly represented only among immigrants of the Mandatory period and early statehood (e.g., Poland and Central European countries). In contrast, the more recent immigration from the USSR around 1970 led to a reduction in 1988 of the share of Israeli-born among the Jews originating from that country.

Table 8 also shows the small share among Israel's Jewish population of persons born in the Americas and Oceania, though their numbers increased in the period following the Six Day War. At the time of the 1983 census, persons born in these regions numbered 75,400 and those born in Israel to fathers from these origins numbered 28,300. The corresponding figures for the United States were 32,300 and 9,100.[17]

Age Composition

The age structure of a population is largely determined by past and current fertility. In Israel, it has also been significantly influenced by the specific age distributions of the large immigration during the early decades of the state.

Table 9 shows the age composition at time of arrival in Israel of Jewish immigrants who were born in Asia-Africa or Europe-America. The Asian-African group was consistently younger, but the differences narrowed after the large immigration waves of 1948–1964. The immigrants from Asia-Africa during 1961–1964, consisting mostly of Moroccans, were even somewhat younger than during the mass influx of 1948–1951; this may have been partly due to lowered child mortality and less selective representation of young adults among the immigrants. After the mid-1960s, immigrants from these continents had a less youthful age structure, which may be attributable to declining fertility and to more selective *aliyah* of young adults. The change may also be related to the fact that the children born in France to

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[17] The main reason for the discrepancy between these figures and those of table 8, as compared to table 1, is remigration. The figures here and in table 8 relate to country/continent of birth, while those in table 1 relate to continent of last residence before *aliyah*. More immigrants to Israel from America and Oceania were born elsewhere than were born in America or Oceania and moved elsewhere before immigrating to Israel.

North African Jews who first migrated to that country and only afterward to Israel were not classified in the birth-region statistics together with their parents, but as European-born.

The age composition of immigrants from Europe showed strongly the irregular course of fertility which is characteristic of the group as well as the loss of children in the Holocaust. Three chronological stages of reproductivity can be distinguished up to the mid-1950s, whose impact could be seen first in the lower age groups and subsequently in the higher ages as time went on: depressed birthrates in the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, compounded by child mortality in the Holocaust; a "baby boom," especially in the second half of the 1940s; and a renewed fertility recession afterward. The above-average survival of younger adults in the Holocaust is clearly exemplified in the European mass immigration of 1948–1951. The large percentages of 15–24 or 15–34-year-olds among the immigrants from Europe-America during the last two decades point to selective immigration of younger adults. Increased shares of the elderly are found among more recent immigrants from Europe-America, indicative both of the aging of the Diaspora and of a specific phenomenon of old-age *aliyah*.

In Israel itself, the age structures of Asian-Africans and European-Americans evolved due to the following major influences: the youthful character of the *yishuv* as a whole toward the end of the Mandatory period, mainly due to the arrival of pioneers and, afterward, of Holocaust survivors; the initially high but rapidly decreasing fertility of Asian-African Jews in Israel, though the latter trend was somewhat offset by improved child survival; and a rise in the fertility of European-born Jews after immigration to Israel.

The official population statistics of Israel divide Jews into foreign-born and Israeli-born. All children born in Israel to immigrants are classified as Israeli-born, separate from their parents. This leads to artifacts in the respective age distributions: as a group, the Israeli-born appear inordinately young, while the foreign-born have an elderly bias. Any birth-region group that has received recent migratory reinforcements may have relatively more young children than an equally or even more fertile group that has not absorbed many immigrants of late. Table 10 illustrates the biases due to immigration chronology in the officially published age statistics, when European-Americans are compared with Asian-Africans, and even when Africans are compared with the Asians as of 1988.

Tables 11–13 present the more realistic age distributions of origin groups in dichotomous division. The median ages of the European-American group in Israel have remained rather stable during the considerable span 1961–1988 and are projected to continue at approximately the same level for ages 15 and over, until the year 2000 at least (table 11). This is essentially due to comparatively limited fluctuations of fertility. In contrast, median ages have risen markedly in the Asian-African origin group and are projected to continue to rise, primarily because of fertility decline.

The basic finding of this section, then, is that the origin differentials in age distribution among Israel's Jews are diminishing, as Asians and Africans move more closely to the European-American pattern. Such a process, however, must take considerable time, since current fertility levels make themselves felt at the bottom of the age pyramid, through the relative size of newborn cohorts, while the age pyramid as a whole reflects the demographic experiences of the entire population, including the elderly.

Table 12 shows these developments in greater detail for three points of time: 1961, 1988, and 2000 (the latter only with regard to ages 15 and over). Among European-Americans no marked changes have occurred or are foreseen in the proportions of children and younger adults, which is indicative of the rather stable fertility that has prevailed among this origin group in Israel. The small cohorts born and surviving from the 1930s and the Holocaust in Europe made themselves particularly felt in 1961 at ages 15–24, as compared to the large "baby boom" cohort then aged 5–14; by 1988 these groups had advanced to ages 45–54 and 35–44, respectively. The percentage of elderly (aged 65 and over) among the European-American origin group rose between 1961 and 1988 from 6 to 15 percent. However this was not due to declining fertility, as is now usual when aging takes place in developed countries and as happens also among Asian-Africans in Israel. Rather, the bulges of young adults that had arrived from Europe during the Mandatory period and early statehood eventually reached old age. No augmentation in the proportion of elderly among European-Americans is foreseen until the year 2000, when the decreasing cohorts born in the 1930s will enter the elderly age range.[18]

In the Asian-African origin group, aging processes due to decreasing fertility have manifested themselves. The median age rose and is projected to continue doing so (the latter is substantiated in tables 11–12 for ages 15 and over). The percentages of children declined between 1961 and 1988, while those for persons above age 15 went up. Similarly, the percentages of 15–24-year-olds among all adults will have dropped by the year 2000, while the proportions of the 65+-year-olds are gradually expanding.

Table 13 indicates the proportions of dichotomous origin groups in Israel's total Jewish population age-specifically. In 1961 persons of Asian-African origin accounted for a much greater proportion of children than of middle-aged persons and especially of the elderly. At present, while Asian-Africans still make up a moderate majority of children, the percentage has declined (due to fertility reduction). The peak proportions of this origin group are now reached among younger adults (aged 15–34), while its share in the older ages continues to diminish strongly. For the year 2000, the largest proportion of Asian-Africans is foreseen in ages 35–44, with relatively less diminution in the later ages. The bulge of greatest Asian-African representation among the cohorts born around 1960, when this origin group was already large in Israel and its fertility still high, is moving up the age pyramid. Thus, if separate age groups of Israel's Jewish population are considered, their division by dichotomous origin is also becoming more balanced.

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[18] U.O. Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1984).

RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION

Determinants of Evolution

Israel is a small country with a relatively dense network of roads in its inhabited areas. This facilitates commuting by those who work outside their place of residence as well as travel within the country for other purposes. Still, great practical importance with regard to economic, social, and cultural matters attaches to the spatial distribution of the population according to large territorial divisions, individual localities, and neighborhoods within towns. The degree of intermingling between the two major origin groups in small residential areas is a basic aspect of their interrelationship.

After Israel's War of Independence in 1948 and the exodus of most Arabs from the new state, large parts of the country were virtually uninhabited. This applied not only to the Negev in the south, but also to sizeable stretches of land within the Jewish settlement area as it had crystallized in the late Mandatory period, and the de facto frontiers.[19] In order to take effective possession of these parts of the country for security and other reasons, it was seen as imperative to establish Jewish settlements there. Precisely at this juncture in the earliest years of the state, mass immigration took place. A great many of the new immigrants were placed in temporary accommodations that were hastily set up; later they were moved to permanent housing. These factors together led to the extensive and rapid establishment of new localities in the countryside and new residential neighborhoods in existing towns.

Of the 1,034 Jewish localities[20] that were officially counted in Israel as of 1988,[21] 291 existed in 1947, while as many as 383 were set up in the short span 1948–1954. Of these latter, about half were located in the Northern and Southern districts, and another tenth in the Jerusalem district so as to strengthen the "corridor" between the capital city and the bulk of the state. After this early formative phase of striking relative growth, both in the size of the Jewish population and in the number of Jewish localities, the tempo slackened. Sixty localities were established during 1955–1959, half in the south, and only 48 throughout the 1960s. In the changed geopolitical conditions following the Six Day War, 98 Jewish localities were founded in the 1970s and another 154 during 1980–1988. Of these 252 recently created localities, more than half were situated in the administered areas or the Golan (incorporated into Israel as of 1982). The second largest concentration was in the Northern district (outside the Golan), where the relative proportions of Jewish and Arab population and landholding were a matter of concern to Jews.

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[19] The "Green Line" according to the armistice agreements of 1949.

[20] This includes nine "mixed localities" with a sizeable Arab sector in the population; eight of these are urban, including the three major cities.

[21] These and the following data are from the Central Bureau of Statistics. Over the years

Of Israel's 89 urban Jewish localities—defined as each having more than 2,000 population—in 1988 only 56 had over 10,000 inhabitants. A total of 44 urban localities—30 with a population above 10,000—were settled by Jews prior to independence. The last category included all cities currently over 100,000, except Beersheba.

The expansion of Israel's urban sector expresses itself in population size rather than number of towns. Since the 1960s, about 90 percent of Israel's Jews have been living in localities classified as urban. Between the censuses taken in November 1948 and the end of 1955, the Jewish population of the three main cities rose as follows: Jerusalem—from 83,000[22] to 144,000; Tel Aviv-Yafo—from 245,000 to 354,000; and Haifa—from 86,000 to 150,000.

The immigrants were first placed in abandoned Arab houses, e. g., in Jaffa, which had been a separate town and was now incorporated into the enlarged Tel Aviv-Yafo municipality, and the southern quarters of the Israeli part of divided Jerusalem. Subsequently, over a period of many years, public housing projects were set up at the ever-widening perimeters of the built-up areas of cities and towns, and newly arriving immigrants were accommodated in them. Date of immigration thus became a prominent factor in the residential location of people. Much later, higher-quality housing was also constructed on the outskirts of the built-up urban territories, attracting young couples from among the longer-resident population of Israel who strove to improve their quality of life and conditions for child rearing outside residentially congested or commercial areas.

The suburbanization of the population of large cities assumed two partic-

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changes occurred in the total number of Jewish localities not only through establishment of new ones but also through merger, division, or abandonment of existing localities.

[22] Thousands of self-declared Jerusalem inhabitants were actually absent from the city when it was besieged during the 1948 war.

ular forms. First, around Tel Aviv-Yafo—and to a far lesser extent around Haifa—a metropolitan area took shape that comprised many administratively separate localities. Families moved from the core city or inner localities to localities further out.[23] What is defined for statistical purposes as the Tel Aviv conurbation in 1988 comprised 1,632,000 Jews or 45 percent of Israel's Jewish population. Second, in recent years there has been a marked tendency for people to transfer themselves from large towns to rural localities or to new and small-sized urban localities that have sprung up near the pre-1967 frontiers (the Green Line) in proximity to the Tel Aviv conurbation or in the administered areas.

As to the geographical location within Israel of Jews from different origin groups, several major determinants can be pointed out:

a. Immigration chronology was a crucial factor. At the end of the Mandatory period, the Jewish community as a whole and the populations of most Jewish localities were preponderantly European. This applied in particular to the kibbutzim and moshavim, which had an almost exclusively agricultural character. It has been shown above that during the period of mass immigration (1948–1951), the proportions of European and Asian-African groups were balanced. Yet a look at the annual figures reveals a strongly rising trend among the latter group. The percentage of Asian-Africans among all Jewish immigrants increased as follows: May to December 1948—14; 1949—47; 1950—50; and 1951—72 percent. From 1951 to 1956 a strong Asian-African majority prevailed among Jewish immigrants. Moreover, whereas Asian immigrants outnumbered Africans 2½-fold during 1948–1951, a strong surplus of Africans over Asians was typical of immigration in the following years, until the end of the large influx from these continents in the mid-1960s. During the period of most intensive settlement activity, from 1948 until the mid-1950s, the numerical majority in the yearly immigration contingents thus shifted from European to Asian and then to African Jews. This had important consequences in the context considered here.

The earliest arrivals, Europeans and Asians, could still be housed in existing localities, in dwellings deserted by Arab residents. The somewhat later arrivals, including relatively more African Jews, had to content themselves with temporary camp accommodations before moving to newly established localities or urban housing projects. At a subsequent stage, when immigration came largely from Africa, the new arrivals were directed straightaway to new localities or urban neighborhoods, which were at the time under construction. Whereas the early new localities were often established in semiperipheral areas, e.g., the margins of the Central district or the Jerusalem district, the later new localities were founded to an increasing extent at the periphery of the country, in the Southern and Northern districts.

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[23] The city of Tel Aviv-Yafo has lost Jewish population through outmovement, primarily within its own metropolitan area, since 1963, when it numbered 388,000 Jews. By 1988 it had only 307,000 Jewish residents. Its daytime population, on the other hand, has grown considerably.

b. The educational and occupational qualifications of the origin groups played an important role. Many of the new immigrants from Asia and Africa arrived with deficient schooling and a lack of modern occupational skills. Because the State of Israel as a whole was still in its early stages of industrialization and unable to absorb many factory hands, a portion of these immigrants were slated by the settlement authorities for agricultural work in new or already existing rural localities. Most immigrants from Asia and Africa—with the exception of many Yemenites and Kurds and some Jews from the Atlas mountains—had in fact been town dwellers before and, however backward the urban conditions in their former countries of residence, were not accustomed to farming. The sudden transfer to isolated rural localities therefore led to hardships of adjustment. Adding to this was the fact that manual labor and agricultural work suffered a loss of status as the fledgling Jewish state moved toward industrialization.

c. New rural localities in Israel were small and were thus often settled by immigrants from only one or two countries, sometimes those arriving together. Often family relationships or other preexisting affinities existed among the new inhabitants, and were accepted by the settlement authorities as given facts. Similar phenomena occurred when groups of new immigrants were placed in urban housing. All this made for segregation[24] by origin groups.

d. Another factor that had the same effect in the rural sector was ideology. The kibbutzim and prestate moshavim had been set up by European Jews imbued with socialist ideals that were alien to most of the new immigrants. Hence these existing localities did not attract many new immigrants, especially those of Asian-African origin. Whereas kibbutzim had been a little more than half of all rural Jewish localities at the end of the Mandate, by 1988 they amounted to only 30 percent. More tellingly, of the 1988 total of 267 kibbutzim, 133 had been established by 1947, another 80 in 1948–1954, and only 54 during the lengthy period 1955–1988. The localities set up after 1948 were mostly publicly sponsored "new immigrant moshavim," while a considerable proportion of the more recent ones have been sponsored by politically right-wing and/or religious groups.

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[24] The word "segregation" is used in this article descriptively, without a negative connotation, to indicate marked residential separation between ethno-religious groups. Such segregation has been traditional in Palestine/Israel not only between different communities of Jews but also between Jews and Arabs, and Muslims and Christians.

All these developments have produced three often overlapping cleavages in the rural and semirural sector. They run according to origin group, organizational pattern, and sometimes also employment status, since old-established localities hire workers for agriculture and new industrial or service enterprises from the rural localities or "development towns" originally set up for new immigrants. In consequence, a considerable amount of residential segregation according to origin prevails in the rural sector. This applies not only to continents but also to individual countries of origin. Moreover, once a population is settled in a rural locality in Israel, its distinctive origin composition is more likely to be perpetuated than in urban neighborhoods without a communal framework or joint activities, and where changes of resident families may be more frequent.

The long-established towns mostly had a majority of Jews of European origin at the end of the Mandate period. Where neighborhoods of Asian-African Jews existed, for instance in Jerusalem, they tended to be subdivided according to particular ethnic backgrounds. In the decades of statehood, the general change in the origin composition of the Jewish population through strong additions of Asian-African Jews made itself felt in all urban localities, though to varying degrees. In some towns the longer-resident elements were flooded by newcomers, many of them from Asia-Africa; in some new "development towns" this origin group was dominant. Moreover, as public housing projects were set up and populated by evacuees from temporary camps or fresh arrivals from abroad, the initial inhabitants tended to comprise higher or lower proportions of Jews of Asian-African or European origin, depending on the origin composition of the immigrants at the time. Since immigration came largely from Asia-Africa during the 1950s and early 1960s, and from the USSR during the early 1970s, a great deal of origin-specific spatial segregation eventuated as a by-product of these public-housing activities.

The subsequent spatial evolution has been determined by a variety of factors. Regarding types of demographic dynamics, the following are most important: internal migration; place of settling by the immigrants who continued to arrive; and differential natural increase. A background factor of particular importance is the widespread improvement in living conditions and the quest for better-constructed housing, as seen, for example, in the publicly supported "Project Renewal" *(shikum hashekhunot)* activity. Other significant factors have been the strong differences in prices of land and housing in various geographical locations, as well as the establishment of Jewish localities, with comparatively inexpensive housing, in the administered areas.

Internal migration takes place between localities as well as within towns and cities. There is also much residential movement between localities of the same metropolitan area in Israel, especially the Tel Aviv conurbation. A three-phase pattern is strongly evident in the geographical mobility of the population: new immigrants were often placed initially in peripheral localities; many of them as well as persons of longer residence in Israel moved to the Greater Tel Aviv area,[25] the economic heart of the country; that area itself experienced successive suburbanization both within the municipal or metropolitan boundaries and beyond them. There has also been strong residential mobility in the towns and cities outside the Tel Aviv conurbation. Older and lower-class neighborhoods, which are often centrally located and can be converted to commercial and institutional functions, have been deserted by residents, especially of the younger generation, who move to newer, better-situated areas in or beyond the municipal boundaries. In terms of residential origin composition, these moves have often been from strongly segregated neighborhoods to others where the origin groups are more balanced.

Differential natural increase operated toward more-than-average growth of Asian-African neighborhoods as long as their inhabitants were very fertile. It continues to have this effect in ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods where great fertility persists. The city centers that are being abandoned by young residents turn into areas with elderly population remnants and experience a great drop in natural increase.

The discussion that follows will focus on the residential distribution patterns of the two major origin groups and on the evolution of these patterns over time.

Major Spatial Divisions

The state territory of Israel is divided into 6 administrative districts and 15 subdistricts, including the Golan.[26] There are, in addition, Jewish localities in the administered areas.[27]

The main outlines of the spatial distribution of the origin groups took shape as early as the mid-1950s. Tabulations of the official Population

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[25] The area defined for statistical purposes as the Tel Aviv conurbation has grown rapidly. It now extends not only over the whole Tel Aviv district but also comprises most of the population, Jewish and general, of the Central district.

[26] Some demographic data for subdistricts and other geographical divisions are to be found in the following publications: CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various issues; CBS, 1983 census, vol. 12; D. Friedlander, E. Ben-Moshe, Y. Schelekens, *Regional Demographic Changes in Israel* (in Hebrew), Research Report, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1989; U.O. Schmelz, "Population," in *Atlas of Israel*, 3rd ed., 1985.

[27] The proportion residing in the administered areas among Israel's total Jews rose from 0.7 percent in 1983 (table 14) to 1.8 percent in 1988.

Register records of September 1953[28] already show the essential features of variation in the proportion of Asian-Africans among all Jews, by district and subdistrict, that on the whole persist to this day. With regard to the data in table 14, it should be noted that definitions changed in the course of time: the figures for 1953 and 1961 relate to the percentages of Asian-Africans among all foreign-born Jews, while those of 1983 refer to the percentages of the Asian-African origin group of ascertained origin abroad (i.e., the foreign-born and the Israeli-born of foreign paternity, to the exclusion of the Israeli-born of Israeli paternity).[29] The figures for the same geographical unit in the three years indicated are therefore not exactly comparable, but the essential features of geographical variation in each year are documented and can be safely compared.

In the whole of Israel the proportion of Asian-Africans increased markedly during the 30 years covered by table 14 (cf. tables 5–7). Comparatively elevated levels of Asian-African representation in all the three years reported are found in the Southern district, in the Kinneret, and, as from 1961, also in the Zefat subdistricts on the outskirts of the Northern district, as well as in Ramla subdistrict. Medium levels have prevailed in most of the Central district, in some parts of the Northern district, and more recently also in the Jerusalem district. Regarding the last, since the Six Day War, the state capital has absorbed relatively more new immigrants from Europe and America than has the country as a whole. Low representation of Asian-Africans has been characteristic for the (sub)districts comprising the cities of Tel Aviv-Yafo and especially Haifa, as well as for the Golan and the administered areas. As a consequence, in comparison to all European-Americans in Israel, a higher percentage of all Asian-African Jews live in the Southern district, but also in the Northern, Central, and Jerusalem districts. On the other hand, the Tel Aviv and Haifa districts—in the case of the latter the Haifa subdistrict in particular—account for larger shares of the country's European-Americans.

If a distinction is made between Jews of Asian and African origin—who form groups of almost equal size in Israel as a whole—the more central location of the former and the more peripheral of the latter becomes evident. Table 15 shows this for 1983. The largest proportions—around 30 percent—of Asians among all Jews were found in the bloc formed by the

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[28] See Benjamin Z. Gil, *Settlement of New Immigrants in Israel 1948–1953*, Preliminary Report, Falk Project for Economic Research and Central Bureau of Statistics, 1957.

[29] The Israeli origin group, whose ultimate provenance abroad is unrecorded, has been excluded from the determination of origin composition in all the statistical tables and from the analysis of residential distribution of the different origin groups. However, the data on residential distribution of the total Jewish population in tables 17 and 19–21 include the Israeli origin group.

Jerusalem, Central, and Tel Aviv districts, which together comprise the majority of Israel's Jewish population. In contrast, the largest proportions of African Jews—around 50 percent—were located in the Zefat and Kinneret subdistricts to the North as well as in the Southern district.

The continental origin figures so far reported constitute weighted averages of the actual distributions of Jews from different countries. In many instances the country-of-origin distributions conform in essential features to what has been stated above regarding continents of origin, but there are exceptions. Thus, relatively large representations of Jews from the following countries are found in subdistricts that are not typical of their continent of origin: Iraq—Kinneret; Tunisia and Algeria—Ramla, Zefat; Libya—Sharon, Hadera. Table 16 highlights these points, indicating for each principal country of origin (or group of less frequent countries, cf. table 8) the three subdistricts with the highest concentrations of Jews from particular countries. For comparison, the percentage of Jews in all Israel from each of these countries is also indicated. As can be seen from table 16, the ratio between the country's highest percentage in a subdistrict and its percentage in Israel as a whole can vary considerably. Thus, the picture of the actual origin mosaic prevailing in Israel is more complex than the continental data alone indicate. Of course, if a country of origin is relatively overrepresented in some subdistricts, it must be underrepresented in others.

The recent dispersion of the two major origin groups is shown in greater territorial detail in table 17, where Israel as of 1983 is divided into 45 "natural regions."[30] In 26 of them the proportions of the Asian-African and European-American origin groups ranged between 35 and 65 percent of all Jews, i.e., the origin groups were roughly balanced.[31] These regions accounted for the great majority (82 percent) of all Jews in Israel. In 10 regions, which comprised somewhat more than half (54 percent) of the country's Jews, the origin groups were more closely balanced: 45–55 percent of Asian-African origin, at a time when this proportion amounted to 52 percent in the country as a whole. The 5 regions with less than 35 percent of Asian-Africans were constituted all of kibbutz concentrations in the Northern district and together accounted for only half of 1 percent of Israel's total Jews. The 14 natural regions with a considerable majority of Asian-African Jews (above 65 percent) formed two main nuclei, in the Southern and Northern districts, respectively; the former accounted for more than half of that category's Jewish population. In two regions in the south, the Jewish population was more than 80 percent of Asian-African origin. The differences between the natural regions in location and composition of the population according to Jews and Arabs, as well as in origin proportions of the Jews, are associated with other sociodemographic and socioeconomic differentials.[32]

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[30] The natural regions constitute a subdivision, for statistical purposes, of the administrative districts and subdistricts. They are geographically, socioeconomically, and demographically more homogeneous than the subdistricts, but are of very unequal population size. For a recent locality list by natural regions, see 1983 census, vol. 6.

[31] In table 17 and the others of this type (19–25), if the proportion of Asian-Africans in an area ranges between 35 and 65 percent, the proportion of European-Americans must range inversely between 65 and 35 percent.

Most of Israel's Jewish population lives in urban localities (table 18), which have here been uniformly defined as having a population exceeding 2,000.[33] The respective percentages were 87 and 90 in the censuses of 1961 and 1983. Hence the proportions of Asian-African origin among urban Jews (43 and 53 percent in these two censuses) came quite close to those among total Jews in the same years in Israel (43 and 52 percent). There is a good deal of difference in this respect between the three main cities, however. Jerusalem has the highest percentage of Asian-Africans, though this did not grow between 1961 and 1983 and closely corresponded in the latter year to the country average.[34] Tel Aviv-Yafo is in an intermediate position, but clearly below the country average, while Haifa has a particularly strong majority of European-Americans. All the other urban localities considered together somewhat exceed the average proportion of Asian-Africans in Israel as a whole.

In 1983, unlike 1961, total rural localities had a lower proportion of Asian-Africans than total urban localities. The change was due primarily to a decline of this proportion in the "other rural localities," which are neither kibbutzim nor moshavim and comprise many of the recently established settlements. Kibbutzim have particularly low shares of Asian-African Jews in their populations. The opposite is true of moshavim as a whole, due to those originally set up as "new immigrant moshavim." The latter differ in many respects from the long-established moshavim that preceded the creation of the state and whose origin composition is more similar to that of the kibbutzim. As a consequence, while the overall division of both major origin groups into residents of urban and rural localities comes quite close, Asian-Africans comprise notably greater shares living in "other towns" (i.e., outside the three main cities) and in moshavim, while European-Americans are relatively more represented in Tel Aviv-Yafo, Haifa, and the kibbutzim.

Table 19 analyzes the Jewish localities with more than approximately

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[32] See Gabriel Lipshitz, "Inter-regional Inequality in Israel" (in Hebrew; Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1982); 1961 census, vol. 42; 1983 census, vol. 5.

[33] At the time of the 1961 census, some Jewish localities above 2,000 were still considered as rural ("large villages"). They have here been reclassified according to the practice now current in the official statistics.

[34] The explanation was already given above, in the passage on subdistricts.

10,000 inhabitants[35] according to the percentages of Asian-Africans in 1961 and 1983. However, definitions of the available data differ. The 1961 figures relate to immigrants from Asia-Africa among foreign-born Jews,[36] whereas those of 1983 relate to the major origin groups. The number of localities with a population above 10,000 grew between the censuses of 1961 and 1983. In both censuses about half of these localities had a roughly balanced composition of Jews according to provenance from abroad, but the distribution of the aggregate populations changed drastically. In 1961 more than half of this population still lived in localities with a strong majority of European-Americans. By 1983, in contrast, almost three-quarters resided in localities with a roughly balanced origin distribution. In 1961 most of the prestate ("old") Jewish towns had strong local majorities of European-Americans, while most of the towns settled after 1948 ("new")[37] comprised more than 55 percent Asian-Africans. It may be added that this difference was associated with lower locality sizes in the second category.

The 1983 data in table 19 underscore this point more clearly. The three main cities had the following percentages of Asian-African origin in their Jewish populations: Jerusalem—53, Tel Aviv-Yafo—41, Haifa—28 (see table 18).[38] The great majority of Jews in the other cities above 50,000 inhabitants (all of which fell much short of the 200,000 mark) lived in rough origin balance. In the localities numbering between 20,000 and fewer than 50,000 inhabitants, only a small majority of the population lived in rough origin balance, and the proportions of those residing in marked concentrations of either the European-American or the Asian-African origin group were of similar size. However, in the localities of 10,000 to nearly 20,000 (table 19) and 2,000 to nearly 10,000 inhabitants (see "semi-urban" in table 21), the situation was quite different. In these size categories—comprising most of the "development towns"[39]—the great majority of Jews lived in localities with a strong preponderance of Asian-Africans. Of the 22 Jewish localities above 2,000 population that comprised at least 65 percent Jews of Asian-African origin in 1983, 20 had fewer than 20,000 inhabitants.

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[35] Actually, the cities and towns that were divided into statistical areas, see below.

[36] More precisely, the percentages of immigrants from main birth countries in Asia and Africa among all Jews from main birth countries abroad (i.e., excluding those from minor birth countries). In the full enumeration of the 1961 census only main birth countries abroad were specified and can be grouped according to continent, and only such data were published for individual localities. In the 20-percent sample enumeration of 1961, all countries were specified, and such data are available for larger geographical aggregates (see tables 14 and 18; and cf. 1961 census, vol. 25).

[37] Several towns that were established before 1948 but whose populations received relatively very large additions of immigrants in the first years of the state were classified in the "new" category in the 1961 statistics.

[38] In 1983 the three main cities had the following numbers of Jews (total population in parentheses) according to the census: Jerusalem—306,300 (428,700); Tel Aviv-Yafo—317,800 (327,300); Haifa—208,400 (225,800).

[39] No agreed-upon list of development towns exists, although economic advantages are variously bestowed by government agencies under this title. The small urban localities estab-

Two main patterns with regard to residential distribution emerge from the above analysis. As is the case for total Jews in the country, an approximate balance of the major origin groups is found in the 1983 census data for most subdistricts, and also among the great majority of the Jewish population according to natural regions, types of localities, and towns above 20,000 inhabitants. At the same time there do exist marked instances of origin differentiation. Strong concentrations of European-Americans persist in Haifa and the prestate rural localities; they are also found in the later established kibbutzim and in the Golan and the administered areas. On the other hand, heavy concentrations of Asian-Africans are found particularly in the Southern district and outlying parts of the Northern district, in those rural localities that used to be called "new immigrant moshavim," as well as in most development towns with populations ranging from 2,000 to fewer than 20,000 inhabitants.

Small Area Statistics

Since the 1961 census, Israeli towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants have been divided into "statistical areas" for purposes of data analysis (tables 20–21).[40] This circumstance makes it possible to present in table 21 statistics on origin composition of the Jewish population as of 1983 in the smallest

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lished in the period of statehood, many of them in outlying places and with high proportions of Asian-African Jews, are generally described by this name.

[40] Some of the studies utilizing the division into urban statistical areas for research purposes are the following: Yehuda Gradus, "The Spatial Urban Ecology of Metropolitan Haifa, Israel—A Factorial Approach" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1971); Vivian Z. Klaff, "Ethnic Segregation in Urban Israel," *Demography*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1973, pp. 161–184; Leah Shanan, "The Social Ecology of Jerusalem 1961" (in Hebrew; M.A. thesis, the Technion, Haifa, 1975); Sara Hershkovitz, "The Spatial Structure of the Population of Tel Aviv Metropolitan Area 1961–1972" (in Hebrew; Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1979); E. Borukhov, Y. Ginsberg, and E. Werczberger, "The Social Ecology of Tel Aviv: A Study in Factor Analysis," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 2, 1979, pp. 183–205; Amiram Gonen, "A Basic Pattern in the Social Geography of Israeli Cities," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1977* (Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 351–366; U.O. Schmelz, "Aging Areas in Jerusalem: Geography and Characteristics" (in Hebrew), *Gerontologia*, no. 9, 1977, pp. 22–33; Amiram Gonen, "The Changing Ethnic Geography of Israeli Cities," in Alex Weingrod, ed., *Studies in Israeli Ethnicity*, 1985, pp. 25–37; Amiram Gonen and Michael Sonis, "Dynamic Spatial Patterns of Age Structure in Metropolitan Tel Aviv," in U.O. Schmelz and G. Nathan, eds., *Studies in the Population of Israel in Honor of Roberto Bachi*, *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, vol. 30 (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 362–380; Arie Shahar, "Urban Ecology of the Israeli Metropolitan Areas," in Schmelz and Nathan, *Studies in the Population of Israel*, ibid., pp. 381–414.

geographical units for which such information is available from the census files as processed—statistical areas within cities and towns that have been thus divided,[41] and smaller localities in their entirety.[42] It should be understood, however, that considerable variation according to actual population size exists in each of these two categories and between them. The average number of inhabitants per urban statistical area has exceeded 3,000, while it has amounted to only a few hundred per locality below 10,000 population. In 1983 the urban statistical areas comprised 86 percent of Israel's total Jewish population. As in the case of the larger urban localities (table 19 above), the population of the statistical areas was divided into Asian-Africans and European-Americans according to the foreign-born alone in 1961,[43] but according to major origin groups in 1983. More detailed information on the Jewish population in urban statistical areas, cross-classified with additional characteristics, is presented in tables 22–25.

The number of statistical areas in the Jewish cities and towns of Israel grew by about two and a half times from 1961 to 1983, due both to the increase in the number of localities concerned and the expansion of their populations. As was shown above for these towns when each was considered in its entirety (table 19), a shift toward a more balanced origin composition is evident from 1961 to 1983 if they are disaggregated into a considerable number of statistical areas. This is chiefly due to a reduction in the relative frequency and population share of statistical areas with a high representation of European-Americans, as against strongly increased instances of more limited differences between the origin groups in the statistical areas. This basic finding is abundantly clear from the data, beyond any possible influence of the disparate definitions (bigenerational origin groups versus foreign-born) between the two censuses.

The data in tables 20–21 also show that in the three main cities larger proportions of the Jewish population resided in statistical areas comprising relatively few Asian-Africans than was the case in other towns above 10,000 population. This was due to the influence of Haifa and Tel Aviv-Yafo among the main cities. Yet the trend toward a more balanced origin distribution is quite clear in both these urban categories of main cities and other towns. The relative frequency of areas where the Asian-Africans and European-Americans each accounted for 35–65 percent increased; so did the corresponding proportions of the aggregate populations of the areas. The proportion of Jewish population living in roughly origin-balanced statistical areas rose as follows from 1961 to 1983: main cities—17 to 37 percent; other towns—35 to 47 percent. This change was mainly effected by a strong reduction in the proportion of urban population dwelling in areas predominantly inhabited by European-Americans, while the population share of preponderantly Asian-African areas increased somewhat.

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[41] The division into statistical areas is made prior to a census, before its results are known. This explains why in 1961 three towns somewhat above 10,000 inhabitants failed to be divided. Nor are they included in our table 19. In 1983, on the other hand, three towns, each of which turned out to comprise a population somewhat below 10,000, were divided. In tables 19 and 21 they and their statistical areas have been included in the "10,000–19,999" category and excluded from the "semi-urban" category.

[42] The results were obtained from tabulations specially undertaken for this article. The tabulations for 1961 were effected from data of the full enumeration, those of 1983 from the 20-percent sample that formed part of the census. Statistical areas below 20 Jews in 1961 as well as localities and statistical areas below 100 Jews in 1983 were excluded from the data presented here.

[43] See note 36 for specification.

Table 21 also shows analogous data for smaller localities in 1983. The proportions of localities and of their aggregate populations characterized by a high concentration of Asian-Africans were particularly great in the semi-urban category (2,000–9,999 inhabitants). Within the rural sector (below 2,000 inhabitants), this proportion decreased from the total of moshavim to "other rural localities" and was insignificant in kibbutzim, most of which had an overwhelmingly European-American population. Close parallelism of these differentials was found between the distribution of the smaller localities themselves and the distribution of their aggregated populations (in the upper and lower parts, respectively, of table 21) according to the proportion of Asian-Africans in each locality. Moreover, these observations fit the findings for the entire population of these locality types (table 18 above). Studied at the local level, 85 percent of the smaller localities and 80 percent of their aggregate populations were markedly origin-segregated. Half of the smaller localities in question[44] had a clear majority of European-Americans, under the influence of the kibbutzim as well as of parts of the long-established moshavim and "other rural localities." Most semi-urban localities on the other hand, being development towns, had a strong majority of Asian-Africans. Since the semi-urban localities have by definition more inhabitants than the rural localities, the population distribution of all the smaller localities together turned out symmetrical—40 percent each with a clear majority of either European-Americans or Asian-Africans, and a minority of only 20 percent with a roughly balanced origin composition.

A differently symmetrical distribution by origin composition in the respective residential areas (urban statistical areas or small localities) was found for Israel's entire Jewish population as of 1983: 42 percent in the roughly balanced central categories and 27–31 percent each with a predominance of one of the two major origin groups.

From the 1961 census, only loosely comparable data are available for smaller localities. They relate to the percentages of Asian-African-born who immigrated since 1948 among all foreign-born Jews.[45] Here again, there were high concentrations of Asian-Africans in the semi-urban category, in moshavim, but then also in "other rural localities," whereas the kibbutzim were chiefly populated by European-Americans. Nor is the resultant parallelism with the solid data of 1983 surprising. It was noted above that most smaller Jewish localities in Israel were already set up prior to 1961, and that once such a locality was established, the origin composition of its population was more likely to persist than in the expansive and dynamic urban sector.

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[44] Excluding localities with less than 100 Jews; see note 42 above.

Attention will now be given to the distribution of each of the two major origin groups separately across the urban statistical areas in 1983, by extent of residential (de)segregation[46] and according to explanatory characteristics. Retrospective variables will render it possible to examine trends. The extent of segregation will be measured by the percent of Asian-Africans living in an area (as was done in tables 17 and 19–21).[47] Distinguishing the three main cities from other towns is important because the former contain significant concentrations of European-Americans. Under the prevailing conditions of upward social mobility, residential convergence of the major origin groups can be achieved in two ways: by moves of Asian-Africans into predominantly European-American areas whose origin composition is thus changed in the process, entailing the taxonomic shift of the areas into the "roughly balanced" category; or when members of both origin groups move into a newly populated area in proportions that ensure approximate balance between them.[48]

Table 22 examines the effects of period of entry of households[49] into the dwellings they occupied in 1983. It is seen that the later the entry the greater is the proportion living in a roughly balanced origin composition. In all statistical areas together, these proportions rose between the years prior to 1964 and 1974–1983 from 30 to 46 percent for Asian-Africans and from 39 to 52 percent for European-Americans. Essentially the same trend manifested itself in the three main cities as well as in the other towns that were divided into statistical areas. Of the Asian-African Jews in both types of towns, the proportions living in preponderantly Asian-African areas declined, while those in roughly balanced areas increased. On the other hand, growing proportions of European-American Jews tended to move into areas that were classified as origin-mixed in 1983. There was thus a convergence of both origin groups. Table 22 also shows greater, though decreasing, residential segregation of European-Americans in the main cities than in other towns; in contrast, there was greater, albeit declining, segregation of Asian-Africans in the towns outside the three main cities.

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[45] More precisely, immigrants since 1948 from the main birth countries of Jews in Asia-Africa per 100 foreign-born Jews (including those from minor birth countries). See 1961 census, vol. 28.

[46] See note 24.

[47] Excluding the Israeli origin group; see note 29.

[48] Those moving in may have departed from other areas of the same municipal or metropolitan territory, from elsewhere in Israel, or can be new immigrants from abroad taking up residence in Israel for the first time.

[49] According to year of entry of household head into the apartment.

The trend toward increasing residence in origin-balanced statistical areas appears even more saliently when the Asian-Africans and European-Americans are divided according to whether they inhabited old or new neighborhoods in 1983 (table 23). "New neighborhoods" are defined as those statistical areas where, at the time of the 1983 census, at least half of the Jewish population was living in dwellings constructed recently (1975–1983), while the other statistical areas are classified as "old neighborhoods." Altogether the proportions living in roughly origin-balanced statistical areas (35 and 65 percent of Asian-African and of European-American Jews, respectively) were greater in the new than the old neighborhoods, as follows: Asian-African origin—60 as compared to 39 percent; European-American origin—64 as against 44 percent. Very considerable convergence thus took place in this respect too.

Among Asian-Africans, the relative increase of those inhabiting roughly origin-balanced neighborhoods was effected outside the main cities through a great decline of those living in high concentrations of their own origin group, while in the three main cities it was due to some proportional shift away from old areas with strongly European-American populations to more balanced new areas. Among European-Americans, the change was rendered possible by a marked reduction of the proportion residing in high concentrations of their own origin group in the three main cities, but elsewhere by moderate diminution of the proportions resident in areas that were either strongly European-American or Asian-African.

Table 23 makes it clear that the greater origin balance in new areas is not the result of extended and gradual penetration by one origin group into areas where the other origin group was previously preponderant. Since new areas exclusively are considered, it must mainly be due to more or less synchronous and quantitatively balanced moves by members of both origin groups into the same areas. This is evidence of an actual convergence pattern. In fact, everyday experience shows a tendency for younger people of both origin groups—especially couples that have recently married or are raising children—to move from centrally located and residentially unattractive urban areas to housing projects and villas nearer the municipal outskirts. These new residential neighborhoods tend to be origin-mixed.

The trend toward more balanced origin composition in the urban sector was shown above for entire towns (table 19) as well as through the respective changes that occurred in the statistical areas from 1961 to 1983 (tables 20–21). It has now been confirmed by comparison of longtime residents with more recent entrants into apartments and of residents of older neighborhoods with those of newly established ones (tables 22–23).

If the residential distribution of the urban Jewish population aged 15 and above is examined according to origin group and educational attainment in 1983 (table 24), it is found that with rising education the proportions of people living in statistical areas of Asian-African predominance decreased, while the proportions inhabiting preponderantly European-American areas increased. This holds good for both origin groups. It should be noted, though, that persons with less than nine years of schooling are now a restricted and dwindling minority among European-American Jews. At the higher educational levels, Jews of Asian-African origin tended to live to an increasing extent in chiefly European-American areas of the three main cities, and in similar but more often in roughly origin-balanced areas of the other towns. There was no marked difference between European-Americans with 9–12 years of schooling and those with 13+ years, in their distribution in residential areas in the three main cities. The majority resided in areas predominantly populated by their own origin group. In the other towns, the majority of European-Americans lived in approximately origin-balanced areas, while the proportion residing in chiefly European-American areas rose with education.

What appears to be the basic residential pattern as education rises—relatively more Asian-Africans in European-American settings but fewer European-Americans amid Asian-African Jews—corresponds to the finding that emerges (see next section) concerning marriage between the major origin groups in Israel. The propensity toward origin-specific outmarriage is positively associated with educational attainment among Asian-African Jews but negatively among the European-American Jews. It is possible that some sort of causal connection exists between the two phenomena.

Based on the results of the 1983 census, a socioeconomic score was computed by the Central Bureau of Statistics for each urban statistical area through factor analysis.[30] The score rises with socioeconomic level. Values below the country average are expressed by negative figures. Birth region and origin group were not included among the restricted number of census variables selected for the final stage of the factor analysis because preliminary screenings showed them to be highly correlated with other variables that had a stronger direct influence on the socioeconomic profile of the statistical areas.

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[30] See 1983 census, vol. 15. No score was computed for statistical areas with a population smaller than 1,000 and/or with less than 50 percent living in private households.

The relationships between four characteristics are examined here: two for individuals (origin group and educational attainment) and two for the population in the statistical area of residence (origin composition of Jews and socioeconomic score). For brevity, table 25 presents only the average scores of groups of persons defined by combinations of the other three characteristics mentioned. The average scores declined rather regularly as the percentage of Asian-Africans increased in the statistical areas.[51] This applied to persons of each origin group and educational attainment. At each percentage frequency of Asian-African origin in the statistical areas, the average scores rose moderately according to education among persons of each origin. However, at the same educational level there was little difference between the average scores of Asian-Africans and European-Americans in the various columns of table 25. This was particularly evident at the highest educational level indicated: 13+ years of study. There are thus two principal findings: the origin composition of the residential areas was strongly associated with their socioeconomic profiles as epitomized by the scores; and persons who lived in areas with approximately the same origin composition shared on the average a similar socioeconomic profile, rather irrespective of their personal origin.

We have seen that residential interpenetration of origin groups increases in new urban neighborhoods and also with higher education levels. Since new neighborhoods are continually being created or expanded, and the educational level is rising in both origin groups—both trends affecting the younger generation in particular—the expectation is that residential intermingling will intensify.

INTERETHNIC MARRIAGE

Marriages between spouses belonging to different origin groups are a prime mechanism for the gradual integration of Israel's Jewish population and are thus of profound social importance. This section will trace the evolution of interethnic marriage among the Jewish population of Israel, point to the marked increase of the phenomenon, and consider the determinants and patterns of this trend, especially in relation to educational attainment of spouses.[52]

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[51] Weighted for population size of the areas. The strongly negative correlation factor between these variables amounted countrywide to -.72.

[52] Studies relating to interethnic marriage among Israeli Jews include the following: Zvi Eisenbach, "Marriage and Fertility in the Process of Integration: Intermarriage Among Immigrant Groups in Israel," paper presented to IUSSP Conference, New Delhi, 1989; Judah Matras, *Families in Israel*, part 2, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, vol. 39 of 1961 census publication series, 1968; Judah Matras and Kelvin Selbee, "On Marriage, Social Stratification

Since Israel's Jewish population is very mixed according to geographical origin and also of rather recent formation, it is to be expected that many people have social affinities with those who share the same origin background. This tendency is intensified by the fact that persons of the same geographical origin often belong to common networks of relatives or acquaintances in Israel.

Mate selection and matchmaking are complicated processes, especially in the modern world. With regard to the situation in Israel the following needs to be kept in mind:

a. In terms of statistical probabilities, the larger a group, the greater is the chance that its members will contract their marriages homogamously within the group.

b. Empirical experience confirms the commonsense assumption that marriages outside any origin group become more frequent the longer the group has, on average, been in Israel. Duration of residence and proportion of Israeli-born in an origin group are positively connected with opportunities for social contacts with members of other origin groups. Contrariwise, if an origin group is reinforced by a relatively large influx of new immigrants, the prospects of new marriages being formed within the group are enhanced.

c. It is usual for grooms to be a few years older than brides. Thus, what matters regarding prospects of matchmaking is not the numerical balance of the sexes at the same ages, but at several years of age apart. In a situation of sex imbalance between somewhat older men and somewhat younger women in the principal age range of first marriage, one speaks of a "squeeze" for the sex that has a surplus so that its members encounter difficulties in finding mates. Such squeezes can be wholly or partly counteracted by changes in the mean age difference at first marriage between the sexes and, in case of groups within a population, by marriage with a partner outside the specific group.

Marriage squeezes have occurred in Israel in both major origin groups. Asian-Africans experienced high fertility abroad and for a time in Israel; hence each successive birth cohort was larger than its predecessor. This made for surpluses of would-be brides over grooms, especially when young men born abroad prior to the period of mass immigration confronted young women already born in Israel soon after that immigration. Not only was the fertility of the Asian-African group in Israel high, but the sudden reduction of child mortality among the immigrants resulted in greater survival of the newborn than had been the case abroad.

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and Mobility in Israel," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1977* (Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 283–300; U.O. Schmelz, "Marriages of Jews of Different Origin and Different Duration of Stay in Israel (Report)," in 6th Ford Foundation Project in Israel, Israel Foundation Trustees, Tel Aviv, 1974, pp. 1342–1345.

The situation among European-Americans has been more complicated and unstable. A surplus of somewhat older men prevailed as long as the members of both sexes belonged to the decreasing cohorts resulting from the fertility slump of the 1930s and early 1940s. When the large cohorts of women born in the "baby boom" after World War II faced the small cohorts of men born during or just before the war, European-American women underwent an intensive squeeze. Both of these stages were exacerbated by the effects of the Holocaust on the birth and survival of young children among post-World War II immigrants from Europe to Israel. Subsequently the situation was reversed once again, though less drastically, as smaller cohorts of women born after the "baby boom" faced larger cohorts of men still born during that phase of enhanced natality. A similar constellation continued for some time afterward, because of further decreasing birth cohorts.

The following simple presentation illustrates the occurrence and intensity of successive demographic squeezes at prime marriageable ages in the two major origin groups (excluding the Israeli-born of Israeli paternity):

Year	Men per 100 Women at the Age Interval Indicated					
	Men Aged 30–34 Women Aged 25–29		Men Aged 25–29, Women Aged 20–24		Men Aged 20–24, Women Aged 15–19	
	Asian-African Origin	European-American Origin	Asian-African Origin	European-American Origin	Asian-African Origin	European-American Origin
1961	86	103	99	103	91	76
1972	83	61	73	72	86	132
1983	89	119	104	123	104	122

d. Interethnic marriage can be both a result of, and a mechanism for, social mobility. In Israel the European-American origin group has so far enjoyed a more favorable socioeconomic position. Hence, individuals of Asian-African origin, of either sex, who have advanced educationally, tend more than others of their group to marry European-American partners.

e. For simplicity of exposition, the frequencies and determinants of interethnic marriage among the Jews of Israel are presented for the country as a whole. In actuality, matters are far more complicated. Though Israel is a comparatively small country, there is no nationwide "marriage-market"; contacts leading to marriage often occur in one's own locality or neighborhood or in nongeographical frameworks, such as the army.

f. We can only mention here that the social networks and mechanisms through which potential marriage partners become acquainted and the decision is made to marry vary according to origin group and have undergone rapid change in Israel during recent decades.

"Interethnic marriage," "origin-specific heterogamy," and "outmarriage" of Jews in Israel all have the same meaning. For conciseness of expression the term outmarriage will usually be used here.

Attention will be given to the proportions outmarrying, according to origin, among Jewish couples and individual spouses. Methodologically, this is unlike the situation customary in the demographic study of Diaspora Jews. In the case of the latter, the "individual rate" of the outmarrying per 100 Jewish spouses is compared to a "couple rate" indicating the proportion outmarrying among all the couples with 1–2 Jewish spouses. In the tables in this article, the "couple rate" indicates the proportion contracting interethnic marriages among all Jewish couples that married in Israel during a given period. This couple rate must be smaller than the previously mentioned one. In terms of Diaspora Jewish demography, the rate used here concerning Israel would correspond to the proportion of couples with outmarrying Jewish spouses among all couples marrying in the entire population of a Diaspora country (including the wholly non-Jewish couples). Appended is a numerical illustration; the total in the last row is the weighted average of the origin groups.

In addition, indexes of ingroup marital attraction will be employed that take into account the size of the various origin groups among Jews who

Type of Data	Percent of Jews Outmarrying in Israel by Origin (Major Groups), 1974–1983		
	Total	Asia-Africa	Europe-America
Outmarrying per 100:			
Spouses of origin group			
Total	21.0	17.6	26.1
Husbands	21.0	16.0	28.1
Wives	21.0	19.1	24.0
Total Jewish couples	21.0	21.0	21.0
Couples with 1–2 spouses of origin group	(34.7)	29.9	41.4

married at given times in Israel and the consequent statistical probabilities of origin-specific inmarriage.[53]

All the data relate to Jewish couples in first marriages, and consisting of a household head and his wife (these form the overwhelming majority of existing couples). The data were collected in the censuses of 1961 and 1983; they are retrospective, specifying period of marriage.[54]

Major Origin Groups

The official statistics of Israel, as we have seen, make it possible to distinguish between those of Asian-African, European-American, and Israeli origin. The first two groups comprise the respective foreign-born together with the Israeli-born whose fathers were born in the same continent abroad. The Israeli origin group consists of the Israeli-born of Israeli paternity.

The Israeli origin group has so far accounted for no more than a small minority of Jewish spouses of either sex marrying in Israel. Moreover, the available statistics do not provide information about ultimate origin abroad. For these reasons, and because of the greater ease of dealing with two rather than three origin groups of the two spouses in couples—that is, with two rather than six possible outmarriage combinations—the data presented here will be only for those couples whose spouses are of overtly Asian-African or European-American origin. Excluded are couples with 1–2 spouses classified in the statistics as being of Israeli origin. The percentage of total Jewish marriages contracted in Israel that is lost is small. Still, it should be borne in mind that this approach leads to some underrepresentation of the levels of origin-specific outmarriage among Israel's Jews. A section below will substantiate this statement and provide further information on the matter.

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[53] This is the attraction index of Benini, which ranges between .000 in the absence of attraction and 1.000 if attraction is maximal (there is also a repulsion index, with negative values down to −1.000). Applied to marriage, the maximum value means complete inmarriage, while the lower the positive index, the greater is the relative extent of outmarriage. The index is represented by the formula $(a-e)/(m-e)$; "a" denotes the actual number of homogamous marriages in a given group, "e" their expected number according to statistical probability alone, and "m" whichever of the total numbers of grooms and brides of the group is the smaller (this is the upper limit of homogamous unions possible among the given spouses of the group). If there are only two categories, such as the major origin groups of Jews in Israel, the index assumes an equal value for both (in tables 26, 27, and 32, contrasted with table 30).

[54] Coming from censuses, the data relate to "surviving" couples, i.e., the original number minus those that were severed by death or divorce or where the couple emigrated. Nevertheless, table 27 shows good agreement between corresponding cohorts of the 1961 and 1983 censuses. Corresponding data exist from yearly statistics of new marriages, but they contain neither the breakdown of Israeli-born grooms and brides by father's country of birth (as distinct from only the birth continent of the father) nor any information on the educational level of the spouses.

When the two main origin groups being considered are viewed overall by means of the attraction index, it can be seen that outmarriage decreased in the transition from Mandatory times to the period of great immigration during early statehood, but has been increasing substantially ever since (tables 26–27). The index of marital attraction rose at first but then fell from .854 for marriages contracted in the years 1949–1953 to .560 in 1979–1983 and only .490 by 1987.[55] As noted above, this is related to the fact that the mass influx of immigrants tended very strongly at first to marry within their own groups. In the course of time, the proportions outmarrying have grown substantially due to the operation of several factors: mutual acquaintance and adjustment; the rise in the proportion of Israeli-born at marriageable ages within each origin group; upward social mobility of persons of Asian-African origin; and demographic squeezes, especially in the European-American origin group.

When each origin group is examined separately, one finds a marked reduction in outmarriage among Asian-Africans in the first years of the state, when large immigration waves flooded the small previous population of that origin, a part of which had educationally and socially acculturated to European models during the Mandatory period. A rise in outmarriage by Asian-Africans in Israel took place in the 1960s, coinciding with the end of large-scale immigration from those continents, and has been followed by rather stable proportions outmarrying, especially among men. In the European-American origin group a gradual increase in outmarriage for both sexes has occurred since Mandatory times, when its level was very low. The proportion outmarrying in Israel has been greater in the European-American than in the Asian-African origin group: among husbands since the mid-1950s, among wives since the mid-1960s. The relative difference in this respect has increased in the course of time, until around 1980 the proportion outmarrying among European-American men was twice that among Asian-African men. On the whole, the percentages outmarrying have been somewhat greater for women than men in the Asian-African group, while the opposite ranking of outmarriage proportions—men exceeding women—has prevailed in the European-American group, except toward the end of the 1960s. According to the census data presented, as many as 32 percent of the men and 27 percent of the women in the European-American group married a spouse of other origin around 1980; the corresponding percentages for the Asian-African group were 16 and 20, respectively.

These disparities in the evolution of mate selection by origin group and sex are better understood when viewed against the demographic background (table 29). Asians and Africans were but a small minority among the Jews of Palestine in general, and the Jewish newlyweds in particular, during the late Mandatory period. Their proportion increased dramatically under the impact of mass immigration, reached the 50-percent mark of new spouses before the end of the 1950s, and somewhat exceeded 60 percent around 1980.[56] Thus, the Asian-African origin group has been a majority of all newly married Jews in Israel for the last 30 years. Consequently, any given absolute number of marriages between the two origin groups must involve a greater proportion of total European-American spouses than of total Asian-African spouses. Besides, until the 1970s, European-Americans comprised a larger proportion of the Israeli-born among marrying individuals. The Israeli-born, being best adjusted to the origin-mixed Jewish society of Israel, are shown by the data to have usually been more amenable to origin-specific outmarriage than the foreign-born. Moreover, the European-American group has had on the whole a surplus of men over women among marrying individuals, while the opposite sex ratio has prevailed among the Asian-African newlyweds.

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[55] Computed from yearly marriage statistics and including remarriages.

These origin-specific sex differentials can be understood in terms of what has been stated above regarding demographic marriage squeezes. When European-American women were most subjected to a squeeze toward the end of the 1960s, the numerous girls of early marriageable age who were born after the mid-1940s did not find sufficient partners among the relatively few men of their own origin group who had been born during World War II. As a result, the usual numerical relationships were temporarily reversed. Only in the late 1960s were more women than men married in the European-American group, but more men than women among Asian-Africans. Likewise, only in the late 1960s were the proportions marrying outside their origin group greater for women than men in the European-American group but smaller for women than men in the Asian-African group.

The proportion of Israeli-born among marrying spouses has risen strikingly since the early years of the state (table 29), in line with the general evolution of Israel's Jewish population. Around 1980 this proportion already reached two-thirds of newlyweds. Until the mid-1970s it was higher in the European-American than the Asian-African origin group, because of the predominantly European character of the *yishuv* in Mandatory times. Around 1980 the positions of the origin groups were reversed, due both to the great initial fertility of Asian-African immigrants and to the cessation of large-scale immigration from these continents in the 1960s. As a rule, the Israeli-born were relatively more frequent among wives than husbands, with only a few exceptions in the European-American origin group (not shown in table 29). The usual situation is due to the fact that wives are on average younger than husbands, and in Israel's adult Jewish population the lower the age the greater the proportion of Israeli-born.

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[56] The respective proportions of Asian-African origin in table 29 are somewhat higher than at prime marriageable ages of the Jewish population according to table 13, because the Israeli origin group which in its majority was ultimately assigned to the European-American group (see above) has here been omitted.

Within the Asian-African group, the percentages of persons contracting origin-specific outmarriages have been consistently greater for both sexes among the Israeli-born as compared to the foreign-born (table 28). The same has often also applied to both sexes of European-American spouses. Exceptions were found among men during 1954–1968. European-American men born in Israel or abroad were on a par regarding the proportion outmarrying in 1969–1973; the same applied to European-American women during 1964–1973. The last-mentioned fact was perhaps due to the great marriage squeeze among European-American women at that time. The low proportions outmarrying among the Israeli-born men of this origin group in the 1950s and most of the 1960s might be conjecturally attributed to a tendency toward social seclusion on the part of Israeli-born young adults at the time. On the whole, however, it would seem that the native-born have been readier to disregard spouse's origin in mate selection, the more so as deeper analysis shows that the Israeli-born largely marry Israeli-born spouses, whatever their origin.

Considering all Israeli-born and all foreign-born, the indexes of marital attraction have been as follows: according to the 1961 census—.218 until 1945, .451 in 1946–1955, and .543 in 1956–1961; according to the 1983 census—.414 in 1964–1973 and .364 in 1974–1983. These indexes have evolved in a similar manner to those of the two origin groups abroad, but at a lower level. There has been a greater propensity for marriage between Israeli-born and foreign-born, irrespective of origin, than between Asian-Africans and European-Americans irrespective of birthplace.

Countries of Origin

So far, interethnic marriages have been considered only according to the two major origin groups. Table 30 presents indexes of marital attraction for the principal countries of origin,[57] by period of marriage in Israel. Persons born in any given country have been combined into one group with the Israeli-born whose fathers were born in the same country; couples comprising 1–2 Israeli-born of Israeli paternity are again excluded from the analysis. Similarly to what was found on the continental level, inmarriage increased for persons originating from some of the countries in the transition from the Mandatory period to the period of mass immigration during early statehood. This applied especially to countries in Asia, North Africa, and the Balkans, though not to most European countries. Since the period of the great influx of immigrants, the indexes of marital attraction have declined with regard to all countries. This conforms to the expectation that comparatively large immigrant contingents of different provenance would at first tend to keep together socially in a new country, but would gradually come closer to the preexisting population and to one another.

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[57] In some rows of tables 30–31 the data do not relate to individual countries but to wider geographical regions that are comparatively little represented among Israel's Jews.

The indexes of marital attraction were on the whole higher for Jews from Asian and African countries than from the European countries. In the main this reflects the fact that the propensity for marriage between persons originating from different countries within the Asian-African aggregate has been smaller than within the European-American aggregate. The country groups from Asia-Africa which attained especially high indexes in the early period of statehood—Yemen, Iraq, Iran, as well as Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria—were very distinct not only from European Jews, but also from one another. It is noteworthy, however, that of the country groups with initially high levels of inmarriage, only Jews from India,[58] Yemen and, to a lesser degree, Morocco continue to display comparatively elevated, though already considerably reduced, indexes of marital attraction. The rather recent rise of inmarriage among Jews originating from the Soviet Union has been connected with the wave of new migration from that country since the 1970s and corresponds to similar phenomena that occurred in other country groups at the time of mass immigration into the young State of Israel.[59]

The last two columns of table 30 show the percentages of outmarrying husbands and wives in Israel during the recent period 1974–1983, by country of origin. The countries with the lowest indexes of attraction attained the highest proportions of outmarrying persons. These proportions reached about 90 percent for some European countries from which immigration virtually stopped in the early years of Israel's existence, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, and Austria. Table 31, which also relates to 1974–1983, divides the outmarrying husbands and wives of the various countries of origin according to spouse's continent of origin.[60] A considerable majority of individuals of either sex from European countries found a spouse from another European-American country of origin. In contrast, outmarrying Asians of either sex chose their spouses in not very different proportions from another Asian country, from Africa, or from Europe-America; the same pattern held for outmarrying African Jews. Intercountry attraction within Asia and Africa was comparatively limited.

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[58] Most of the Jews from India immigrated to Israel only as from the 1960s.

[59] The Soviet immigration was not all composed of European Jews, but included Jews of Asian communities such as Grusinians and Bokharians.

[60] Not accounting for size of the groups in Israel's Jewish population.

Computed comprehensively for all the 22 principal countries (or regions) of origin that are listed in tables 30–31, the index of marital attraction in 1974–1983 was .316, and the proportion outmarrying as high as 64 percent. The results would have gone even beyond these figures with a more detailed breakdown of countries or if the Israeli origin group were included. Recent Jewish marriages in Israel have been preponderantly mixed, if investigated by countries of origin rather than only for the two large bicontinental origin groups. Within these origin groups, inmarriage according to country has been more persistent among Asia-Africans than European-Americans.

Import of Education

The educational level of each spouse is an important factor in the formation of marriages within or outside an origin group. Educational level has been measured in tables 32–36 by number of years of study according to the 1983 census.[61] It can also serve as a proxy for socioeconomic status in general.[62] Viewed comprehensively by means of an attraction index, there is a tendency in the two major origin groups and both sexes together for outmarriage to increase with rising education of husbands and wives (table 32). The general outmarriage tendency can be observed from its somewhat increased level in the late Mandatory period through its reduction during the period of great migration into Israel and into its gradual extension in recent decades.

However, if the tendency to outmarriage by educational attainment is examined separately for each of the two major origin groups and by sex, a more complex picture is revealed. Table 33 compares the educational distribution of inmarrying and outmarrying husbands and wives, by origin group and period of marriage in Israel. In the Asian-African group, the educational attainment of those outmarrying was considerably higher than that of the inmarrying, while the outmarrying European-Americans had a lower educational profile than the inmarrying of their group. These findings applied both to husbands and wives of each origin group, though to a lesser degree to European-American wives married before 1960. Moreover, the educational differences between the inmarrying and outmarrying of each origin group were considerable in most instances—across the general rise in educational levels at marriageable ages that is reflected in table 33. The educational differences between the origin groups were maximal for the inmarried.

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[61] The years of study have been grouped into three major strata so as to avoid an excessive number of categories in the cross-classified data for husbands and wives together. These strata correspond to primary (and junior high) school, high school, and college or above. The lumped category "9+ years of study" is used here in order to account for the fact that husband's education often exceeds that of the wife.

[62] Census data on couples do not usually supply information on the family background of the spouses prior to marriage.

In the past, outmarrying Asian-African husbands had received more education than their European-American counterparts, but recently the educational levels of outmarrying men of either origin group have become rather similar, while both are topped by the superior education of inmarrying European-American men. Outmarrying Asian-African women have generally studied fewer years than corresponding European-American women, whereas since the 1960s the latter's education has been markedly exceeded by that of inmarrying European-American women. Generally, since the 1960s, the sex differential in education for each of the groups, i.e., the inmarrying and outmarrying of each origin, has become smaller.

Table 34 shows the cross-classified education of husbands and wives together. The most frequent marriages were between spouses in the same category of years of schooling—with differences according to origin and whether inmarrying or not. Admittedly, the categories of years of study as used here are wide, but they do characterize low, medium, and advanced education. Within spouses' origin combinations, the frequent combinations by years of study rose on the educational scale in the course of time.

The proportion outmarrying was positively associated with rising education among persons of both sexes of Asian-African origin, but tended to be inversely related to educational attainment among both sexes of European-American origin (table 35). This again is observable in all periods of marriage, though the inverse relation of education and outmarriage among European-Americans of both sexes has become more marked in recent decades.[63]

Finally, table 36 shows that the proportion of outmarrying husbands in the Asian-African group rose not only with their own education but also, within each educational level, it corresponded to rising education of the wives. In contrast, the proportion outmarrying among European-American husbands varied not only inversely to their education at 9–12 and 13+ years of their own studies, but also tended to drop with increases in the wives' education. The highest, though gradually decreasing, rates of outmarriage among Asian-African husbands were found when both they and their wives had 13+ years of study, while the highest rates of outmarriage by husbands of European-American origin were obtained when both they themselves and their wives had only 0–8 years of study. The same situation applies to wives. The proportions outmarrying rose among Asian-African wives in accordance with their own and their husbands' education. Among European-American wives with above 8 years of study, in recent times these proportions varied inversely to their own and their husbands' education. In the course of time, the proportions of outmarrying European-American husbands and wives rose markedly at all levels of their own and their spouses' education. The proportions of outmarrying Asian-African husbands and wives within specific educational levels tended to decline, but overall this was more than compensated for by the fact that these proportions remained much greater at higher educational levels and that the share of better-educated Asian-African Jews in Israel expanded markedly.

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[63] Since there are now few European-Americans with only 0–8 years of education, their number is also small among those contracting a first marriage in recent years. Therefore the respective outmarriage data in table 35 are to be treated with reservation.

The influence of education on origin-specific outmarriage levels of Jews in Israel is thus seen to be vigorous as well as rather consistent over time. The most educated persons of European-American origin of both sexes strongly tend to marry within their origin group. The most educated persons in the Asian-African group display a marked tendency to outmarriage, probably as part of upward social mobility. Conversely, the least educated European-Americans outmarry more than others of their group, while the least educated of either sex in the Asian-African group show a strong propensity to marry a partner of their own origin. These tendencies have prevailed since Mandatory times and can be observed across the general rise in origin-specific outmarriage among Israel's Jews that has manifested itself in recent decades.

Looking into the future, it should be noted that new spouses in first marriage with only 0–8 years of education are a rapidly diminishing category. The constant improvement in the educational attainment of Asian-Africans will continue to strengthen the better-educated sections among them, which have so far shown a greater tendency to outmarry. It is true that opposite education-specific differentials in outmarriage propensities have prevailed among European-Americans. Nevertheless, their propensities have increased considerably in the course of time at all educational levels, including the uppermost, resulting in a marked rise in the overall proportions of outmarrying European-American husbands and wives. This trend might be sustained in the future by the continuous growth of the upper educational stratum of Asian-Africans, who will provide enlarged opportunities for marriage of educated Europeans and Americans with Asian-African partners of their own standing. The rise of average duration of residence in Israel among the country's Jewish population and the increase in the percentages of Israeli-born should supply further sociodemographic incentives for an increase of marriages between members of the two major origin groups from abroad. The anticipated substantial growth of the

Israeli origin group will effectively add to this tendency. Large waves of *aliyah*, if and when they occur, might delay these developments but are not likely to change the basic trend toward increased interethnic marriage among Israel's Jews.

The Israeli Origin Group and Interethnic Marriage

It has been explained above that couples with 1–2 spouses of Israeli origin have been excluded from the data presented in the tables and from the discussion in the body of the text. If they were included in the analysis, the following findings would emerge.

Persons of Israeli origin have so far been no more than a very small proportion of Jewish spouses of either sex marrying in Israel—5–8 percent from late Mandatory times until the 1983 census. Their great majority—between 65 and 82 percent—appear in the statistics as outmarrying, i.e., marrying a partner of overtly Asian-African or European-American origin. The indexes of marital attraction in the Israeli origin group have consequently been very low: according to the 1961 census—.310 until 1945, .251 during 1946–1955 and .244 during 1956–1961; according to the 1983 census—.136 during 1964–1973 and .159 during 1974–1983.

These marital peculiarities of the Israeli origin group are attributable to two basic facts: it is both the Jewish group of longest residence in this country and is itself mixed according to whether the most recent foreign-born ancestor (generally in the male line) was a native of either Asia-Africa or Europe-America. In addition, the ancestry of persons in the Israeli origin group may actually be origin-mixed because of outmarriages in the parental or previous generations, which have not been infrequent in Palestine/Israel. On the other hand, not all unions with one spouse of Israeli origin are substantively outmarriages. They really are inmarriages, if the Israeli-origin person in question belongs by descent to the same origin group abroad (Asia-Africa or Europe-America) as his/her partner, even though this fact cannot be ascertained in the available statistics.

The exclusion of couples with 1–2 spouses of Israeli origin reduces the measured levels of outmarriage, though the extent of underrepresentation cannot be accurately ascertained because of the indeterminate composition of the Israeli origin group. In 1974–1983, for instance, the percentage of outmarrying couples was 29.9 according to the three origin groups, but only 21.0 according to the two origin groups overtly from abroad. The actual level must have fallen between these two values, since only a portion of the unions of Asian-African or European-American spouses with those of so-called Israeli origin are, as just explained, substantively outmarriages. It can therefore be estimated that the actual level of outmarriage in terms of ultimate dichotomous origin groups abroad was already as high as about a quarter of all new couples around 1980.[64]

FERTILITY

The natural movement of a population comprises fertility and its corollary natality, as well as mortality, marriage, and divorce. These, together with migration and, if applicable, assimilation, directly determine the changes in the size of a population or subpopulation. In the context of this article, the major types of natural movement are of considerable relevance and illustrate well the diversity of evolutionary patterns.

Asian-Africans have increased their marriage age, especially for girls, while European-Americans have reduced theirs, adopting a common mode of conduct in this regard. In addition, both origin groups have somewhat reduced their previously very high marriage propensities and raised their marriage ages in recent years. The fertility convergence of the origin groups is so far advanced that the wide gap that was prevalent at the time of the period of mass immigration has been virtually closed. Mortality, which was high in the Jewries of Asia and North Africa, has been reduced for these groups in Israel with remarkable speed, furnishing yet another example of Asian-Africans becoming more like their European-American counterparts.[65]

The discussion which follows will focus on fertility, using the following measures and drawing upon the following data sources:

a. Total fertility rate (TFR), which indicates the average number of children per woman in a population, irrespective of marital status, on the assumption that the age-specific birthrates throughout the fecund life span are the same as in the year(s) studied. This is a measure of "period fertility," i.e., current fertility, that synthesizes the behavior of different birth cohorts.[66] In Israel it is computed annually by the Central Bureau of Statistics from the birth and population data of the most recent year. If TFR remains roughly constant for a sufficient number of years, it approximates completed cohort fertility.

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[64] If the method of computation customary in Jewish Diaspora statistics were applied to the tripartite origin scheme of Israel's Jews, the couple rate of outmarriage during 1974–1983 would be 46 percent—as compared to 35 percent according to the two major origin groups. If the overt but excessive outmarriage figures of the Israeli origin group are revised downward, a rate of about 40 percent could be estimated.

[65] Remaining morbidity and mortality differentials, including those between the Jews from various Asian and African countries, are of obvious interest to epidemiologists but of minor consequence in the overall sociodemographic assessment.

[66] TFR has the advantage of being rapidly available but is affected by changes and inconsistencies in the fertility behavior of the various cohorts synthesized. Cohort statistics of fertility, following up separate birth or marriage cohorts, also exist in Israel from the following: special fertility surveys (Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, "Immigration, Social Change and Cohort Fertility in Israel," *Population Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2, 1978, pp. 299–317); aggregate

The net reproduction rate (NRR) is derived from the TFR. It indicates the average number of girls that will replace a woman intergenerationally, accounting for mortality. NRR = 1.00 means maintenance of existing population size after the lapse of a generation. At minimal empirical mortality, the TFR required for bare demographic replacement amounts to 2.1. At higher mortality levels the required TFR is accordingly greater.

b. Census data on cumulative fertility up to the age or marriage duration at the time of a census. Such data will be presented for Jewish women in first marriage from the Israeli population censuses of 1961, 1972, and 1983, according to various demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.

c. Data on expected fertility of married women from two specific interview surveys on fertility that were conducted by researchers in Israel in 1974–1975 and 1987–1988.

d. Data on fertility differentials among Jews according to religiosity, obtained from interview surveys or through an ecological method.

Fertility Levels

During the 1920s and 1930s, the Jewish population of Palestine, which was predominantly of European provenance, experienced a strong fertility decline (table 37), in keeping with the general trend in Europe and North America at that time. Around 1940, TFR went down to approximately 2.35, corresponding to an NRR of no more than about 1.00.[67] However, the youthful age structure of that population kept the crude birthrate above 2 percent per annum.[68] At the end of World War II, a "baby boom" set in—again in conformance with the general trend in developed countries—which lasted until the beginning of the 1950s. Meanwhile, mass immigration was taking place and the new immigrants exhibited strikingly different fertility patterns. Europeans came with low fertility, something that the horror of the Nazi period had only intensified. Except for the Balkan countries, the completed fertility of European women immigrating near age 50 fell somewhat short of the replacement level, and that of the younger

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follow-up of the births to marriage cohorts (CBS, *Statistical Abstract*); and record linkage of women and their children enumerated in censuses (U.O. Schmelz, "Fertility Follow-Up of Marriage Cohorts in Israel," paper presented to the 10th World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1989). In the context of origin-group differentials, however, these data do not add much to the figures presented here.

[67] Bachi, *Population of Israel*, p. 225.

[68] The crude birthrate is determined both by the fertility level and the age structure of a population. Youthfulness of the population raises the birthrate; aging depresses it.

women was very low. On the other hand, until their mass immigration, Asian and African Jews had on the whole high completed fertility—approximately 6 children per woman—with marked differentials between countries of origin according to levels of modernization. Jewish fertility was particularly high (about 7 children) in Northwest Africa, Iran, and Yemen; it was somewhat lower in Iraq, and comparatively reduced in Egypt and Turkey.

Already in the Mandatory period, a ranking of Jewish fertility according to region of birth had taken shape in Palestine as follows (in descending order, table 37): Asia-Africa, Israel, Europe-America. The Israeli-born were of mixed origin, so that this three-tier ranking implied intergenerational fertility convergence.[69] Since Asian-African fertility in the last decade of the Mandate was considerably lower than during the subsequent period of mass immigration, some decline had probably taken place in this group,[70] implying a convergence tendency between the origin groups already at that time. The renewed fertility rise during the "baby boom" in the closing years of the Mandate was relatively much stronger in the European-American than the Asian-African group and thus also produced a convergent effect on the respective fertility levels.

From the period of mass immigration on, origin-specific convergence has been the dominant pattern in the fertility evolution of Israel's Jews. Asian-Africans reduced their fertility consistently and rather rapidly, from 6 children on average in the early 1950s to slightly above 3 in the 1980s. This accorded with the world trend toward fertility reduction under conditions of sociodemographic modernization,[71] but was undoubtedly accelerated by departure from a Muslim environment and joint life with European Jews in the modern and open society of Israel.

Fertility evolution among the European-Americans has been more remarkable. They raised their fertility during the "baby boom" around 1950 to levels—a TFR slightly above 3 children—which considerably surpassed that of the Diaspora Jewries in the respective continents. Though some recession took place around 1960, the TFR of European-Americans in Israel—fluctuating around 2.5 children—remained even then distinctly above the replacement minimum of 2.1. In subsequent years, an important peculiarity manifested itself. While fertility declined strongly throughout the advanced countries of the world and since the 1970s has been below replacement needs in nearly all of them, Israel's European-American-born Jews have not participated in this widespread trend. About 1970 they even raised their TFR slightly and have maintained it at a level around 2.7 children until now.[72] The decline of fertility on the part of Asian-Africans and its rise among European-Americans, as compared to the Diaspora, constitutes conspicuous evidence of origin-group convergence in Israel.

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[69] This was compounded by the fact that the adult Israeli-born comprised relatively more religious persons than the European-born, which raised their fertility.

[70] However, the composition of the Asian-African immigrants by countries of birth changed in the course of time.

[71] Fertility reduction need not occur quickly when technological modernization is imported, as illustrated by some Muslim populations.

The above findings derived from the current TFR are fully confirmed by data from the three population censuses of 1961, 1972, and 1983 on cumulative fertility up to given ages or marriage durations. For economy of space, table 39 presents only selected data, according to these two approaches: women aged 30–34 and 45–49 or married 10–14 and 25–29 years respectively. The first category according to either approach relates to women sufficiently advanced in age or length of marriage to clearly show intergroup differentiation; the second category comprises women of virtually completed fertility. Table 39 shows again that the descending fertility ranking of the birth regions is Asia-Africa, Israel, and Europe-America, and that the dissimilarities between these groupings have much narrowed in the course of time. The latter trend is seen particularly among younger or shorter-married women.

Regarding foreign-born Jewish women, tables 39 and 40 make it possible to discern several other important features of fertility evolution:

a. In keeping with the basic pattern of fertility convergence, it is found that with longer stay in Israel fertility tended to decline among Asian-Africans but rise among the European-Americans. Table 40 divides the women born in each continent abroad according to periods of immigration, but presents only strongly populated categories, selecting the periods shown for Asian-African women in conformance with immigration chronology. All three censuses document a tendency for Asian-Africans to have lower fertility the earlier their arrival in Israel—the longer they had been exposed to Israeli conditions until each census. The opposite tendency obtained with regard to the European-Americans who immigrated until the 1960s. However, the fertility of those who arrived around 1970 was slightly greater than that of the preceding immigrants from these continents. There is no conclusive information on the causes of this slight change in trend. Conjecturally, it might be attributed to the considerable proportion of Asian Jews (Grusinians, Bokharians) among Soviet immigrants at that time and/or to religious elements among the selective Jewish immigrants from Western countries.

b. The influence of prolonged stay in Israel on the fertility of foreign-born Jewish women could make itself felt both among those who had married while still abroad and those marrying in Israel (possibly with the husband of longer residence in Israel or perhaps even from another origin group). Table 40 gives some data (where possible) on fertility by place of marriage, when birth continent, immigration period, and marriage duration are kept constant. The available data show a tendency among Asian-African women who arrived in the mass influx after 1948 to have reached lower fertility when married in Israel rather than abroad. The corresponding picture for European-American women is not consistent, but at any rate the fertility differences by place of marriage were small and therefore liable to be more easily confounded by artifacts.[73]

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[72] However, there has been some postponement of childbearing until later ages, due to an increase in age at first marriage (see below).

c. In terms of continental aggregates, African-born women in Israel have consistently displayed somewhat higher fertility than their Asian-born counterparts. This was already the case with regard to the fertility abroad of the women who immigrated during 1948–1954 (table 38). Moreover, large-scale immigration from Asia stopped as early as 1951, while that from Africa continued until the mid-1960s. In recent years Asian-born women of fertile age, much more than corresponding African-born women, have belonged to small and selective immigration contingents that have arrived in Israel. The convergence motif has been carried forward by the total Israeli-born women whose fertility has always been intermediate between the Asian-Africans and the European-Americans. In the Mandatory period their own fertility was nearer to the former group; in the period of statehood it has been much closer to that of the European-Americans. This may be attributable both to the coming of age of children born in Palestine to the relatively many European immigrants who arrived during the Mandatory period and also to social developments, such as reduced religiosity, compared to the past.

To clinch the convergence argument, table 39 disaggregates Israeli-born women by father's region of birth. It is found that in all the three censuses the fertility ranking by paternal birth region paralleled that of foreign-born women: Asia-Africa, Israel, Europe-America, in descending order. For 1983, sufficient numbers of Israeli-born women of African paternity were already available to distinguish their slightly greater fertility from that of the Israeli-born of Asian paternity among younger or shorter-married women. Altogether the fertility differentials among the Israeli-born by father's birth region strongly narrowed in the course of time, but the accustomed ranking persisted until the 1983 census.

Given the special interest in the fertility evolution of European-American women, the relevant data are displayed more fully in table 41 for immigrants up to the mid-1960s, who overwhelmingly came from Europe, excluding the Soviet Union. The table documents the rise of fertility with lengthening stay in Israel according to four measurements (where feasible): at immigration and up to the 1961, 1972, and 1983 censuses respectively. The table compares the women according to their age at immigration or at the time of any of the censuses available. Obviously the women of a given age at these separate occasions were not the same women but belonged to different birth cohorts that were followed up to a common age. For instance, regarding each immigration period, the 30–34-year-olds in 1983 were born 11 years after their counterparts of 1972 and 22 years after the corresponding women of 1961; their average age at immigration and length of exposure to Israeli conditions varied accordingly. This lengthening of stay in Israel, in fact, is a plausible explanation for the observed fertility increases.

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[73] For instance, European-American women who immigrated during 1972–1974 and married in Israel had maximally little more than 11 years of marriage by the time of the 1983 census, while the corresponding group of women married abroad could have been fully 10–14 years past their weddings. The latter had the opportunity to attain a greater average number of children.

On the whole, table 41 documents the fact that each immigration contingent raised its fertility in Israel, and the earlier the contingent arrived the greater was the average fertility reached by the time of each census. The fertility increase in Israel, compared to the Diaspora ("at immigration"), was particularly impressive with regard to immigrants around 1960, who arrived a considerable time after the upheaval of World War II, most of them from Communist-ruled countries such as Romania, Poland, and Hungary. However at least two special matters require mention. The oldest women at arrival or in the 1961 census still showed traces of the higher fertility preceding the historic fertility depression around the 1930s; their levels must not be confused with the renewed and continual rise subsequently occurring in Israel, which is our concern here. The disturbing effects of World War II made themselves felt and must be isolated in interpreting table 41; e.g., concerning 1948–1954 immigrants aged 45–54 in 1961 or the 55–64-year-olds in 1972, who immigrated after the war. Part of the findings from census data presented above can be checked against period fertility measurements (TFRs), and both kinds of data are found to confirm one another in essentials.

Asian-African TFR tended to decline with lengthening stay in Israel, at least with regard to the immigrants of the period of mass influx. The maximum difference was measured in 1951, when the TFR of Asian-African immigrants since 1948 was computed as 6.9, compared to 5.1 among the earlier arrivals. The corresponding figures for European-Americans at that time of "baby boom," notably among the old-timers, were 3.5 for those who arrived before the establishment of the state and 2.8 among 1948–1951 immigrants.[74] The further course of European TFR in Israel by period of immigration was not very regular, though a somewhat increased level among the arrivals around 1970 is also noticeable from these data.

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[74] CBS, *Statistical Abstract*, various issues.

For the years 1985–1988, the TFR by women's origin and birthplace ranked as follows: total—2.81; Africa, born abroad—3.36; Africa, born in Israel—2.98; Asia, born abroad—2.86; Europe-America, born in Israel—2.82; Asia, born in Israel—2.80; Europe-America, born abroad—2.69; Israel, father also born in Israel—2.62. Insofar as recent period fertility is concerned, the Israeli-born of European-American paternity have caught up with the Israeli-born of Asian paternity, while the Israeli-born of Israeli paternity have for the time being slightly dropped below all the other categories. However, with the exception of the African-born, the fertility differentials between all the other categories have been small. The Israeli-born comprised 68 percent of all Jewish women who had live births during 1985–1988; the African-born constituted only 12 percent.[75]

Completed fertility can be empirically known only when women reach or come near the end of their fertile life span. In order to anticipate such information, it is usual in fertility studies to ask younger women about the final number of children they expect or would like to have. The conjectural nature of such replies requires that they be used with reservation, and actually discounted according to the respondents' age, marital status, etc. It is also possible to inquire about the number of children which the interviewed women consider to be the societal norm. The two major fertility surveys conducted in Israel in the 1970s and 1980s have yielded such information, which is epitomized in table 42.[76] Three facts emerge from these data: The origin differentials narrowed from the 1970s to the 1980s in these areas, just as they did for TFR and cumulative fertility up to given ages or marriage durations according to censuses. The reported levels of fertility desired, seen as ideal, or perceived as normative exceeded the fertility empirically observed at the particular time. Beyond their unusually high empirical fertility level among the developed countries of the world, Israel's Jews evince a considerable demand for children, much in excess of bare replacement needs. This applies to all origin groups, including European-Americans.

A recent development in the fertility pattern of Israel's Jews, common to all origin groups, is a tendency to somewhat delay reproduction in keeping with somewhat later age at first marriage. The age-specific birthrates changed in the short span from 1980–1984 to 1985–1988, as set out in table 43. The rates declined below age 25, especially at ages 20–24, but rose at later ages, especially ages 25–39. This occurred simultaneously among all origin groups and in all of them with hardly any change in the respective TFR.

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[75] CBS data.

[76] The questions asked in the surveys and their nomenclature in table 42 are as follows: 1974–1975 survey: ("ideal") "If you had the medical and economic possibilities of having the number of children that would be most appropriate to you, what would that number be?"; ("Israeli norm") "What do you think is the most appropriate number of children for the average Israeli family?" 1987–1988 survey: ("desired") "How many children do you want?"; ("ideal") "If you had the medical and economic possibility to have the number of children that suits you best, what would that number be?" See Calvin Goldscheider and Dov Friedlander, "Reproductive Norms in Israel," in U.O. Schmelz and G. Nathan, eds., *Studies in the Population of Israel in Honor of Roberto Bachi, Scripta Hierosolymitana*, vol. 30 (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 15–35; Eric Peritz, "Fertility Patterns in the Jewish Population of Israel—Results from a Sample Survey," research report, 1989, publication in preparation.

Socioeconomic Characteristics and Fertility

If the origin groups in the population censuses of 1961, 1972, and 1983 are divided by educational attainment, a strong and rather consistent pattern becomes evident—that fertility varies inversely with education; the higher the educational level, the lower the fertility level. Table 44 presents the data by six educational levels and selectively for two marriage durations. The greater was the cumulative fertility of an origin group overall, the larger was the ratio between the higher fertility associated with low education and the reduced fertility at advanced education. Accordingly, the ratios were greater at 25–29 years of marriage duration than at 10–14 years. The fertility comparisons between the origin groups are somewhat handicapped at the educational extremes by the paucity of European-Americans with no or little schooling and Asian-Africans with 13 or more years of study. If inspected vertically, table 44 supplies evidence that at virtually each educational level the basic fertility ranking by birth regions—Asia-Africa, Israel, Europe-America—was preserved. Regarding the more detailed origin groups, the usual fertility ranking, expressed by descending rows of table 44, is on the whole preserved, though with irregularities. Education-specifically, a strong narrowing of fertility differences between the origin groups is evident, especially among women married only 10–14 years by 1983.

Table 45 carries this socioeconomic analysis one step further, separately investigating the fertility of women in the labor force and those out of it, by origin-birthplace and educational attainment. The data presented here are confined to women married 10–14 years, according to each of the three censuses. It should be noted that labor-force participation relates here to work in the 12 months preceding each census ("annual labor force"). Women who were in the labor force 10–14 years after marrying need not have been so earlier in their married life, and vice versa. However, such are the census data available, and there is probably some correlation between working by comparatively young women (10–14 years of marriage duration) and working at different preceding stages of their life cycle.[77]

Table 45 essentially confirms the inverse relationship between fertility and education for both working and not-working women. A strong though not quite regular tendency has prevailed for fertility to decline with rising education in each category, by origin, labor-force participation, and census in question. Table 45, however, adds a new finding: for each origin group generally, as well as by educational attainment, and according to each census, women classified as not being in the labor force tended to have somewhat greater fertility than their otherwise comparable counterparts in the labor force. This tendency has been rather consistent. Of course, the absolute differences between the fertility averages of the working and not-working women, measured here after only 10–14 years of marriage, were smaller in those origin groups that had comparatively limited fertility anyway, especially among the European-Americans.

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[77] This could be checked from the file of the 1987–1988 fertility survey.

For women both in and out of the labor force, at each educational level, and according to each census, fertility by birth region declined in the order Asia-Africa, Israel, and Europe-America. Less regularly, lower fertility figures were found among the more detailed origin groups presented in table 45 in conformance with the descending order of the rows. The table also corroborates, by labor-force participation and education, the basic trend of narrowing fertility differentials between origin groups over the course of time.

Religiosity and Fertility

A notable concentration of religious Jews, including ultra-Orthodox circles, is found in Jerusalem. Results of two large-scale studies on religiosity and fertility in Jerusalem are summarized in tables 46 and 47. The first was a maternity-ward interview survey (1975–1976); the second was an ecological investigation assigning to each woman the religiosity level of her immediate neighborhood, as ascertained from the proportions of votes cast for the various religious parties in the parliamentary elections of 1984.[78] The data relate to women who gave birth during the years indicated.[79] Though the ecological approach of the later study has obvious limitations, the results cannot be easily dismissed: they rely on numerous cases, are clear-cut, and accord with nonstatistical evidence.

While both studies found rising religiosity to be strongly associated with increased fertility, there was a difference. In the maternity-ward survey, origin-specific fertility variation among the ultra-Orthodox was rather limited; the ecological survey found greater fertility of the European-American and Israeli origin groups as against the Asian-Africans. The general fertility survey of 1987–1988 came up with a similar finding.

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[78] U.O. Schmelz, "Religiosity and Fertility Among the Jews of Jerusalem," in U.O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1985* (Jerusalem, 1989), pp. 157–185.

[79] Unlike the census data reported here, which relate to all women in first marriage, and unlike the TFR, which relates to all women in a population, irrespective of marital status.

A negative relationship of fertility with women's education and engagement in gainful work[80] is found at various religiosity levels. This also applies to most origin groups within each religiosity level, as far as is ascertainable from the data (table 47). However, these effects are minor as compared to the overriding influence of fertility differentiation according to religiosity levels. Unlike among total Jews in Jerusalem, at higher religiosity levels the fertility of women in the European-American and Israeli origin groups clearly tended to exceed that in the Asian-African group. Analogous results have been found in B'nei Berak, another large center of ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel.

In sum, whereas origin-specific fertility convergence has been the rule for the total of Israel's Jews, some fertility differentiation according to origin manifests itself at higher religiosity levels. Contrary to the overall trends in the past, however, at higher religiosity levels, the fertility of European-Americans now exceeds that of Asian-Africans.

Size of Households

Size and composition of households are of great demographic, social, and economic importance. Private households (as distinct from institutions) are defined in Israel's official statistics as groups of persons living in the same dwelling who consume major meals together, as well as persons living alone in a dwelling.

The major determinant of household size in a population is the level of fertility, and for this reason the subject is included in this part of the study. However, the overall determinants of household size are complex, involving other aspects of natural movement (marriage, divorce, mortality) as well as changing habits of coresidence between persons not belonging to a nuclear family. Coresidence in turn is influenced by the availability of dwellings and thus by building intensity.

As long as the fertility of Asian-African Jews in Israel was high, the average number of persons in households headed by individuals of this origin group was markedly greater than in the European-American group. With the decline of Asian-African fertility and the increase in building activity in Israel connected with improved living conditions, these differences have narrowed. Since household size is associated with the age of the household head—it peaks at about age 35–44, when most children of existing couples are already born but have not yet left the parental home to start living on their own—both kinds of figures are shown.

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[80] The information in these surveys, addressing themselves to women who had just given birth, did not conform to strict definitions of labor-force participation but related more loosely to whether these women had a gainful occupation or not.

Age of Household Head and Year	Average Number of Persons per Household			
	Origin of Household Head			
	Jews Total	Asia-Africa	Israel	Europe-America
All households				
1961	3.6	4.8	3.6	3.1
1983	3.2	3.8	3.3	2.8
Head aged 35–44				
1961	4.6	5.5	4.3	3.7
1983	4.5	4.9	4.4	4.2

Sources: CBS: 1961 census, vol. 36; 1983 census, vol. 8.

The above data actually give only a partial picture of the change that is taking place in origin-specific differentials in household size. An important further drop in Asian-African fertility, bringing it close to the persistent European-American level, occurred in Israel only in the 1980s (table 37). Since children in Israel tend to stay with their parents until the late teens, the full effect of the recent diminution of interorigin fertility differentials will make itself felt only in the future, at the turn of the century. Here then is an instance of near-equalization in one demographic aspect—fertility—with delayed repercussions in another—household size—as well as socioeconomically.

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

This section will examine differences between the main origin groups with respect to levels and types of education. A major distinction in what follows is between Israeli-educated adults, whether born in Israel or elsewhere, and immigrants educated abroad. This distinction is necessary for an understanding of the sources of the educational discrepancies between the origin groups, as well as for the prospects of bridging them.[81] A focal point in the following review concerns the persistence of considerable differentials between origin groups with regard to the proportions of highly educated people, even though the proportions of adults with secondary-school education exhibit a convergent rising trend.

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[81] See Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1977), Ch. 15; M. Inbar and Ch. Adler, *Ethnic Integration in Israel: A Comparative Case Study of Moroccan Brothers Who Settled in France and in Israel* (New Brunswick, 1977); Y. Nahon, *Patterns of Educational*

Patterns of educational attainment in Israel are related to three sets of factors: (a) institutional arrangements, such as compulsory education and a tracking system at the secondary-school level;[82] (b) behavioral patterns, such as those reflected in age-specific rates of noncompulsory school attendance; (c) compositional factors, such as the sociodemographic structure of the population by age, country of origin, or age at immigration, which indicate whether the acquisition of education occurred before or after arrival in Israel.

Educational expansion owing to either institutional or behavioral change is relatively slow, since it occurs mainly through the regular school system. On the other hand, compositional changes occur independently of the national education system and may thus more rapidly alter the educational level of the population as a whole, either in an upward or downward direction. Such changes may also affect the relative position of different groups with respect to educational attainment.

Attention will first turn to an overall review of the educational attainment of the main origin groups as recorded in the 1983 population census, disregarding place of education. This will be followed by an analysis of Israeli-educated and foreign-educated adults of different origin groups with respect to some selected educational indicators. Next comes a look at the main changes that occurred within each group during the 1961–1983 period, using mainly data of three population censuses as well as some survey findings and educational statistics. Finally, some basic features of the Israeli education system will be examined, concentrating on those relevant to the analysis of differential attainment among the Israeli-educated, by origin.

Origin-Group Differences in Educational Attainment

Table 48 combines Israeli-born and foreign-born adults into three origin groups: Asia, Africa, and Europe-America. For each group, cross-classified by sex and age, several educational indicators are presented, ranging from the lowest to the highest levels of educational attainment, as recorded by

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Expansion and the Structure of Occupational Opportunities: The Ethnic Dimension (in Hebrew), Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1987.

[82] Upon completing elementary school, Israeli pupils who continue their studies are directed into general or vocational education within either separate secondary schools or "tracks" in comprehensive schools. After the school reform measures of 1969 (see below), this tracking took place at the end of the final (9th) grade of the lower-stage of secondary education.

the 1983 population census. Ratios between the figures for Asia and Africa, on the one hand, and Europe-America, on the other, were calculated for each cell as indices of the educational differentials between the groups. The figures for Europe-America were given the value of 1.00 for this purpose. Thus, the closer the ratios are to 1.00, the smaller the educational differentials are between the origin groups. The Israeli-born of Israeli paternity are omitted from the analysis since they cannot be classified according to origins.

Several points emerge from the figures in table 48. In all three origin groups, younger cohorts of both genders have considerably higher educational attainment than older ones, and there is among them much more equality between the sexes in this respect. All educational indicators bear out this relationship. Thus, the medians of school years for men of Asian origin range from 5.3 among the 75+-year-olds to 12.0 among the 15–24 age group, compared with a 4.1–11.7 differential for men of African origin and a much smaller one (8.9–12.3) for men of European-American origin.[83] Substantially greater discrepancies exist among women of Asian and African origin. Their median years of schooling for the oldest and youngest age groups range from 0.7 to 12.1, compared with a range of 8.7 to 12.4 for women of European-American origin.

The percentages of people with at least some higher education (13+ years) likewise exhibit a pattern of age differentials: 5 percent for the 75+-year-olds as against 17 to 20 percent for the 25–34 age group among men of Asian or African origin, compared with a 19–54 percent range for men of European-American origin; from 1 to 19–20 percent, among women of Asian or African origin, and from 11 to 57 percent among women of European-American origin. (The figures for the 14–25 age group are relatively low, since they are too young to have acquired higher education.) Likewise, the proportions of total or functional illiterates (0–4 years of schooling) are significantly lower among younger persons of Asian-African origin, especially women. These patterns indicate compositional changes, with young and relatively well-educated cohorts replacing old and relatively poorly educated ones. The changes operated toward raising over time the educational level of all origin groups.

Controlling for age and sex, the wide educational discrepancies which prevail between the origin groups become clear. Thus, men aged 35–44 of European-American origin have a median of 13.7 years of schooling compared to only 10.6 years among their Asian-African peers, while 31 percent of the former are university graduates as compared to about 6 percent of the latter. Among women of these ages the differentials are still larger: 13.5

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[83] It should be recalled that the median, a useful measure that refers to the midpoint of a distribution, is insensitive to its extremes. Therefore, medians should be treated with caution.

years of schooling for European-Americans compared with 10 years for Asians and Africans, and 23 percent of university graduates compared to 3 percent, respectively.

Since the ratios for Asians and Africans are quite similar, the two groups may be combined and compared with European-Americans. As the ratios show, different conclusions may be drawn regarding the magnitude and patterns of discrepancies between the origin groups depending on the measure chosen for comparison. With regard to median years of schooling, the medians for men and women aged 15+ of Asian-African origin are only 13–16 percent lower than the medians for European-Americans. Moreover, the discrepancies between origin groups, as measured by age-specific ratios based on the medians, grow substantially with age. For the youngest age group (15–24), the medians are only a few percentage points apart, while the differentials increase to 30–50 percent among elderly men (aged 65+) and even more than 90 percent among elderly women.

In comparison with the medians, much wider differentials exist at either extreme of the distribution of all adults by educational attainment. The percentages of functional illiterates among Asian-Africans are twofold to fourfold higher than among European-Americans (for men of all ages, 9–10 percent for Asia-Africa compared to 4 percent for Europe-America; for women—18–20 percent against 5 percent, respectively). Since the lack of even some education adversely affects life chances, the older age groups (ages 45+) of Asian-Africans and their dependents were clearly disadvantaged in comparison with their peers of European-American origin.

As one moves up the educational ladder the ratios decline, i.e., the differences between the origin groups tend to grow. Thus the percentages of Asian-Africans with completed education at the secondary-school level or higher are nearly 2/3 as high as those of European-Americans (ratios of .63 to .67). But the ratios expressing the gap between the origin groups drop to 1/3 for the percentages with 13+ years of schooling (equivalent to at least some postsecondary education) and down to 1/5–1/6 for the proportions with academic degrees (both sexes and all ages).[a]

For the proportions of people with secondary-school or higher certificates, the age-specific differentials between origin groups show an orderly pattern of decline as we proceed from older to younger age groups (see table 48, ratios). The percentage of holders of secondary or higher certificates among persons of Asian-African origin aged 15–24 reached 75–87 percent of the level found among persons of European-American origin, compared to 50 percent or less among those aged 45 or more, especially women. In contrast, the pattern of age-specific differentials in the proportions of persons with 13+ years of schooling or academic degrees is more distinct. The highest proportions of people with 13+ years of schooling were found for the 25–34 and 35–44 age groups, but even among them, the percentages for persons of Asian-African origin do not amount to more than 2/5 of the corresponding ones for individuals of European-American origin, and the origin-related ratios pertaining to the proportions of university graduates at these ages stand around the 1/5 level.

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[a] Postsecondary training in Israel (for elementary-school teaching, nursing, practical engineering, etc.) usually extends for 2–3 years of full-time study, whereas university undergraduate education requires at least 3–4 years, or in sum, 15–16 years of schooling.

Distinguishing the Israeli-educated from the Foreign-educated

How are the Israeli-educated and the foreign-educated to be distinguished? In the absence of direct information on the matter, it is necessary to work with data on place of birth and, for the foreign-born, age at immigration.

Israeli-born and immigrants who arrived at the age of 14 or below will be considered as Israeli-educated, since it seems safe to assume that they spent most of their formative years in Israel and thus acquired all or most of their schooling through the local education system. It is assumed also that the majority of immigrants who came to Israel at the age of 25 or more, if they ever studied at all, were old enough at immigration to have completed abroad their highest level of education, including university education. These, then, will be considered foreign-educated. Those who were 15–24 years old at immigration will generally be left aside in the following analysis since they constitute an intermediate group with respect to the place of their education.

To compare educational attainment between the Israeli-educated and the foreign-educated it is necessary to control for actual age in order to capture and isolate possible life-cycle and cohort effects. For the foreign-born, it is also necessary to control for age at immigration as a proximate measure of the length of exposure to the local educational system. A chronological dimension, such as period of immigration, should be added because institutional and other types of changes could have occurred during different periods—either in Israel or in the country of origin, and various waves of immigration differed by size and composition. The relationship between these variables may be expressed as follows: age at census = age at immigration + time elapsed since immigration. Thus, for instance, when actual age is controlled, the higher the age at immigration, the shorter is the stay in Israel and vice versa. In other words, the foreign-educated, as defined above, immigrated later than their Israeli-educated age-peers who were also born abroad. This relationship should be borne in mind as the analysis moves forward.

A quite developed system of Jewish education already existed under the

British Mandate and even before. With the establishment of the State of Israel, a Law of Compulsory Education was enacted (1949), stipulating a compulsory period of 9 years of schooling for all, free of charge, starting at age five. This period was lengthened in 1969 to 11 years. Elementary schools were opened in each rural locality and in every urban neighborhood. In 1969 school-reform measures were introduced, aimed at improving the scholastic achievement of pupils of disadvantaged backgrounds, this by placing them in "integrative" schools, where pupils of different backgrounds would attend the same classes.

A factor that greatly hampered the social mingling of pupils was the dissimilar geographic dispersion of the various origin groups. Another was the relatively stronger inclination for religious education among families of Asian-African origin. In 1983–84, 33 percent of the pupils of this background in primary education studied in religious (state or other) schools, compared with only 19 percent of the pupils of European-American origin. Nearly half of the pupils in state religious schools in the same year studied in relatively homogeneous schools, namely, schools with a majority of 65 percent and over of pupils of Asian-African origin, as compared with only 14 percent of the pupils in state nonreligious schools. On the other hand, 43 percent of the pupils in state nonreligious schools attended schools where pupils of Asian-African origin comprised a minority of less than 35 percent of total pupils. These figures illustrate the difficulties with which the Israeli school system had to cope in implementing social integration policies.[85]

Various measures were taken to motivate pupils of postcompulsory ages to prolong their studies, such as the development of a counseling and guidance system at the "gates" leading from the lower stage of secondary education (the "intermediate schools") to the upper stage; the elimination of all fees for the whole of secondary-school education; the introduction of a flexible tracking system into vocational schools; and later on, increasing differentiation of the curricular demands for matriculation. All these contributed not only to raising the rates of attendance among the relevant cohorts—first at the elementary-school level and then at secondary schools—but also to improving the prospects for entering higher education by obtaining a matriculation certificate.

How did the various origin groups fare in the context of the expanding

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[85] For data on origin-group composition of the religious and nonreligious educational systems, see CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, no. 36, 1985, p. 628. On educational integration policies, see Y. Amir and S. Sharan, eds., *School Desegregation: Cross-Cultural Perspective* (Hillsdale, N.J., and London, 1984). On origin, scholastic achievement, and school integration, see A. Minkowich, D. Davis, and J. Bashi, *Success and Failure in Israeli Elementary Education* (New Brunswick, 1982). For an evaluative review of 15 years of Israeli research, as from the early 1970s, on the scholastic effects of integration, see Y. Dar and N. Resh, "Educational Integration and Scholastic Achievements: Summary and Evaluation of Research in Israel" (in Hebrew), *Megamot*, 31, 1988, pp. 180–207.

Israeli educational system? To answer this question, attention will first be given to the educational attainment of those who were born in Israel and then to that of the foreign-born who were young enough at immigration to be educated in Israel.

Educational Attainment of the Israeli-born

Three groups of Israeli-born adults are distinguished in table 49 by the father's continent of birth—Asian, African, and European-American. The data are median years of schooling and the ratios thereof based on the 1961, 1972, and 1983 censuses. As the table shows, in 1983 the medians for both sexes (all ages) were just above 12 years, reaching nearly 13 years for European-Americans compared to 11.5–12.0 years for Asians and Africans. In other words, nearly half the Israeli-born, of all origin groups, attained an educational level equivalent to a complete secondary-school education or higher. The lowest medians were found among the elderly of Asian-African origin (8.5 years for men and 5.3–6.4 years for women aged 65+), and the highest (14 years) among the Israeli-born of European-American origin aged 25–44.

During the two decades between 1961 and 1983, the medians for all the Israeli-born taken together increased by 1.5–2.0 years of schooling. All groups among the Israeli-born (gender, age, and origin) improved their education impressively, the most dramatic changes occurring in the educational levels of middle-aged and elderly women, whose medians in 1983 amounted to 12.2 years for the 45–64 age group and 8.6 years for those aged 65+, up from 7.3 and 1.0, respectively, in 1961. These figures reflect not only the institutional improvement of the Jewish educational system during the Mandatory period as compared to the late Ottoman period but also the effects of a normative change favoring equal education for both sexes.

Did the origin-group discrepancies narrow during this process of basic educational improvement? As far as median years of schooling are concerned, the answer is affirmative for both sexes: in 1983 the ratio of medians among Asian-Africans versus European-Americans (all ages) reached .90, compared to .70 in 1961 (table 49, ratios). This trend is going to continue in the future, since the origin differentials for the younger age groups are much smaller than for the older ones. The origin-specific ratios for the 15–24 age group in 1983 ranged for both sexes between .94 to .97, compared with .75 for men and .53 to .64 for women aged 65+.

Do origin-group discrepancies in the percentages of the highly educated show themselves for the Israeli-born? Table 51 sheds light on this question, relying on data from two post-censal surveys of university graduates.[86] The ratio between the origin-specific percentages of university graduates in 1984 was just .15, up from .06 in 1974. While the ratios tend to be somewhat higher among the younger age groups, the figures seem to indicate that if there exists a process of narrowing of differentials, it is a very slow one.

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[86] CBS, *Persons with Academic and Post-Secondary Education, 1974*, Special Series no. 643, 1981, p. 63; *University and Post-Secondary Education Graduates, 1984*, vol. B, 1988, p. 57.

Educational Attainment of Foreign-born Educated in Israel

From its inception, the Israeli education system had to cope with the challenge of absorbing young immigrant pupils. Considering the origin-group differentials in educational attainment reviewed above, it is interesting to explore whether any specific requirements or problems pertaining to the immediate postimmigration situation of these children (and their families) could have contributed to this effect. To cite just one example, many of the newly arrived pupils, particularly those of Asian-African origin, were absorbed in lower school grades than were suitable for their ages, in an attempt to compensate for the curriculum they had missed. Did this "grade retardation" or any other factor related to school experience hamper their chances for postcompulsory education?

The matter may be approached by examining the cross-section data of the 1983 census (table 52). Since individuals normally achieve their highest educational attainment around age 30, attention is given to the 25–34 and 35–44 age groups, presenting for them origin-specific median years of schooling and percentages of university graduates among the Israeli-born in comparison with the foreign-born, while controlling for age at the census and age at immigration. For both age groups, the two educational indicators are much higher among European-Americans than among Asians or Africans. The percentages of university graduates, for instance, are 24–34 percent as against 4–10 percent, respectively. The percentages for those aged 35–44 are higher than those of the younger age group, since the latter has not yet exhausted its chances for university graduation.[87]

Controlling for age at the census, the foreign-born of all origin groups show higher medians as well as higher percentages of university graduates among those who were older at immigration, i.e., who immigrated later. The highest medians and percentages were found among those who were 25+ years old at immigration. The lowest medians and percentages were observed among those who immigrated as young children (aged 0–14), their educational attainment being poorer than that of their age peers born in Israel, especially for the European-American origin group. For example, the percentage of university graduates among Israeli-born men aged 35–44 of European-American origin was 34 percent compared with 22 percent for those who immigrated from Europe-America at ages 0–14 (table 52). Discrepancies of similar order were also found for women.

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[87] Compulsory army service in Israel, beginning at age 18, extends for two years for women and three years for men. Many sign on for even longer periods.

Table 53 makes it clear that length of exposure to the Israeli educational system is an important factor affecting the amount of education finally acquired. This is indicated by the differentials in educational attainment between immigrants who came at ages 0–4 and 10–14, for instance. Among those who arrived in the period of mass immigration (1948–1954), the differentials in terms of median years of schooling in favor of those who came younger amount to 2.1 years for Asia, 1.5 years for Africa, and 0.9 years for Europe-America. Differentials with regard to university graduates were 2.8, 0.5, and 8.7 percentage points, respectively. Differentials in the opposite direction were recorded for those coming in later immigration waves, but as already noted, these belong to younger age-at-census groups.

It seems, therefore, that young immigrants—at least those who were already of school age upon arrival—were, indeed, relatively disadvantaged with respect to the development of their educational careers. Still, this group resembles the Israeli-born as far as the origin differentials are concerned; the ratios of both groups are similar and indicate wider discrepancies between origin groups than those of the foreign-educated (table 52).

Educational Attainment of Adults Educated Abroad

The data in the 1983 census make clear the relatively higher educational attainment of the foreign-educated, aged 25–44, of both origin groups, as well as the smaller educational differentials between them. This section presents a more detailed discussion of the foreign-educated as defined above—aged 25+ at immigration (tables 52 and 54).

In 1983 this population amounted to nearly 550,000 persons (table 54), two-thirds of whom were born in Europe-America and the rest, in equal parts (1/6 each), in Asia or Africa. The largest component came between 1948 and 1954 (31 percent); the second largest between 1955 and 1964 (24 percent); and the third largest between 1965 and 1974 (20 percent). Smaller groups came before 1948 (9 percent) and between 1975 and 1983 (14 percent).

The origin groups differ substantially in their breakdown by period of immigration: the foreign-educated who came in 1948–1954 comprised in 1983 more than half the Asian group (56 percent) but just 22 percent of the African group and 28 percent of the European-American group. The proportions of the 1955–1964 immigrants were 12 percent, 54 percent, and 19 percent, respectively. In contrast, 41 percent of European-Americans arrived after 1965 compared with only 22–23 percent of Asian-Africans. A large majority (80 percent) of the more recent immigrants came from Europe-America.

Immigration from Asia-Africa decreased sharply from the mid-1960s on. Therefore, in 1983 the proportion of the foreign-educated of Asian-African origin was found to be considerably lower than the corresponding one for European-Americans; their age composition was also somewhat older. Of the foreign-born aged 25+ of each origin, only 31 percent of Asians and 32 percent of African origin were foreign-educated as defined, compared to 51 percent among European-Americans. Calculating their proportions of the total numbers of the 25+-year-olds of each origin (including the Israeli-born), the figures are 21 percent for Asia, 26 percent for Africa, and 38 percent for Europe-America. Clearly, the differential immigration patterns rendered the educational composition of Asian-Africans as a whole significantly more dependent on education acquired in Israel than that of European-Americans.[88]

Those who immigrated at the age of 25+ constituted in 1983 a relatively mature population of which about 30 percent were 55–64 years old and 47 percent were aged 65+. Their proportions among the total Jewish population (Israeli-born included) varied according to age as follows: from 76 percent of the elderly aged 65+ and 58 percent among those aged 55–64 to only 3 percent of the 25–34 age group. This has contributed to the rising importance of the Israeli educational system in shaping the educational attainment of the population as a whole. The inverse relationship between educational level and age, noted above, reflects not only the pattern of intergenerational differentials in educational attainment but also the increasing weight of the foreign-educated among older age groups. The latter factor accentuated the general pattern, since for all origin groups it was found that among the older age groups the educational level of the foreign-educated majority was far lower than that of the Israeli-born. Thus, comparing median years of schooling for ages 65+, for Israeli-born men of Asian-African origin (a relatively small group), the median amounted to .75 of the median for European-Americans, compared to only .68 for those educated abroad. The largest differentials between the origin-specific medians were found among women; the ratios to Europe-America being .53 for Asia and .64 for Africa among the Israeli-educated, as against 0.8 and .09, respectively, for the foreign-educated. This reflects the very high percentage of illiterates among elderly women who immigrated as adults from Asia-Africa (tables 49 and 54).

Table 54 summarizes several educational indicators for sex–age–origin groups of the foreign-educated. On all indicators, the educational attainment of each origin group (men and women alike) improves substantially when passing from older to younger age groups. Focusing on the older age groups, the effects of their differential backgrounds on their education are discernible. Thus, 29–32 percent of the men aged 55–64 and 44–46 percent of the men aged 65+ of Asian or African origin were functionally illiterate, compared with only 9 percent and 14 percent, respectively, among European-Americans. The percentages of functional illiterates among women of Asian-African origin amounted to 61 percent of the 55–64 age group and to 71–73 percent of those aged 65+, compared to just 9 percent and 17 percent, respectively, among European-Americans.

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[88] Of the total numbers of the 15+-year-olds of each origin group in 1983, the proportions of Israeli-educated (Israeli-born + foreign-born who were 0–14 years old at immigration) were for Asia—71 percent, Africa—66 percent, and Europe-America—49 percent.

As with the Israeli-educated, so also with the foreign-educated, at the extremes of the distribution by education—i.e., below or above secondary education—origin group differentials are wider than at the middle. This relationship does not apply to foreign-educated women because of the dominance of illiteracy among them. For men the median schooling years of Asian-Africans was about 3/4 (ratios of .71–.76) that of European-Americans, while the percentages of functional illiterates were more than three times higher, and the percentages of university graduates reached just 1/5 (table 54, ratios).

The 1983 census shows that, for the foreign-educated, recent immigrants have a much younger age composition than those who came earlier. Bearing this in mind, it is seen (table 55) that, except for 1948–1954 for Asia and Europe-America and 1955–1964 for Africa, the later the period of immigration, the higher the educational attainment acquired abroad. The exceptions relate to periods of mass or relatively large immigration involving whole communities whose educational attainment tended to be lower than that of more selective immigrations that came earlier or later. Furthermore, origin-group differentials regarding education acquired abroad tend to narrow among those who came more recently. Thus, the percentages of university graduates among all men educated abroad were 4 percent for Asian-Africans, compared to 16 percent for European-Americans, but among those immigrating in 1975 or after, these figures were higher (14 percent for Asia, 22 percent for Africa, and 31 percent for Europe-America), and the origin differentials were smaller. Findings in a similar direction were observed for women as well (table 55).

The educational differentials between groups of immigrants varying by period of immigration are not just artifacts of their different age compositions. Table 56 shows, as of 1983, that for the foreign-educated who came from Europe-America, controlling for age, the later the period of immigration, the higher was the proportion of university graduates (e.g., among the 45–54 age group the proportion amounts to 33 percent of the 1975+ immigrants compared to only 16 percent of those who came during 1955–1964). The same is true for the other origin groups. The origin-specific differentials are generally smaller for those who immigrated since 1965 (table 55) compared to those for the whole Jewish population (table 48). For instance, among men who immigrated between 1965 and 1974 from Asia or Africa, the percentage of university graduates was .31 as high as that for Europe-America and even higher among those who immigrated from 1975 on (Asia—.47; Africa—.73), as compared to only about .20 among all Jewish men of Asian-African origin. This analysis indicates that the educational differentials in Israel reflect not only differences between immigrants from different countries but also the changing size of immigration waves and their composition by countries of origin. As future immigration will be composed mainly of relatively well-educated European-Americans, it may be expected to widen the gap in educational attainment between the main origin groups (especially if all adult ages are considered together).

This argument puts additional weight on the functioning of the Israeli education system, as future patterns of educational differentials between origin groups will depend to a great extent on its success or failure in achieving more equality with regard to the highest educational attainment of its graduates of different origins. We turn our attention now to some basic features of the Israeli education system.

Origin-Group Differentials and the Israeli Education System

The census data reviewed above indicate that for the Israeli-born, educational discrepancies between origin groups at the secondary-school level were almost completely closed during the 1961–1983 period. At the same time, considerable gaps persist at the postsecondary and university levels. In the following, attention will be given to some aspects of the functioning of the Israeli secondary and postsecondary school systems which possibly contributed to the persistence of the remaining origin-group differentials.[89]

Entrance to postsecondary education depends on formal completion of a secondary school. In addition, psychometric and other types of examinations are used to further select between prospective candidates. Only a matriculation certificate, of either a general or vocational school, which testifies to success in the nationwide examinations administered by the Ministry of Education, is accepted for candidacy for university studies.[90]

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[89] See Ch. Adler, "Jewish Education in Israel: A Sociological Perspective," in H.S. Himmelfarb and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Jewish Education Worldwide: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (Lanham, 1989), pp. 485–503; A. Yogev and D. Kfir, "Determinants of Tracking in Israeli Secondary Education: Ability Groupings and Sponsorship in the Educational System" (in Hebrew), *Megamot*, 27, 1981, pp. 139–153; Y. Shavit, "Tracking and Ethnicity in Israeli Secondary Education," *American Sociological Review*, 49, 1984, pp. 210–220; Nahon, *Patterns of Educational Expansion*.

[90] Matriculation certificates in relatively small numbers may also be obtained through an

During the first decade of its existence, the young State of Israel succeeded in absorbing growing numbers of children into its rapidly expanding education system. The Law of Compulsory Education, governing children ages 5 to 13, had fully achieved its goals by the end of the 1950s; in 1961–62, 98 percent of the 6–13 age group was attending school.[91] Since the early 1960s, raising the participation in the educational process of youth beyond these ages has been a cornerstone of educational policy. This was to be achieved through inducing more graduates of elementary schools to enter some type of secondary school—normally at age 14—as well as improving school-retention rates of pupils in secondary schools. The measures necessary for these purposes were to be geared mainly to the needs of youth of Asian-African origin, since their scholastic achievement was considerably lower than that of European-Americans.

To facilitate the entrance of youth of Asian-African origin into secondary schools, their scores in a nationwide aptitude test taken at the end of elementary school were intentionally up-scaled to improve their chances in the competitive selection process. A system of gradual exemption from school fees allowed all pupils to pay less or nil according to their socioeconomic backgrounds, thus alleviating the economic burden of prolonged studies. The number and geographic dispersion of secondary schools grew, and within them an increasingly differentiated number of programs was offered to pupils, mainly through two- to four-year curricula in a large variety of vocational tracks. Underachieving pupils were also offered various types of tutoring and supportive extra lessons.

In 1969 a school-reform plan was introduced, aimed mainly at advancing social integration within schools as well as improving the scholastic achievement of pupils of disadvantaged backgrounds. The education system underwent a structural change whereby a three-tier system was established, starting with six years of elementary school, followed by a three-year intermediate division—the lower stage of the secondary school—leading to the final three years of upper-stage secondary school. The intermediate stage included preparatory as well as diagnostic and sorting functions in order to improve counseling and guidance for graduates regarding their choices at the upper stage, which were expected in turn to raise their prospects for completing secondary education successfully.[92] The number of years of

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"external" procedure in which personal registration for examinations is not mediated through any regular secondary school. "Preparatory pre-academic classes," mostly sponsored by the universities, constitute yet another avenue of approach to higher education. Finally, Everyman's ("Open") University admits candidates regardless of their previous educational attainments, and its academic degrees are fully recognized. Important as these "second chance" options may be for improving the prospects of various social groups to attain some higher education, quantitatively their impact has been limited.

[91] CBS, *Statistical Abstract*, no. 16, 1965, p. 548.

[92] The counseling and guidance services in Israel have attracted some research efforts during

tuition-free obligatory education was raised to include the final year of the intermediate school (in sum, ten years between the ages of 5 and 14) and then also the first year of the upper stage (age 15). School fees through the whole of secondary education were abolished in 1978.

How effective were all these measures? The available figures show that considerable progress has been made since the early 1960s. Starting with entrance to secondary education, at age 14 the rates of enrollment in any type of secondary school increased significantly even before the school-reform program, from 51 percent in 1961–62 to 64 percent in 1968–69.[93] The rise continued, and ten years later, 87 percent of children aged 14 were attending a secondary school.[94]

Following initiation of the school-reform program, retention rates also improved significantly, since more pupils were oriented to four-year programs and their dropout rates were reduced. This is reflected in the rising proportion of pupils graduating from elementary school (8th grade) who, four years later, were studying in the final year of secondary school (12th grade)—from 40 percent to 53 percent of the 1965–66 and 1972–73 elementary-school graduation cohorts, respectively. Analyzing the age-specific data on enrollment rates by type of school and origin group, it becomes clear that expanding vocational education played a major role in increasing the entrance rates as well as in prolonging secondary-school studies. About 85 percent of the increase in the enrollment rates at age 14 during the period 1963–64 to 1968–69 was related to rising participation in vocational programs. The proportions of this age group studying in vocational schools, including a small minority of pupils in agricultural schools, grew from 16 to 28 percent, whereas the proportions of those studying in general schools increased only from 34 to 36 percent.[95] The yearly figures on composition by type of curriculum of 9th-grade pupils (the first grade of secondary school before the reform plan) show that between 1961–62 and 1968–69 the proportion of those studying in vocational-agricultural schools increased from 26 to 48 percent (from 37 to 57 percent for boys and from 16 to 39 percent for girls).

The contribution of vocational education to the growth of the enrollment rates among 14-year-olds was far more important for Asian-Africans than for European-Americans. Thus, between 1963–64 and 1966–67 the overall enrollment rate for Asian-Africans grew by 14 percentage points (from 30 to 44 percent), of which 8 percent was recorded for vocational schools (from

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the last decade, specifically with regard to their impact on differential tracking of ethnic groups through secondary education. See Yogev and Kfir, "Determinants of Tracking"; Shavit, "Tracking and Ethnicity."

[93] CBS, *Statistical Abstract*, no. 20, 1969, p. 559. The selection of years for the following comparisons was partly dictated by the availability of data.

[94] Ibid., no. 30, 1979, p. 628.

[95] CBS, *Statistical Abstract*, no. 17, 1966, p. 598; ibid., no. 20, 1969, p. 559.

14 to 22 percent), compared to 3 percent of an overall increase of 10 percentage points for European-Americans (from 18 to 21 percent in vocational schools, and from 65 to 75 percent in secondary schools generally).

Another achievement, also related to vocational schools, was the increasing school-retention rate. This is clearly reflected in the data available for two points in time around 1969.[96] Of the 9th-grade cohort of pupils, the proportions of those who prolonged their studies to the 12th grade of vocational education grew nearly 2.5 times between the 1965–66 and 1972–73 cohorts (from 10.5 to 24.8 percent), whereas the corresponding proportions for general education remained stable at 28–29 percent. Furthermore, the data confirm that vocational education was instrumental in prolonging the studies of both origin groups, particularly the Asian-African. The percentages of 9th-grade beginners who "survived" to the 12th grade among Asian-Africans grew between these cohorts from 23 to 44 percent, and most of the increase was related to developments in vocational education (from 9 to 27 percent as compared to 14 percent and 17 percent, respectively, in general education). The corresponding figures for European-Americans, including a small minority of Israeli-born of Israeli paternity, were 12 and 22 percent for vocational education, and 45 and 44 percent for general education.

As entrance and retention rates rose, increasing rates of secondary-school completion were to be expected. In the absence of a suitable time series on graduates, these may be traced approximately through the rates of enrollment—normally at the final (12th) grade—of the 17-year-olds. The figures presented in tables 57 and 58 indicate that since the mid-1960s the origin-group differences in prospects for graduating from secondary school have been reduced remarkably, but more for girls than for boys. During the period 1966–67 to 1981–82, the overall rates of enrollment at age 17 increased for boys from 34 to 60 percent and for girls from 40 to 78 percent; by 1987–88, the rates had further increased to 72 percent for boys and 88 percent for girls. Some boys opt out of school earlier than girls, either to other kinds of studies (short vocational courses or *yeshivot*) or to work. Still, the great majority of both sexes today complete a full secondary-school education.

Did the two origin groups benefit equally from this process? The figures in table 57 indicate that the advance of Asian-Africans from the previous low position was relatively much greater than that of European-Americans: between 1966–67 and 1981–82, the rates at age 17 increased from 21 to 63 percent for the former, compared to 50 and 73 percent, respectively, for the latter. The ratio between enrollment rates of the origin groups increased from .41 in 1966–67 to .85 in 1981–82 for all 17-year-olds, from .44 to .78 for boys, and from .39 to .91 for girls (1.00 representing parity of enrollment rates, table 58).

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[96] CBS, *Society in Israel: Statistical Highlights, 1980*, p. 181. Retention rates through secondary school are estimates based on gross numbers of pupils in each of the relevant grades, irrespective of changes due to immigration, class repetition, etc.

Two periods are discernible in the data. During the first, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the major growth factor was the expansion of vocational education, whereas during the following period—from the mid-1970s on—a more even growth of vocational as well as general education was recorded. Enrollment rates at age 17, by type of school, reflect these changes. Between 1965–66 and 1974–75 the rates for vocational education more than doubled (from 11 to nearly 25 percent), whereas the rates for general education rose minimally (from 26 to 28 percent). During the period 1974–75 to 1987–88, the rates for both types of education grew by 50 percent (from 25 to 37 percent for vocational education and from 28 to 43 percent for general education; table 58).

The rising rate of growth of general secondary-school education in the later period seems to be clearly related to the reform in the matriculation examinations that was introduced during the late 1970s. The reform aimed at increasing the variety and flexibility of the curricular program and of the examination requirements as well. The reasoning was that a redesign of general education in this direction might enable it to cater to a larger sector of the relevant age groups.

Table 58 presents data on origin-specific rates of enrollment in general and vocational education of youth aged 17, through the period 1966–67 to 1981–82. These figures shed some light on the impact that the changing features of the educational system may have had on the graduation prospects of the origin groups. In 1966–67, only 21 percent of 17-year-olds of Asian-African origin (20 percent of the boys and 22 percent of the girls) were studying in secondary schools (whether general or vocational) for four-year certificates (matriculation or others) compared with 50 percent of those of European-American origin (45 percent of the boys and 55 percent of the girls). The ratio between these values amounted to .41 (.44 among boys and .39 for girls; table 58). Whereas among the Asian-Africans the relatively low rates of enrollment in general and vocational education were quite similar (12 percent and 9 percent; 10 percent and 9 percent, respectively, for boys; 14 percent and 8 percent for girls), among European-Americans much higher rates of enrollment in general education were recorded—38 percent compared with only 12 percent in vocational education (30 percent and 15 percent, respectively, for boys; 47 percent and 9 percent for girls).

In 1974–75, both origin groups showed moderately higher rates for general education (Asia-Africa—16 percent, Europe-America—45 percent), but considerably higher rates for vocational education, with a threefold increase among Asian-Africans (from 9 to 26 percent; boys—from 9 to 24 percent; girls—from 8 to 29 percent) and a twofold increase among European-Americans (from 12 to 23 percent; boys—from 15 to 27 percent; girls—from 9 to 18 percent). This development brought closer the overall enrollment rates in secondary education of the two origin groups (Asia-Africa—42 percent, Europe-America—68 percent) and decreased the discrepancy between them (the ratios grew from .41 to .62).

By 1981–82, the overall enrollment rates rose to 63 percent for Asian-Africans and 73 percent for European-Americans, thus reducing further the discrepancy between the origin groups (the ratio grew to .85). The enrollment rates in vocational education continued to grow faster among Asian-Africans than among European-Americans (from 26 to 38 percent compared with 23 percent and 27 percent, respectively), and the discrepancy between them increased as the ratios grew from 1.16 to 1.39 (both above parity). It is interesting to note the same relative advance of the Asian-Africans in general education as well. Their enrollment rate grew from 16 to 24 percent, whereas that of European-Americans remained almost constant at 45–46 percent, thus reducing the discrepancy between them for this type of education (the ratios grew from .35 to .53).

These findings indicate not only the important role which vocational education played since the early 1960s in raising the prospects for completing secondary school among the Asian-African origin group, but also that the reform in general education was particularly beneficial for this group, as from the late 1970s.

Did the processes that reduced origin-group discrepancies in secondary-school completion also affect their differential prospects of winning matriculation certificates? Cross-section data shed some light on the matter.

The origin-specific rates for 17-year-olds in 1981–82, shown in table 60, indicate that the rates of enrollment in matriculation tracks amounted to only 46 percent among Asian-Africans compared to 66 percent among European-Americans, the difference reflecting mainly their lower representation in general secondary education. Among pupils aged 17 of Asian-African origin, only 73 percent were in matriculation tracks compared with 90 percent of European-Americans. Among the pupils in these tracks of Asian-African origin, 54 percent studied in general schools and 46 percent in vocational schools, compared with 69 percent and 31 percent, respectively, among the European-Americans. Since a smaller proportion of pupils in the vocational track actually sat for the examinations (73 percent compared to 93 percent in the general track in 1985–86), this factor too lowered the chances of Asian-African pupils acquiring a matriculation certificate. For both origin groups, the rates of pupils in matriculation tracks—and the percentages studying in general secondary schools—are higher for girls than for boys. Still, both sexes exhibit similar origin differentials.

The success rate in the matriculation examinations in 1986–87 was about a third lower in the vocational track than in the general one (45 percent vs. 70 percent; table 61). In both tracks the rates for examinees of Asian-African origin were relatively lower than those for European-Americans: 62 percent against 76 percent in the general track, and only 39 percent against 53 percent in the vocational one. The overall success rate was 53 percent for Asian-Africans, about a quarter lower than the 70-percent rate for European-Americans. The proportion of 17-year-olds (per 100 in the specified population) who acquired matriculation certificates in 1986–87, after completing studies in either track, is estimated to be about 23 percent for Asian-Africans compared to 42 percent for European-Americans.

In the light of the data presented above, it seems that this difference reflects the combined effects of factors involved in the streaming of pupils of various sociocultural backgrounds through the secondary schools, as well as of other factors determining their motivation and achievement all along the way.

Were the graduates of secondary schools of both origin groups equally inclined to enter university studies? Table 48 shows that among the 25–44 age group in the 1983 census, the percentages with any kind of secondary-school or higher certificates were in the range of 40–53 percent for men and 32–58 percent for women of Asian-African origin, as compared with 77–82 percent and 79–84 percent, respectively, for European-Americans. It seems that among these secondary-school graduates, who were mostly Israeli-educated (table 52), the majority of the European-Americans pursued higher studies, whereas only a minority of Asian-Africans did so. This is indicated in the data by differentials between the following proportions: (a) the percentage with certificates from a secondary school (including nonmatriculation) or higher education (i.e., 13+ years); (b) the percentage with some postsecondary or academic education; and (c) the percentage with an academic degree. The (b)/(a) ratios range from only .34 to .42 for Asian-Africans as compared with .66 to .70 for European-Americans, with very small differentials between the sexes. The differences in the proportions of secondary-school graduates who gained academic degrees are still larger: the (c)/(a) ratios among men aged 24–45 range from .12 to .15 for Asian-Africans as compared with .31 to .40 for European-Americans. Lower values were recorded for women: .08 for Asian-Africans and .29 to .30 for European-Americans, respectively (table 48).

Table 62 shows that during the period 1964–65 to 1988–89, the rates for university students in the 20–29 age group more than doubled, increasing from 3.8 to 8.2 percent. The rates for Asian-Africans were significantly lower than those for European-Americans, but since they grew faster, the ratios between the origin-specific rates—expressing the extent of similarity between the groups of origin—rose for the Israeli-born from .15 to .43 and for the foreign-born from .15 to .34. The considerable discrepancy which still persists reflects, as already noted, the lower proportion among Asian-Africans of graduates in matriculation tracks (see also table 59).

Another possible factor is a relatively lower inclination of Asian-African youth, even those with matriculation certificates, to turn to higher education. The 1983 census data indicate whether or not people who attained such a certificate—and for whom the information could be checked—attempted (either at the census date or before) to pursue further studies. Table 63 shows for men aged 25–34 that 35–37 percent of Asian-Africans, compared with 46 percent of European-Americans, studied at a time for higher certificates but had not (yet) graduated (for women—21–25 percent and 35 percent, respectively). This discrepancy between origin groups pertains mainly to university studies, whereas their representation in other types of postsecondary (mostly technical or semiprofessional) education is rather similar.

A follow-up survey of candidates who applied for university studies in 1981–82 found these proportions failing to be accepted: among the Israeli-born—27 percent for Asian-Africans compared to only 17 percent for European-Americans, and among the foreign-born—31 percent and 21 percent, respectively. Another follow-up survey, of a cohort of first-year students starting their studies in 1976–77, found that during the ensuing five-year span, about a quarter (27 percent) prematurely discontinued their studies, 34 percent among Asian-Africans compared to 24 percent among European-Americans.[77]

It has been suggested that excessive institutional intervention, involving a guided "streaming" of pupils into the various tracks of study in secondary schools, might have exerted a deterrent effect on pupils of Asian-African origin, more of whom, in a less selective school system, might have been motivated to attain higher education. However, the data reviewed in this section consistently indicate relatively lower rates of success in matriculation examinations for the Asian-African origin group, a weaker tendency for prolonging studies in any type of postsecondary education on the part of those who have acquired a matriculation certificate, lower success rates in the competition for admission to university studies, and, finally, lower graduation rates among those who start such studies. In a recent study of pupil achievement in intermediate schools—i.e., before tracking takes place—significantly lower attainments were recorded for pupils of Asian-African origin on three different tests (IQ, science, and reading comprehension), controlling for socioeconomic status.[98] These findings point to somewhat differential prospects between origin groups with regard to the course of studies they are likely to follow at the upper stage of secondary education.

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[77] CBS, *Candidates for First Degree Studies at Universities in 1981/82*, Special Series no. 819, 1988, p. 65.; CBS, *Course of Studies of University First Degree Students: 1976/77 to 1980/81*, Special Series no. 772, 1986, p. 56.

Along with the already noted trend of educational expansion over time among the Israeli population in general, the educational attainment of younger cohorts of parents is rising among all origin groups. In the long run, this process may be assumed to bring about profound change in home environment and familial socialization patterns in ways conducive to raising children's scholastic achievement and their motivation to prolong studies. It may also be expected to contribute to a further future narrowing of educational gaps between the young of the different origin groups.

VOTING BEHAVIOR

An assessment of voting behavior is indispensable to a broader understanding of Israeli society, particularly regarding the character and evolution of the ethnic dimension within it.[99]

Sharp polarization along ethnic lines has been repeatedly attributed to the Israeli political system, especially since the major political upheaval of 1977. In that election, the conservative-nationalist Likud party, backed by voters of Asian-African origin, for the first time took away the premiership from the Labor party. Subsequently, during the 1981 and 1984 electoral campaigns, instances of ethnic tension intensified, leading some observers to conclude that ethnic cleavages were widening and becoming a predominant factor in the Israeli political process.

In seeking to assess the role of the ethnic dimension in Israeli voting behavior, the general outlines of the evolution of the Israeli party system will first be traced. Attention will then turn to the question of how political parties explicitly focusing on ethnic issues have succeeded with voters. This will be followed by an examination of the connections between ethnic origin and other background characteristics and the Israeli party configurations that prevailed from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s. After that, the political map that emerged from the 1988 Knesset election will be analyzed in detail in an attempt to draw further conclusions about the relative weight of the major socioeconomic and sociocultural variables—ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religiosity, etc.—as determinants of political choice. Finally, attention will be given to those elected to public office, to measure the extent to which there is a trend toward equal political participation and representation of the major origin groups.

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[98] The main findings were reported by investigators Y. Dar and N. Resh of the Hebrew University, during the annual conference of the Israeli Sociological Association, February 1990. See also their paper "Learning Achievements in Junior High Schools in Reading Comprehension and Science" (in Hebrew), Research Institute for Innovation in Education, Hebrew University, no. 121, 1989.

[99] Peter Medding and Abraham Diskin read an earlier draft of this section and offered invaluable criticism. Any responsibility for what follows is solely the author's, however. For recent overviews of the subject see Ernest Krausz, ed., *Politics and Society in Israel, Studies of Israeli Society*, 3 (New Brunswick and Oxford, 1985); Itzhak Galnoor, "Israeli Democracy in Transition," in Peter Medding, ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 5, 1989, pp. 126–147.

Background of the Israeli Party System

The origins of the Israeli political party system can in large part be traced to past Diaspora experience.[100] A great variety of ideological orientations existed among Jews in the Diaspora before Israel's independence. A major political divide concerned the basic analysis of the Jewish question, and of the solutions to be provided for it—whether through Zionism and the struggle to create an independent Jewish state, local Jewish autonomism in the Diaspora, or otherwise. In addition, Jewish political participation in the Diaspora tended to reflect the attraction of Jews toward general ideologies prevailing in the surrounding societies, such as liberalism, socialism, nationalism, and the like. Jewish political responses, then, emphasized a great variety of conflicting ideologies and interests. These diverse political backgrounds were gradually transfused by Jewish immigrants into the political reality of the prestate *yishuv* and provided the foundation of the major political camps that still operate in the contemporary Israeli political arena. In turn, the changing characteristics, needs, and experiences of Israel's population, along with evolving local political realities, stimulated continuous adjustments—and great fragmentation—in the Israeli party system.

According to Israel's electoral law, the 120 seats in the Knesset are divided proportionally according to the vote won by each party. Only parties failing to reach a minimum of 1 percent of the national vote are excluded. One result of the system is to permit political representation of relatively small sociopolitical groups, thus enabling virtually all significant minorities to be heard. Since no single party has ever won an absolute majority of the votes, government has been possible only on a coalition basis. As a result, tiny political factions occasionally gain disproportionate power.

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[100] A broad historical and sociological outline is to be had in S.N.Eisenstadt, *The Transformation of Israeli Society* (London,1985); see also Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine Under the Mandate* (Chicago, 1978).

The Israeli party system accommodates a variety of competing ideological orientations. Prominent tensions exist, first, between different positions with regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict and, second, between various approaches to the question of religion and secularism. A further factor making for political cleavage, common to almost every other political system, is social class.[101] While many issues, taken individually, tend to generate political confrontation with little room for compromise, national defense, religious, and socioeconomic platforms, as expressed by the different parties, do not overlap according to rigid and constant patterns. Each party has worked out its own particular combination of issue positions. This composite political pluralism ensures governability by way of a variety of possible coalition agreements on selected and specific portions of each party's program. This also means that voters usually have a range of choice among several parties, parts of whose programs are sufficiently close to one another.

Since this article is concerned with the relationship between the ethnic dimension and voting behavior rather than politics per se, the following analysis will selectively consider the results of past Israeli political elections. The four elections examined are those of 1955 (3rd Knesset), the first vote after the end of the period of mass immigration; 1965 (6th Knesset), a time of consolidation in Israeli society, and the last election held before the Six Day War; 1977 (9th Knesset), which saw the rise of the Likud party; and 1988 (12th Knesset), the most recent election.

Results of Knesset Elections, 1955–1988

Table 64 presents a synopsis of selected election results, showing the percentage distribution of votes obtained by all parties which won at least one seat. For ease of presentation, the parties have been regrouped into five major political sectors—Labor, Liberal-Radical, Religious, Center-Right to Right, and Communist and Arab—also showing in greater detail changes within each sector.[102] When one considers the momentous events that occurred during this period, what is perhaps most striking is the comparative paucity of major changes in the basic balance of the Israeli party system.

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[101] See Benjamin Akzin, "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy," in Eisenstadt, Bar Yossef, Adler, eds., *Integration and Development in Israel*, pp. 9–46; Emanuel Gutmann, "Parties and Camps—Stability and Change" (in Hebrew), in M. Lissak and E. Gutmann, *The Israeli Political System* (Tel Aviv, 1977), pp. 122–170; Yonatan Shapiro, "Political Sociology in Israel: A Critical View," in Krausz, *Politics and Society in Israel*, pp. 6–16.

[102] Somewhat different typologies of the Israeli party system have been proposed by various scholars. See, e.g., Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, "Authority Without Sovereignty: The Case of the National Centre of the Jewish Community in Palestine," *Government and Opposition*, 8, 1973, pp. 48–71; Daniel J. Elazar, "Israel's Compound Polity," in H.R. Penniman, ed., *Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977* (Washington, 1979), pp. 1–38.

The more significant quantitative shifts, which in turn determined important changes in Israeli leadership, concerned the gradual shift of political hegemony from the Labor to the Center-Right sector.

As table 64 makes clear, the Labor sector reached a peak in 1965—indeed, an absolute majority of the vote if its different and rival factions are counted together. (In 1964, Mapai, the main Labor party, merged with the smaller Ahdut Ha'avoda to form the Ma'arakh, or Labor Alignment.) By 1977, the Labor camp, including Mapam, had lost over half of its support, part of which it recovered in subsequent elections. Several mergers and splits that occurred over the years involving the Labor sector attracted a great deal of the public's attention, perhaps diverting it from the major ongoing political trend of the gradual erosion of the Labor sector as the numerically predominant segment of the Israeli polity. Such a trend can clearly be traced to the early 1960s,[103] but it was not fully realized until the 1977 election. Significant changes also occurred in the internal distribution of the vote within the Labor sector, where the share of Mapam-United Workers' party, to the left of the Labor party, tended to decline significantly.

The Center-Right to Right sector started growing significantly after the 1965 election, reaching a peak in 1977 (the actual high was in 1981), which, however, was significantly lower than Labor's during the 1960s. In retrospect, a most significant change in the Israeli party structure was the creation in 1965 of Gahal from the fusion of the right-wing Herut and the center-right Liberal (formerly General Zionist) parties. While until then Mapai (the Israel Labor party) was the only large party around which a viable coalition could assemble, Gahal, which later evolved into the Likud, constituted a formation whose size was sufficiently large to offer a viable alternative. In 1977 the Likud was able to form a coalition with the decisive support of the religious parties. Within the Center-Right to Right sector, the share of the parties to the right of Likud—such as Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet in 1988—tended to increase.

One of the more important deviations from the predominant Israeli pattern of long-term, gradual political change was the formation in 1977 of the short-lived Dash party (Democratic Movement for Change) led by Yigael Yadin. Dash helped promote the shift between the two major parties at the core of Israeli political life. Dash took most of its own votes from the

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[103] See Amiram Gonen, "A Geographic Examination of Electoral Competition Between the Ma'arakh and the Likud in Jewish Cities in Israel, 1965–1981" (in Hebrew), *Medinah, Mimshal Veyahasim Beinleumiim*, 19–20, 1982, pp. 63–87; Amiram Gonen, "A Geographical Analysis of the Elections in Jewish Urban Communities," in D. Caspi, A. Diskin, and E. Gutmann, eds., *The Roots of Begin's Success* (London-Canberra-New York, 1984), pp. 59–88; Abraham Diskin, *Elections and Voters in Israel* (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv, 1986; American edition forthcoming), pp. 76–80.

Labor Alignment, though it also attracted voters from the Likud and from its own neighbor parties within the Liberal-Radical sector. It was the political defeat of the Labor Alignment, determined by Dash, far more than the relative success of the Likud in 1977, that caused the end of Labor's hold on power. It should be noted, though, that even if Dash's votes are counted with the Labor sector, rather than in the Liberal-Radical sector, a consistently declining trend in the Labor grouping since the 1960s is still evident.

The weight of the religious sector has not changed much over time, remaining steady at just below 15 percent of the total vote. Research on religious attitudes and behavior of Israelis indicates that the proportion of voters for religious parties is substantially smaller than that of Jews defining themselves as very religious or religious. Thus, in a 1979 national survey of the Jewish population aged 14 and older, conducted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 6 percent said they were very religious, 18 percent religious, 37 percent not very religious, and 39 percent not religious.[104] In a 1988 study of marriage and fertility patterns, and limited to married Jewish women aged 22–39 in localities of 5,000 inhabitants and over,[105] 4 percent reported themselves to be very religious, 10 percent religious, 36 percent traditional, and 50 percent secular. Asked about parental home, 4 percent of the same women reported it as being very religious, 25 percent religious, 32 percent traditional, and 39 percent secular.

Religious behaviors were still significantly associated with countries of origin, especially among older age groups. In 1979, 33 percent of Jews born in Asia-Africa reported themselves as religious or very religious, as against 19 percent born in Europe-America and 14 percent of the Israeli-born. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 20 percent of the Asian-African born, 51 percent of the European-American born, and 62 percent of the Israeli-born defined themselves as nonreligious.[106]

Overall, these various findings, and research based on earlier data,[107] indicate a significant process of secularization among younger adult Israelis, although a minority kept to strong religious patterns and was sustained by the higher birthrate of the more religious sector of Israel's Jewish population. At the same time, there was an increased tendency toward ideological polarization between the extremely religious and the extremely secular in Israel. This reflected radicalization within the religious sector itself. Indeed, since the 1981 elections, remarkable changes have occurred within the religious electorate. The relatively moderate Mafdal-National Religious party (NRP)—formerly Mizrachi-Hapoel Hamizrachi, once the leading force among religious voters—lost much of its support. Instead, the more strictly Orthodox forces came to dominate numerically the religious political sector. Overall, Agudat Israel kept its share of the vote, while Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians) emerged as a significant political force. Degel Hatorah emerged as yet another Orthodox faction in the 1988 Knesset.

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[104] See Uri Avner, "Investigation of Attitude to Religion in Surveys" (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1982, mimeo.

[105] Eric Peritz et al., "Family Formation and Fertility in Israel," Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1988, research in progress.

[106] See Avner, "Investigation of Attitude to Religion."

[107] See Yehuda Ben Meir and Perry Kedem, "Index of Religiosity of the Jewish Population of Israel" (in Hebrew), *Megamot*, 24, 1979, pp. 353–362; Calvin Goldscheider and Dov Friedlander, "Religiosity Patterns in Israel," AJYB 1983, vol. 83, pp. 3–39.

The total weight of the Communist and Arab sectors of the Israeli party system was rather stable, despite moderate declines. The Communist party constituencies usually included both Jewish and Arab voters. The largest one was the Israeli Communist party, which split during the 1960s into two parties, one mostly Jewish and the other mostly Arab. The Jewish extreme Left continued to appear under changing party labels until the late 1970s. Later on, it virtually disappeared as a separate political force. Some of its voters joined the Arab-Jewish Progressive List for Peace, others moved to the Liberal-Radical and Labor sectors of the Israeli party system. The small political sector composed of parties exclusively aiming at the Arab electorate tended to decline over time. In the past these included various minorities' lists associated with the Labor movement and, in 1988, the Arab Democratic party. Their decline reflects a strengthened support of Arab voters for the extreme Left political sector, as well as a considerable diffusion of the Arab vote throughout all the Jewish parties.

In retrospect, election results over the years indicate a remarkable flexibility on the part of the Israeli political system in incorporating vast numbers of new voters without repeatedly incurring radical structural changes. This held true even as Likud replaced Labor as the leading political force. The number of voters grew nearly fivefold between 1949 and 1988 and nearly trebled between 1955 and 1988. Absorption of new immigrants, the overwhelming majority of whom had never voted anywhere before, also meant providing them with the basic elements of political education. The party structure as it existed since 1948, and its subsequent gradual evolution, evidently succeeded in providing the outlets for political expression within Israeli society.

Changing Weight of Ethnic Parties Within the Israeli Political System

Beginning with the elections to the 1st Knesset (1949), some Israeli parties openly sought the support of an ethnic constituency. As already noted, these were chiefly parties addressing the non-Jewish sectors of Israeli society. Ethnic parties addressing a Jewish constituency appealed mostly, though not exclusively, to voters of Asian and African origins. Often—though not always—they emphasized the traditional-religious aspects of a given group's cultural inheritance. Their share of the vote in national elections was generally very small; most failed to attain the 1 percent minimum legally required to win at least one seat in the Knesset. The fragmented nature of ethnicity and the narrow and particularistic programs usually advocated by ethnic parties evidently conflicted with the need to reach an audience sufficiently large and differentiated to build up a stable base of political influence.

Overall, the vote for ethnic parties tended to decline from about 5 percent of all votes in the 1st Knesset to about 1 percent or less throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Since the 1970s there has been a limited revival, though it has taken place through repeated substitutions of one ethnic party for another, with each displaced party quickly disappearing from the scene. The ethnic parties collectively obtained roughly 2–4 percent of the total votes in elections held during the 1970s and early 1980s. Among those succeeding in getting Knesset seats, Shmuel Flatto-Sharon's ephemeral Development and Peace list was followed by Aharon Abuhatzeira's Tami (Movement for Israel's Tradition), which in turn was replaced by Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians). Led by former Sephardi chief rabbi Ovadia Yosef, and inspired by the leader of Lithuanian yeshivahs, Rabbi Menachem Eliezer Schach, Shas combined support for the religious traditionalism of Asian-African Jewish communities with an image actually close to that of the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox. It obtained the most impressive success ever by an ethnic political movement, with 4.7 percent of the vote and 6 seats in the 12th Knesset (1988). In the same election, less than one additional percent of the vote was gathered overall by several other splinter ethnic lists.

The vast majority of the Israeli electorate has thus never emphasized ethnic allegiance as the primary determinant of political choice. Actually, Shas's comparatively successful vote reflects a more complex balance of factors than mere ethnicity, being also strongly tied to ideological (religious) preferences and other social factors (see below). It should be noted, however, that the constituencies of several other political parties tended to be overwhelmingly homogeneous with regard to the geographical origins of voters, although ethnic issues were not openly addressed in the platform of such parties. Thus, as a kind of counterpart to the just mentioned concentration of votes by Asian-African origin groups, the constituencies of Agudat Israel, the Independent Liberals, and Dash in the past, or, more recently, Shinui (Center Movement) and Ratz (Citizens' Rights Movement, CRM), tended to be overwhelmingly European. An intriguing question is whether strongly homogeneous ethnic support can be, and in fact is, attracted in the

Israeli political system by way of subtle, symbolic communication, rather than by an explicit call to ethnic traditions and feelings.

The fact that openly ethnic lists have played a relatively marginal role on the Israeli political scene is not sufficient evidence to dismiss the possibility that ethnicity is significant in national political processes. Indeed, of the two major parties, Labor voters comprise a clear majority of European-Americans and the Likud a majority of Asian-Africans. Moreover, the fact that the 1981 and 1984 electoral campaigns to the Knesset were loaded with ethnic symbols and accompanied by episodes of violence with an ethnic undertone aroused fears of a potentially disruptive outburst of ethnic tension.[108] (These tensions were significantly weaker, if at all visible, during the 1988 electoral campaign.) Thus, the actual relationship between ethnicity and voting patterns calls for further careful assessment.

Social Structural Correlates of Voting Patterns, 1955–1988

METHOD

Direct data on the relationship between personal characteristics of voters and party preferences are not easily available. Given the secret ballot, information can be gathered only indirectly through general sample investigations of political attitudes over time or through exit polls. These indirect sources provide a wealth of interesting information and have been incorporated in the vast research literature which deals with elections and political behavior in Israel.[109] However, the approach adopted here is the analysis of actual vote returns, by aggregate characteristics of voters. The advantage of such an approach is that it relies on actual electoral results rather than on more or less perfect proxies. It also allows for homogeneous comparisons over extended periods of time for which other, more disaggregated, data are not available. The disadvantage lies in the risk that the analysis of electoral results for aggregate units of investigation, such as small geographical areas, may lead to different conclusions than would be obtained by focusing on individual voters.[110]

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[108] Zeev Shavit, *Ethnic Connotations and Symbols of Ethnicity in Electoral Propaganda to the 10th and 11th Knesset* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, no. 28, 1986.

[109] Detailed analyses of Israeli political elections, relying on a variety of sources, have been released periodically. See, e.g., Asher Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel—1969* (Jerusalem, 1972); idem, *The Elections in Israel—1973* (Jerusalem, 1975); idem, *The Elections in Israel—1977* (Jerusalem, 1980); idem, *The Elections in Israel—1981* (Tel Aviv, 1983); Penniman, *Israel at the Polls . . . 1977*; Howard R. Penniman and Daniel J. Elazar, eds., *Israel at the Polls 1981: A Study of the Knesset Elections* (Bloomington, 1986); Diskin, *Elections and Voters in Israel*.

[110] See the technical discussions in W.S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, 15, 1950, pp. 351–357; Laura Irwin Langbein

Keeping in mind these basic conceptual limitations, the aim is to find possible similarities and dissimilarities among Israeli political parties in order to discover basic patterns of linkage between the party configuration and selected sociodemographic characteristics of voters. Provided that strong and consistent patterns emerge over time, the ground will be set for formulating at least some promising research hypotheses, if not definitive conclusions. The procedure followed here is to compare the results obtained by each party at each of the four elections already discussed above (1955, 1965, 1977, and 1988).[111] The data were processed through Smallest Space Analysis (SSA), a standard nonmetric multivariate analysis technique.[112] The data input consists of the proportion of votes obtained by each party in each different type of Jewish locality. Based on the standard Central Bureau of Statistics classifications, the following typology of localities was used: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, other veteran cities, other new cities, veteran urban settlements, new urban settlements, veteran villages, new villages, veteran moshavim, new moshavim, kibbutzim, and other rural settlements.[113] The terms "veteran" and "new" refer to the date of a locality's settlement by Jewish inhabitants, whether before or after 1948.

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and Allan J. Lichtman, *Ecological Inference* (Beverly Hills and London, 1978). The ecological approach has been usefully applied by various researchers to the study of Israeli elections. See, e.g., Matras, *Social Change in Israel*, pp. 113–130; Diskin, *Elections and Voters in Israel*, pp. 65–80.

[111] The official election results quoted throughout this article appear, respectively, in Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior—Inspector General of Elections, Office Mechanization Center, *Results of Elections to the Third Knesset and to Local Authorities 26.7.1955* (in Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1956), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series no. 51; Central Bureau of Statistics, Inspector General of Elections, Office Mechanization Center, *Results of Elections to the Sixth Knesset and to Local Authorities 2.11.1965*, vol. 1 (in Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1967), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series no. 216; Central Bureau of Statistics, Inspector General of Elections, Office Mechanization Center, *Results of Elections to the Ninth Knesset 17.5.1977* (in Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1977), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series no. 553; Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior—Inspector General of Elections, Malam Systems Ltd., *Results of Elections to the Twelfth Knesset 1.11.1988*, vol. A (in Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1989), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series no. 855. See also Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1989).

[112] The technique is described in Louis Guttman, "A General Nonmetric Technique for Finding the Smallest Coordinate Space for a Configuration of Points," *Psychometrika*, 33, 1968, pp. 469–506. For an earlier discussion and application of the SSA technique to the study of the Israeli party system, see Diskin, *Elections and Voters in Israel*, p. 73.

[113] There were minor differences in the Central Bureau of Statistics' classification of localities at the various dates considered here. In 1955, the category of *ma'abarot* (transit camps) was also taken into account to determine the proportion of voters in new localities. In 1988, fewer types of localities were separately detailed, and the category of "development towns" was used to represent new localities (see table 65). For the purpose of SSA analyses, it would be better to examine more disaggregated data, e.g., by ballot districts or even by single ballot. Yet, previous ecological analyses of election results indicate that the degree of data disaggregation does not necessarily affect the main conclusions. See Diskin, *Elections and Voters in Israel*, p. 74.

Each type of locality represents an aggregate of voters of varying size and composition. It is assumed here that types of localities—or, more generally, homogeneous residential areas—represent a highly meaningful intermediate variable in the study of the Israeli societal structure. Beyond different geographical locations, the various types of localities reflect the chronology and changing composition of immigration, trends in urbanization and other aspects of socioeconomic change, and ideational differences within the Jewish population. It can be reasonably assumed that the different demographic, socioeconomic, and sociocultural characteristics of the inhabitants of different types of localities are reflected in their political preferences. In the particular context of our analysis, it should be stressed that new localities absorbed a disproportionate share of the mass immigration wave of 1948–1951, and to some extent of subsequent immigration, with a strong predominance of Jews of Asian and African origins. Patterns of political behavior in new localities can more generally be posited as a proxy for patterns among the Asian-African-born segment of the Jewish population. (For a more detailed discussion of ethnic patterns in residential distribution, see the section on this subject earlier in this study.)

Table 65 exemplifies the data input shaping the following analysis. It shows the distribution of votes obtained by major parties in the 1988 elections, by type of locality. Considerable variation characterizes the bases of power of different parties. The strongest polarization appears between mostly Jewish and mostly Arab parties, thus testifying to the social-structural and political cleavages that are known to exist between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Since this study focuses on the relevance of the ethnic dimension among Israel's Jews, the following analysis only refers to parties with a clear majority of Jewish voters and to mainly Jewish localities, thus excluding most of what was referred to above as the Communist and Arab sectors of the Israeli political spectrum. Kibbutzim—comprising an average of 3–4 percent of the total Jewish population—were also excluded from the analysis, the main reason being the skewed vote distribution there. Throughout the period of over 30 years examined here, two parties in particular, Ahdut Ha'avoda and Mapam, stand out for the high share of their total vote obtained in kibbutzim. This, by the SSA procedure, would result in a contraposition between these two parties and an analytically meaningless cluster of all of the other parties.

Diagrams 1, 2, 3, and 4 present the results of SSA analyses for the elections of 1955, 1965, 1977, and 1988, respectively. SSA computes a matrix of intercorrelations out of the original data input, transforms the numerical correlations into Euclidean distances, and produces maps in which each variable (political party) is represented by a point. The smaller or greater distances between points plotted reflect the similarity or dissimilarity in the distribution of votes for the various parties across the different types of localities considered. Having established the relative positions of different parties on a two-dimensional map, the two dimensions then need to be interpreted. It is assumed here that the two major latent dimensions in the Israeli party configuration are, on the one axis, a measure of religiosity, and on the other axis, a measure of ethnicity, namely the amount of support won by each party among voters of Asian-African origin.[114] In agreement with previous statements about the overall stability of the Israeli party system, it is suggested that a persistent set of sociodemographic factors has been associated with the Israeli political party system from the 1950s through the 1980s. In fact, the same structural interpretation applies to the four elections examined here, in spite of their being spread over 33 years and in spite of the significant differences in the respective electoral returns.

The diagrams' vertical dimension rates a party's religiosity in three categories: high, intermediate, and low. Such classification is highly consistent with what is known about the parties' programs on religious issues and about the religious characteristics of the respective constituencies. It is corroborated by the percentages of the respective total vote obtained by the various parties in cities like Jerusalem (see again table 65) or B'nei Berak, which have large shares of religious voters. The diagrams' horizontal dimension rates party support among voters of Asian-African origin as high, intermediate, and low. Ex-post-facto empirical validation of the latter criterion was obtained by computing the actual share of the total vote obtained by each party in new localities. As already noted, these places include high proportions of voters of Asian-African origin and are here considered a reasonable proxy for those origin groups on the whole. The vertical divisions in the diagrams reflect the results of such validation.

It should be stressed that the grid of diagonal and vertical lines in the diagrams was somewhat arbitrarily traced; no excessive significance should be attributed to their distances from the points each representing a different party.[115] The lines are only intended to help read the diagrams, by better characterizing the meaning of their two dimensions. Moreover, it should be emphasized again that, given the highly aggregate character of the data

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[114] Clearly, alternative interpretations could be suggested about the meaning of the diagrams' two dimensions. Other relevant variables in the definition of the horizontal axis could be a measure of some demographic characteristic, such as the voters' age distribution or seniority of residence in Israel; a measure of educational attainment; or a measure of political orientation, ranging from most hawkish to most dovish.

[115] In comparing the four diagrams, it should be kept in mind that the respective scales are not necessarily the same. Diagram 4, in particular, is affected by the very eccentric position of one party, Degel Hatorah, which influences the respective positions of all the other parties, making them apparently very close one to another (see below).

DIAGRAM 1. SMALLEST SPACE ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION OF VOTE FOR JEWISH PARTIES, BY TYPE OF LOCALITY—JEWISH LOCALITIES WITHOUT KIBBUTZIM, 1955



input and the roughness of a two-dimensional representation, results of the following analysis can only be considered exploratory and suggestive.

RESULTS

Along with clear signs of overall structural stability in the party configuration, several important changes should be noted among the four elections examined here. These variations reflect: (a) changes in the respective proportions of different types of localities out of Israel's total Jewish population; (b) demographic changes in the electoral body; (c) actual shifts in each party's share of the total vote; and (d) the drift of some of the parties across the sociopolitical space schematically represented in the diagrams.

Politically, the most significant aspects relate to the position of the point representing "Total" voters in the party configuration, and the proximity of the position of any single party to that of Total voters. Total is consistently plotted in an area characterized by low but not extremely low religiosity, and with intermediate support among Asian and African voters. This correctly describes the overall or "average" characteristics of the Israeli voter. If anything, in the course of time, Total tends to move slowly toward an area closer to a more Asian-African electorate (strong in new localities). Again, this aptly reflects changes in the demographic composition of the electorate between 1955 and 1988.

Closeness to Total reflects a balanced representation of a party in each type of locality—and, by implication, among each type of voter. The further a party is from Total, the more it is concentrated in one or a few types of localities, thus revealing a narrower and more particularistic constituency. Consistent with the election returns, the largest parties are closer to Total: this was the case with Mapai and the Alignment in 1955 and 1965, and with Likud in 1977 and 1988. (In 1955, the General Zionists, later to join Herut in eventually forming the Likud, were actually closer structurally to Total voters than Mapai was.)

The changing position of each individual party in the sociopolitical space defined by religiosity and support among Asian-African voters is also worthy of attention. Changes affecting the position of Likud among the Israeli electorate, as reflected in diagrams 1–4, are particularly significant. In 1955 the Herut and General Zionist parties were separate and had distinctly different constituencies: the former, moderately traditional and ethnically blended, the latter, distinctly secular and mostly of European origin. After the merger of these two parties in 1965, Likud (then Gahal) appeared to be still markedly associated with a secular constituency, with intermediate support among voters of Asian-African origin. In 1977 Likud had moved significantly closer to an electorate of Asian-African origin and one that was

DIAGRAM 2. SMALLEST SPACE ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION OF VOTE FOR JEWISH PARTIES, BY TYPE OF LOCALITY—JEWISH LOCALITIES WITHOUT KIBBUTZIM, 1965



close to moderately religious. The same trend appears to have continued in 1988, when the Likud's share among Asian and African voters grew above average. [116]

In a sense, an opposite trend characterizes the changing position of the Labor sector and its various components in the party configuration. Although Mapai had been for many years the dominant political force of the new State of Israel, playing an important role in the political absorption of large and heterogeneous groups of Jewish immigrants,[117] it appears that in 1955 its voters featured somewhat distinctive characteristics from those of the total electorate. Mapai's successor, the large Labor Alignment (Ma'arakh) party, reached a much closer relationship to Total voters in 1965—hence implying greatest extension and socioeconomic and ethnic heterogeneity. Later on, however, Labor tended to move to a more marginal position in the sociopolitical space, becoming associated with a more definitely secular, and somewhat more markedly European, electorate. It may be noted that of the original components of the Alignment, Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avoda in 1955 appealed to voters with very similar social characteristics, while the more left-wing Mapam—except for its strong kibbutz base—received stronger support among Asian-African voters. Also of interest in the diagrams is the apparent passage of Mapam's urban voters[118] from a strongly secular stance in the 1950s to a more central position in the religiosity continuum during the 1980s.

The already mentioned important role of Dash in promoting the Labor movement's defeat in 1977 clearly appears in diagram 3 to have been mostly determined by a secular and European-American electorate. At the same time, about the same proportion of voters of Asian-African background left the Alignment in 1977 for a variety of other political formations.[119] The secularization and Europeanization of the Alignment appears to have continued in the 1988 elections, as indicated by the lower location of this party in diagram 4 as compared to 3.

A further intriguing finding concerns the social-structural similarity of Shlomzion—the list headed by Ariel Sharon in 1977 and the Alignment (see diagram 3). It seems not impossible that Sharon, who soon after his election merged with the Likud, attracted some of the more hawkish voters who had previously been part of the Labor movement. Shlomzion's voters were not markedly concentrated among the Asian-African origin group. Not incon-

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[116] The slight deviation in one vertical line in diagram 4 had to be introduced to accurately reflect the support of voters of Asian and African origin for the various parties.

[117] See Peter Y. Medding, *Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society* (Cambridge, 1972).

[118] Kibbutzim are excluded from the present analysis.

[119] See Diskin, *Elections and Voters in Israel*, pp. 125–131.

DIAGRAM 3. SMALLEST SPACE ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION OF VOTE FOR JEWISH PARTIES, BY TYPE OF LOCALITY—JEWISH LOCALITIES WITHOUT KIBBUTZIM, 1977



sistently, in the 1965 elections, Rafi—born of the split from the mainstream Labor movement of David Ben-Gurion and his younger and activist followers—occupied about the same ethnic position in the party configuration that was later to be taken by the Likud (diagrams 2 and 3). As a party Rafi eventually returned to the fold of unified Labor and the Alignment, but it would appear from these analyses that many of its supporters were left behind.

Among other interesting changes of position in the Israeli sociopolitical space, one of the more remarkable is that of Agudat Israel. Its constituency, while remaining within the religious sector, passed from low support among Asian-African voters throughout the 1955, 1965, and 1977 elections, to high support in 1988. This transition was helped by periodic association with the smaller Poalei Agudat Israel party (in 1955 and 1988), whose political base was comparatively strong in new localities. Even more significantly, in 1988, together with a new association with the Lubavich movement, Agudat Israel came to appeal to an electorate of Asian-African origins quite similar to that of the highly ethnic Shas party. On the other hand, Degel Hatorah seems to have taken over in the 1988 election some of the political space occupied by Agudat Israel between the 1950s and the late 1970s. Because of its strong concentration in Jerusalem and B'nei Berak, Degel Hatorah's actual position in the party configuration is extremely eccentric, which makes all the other parties appear much more clustered than in the preceding diagrams. It should be stressed that this is an artifact of the particular method of data processing used here and not a real change in the nature of the party configuration. Diagram 4 actually displays a modified SSA in which a substantial empty area between Degel Hatorah and all other parties was cut away to facilitate the reading of the results.

Other political drifts—at the European end of the ethnic continuum—concern the increasingly secular basis of the Independent Liberals, associated with Shinui-Center in 1988, and Ratz (CRM). The last party, originally an outgrowth of the Labor Alignment, subsequently developed a more radical stance on issues of civil rights and separation between religion and state. Conversely, the Mafdal–National Religious party (NRP) incurred important electoral losses but kept basically the same structural position over the years.[120] The small aggregate of "other" parties that did not achieve any Knesset seats tended in 1965 and 1977 to be composed of voters with characteristics similar to those of the NRP. Prominent among this heterogeneous political element were the already mentioned small ethnic lists which unsuccessfully represented a variety of Asian and African

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[120] The NRP indeed lost many of its voters of Asian-African origin. Its actual strength in new localities, reflected in the party's position in diagram 4, may well derive from support among European-American voters in new localities.

DIAGRAM 4. SMALLEST SPACE ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION OF VOTE FOR JEWISH PARTIES, BY TYPE OF LOCALITY—JEWISH LOCALITIES WITHOUT KIBBUTZIM, 1988


Support Among Voters of Asian and African Origin
High
Intermediate
Low
Religiosity
High
Intermediate
Low
DEGEL HATORAH
SHAS
AGUDAT ISRAEL
OTHER
TEHIYA
MAFDAL
MOLEDET
MAPAM
RATZ
LIKUD
TOTAL
SHINUI
TZOMET
ALIGNMENT

origin groups. In 1988, though still tangentially associated with the moderately religious party area, "other" parties obtained most of their support among voters of European and American origin.[121]

At the extremes of the ideological spectrum, there was never any significant Jewish support for the Communist Left among Asian-African voters, in spite of attempts to incorporate protest movements such as the Black Panthers during the early 1970s (see diagrams 1–3). Right-wing parties such as Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet (which latter probably absorbed most of the votes that might have gone to Meir Kahane's outlawed extreme-right Kach movement) in 1988 each appealed to somewhat different constituencies, ranging from moderately religious to secular, and from average to more strongly Asian-African (diagram 4). Looking across the four elections reported here, the combination of low religiosity and strong Asian-African support was infrequent, but it appeared from time to time under different political banners.

Finally, it can be noted that most parties—with the prominent exception of the ultra-Orthodox—appear to be plotted along a diagonal pattern cutting across the interpretative grid. It can be assumed that the observed diagonal ranking roughly indicates a measure of social status of the respective party constituencies, from lowest at the upper-left end of the diagonal to highest at the bottom-right end (see further discussion below). Such an assumption is consistent with the previously mentioned relationship between levels of educational attainment and ethnic origin group, namely, the lower socioeconomic status of the Asian-African group as compared to the European-American group, and the higher socioeconomic status of the younger and more secular Israeli-born as compared to the foreign-born.

Keeping in mind the tentative and exploratory nature of this analysis, a few significant conclusions can be drawn. First, ecological segregation—here expressed through different types of localities—plays an important role in Israeli society as an intermediate variable associated with political identity and behavior. Changes in spatial segregation, discussed earlier in this study, may prove important to the mutual relationship with political behavior. Second, several of the features described here point to considerable dynamism and fluidity of voting choices in Israel, within the context of rather static and lasting political coordinates. It is true that, so far, certain social-structural characteristics of the electorate, such as religiosity and ethnic origin, have provided the basic defining dimensions of the Israeli party configuration. Yet, the analysis clearly indicates that in Israel it is not always possible to easily deduce ideological differences between parties from the sociodemographic characteristics of their voters.

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[121] The two lists which attracted the most votes among the "Other" group in 1988 were the Pensioners' party and Meimad, a moderate religious list. Both appealed mainly to voters of European-American origins.

Ethnic Origin vs. Socioeconomic Status in 1988 Elections

Twelve mostly Jewish parties and three mostly Arab parties won at least one seat apiece in the 12th Knesset. Given this situation, it is noteworthy that in about one ballot district out of four that were located in areas with Jewish majorities (1,094 out of 4,380 ballot districts), one single party won an absolute majority of the vote. This again points to the very significant homogeneity of political preferences within small geographical areas, also hinting at residential homogeneity according to other sociodemographic characteristics.

Following this ecological approach, table 66 offers a closer look at the amount of ethnic-origin and social-class differentiation among parties in the 12th Knesset election of November 1988. The data relate to the votes given to the main parties in 810 statistical areas in urban Jewish localities of over 10,000 inhabitants, each area being composed of several contiguous ballot districts. Residential areas of voters were classified according to the predominance of one or more origin groups among the resident population. Thus, by way of aggregate data, some inference can be drawn about the relationship between the ethnic backgrounds of voters and their party preferences. The same urban areas were also classified according to the predominant socioeconomic status of the inhabitants, providing a further aggregate frame of reference for the interpretation of electoral results.[122]

As already noted, correlation between ethnic origin and party preference appears to be substantial in Israel, though rather fluid. With regard to the Jewish vote, in 1988 the most ethnically homogeneous parties were Shinui and Ratz (CRM), each of which garnered about three-quarters of the respective votes in urban areas with a plurality of Jews of European-American origin. The newly formed Orthodox religious party Degel Hatorah followed closely, with over 70 percent of its votes in predominantly European-American areas. At the opposite end of the ethnic continuum, the Orthodox religious Shas party obtained nearly 73 percent of its votes in residential areas with Asian-African Jewish majorities. These four political movements, relying mostly on highly homogeneous ethnic precincts, together received 15 (13 percent) of the 114 Knesset seats won by Jewish parties. (Of the total 120 seats, 6 were won by parties with a predominantly Arab constituency; see table 65.)

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[122] Geographical definitions of urban areas and classifications of the characteristics of their inhabitants were based on the results of the 1983 population census. For more technical explanations and the original data, see Uri Avner, "Voting in the Elections for the 12th Knesset in Comparison to Previous Elections" (in Hebrew), in Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior—Inspector General of Elections, Malam Systems Ltd., *Results of Elections to the Twelfth Knesset 1.11.1988*, vol. A (Jerusalem, 1989), Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series no. 855, pp. 25–42.

Voters for other parties, including the two largest ones, Likud and Labor, featured lesser deviations from the overall ethnic background distribution of total voters. Yet, Labor and Mapam clearly appealed more to voters of European-American origin (close to 65 percent), while the Likud obtained greater support in predominantly Asian-African areas (57 percent). Substantial support among Asian-African voters (52 percent) was also won by Agudat Israel, in spite of its overwhelmingly Ashkenazi leadership. The smallest deviations from the mean, indicating fairly balanced representation among all major origin groups, appeared among the religious Mafdal (NRP), and among the three right-wing lists of Moledet, Tehiya, and Tzomet. Overall, in terms of their relationship to the ethnic background of voters, these results point to a continuum in the transition of party constituencies from mostly European-American to mostly Asian-African, rather than to the contraposition of two ethnic blocs of voters with distinctly different political orientations. It also appears that in 1988 the Labor Alignment was somewhat more European-American than the Likud was Asian-African.

Political cleavages associated with social-class stratification appear to be stronger than those just observed in relation to the ethnic origin of voters. Once again, based on an analysis of electoral results for small areas in Jewish urban localities, by aggregate characteristics of the resident population, the relationship between party preference and socioeconomic status of the area is examined in table 66. Five distinct clusters of parties emerge: (a) strongest in urban areas characterized by higher-than-average social status the Liberal-Radical parties Shinui-Center and Ratz (CRM), which obtained about 70 percent of the respective votes in the two highest socioeconomic quintiles and over 40 percent in the top one; (b) the Labor party and Mapam followed (over 50 percent of votes in the two highest quintiles); (c) somewhere socially intermediate—tending to a higher-middle social status—were the three kindred right-wing movements of Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet; and (d) tending to a lower social status, the Likud and Mafdal (NRP); (e) strongest in lower-than-average social status areas were the three religious parties of Shas, Agudat Israel, and Degel Hatorah (over 50 percent of votes in the two lowest quintiles).

A comparison of the 1988 vote with the previous election of 1984 highlights the strengthening or weakening of the major groups of parties in different ethnic and socioeconomic contexts (table 67). With regard to the ethnicity of voters, the Likud together with the kindred Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet made substantial gains, or incurred relatively minor losses, in predominantly European-American Jewish urban areas. These same parties obtained less remarkable gains, or suffered comparatively more important losses, in neighborhoods with a predominantly Asian-African electorate. In turn, Labor together with the left-of-center kindred parties (Mapam, Ratz, Shinui) won modest net gains in European-American-origin precincts, but incurred more substantial net losses in predominantly Asian or African areas. The religious parties overwhelmingly improved their standing in any type of neighborhood, regardless of origin of voters, though more strikingly so in predominantly Asian-African areas.

An examination of gains and losses of major party groupings between 1984 and 1988 elections, by social status of urban areas (see table 67), confirms that socioeconomic characterization of small residential areas is a much better predictor of voting behavior than ethnic composition of the same areas. Interestingly, there was a similarly positive correlation between electoral gains and an area's socioeconomic status for both the Center-Right to Right (Likud and kindred parties) and the Center-Left to Left (Labor and Liberal-Radical parties) political sectors, though that association was stronger for the former group of parties. Clearly, in 1988 the two major parties were competing directly for the votes of the same higher-than-average socioeconomic groups. This may have implied a certain similarity in electoral strategies and, possibly, a certain convergence of the two major parties toward the center of the political spectrum. On the other hand, for the aggregate of religious parties, the association between electoral gain and an urban area's socioeconomic status was significantly negative. Thus, the religious parties successfully competed for both the Likud's and the Alignment's lower socioeconomic strata.

The associated effects of ethnic origin and socioeconomic status on party preference are shown in table 68. The figures reported are indexes of vote concentration for the major parties or groups of parties, by combined characteristics of statistical areas in Jewish urban localities. In each cell, indexes above 100 indicate overrepresentation of voters with the indicated combination of characteristics; indexes below 100 indicate underrepresentation. Ratios between maximum and minimum indexes in each row and column of table 68 help to evaluate the amount of voter diffusion or polarization prevailing among each party or group of parties. Lower ratios indicate that a party's constituency is sociodemographically more balanced.

The least tendency toward vote concentration appears for the Likud, whose voters are comparatively more spread out across the different ethnic groups and social strata than is the case for other parties. Likud voters display the weakest social-class concentration, after controlling for ethnic origin. As already noted, social diffusion and heterogeneity of voters are consistent with a party's preponderant role in the political system. Kindred parties of the Right political sector appear, too, to be appealing to a quite heterogeneous constituency. Besides their weakness in the lowest socioeconomic quintile, these parties display weakest ethnic-origin concentration, after controlling for social status.

Far greater concentration appears among the other groups of parties examined in table 68. Trends among the religious parties appear to be antithetical to those among Labor and kindred parties of the Center-Left to Left. The former are strongest in areas combining lowest socioeconomic status and strongest Asian or African origin-group concentration; the latter emerge as strongest in areas combining a predominantly European-American background with high socioeconomic status. The socioeconomic base of the Labor Alignment in 1988 was intriguingly narrow, especially in view of the far larger extension of sociological boundaries of the Labor movement in the past.

Wishing to reduce the description of sociodemographic correlates of the Israeli party system to its bare minimum, a tripartite division can be suggested. It would appear that the Center-Left to Left parties, including the Alignment, stand diametrically opposed to the religious parties, while the Center-Right to Right parties, including the Likud, occupy an intermediate position. These findings confirm the suggestions concerning the social profile of party constituencies advanced in the preceding analysis of Israeli party configurations. Contraposition of the Alignment and the Likud, routinely mentioned in discussions of Israeli politics, does not capture the essential relationship between Israel's party system and sociological realities.

It is of particular relevance that the voting patterns of upwardly mobile Jews of Asian-African origin—those concentrated in upper-status residential areas—tend to resemble more the patterns of their European-American peers than those of voters of their own ethnic origin group who belong to lower socioeconomic strata. On the other hand, it seems plausible that the lowest social strata of the Jewish electorate found some of the religious parties more appealing than either of the two major political forces, whether at the left or the right of the political center. These findings tend to indicate that social class is significantly stronger than ethnic background as a correlate of party preferences. At the same time, a considerable number of voters of each major origin group shifted their party preferences from one election to another. Some of these moves probably reflected the changing personal characteristics and political perceptions and interests of the electorate; some were related to the changing issue positions and public images of the competing political parties. The data suggest a substantial fluidity of voting patterns, in marked contrast with deterministic interpretations of the role of ethnicity in the Israeli political process (see below).

Ethnic Background, Political Participation, and Representation

Another important aspect of the role of ethnicity in the political sphere—complementary to that of party preference—is the amount of active participation and share of leadership attained by each origin group. Elite formation and power sharing, in fact, constitute fundamental tests of the amount of ethnic integration attained in society.

Looking at the ethnic background of ruling elites in Israeli society over the years, one finds an overwhelming preponderance of European-born persons.[123] Where sectors such as academic and technical professions, private industry management, or even the judiciary or the military are concerned, such a European preponderance was the natural result of the deep inequalities in wealth, educational attainment, work experience, and seniority of residence in the country that prevailed among the different origin groups during the years of mass immigration and soon afterward. Mechanisms of cooptation into the upward echelons of such specific socioeconomic sectors would have to take into account a candidate's fitness by very stringent professional criteria as well as the existing relational network of the more veteran and established sections of the population. Therefore, there could be no reasonable expectation that in the short run the process of substitution of the entrenched senior personnel would involve significant ethnic change.

With regard to access to public office, and more particularly to elective office, however, it could be presumed that sooner or later the system would have to adapt itself to represent population composition more accurately, particularly in regard to ethnic background. Although persons of Asian-African origin were underrepresented among senior political figures since the onset of statehood, their share of total national officeholders could be expected to increase steadily.

A fundamental parameter in the process of integration is the ability of each ethnic group to produce from its ranks leading role-holders in the public institutional system, even if this does not occur with the same frequency as would be expected from a consideration of the group's numerical size. From this point of view, there was great symbolism attached to the fact that the highly honorific position of president of the state was filled by the Asian-African origin group at least once (Itzhak Navon), as was the crucially important position of chief of staff of the military (Moshe Levy). Several Knesset Speakers have been of Asian-African origin, as were the two vice-prime ministers in the government that was formed after the 1988 elections (Navon and David Levy), and the Histadrut secretary-general (Israel Kesar). The process of ethnic integration cannot be said to be completed, however, unless fairly large representation is simultaneously attained at all levels of the political system.

At what is generally considered to be the most senior political level in

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[123] Yuval Elizur and Eliahu Salpeter, *Who Rules Israel?* (New York, 1973).

Israel, that of government member, between 1949 and 1958 the Asian-African origin group (including the Israeli-born) regularly obtained one single post out of a total ranging between 12 and 16 ministers (corresponding to 6–8 percent of ministerial posts).[124] Between 1959 and 1973 the number of ministers of Asian-African origin rose to 2 out of a total ranging between 15 and 24 (8–13 percent of ministerial posts). By 1989 their share in the government had increased to 9 out of a total of 26 (35 percent).

In the Knesset (constantly set at 120 members since 1948), the number of Jews of Asian-African origin (again including those born in Israel) grew from 8 in 1949 to 19 in 1973—an increase of from 7 to 17 percent, respectively, of the Jewish Knesset members.[125] In 1988 the number of Knesset members of Asian-African origin had grown to 38 (33 percent of total Jews in the House).

As to the ethnic composition of the central party committees of the two major parties, Labor and Herut (the major component of the Likud), it has evolved to be not significantly different.[126] The shares of those of Asian-African origin were 37 percent and 34 percent, respectively, in 1986. Herut had a comparatively higher share of Israeli-born activists of Israeli paternity, some of whom were of Asian-African origin (these are not included in the preceding percentages). The share of the Asian-African origin group was comparatively much larger among officeholders at the municipal level and among national and local trade-union leaders. In 1955, 26 percent of mayors and local council members were of Asian or African origin, this share growing to 47 percent in 1965, and 51 percent in 1983.[127] The proportion of Asian-African origin among members of the Histadrut central council grew from 9 percent in 1955, to 17 percent in 1965, and to 41 percent in 1983.

These trends are visible among both major parties and are further enhanced through the presence in the political system of forces even more attuned to an Asian-African electorate. The implications in the longer run may be quite significant, since local authority and trade-union frameworks may constitute important channels of recruitment for the national political leadership. In turn, structural similarity at the level of second- or third-rank party leadership is consistent with the already noted striving of both major parties to win the confidence of large and ethnically heterogeneous constituencies. It is interesting to note, though, that the party preferences of a majority of the Asian-African origin group have not been influenced by the exact share of candidates of the same origins in the competing lists. This again tends to confirm that ethnic cleavages have not constituted the main factor in the contraposition of the major parties, as may instead have been the case with social-class and ideological differences.

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[124] Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, p. 310.

[125] Ibid., p. 311.

[126] Hana Herzog, Michal Shamir, and Alan Zuckerman, *The Israeli Politician: Social and Political Profiles of Activists of Labor and Herut Parties* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, no. 34, 1989.

[127] Szewach Weiss, *Local Government in Israel: A Study of Its Leadership* (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv, 1972); Lev Grinberg, *Political Activists in Local Authorities and Trade Unions: The Ethnic Dimension* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, no. 33, 1989.

It is also significant that basically the same amount of representation has been achieved by the Asian-African origin group at different levels of the national political system, from the lower one of central party committee, up to Knesset and government member. Results at the top of the system seem therefore to reflect basically what is developing at the bottom in terms of recruitment of political leadership from the rank and file of party supporters. The latter process is highly selective and tends to allocate more space to middle- to upper-middle-class elements[128] whose relative weight, as already noted, is not the same among the different origin groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Mechanisms of mass and selective migration brought to Israel sections of the Jewish Diaspora that had been quite differently affected by processes of modernization. Immigrants from more than fourscore countries possessed distinctive clusters of demographic characteristics, levels of education, social status, religiosity, and other cultural traits. While the different immigrant groups shared a common history and religion and the experience of being minorities in often hostile surrounding societies, their great diversity contained considerable potential for conflict. This was chiefly along lines of religion and secularity, socioeconomic status and interests, and cultural premises and intellectual traditions.

It is important to note that while Israel's creation was largely the product of an idealistic movement of national revival, the "fathers of Zionism" apparently gave little thought to the ramifications of immigrant absorption and ethnic stratification. The two pillars of Zionist thought, *kibbutz galuyot*, the ingathering of the exiles, and *mizug galuyot*, the fusion of the exiles, fundamentally imply homogeneity and egalitarianism in the new Jewish society. This is expressed in Israel's Declaration of Independence, which ensures social justice and equal opportunity to all its citizens. However, while the melting pot would ultimately seem to be the preferred model in the Zionist vision of nation building, there was always a latent, yet sufficiently clear preference for conformity to a predetermined ideal type—in this case, Western and European—because of the intellectual frame of reference of the movement's major leaders and because of the perceived need to build a nation that could hold its own with the leading nations of the world.

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[128] See Diskin, *Elections and Voters in Israel*, p. 159.

The process of mass immigrant absorption occurred in a very compressed period of time, one in which Israeli society was largely dominated by problems of defense and security. This placed a heavy drain on national resources, contributing to competition and inequities. At the same time—and this is what distinguishes the ethnic picture in Israel from that elsewhere—the conflict has been moderated, at least in part, by a sense of solidarity, a recognition that, as Jews, all confront common problems and share the same fate.

This implies that general theories of ethnic stratification may only have partial applicability within the limits of the present study. While the Israeli case should be studied in the larger context of ethnicity patterns in immigrant-absorbing countries, the attempt to deduce straightforward comparisons between ethnic processes among Jews in Israel and among Jews or other groups elsewhere may be deceiving. Keeping this in mind, some broader perspective needs to be provided for the empirical findings.

Observation of countries that have experienced large-scale, heterogeneous immigration—whether or not in the presence of veteran, "native" populations—has led to the formulation of alternative theories of the ethnic dimension in society. Central to the debate on the ever-changing salience of ethnicity is the assessment of the respective role and possible overlap of its social-structural and cultural components. Based on a variety of historical analyses, theoretical assertions, and empirical findings, various analysts have expressed quite different positions, affirming, respectively, the "twilight," "revival," or "transformation" of ethnicity in contemporary societies. These models may be viewed, and have actually served from time to time, as mere descriptions of the present situation, or theoretical expectations, or even normative ideals in relation to the future development of society.[129]

The Israeli case naturally offers ideal ground for confrontation between these different conceptualizations. Israeli society has often been referred to as an "ethnic mosaic" or even a "human laboratory" in which the unfolding of complex social processes tied to ethnicity can be routinely observed in daily life. This obviously reflects the seminal importance of large and heterogeneous immigration in the formative process of the Jewish population, as well as the presence of diverse non-Jewish religious, cultural, and social sectors in Israeli society. Numerous studies have addressed demographic, socioeconomic, and sociocultural differentials connected with origin group among Israel's Jewish population, generating a rich and lively theoretical debate.[130]

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[129] From the classic formulation by Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York, 1964), onward. See, for example, the different positions of: Michael Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York, 1972); Richard D. Alba, *Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity* (Englewood Cliffs, 1985); and William L. Yancey, Eugene Ericksen, and Richard N. Juliani, "Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation," *American Sociological Review*, 41, 1976, pp. 391–403.

Among the major analytical perspectives suggested in the literature dealing with ethnic diversity in Israel, much emphasis used to be placed on the process of nation-building. Israel's success in developing the basic societal infrastructure—legal, institutional, motivational, cultural, economic—in a relatively short span of years and despite enormous difficulties seemed to proponents of this approach more significant than the issues of internal differences, inequality, and even conflict that developed. Much recent research is concerned with the effects of institutional interventions on the unfolding of individual and group mobility processes among immigrants and their children. A prominent point of view perceives the significance of ethnicity to be mainly along cultural lines, and thus of transient salience in an Israeli society that is striving toward greater uniformity. An opposite view stresses ethnic cleavages in Israeli society as fundamentally overlapping with social-class divisions and conflicts. At the extreme of this position, an exploitative interpretation of existing inequalities has been suggested. A further perspective, in a sense intermediate between the two preceding ones, recognizes the existence of various types of stratification—religious, social class, and ethnocultural—as a fundamental characteristic of a pluralistic Israeli society.[131]

Our study has attempted to contribute to these debates by providing some historical background and much substantive and updated evidence concerning the ethnic dimension in contemporary Israeli society.

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[130] Moshe Lissak, "Research on the Ethnic Problem—An Overview" (in Hebrew), in N. Cohen and O. Ahimeir, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Ethnic Problems,* Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, no. 8, 1984, pp. 13–22; Sammy Smooha, "Three Perspectives in the Sociology of Ethnic Relations in Israel" (in Hebrew), in *The Ethnic Problem in Israel—Continuity and Change, Megamot,* 25, 1984, pp. 169–206; S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Development of the Ethnic Problem in Israeli Society,* Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, no. 17, 1986.

[131] Yaacov Nahon, *Trends in Occupational Status—The Ethnic Dimension* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, no. 10, 1984; Nahon, *Patterns of Educational Expansion;* Eliezer Ben Rafael, *The Emergence of Ethnicity: Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel* (London, 1982); S. Svirsky, *Not Deprived But Dispossessed* (in Hebrew; Haifa, 1981); Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict.*

Summary of Major Findings

GENERAL ASPECTS

This study has presented a selective yet diversified overview of the changing role and mutual relationship of the two main origin groups of Israeli Jews. The topics have included immigration, population composition, spatial distribution, marriage, fertility, educational attainment, and political behavior. The emphasis in each case has been on aspects that lend themselves to quantitative measurement, even though it is clear that quantifiable aspects alone do not exhaust a very complex subject, whose subtle psychosocial and symbolic connotations require additional investigative approaches.

The major conclusion to be reached from the overview is that no single type of process characterizes recent trends in the demographic, socioeconomic, and sociopolitical evolution of the major Jewish origin groups in Israel. A surprisingly large number of different patterns appear to coexist regarding the changing presence of the ethnic factor. The starting date, rhythm, and consistency of each of the evolutionary patterns have been different. Consequently, no simple or single conclusion can be drawn about the role of ethnicity in the ongoing process of coalescence of the Jewish sector of Israeli society. While definite and sometimes dramatic changes have appeared in the course of a relatively brief time span of 40 years in each of the areas reviewed in this study, different judgments can be reached about the main thrust of the long-term process of immigrant absorption and integration, depending on which particular process is being examined. In a sense, the emerging trends demonstrate the inadequacy of the basic question which, in its simplest formulation, runs: "Are ethnic-related gaps among Israeli Jews narrowing or widening over time?"

One fundamental element of change in Israeli society over the last decades has been the growing share of Asian-Africans in the total Jewish population. In theory, this might have generated a variety of results ranging between the extremes of a much intensified concentration of the Asian-Africans in segregated areas and strata of society, or a much intensified dispersal throughout areas and strata with a strong presence of European-Americans. Keeping this in mind, the analysis of most demographic processes points to declining differences between the major origin groups, whether through mutual intermingling of persons belonging to the different groups (homogenization), intense accession of members of the Asian-African origin group to more favorable patterns that previously were typical of the European-American group (catching-up), or mutual reduction of previous gaps (convergence). In other areas of Israeli society, the major origin groups are characterized as well by processes of simultaneous but not necessarily equal improvement (convergent, parallel, or divergent rises), by crystallization in different patterns not involving a clear hierarchy of statuses (specialization), or by actual increases in social distance (polarization).

DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS

Homogenization involves achieving the same goal—reduced ethnic diversity—through intensive intermingling with persons of different backgrounds. An example is provided by the continuously increasing proportion of interethnic marriages, which are assumed to be a main factor in reducing the salience of ethnicity among the generation born of such marriages. A further example concerns intense residential mobility into ethnically mixed new residential neighborhoods.

Catching-up involves behavioral stability among the higher status group and upward change or other types of improvement among the lower status group. This pattern is exemplified by the changing spatial distribution, when upward mobility of Asian-Africans has been accompanied by a substantial penetration into existing residential areas which formerly were more exclusively European-American, or by improving local quality of life, through urban renewal projects. This does not mean that identical residential distributions were attained, nor that such a goal was attainable. The patterns of initial settlement of new immigrants in Israel, both nationally and locally, involved a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, sometimes described as a "mosaic of segregated groups."[132] Still, in spite of the considerable residential segregation which persists, a powerful trend toward achieving more equal environments, with regard to both a neighborhood's ethnic composition and amenities, has been at work. A different but conceptually analogous process was the rapid improvement of health standards among Asian-Africans during the early years of statehood and their achieving virtual parity with the longevity patterns of European-Americans.

Convergence involves achieving the same gap-reduction goal through opposite strategies. This was the case with family formation and fertility levels, in which substantial modernization and westernization of behaviors among members of the Asian-African group, leading to fertility reduction, was matched by a significant increase in familism, including some fertility increases, among members of the European-American group.

All of these different patterns point to the gradual formation of a more homogeneous or unitarian approach in the basic demographics of Jewish Israelis. At a minimum, the trends indicate that origin, as distinct from social class, has tended to become less influential in determining preferences related to basic family processes and choice of places of residence. It needs to be added here that these family norms and behaviors stand in striking contrast to those now prevailing in most developed countries, and even more so among the Jewish populations of those countries. Developed countries have experienced over the past 15 years an unprecedented general erosion of family processes, whose most conspicuous result has been a fertility level much below generational replacement. Judging by their still considerably high propensity to marry and their moderately high fertility levels, Israelis have developed a distinctive demographic environment which may be seen as the product of ethnic integration, at least as one among several other contributing factors.

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[132] Vivian Klaff, "Residence and Integration in Israel: A Mosaic of Segregated Groups," *Ethnicity*, 7, 1977, pp. 103–121.

SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECTS

The leading trends in educational attainment, as well as other socioeconomic trends not discussed in this study, can be defined as *simultaneous rises* in the standards of all major origin groups. The relative amounts of rise have varied considerably, thus generating patterns of *convergent, parallel, or divergent rises*. General improvement appears especially in enrollment patterns at the primary and secondary levels and partly at higher educational levels. Catching-up of the Asian-African group was virtually completed by the mid-1980s for the amount of schooling attained at age 20, but significant gaps between the major origin groups persist in the types of secondary schools attended and the frequency of enrollment in college and university studies. In many respects, by the late 1980s these gaps could be operationally defined as a time lag (roughly corresponding to about 20 years) in the educational attainment of Asian-Africans as compared to European-Americans. The data indeed indicate that the educational characteristics of Jews of Asian-African origin in the 1980s stood at the same, or even a slightly better, level than that of Jews of European-American origin during the 1960s.[133] In the 1960s the relative disadvantage of Asian-Africans was substantially greater. Catching-up has been more rapid among women than among men.

Considering the initial social characteristics of Asian-African immigrants during the late 1940s and early 1950s, these are remarkable achievements. At the same time, European-Americans have not been immobile. Consequently, the absolute gap between the two origin groups at the higher end of the educational attainment scale remained very large in the 1980s and was in fact only moderately smaller than in the 1960s, though at a much improved level for all.

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[133] See also Nahon, *Patterns of Educational Expansion*, pp. 31–32.

Comparisons of the educational achievement of the foreign-born and the Israeli-born reveal one of the critical human cost factors of Israeli society, especially for young male adults raised and educated locally. Israeli-educated young adults are shown to be impaired in their higher-education achievements, especially when compared with education achieved abroad by the more recently immigrated foreign-born of the same origin group. An insuperable constraint here seems to be connected with the different positions of the Jews as a minority and a majority, respectively, in the Diaspora and Israel. In the Diaspora, under the prevailing conditions of status as a small minority, universal or quasi-universal academization of the Jewish young adult generation has been a long-standing normative goal, attained by a majority. In Israel, academization can actually be accomplished only by a more or less substantial minority, considering the much more complex labor-force requirements of a country which must take care of all of its necessities, including agriculture, industrial production, and military service.

This is the more so since Israel has adopted selective criteria of admission to its higher education system—in accordance with the prevailing system in some Western and Central European countries and unlike the open and less selective practice in other developed countries, such as the United States. Under these circumstances, many more academics of one group may imply somewhat fewer academics of another group and competition may become intense (unless the state enforces negative quotas on the higher-status group—which seems operationally quite unfeasible in Israel). So far, then, the more favorable initial characteristics of European-Americans have clearly permitted them to continue keeping a conspicuous relative advantage, though Asian-Africans have been slowly improving their relative standing.

Somewhat similar trends (not discussed in detail in this study) appear in the occupational sphere. There, however, the patterns are more complicated. Rather than reflecting one linear and absolute criterion—years of study or educational degrees attained—the possible occupational patterns are much more flexible and multiform. Various trade-offs between occupational prestige, decisional power, and income are conceivable. Options for upward occupational mobility may exist, regardless of educational attainment.[134] An appropriate description of the difference between the major origin groups may be, again, a time lag to the advantage of European-Americans. This refers in particular to the growing percentage of the labor force in academic, technical, and managerial occupations, and to declines in agriculture and semiskilled or nonskilled production work. Yet, it is not self-evident that the same final distributions should be expected for the two origin groups. As in any societal setup involving the presence of different groups, some amount of group occupational specialization is likely to develop and is in fact occurring in Israel.

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[134] Nahon, *Trends in Occupational Status.*

At the same time, the very processes of ethnic gap reduction just described in the demographic and socioeconomic areas have tended to produce some increased *polarization*. The fact that among persons of Asian-African origin marriage with European-American spouses and residential mobility into ethnically mixed localities and neighborhoods have been associated with upward mobility implies leaving behind the nonmobile, the downwardly mobile, or those, e.g., the elderly, whose mobility opportunities are exhausted. Therefore, given the asymmetric socioeconomic stratification of European-Americans and Asian-Africans, the bottom social strata have tended to remain homogeneously ethnic, namely, Asian-African. Nationally, this situation involves a minority of the total population, and even a minority of the Asian-African group. Yet, the pattern itself cannot be ignored in the global assessment of the role of gaps in Israeli society.

It is with regard to socioeconomic processes that the polarization trend seems to be of greatest significance. The process in which the least socially mobile are left behind and become ethnically more homogeneous has sometimes been referred to as generating a deprived "ethnoclass." This corresponds to the lower stratum of the Asian-African origin group, including its Israeli-born descendants. Its possible isolation from ongoing processes of sociodemographic mobility and ethnic equalization constitutes the very problematic hard core of the ethnic problem among Israel's Jews.

Viewed through the prism of social indicators, however, the overall socioeconomic position of the major origin groups is not one of real polarization but rather of unequal representation on the rungs of the social ladder. One can see this clearly by looking at the varying weight of each origin group within income deciles. The following are the percentages of Asian-African-born out of all foreign-born Jewish heads of households in urban households, by deciles of net income per capita in 1986–87:[135]

Total	Highest Decile	9th	8th	7th	6th	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	Lowest Decile
44	18	25	28	40	46	55	53	60	60	68

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[135] CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1989. Jews born in Israel and non-Jews were excluded from the following calculations.

In comparison to their percentage among total urban households (44 percent), Asian-Africans are clearly underrepresented—but not absent—in the three upper-income deciles, and clearly overrepresented—but not alone—in the three lower deciles.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

One of the most interesting patterns has emerged in the political sphere. The findings discussed above indicate clearly that rather than being characterized by a simple bivariate mechanism, the relationship between ethnic origin group and ideological preferences—as expressed in party choices—appears to be strongly mediated by the socioeconomic status of voters. Ethnic, socioeconomic, and political characteristics of the population, as already noted, are related to a great deal of ecological concentration. As shown earlier in this study, the ethnic composition of different social strata among the Jewish population is quite different. Lower social strata still have a predominantly Asian-African origin, while the majority in higher social strata have a European-American background. Similar relationships exist between religiosity levels and ethnic origins. These overlaps between social, ideological, and ethnic differentiations may lead to some confusion with regard to the real motives behind political choices, especially in relation to the role played by the voting patterns of main ethnic groups in determining the balance between major political forces in the country. The question refers in particular to the shift to the Likud of sections of the electorate of Asian-African origin, large parts of which had previously supported the leading Mapai party and its Labor Alignment successor.

Deterministic political interpretations tend to attribute the major thrust of Israeli political changes to shifts in the demographic composition of the population, namely, the changing weight of different ethnic groups. Assuming rather stable political allegiances within each major origin group, and each group's alleged differential rate of growth in the voting population, the current and future trends in Israeli politics are presumed to depend primarily on the changing demographic balance between ethnic groups.[136] The political choices of Israelis, particularly of those of Asian-African origin, are attributed, by such reasoning, to primordial sociocultural allegiances rather than to substantive political considerations. Such an argument, promoted by the Likud's electoral increases during the late 1970s and early 1980s, seems to downplay the fact that Israeli voters of all origins actually showed a substantial amount of party mobility over the last 30 years.

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[136] Yochanan Peres and Sara Shemer, "The Ethnic Factor in the Elections to the Tenth Knesset" (in Hebrew), in *The Ethnic Problem in Israel—Continuity and Change, Megamot*, 25, 1984, pp. 316–331.

Indeed, the same Likud, or more significantly the whole Center-Right to Right political sector, after reaching a peak in 1981, tended to decline through 1988, in spite of the continuing moderate increases in the percentage of Asian-Africans out of the total Jewish population.

Even more interesting, though, is the fact that the decisive event at the turning point of the 1977 elections was not the Likud's plurality of votes, but rather the fact that many of Labor's former voters opted out. It was this virtual split of the predominantly European-American Labor camp that dramatically modified the parliamentary balance and coalition-making opportunities in Israel. These voting shifts reflected the dissatisfaction—in the context of the mid-1970s—of large strata of Israeli society with the party that had ruled the country since independence and before. At the same time, these changes seem to have reflected the Likud's shift, from being largely European, middle-class, and rather secular, to being populist, interclassist, and not antireligious. This combination of factors apparently was particularly appealing to middle-lower socioeconomic strata in the population, disappointed with the Labor movement, seeking a strong national image, and asking for more active participation in the political system. Many of these voters were of Asian-African origin.

It would appear, then, that in the Israeli political system, beyond narrow group interests the major determinants of political behavior have been rationally motivated political choices, which in turn reflected the different existential experiences of different strata of the electorate. Party shifts by large sections of certain ethnic groups may have occurred much more on the grounds of general, national political goals and aspirations than in relation to particularistic, ethnic-related interests.[137] It appears that the same political causes sometimes determined different political choices among ethnically different people. Ethnic allegiances functioned as an important contributing factor in Israeli politics primarily to the extent that ethnic origin partly overlapped with two other major explanatory variables of political behavior—socioeconomic status and religious-national ideology. There is no point in denying some independent effects of ethnicity in the party choices of Israelis, but overall such effects were secondary as compared to other factors.

In the Israeli experience, the possibly common normative goal of more equal power sharing between major origin groups conflicts with what is essentially a zero-sum situation: in spite of the continuous significant expansion in the number and types of public offices available, more power to one group means less power to some other group. Hence, the existing veteran, overwhelmingly European political elites demonstrated a great slowness, if not reluctance, in allowing greater access to power to the emergent strata of the newer Asian-African groups. As a reaction, a circumventing strategy was enacted by members of the Asian-African group, mainly through the maneuvering space offered by the veteran party system, and to some extent with the flanking assistance of smaller and ethnically militant political new formations. The results achieved, in terms of percentages of political elite positions now held by Asian-Africans, are superior to those just demonstrated with regard to the upper-income strata, and by implication, occupational elites.

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[137] Hanna Herzog, "Political Ethnicity in Israel" (in Hebrew), in *The Ethnic Problem in Israel*, ibid., pp. 332–352.

It may be legitimate to assume that the progress attained in the political sphere will influence, at least indirectly, the further chances for advancement and gap reduction of Asian-Africans in the socioeconomic sphere, through the emerging network of personal contacts and through legislation or other interventions. In any event, it has been shown earlier in this study that political behavior reflects the socioeconomic stratification of origin groups more than ethnicity per se. Proof is to be had in the overwhelming vote for extremely religious parties with a strong ethnic appeal among the lower socioeconomic strata, possibly including some cases of actual downward mobility, and the vote for either of the two major parties or for smaller formations to the left-of-center among the higher strata of each origin group.

OTHER SOCIOCULTURAL ASPECTS

Even in the sociocultural sphere, independent processes of ethnic equalization are clearly visible. Religiosity patterns have evolved to be quite independent of ethnic background.[138] A similar continuum from most to least religious now obtains among younger cohorts within each major origin group, in contrast to a previous generation in which Asian-Africans were much more traditional than most European-Americans—with the exception of an ultra-Orthodox minority of mostly European background. Moreover, on a more general plane, the differences in socioeconomic stratification, personal experience, and related personal satisfaction of Jews of Asian-African and European-American origins do not seem to have produced significantly different cognitive attitudes about the reality of Israeli society.[139] Rather, people belonging to each origin group appear to have quite similar perceptions of the mutual relationships and contradictions between the major social, economic, legal, political, and attitudinal variables at work in Israeli society and of their possible effects on the widening or narrowing of social gaps. Perhaps the most significant implication of this relative uniformity of perceptions and mental maps is that it narrows the ground for possible ethnic tensions in Israeli society based on an organic combination of conflicting socioeconomic interests with hostile ethnic stereotypes.

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[138] Goldscheider and Friedlander, "Religiosity Patterns in Israel," pp. 3–39.

[139] Zeev Ben-Sira, *Alienated Identification in Jewish-Israeli Society: Interethnic Relations and Integration* (in Hebrew; Jerusalem, 1987), especially pp. 58–88 and 129–137.

Role of Ethnicity in Social Stratification

In conclusion, a few remarks should be added about the changing role of ethnicity in the Jewish sector of Israeli society. As in any other society, but perhaps more distinctly so in the Israeli case, there coexist multiple bases of identification between individual and society. Ethnicity, which is fundamentally a derivative of geographical background abroad and of the cultural and socioeconomic traits associated with countries of origin, is only one of them. Two other highly relevant variables are socioeconomic status and ideological orientation, the latter itself a complex of variables, including mostly, but not exclusively, religiosity.

Ascription to a given origin group is a primordial, transmitted characteristic. Overall, little statutory legitimation is given to communities of origin in the Israeli social system. The major exception is represented by the Chief Rabbinate, and more generally by the set of national and local institutions which deal with religious matters, including personal status. In these matters, separate branches of the same institution provide services to Ashkenazim and Sephardim (in the wide sense of the latter term). True, the process of immigrant absorption often resulted in geographic concentration of immigrants from the same place of origin; however, this more often reflected contingent expedients rather than a clear ideological directive. In more recent years, greater recognition and legitimation have been awarded to *edot* as intermediate social frameworks, the main rationale being that ethnic-group identification may help the individual process of emotional identification with society at large. But it is practically impossible to establish an accepted hierarchy of origin groups—apart from the respective socioeconomic and religious correlates—or criteria for mobility between groups.

In comparison, social class provides a conventional criterion for social stratification, the belonging to which is more flexible and which definitely allows for internal mobility. At least ideally, no legitimation is provided in Israeli society for social-class divisions and inequality. Yet, the socioeconomic fabric includes important sectors—namely, the Histadrut and its numerous associated social and industrial institutions—which, at least nominally, are supposed to care primarily for the interests of the working class or other particular socioeconomic groups. In any event, the amount of social conflict related to economic interest and to class solidarity seems to be more diffuse and persistent than ethnic conflict in Israeli society.

Segregation and cleavages connected with religious attitudes and practices probably are even more intense and durable. Divisions based on religion are, indeed, officially sanctioned within the Israeli social system. For example, separate educational systems are available to *haredi* (ultra-Orthodox), religious, and secular Jews. The choice to belong to any of these educational systems is the sole prerogative of citizens—in fact, of the pupils' parents. But once the choice is made, the likelihood of significant interaction between youth belonging to each of these educational systems becomes reduced until a later stage in life, be it military service or, even later, participation in the labor force. Separate and parallel tracks, characterized by different religious content, thus direct the main stages of socialization of the new generation of Israelis.

Another stratification factor that was powerfully at work in the past was *vetek*—seniority in the country. During the British Mandate and during the early statehood period, *vetek* often was the sole status differentiator among people, mostly refugees, who, for the most part, lacked any economic means and whose familiarity with the local language and culture was extremely limited. In the course of time, with the decline of immigration and with the gradual growth to numerical predominance of the local-born sector of the Jewish population, the societal relevance of seniority has tended to decline.

Several mechanisms of social change, already mentioned in the preceding analysis, have directly or indirectly affected the ethnic dimension in Israeli society. Three different factors of transformation call for particular attention.

Institutional interventions: the introduction of laws and regulations affecting the whole population or very large sections of it. Relevant examples are the introduction of compulsory education and the lengthening of its duration; regulations establishing the basic approach and technical standards concerning the absorption of new immigrants; regulations affecting the labor market and the main patterns of economic activity; compulsory national insurance and transfer payments; compulsory military service; official recognition of the role of religion in society; and other broad interventions of the institutional system in the life of the individual.

Compositional changes: sociodemographic trends affecting variations in the size of successive birth or marriage cohorts, the size and composition of immigration waves, the size of cohorts joining the educational system and the labor force, and the like. By affecting the basic size and composition of the population, and the environments within which each specific process occurred, these changes powerfully determined the constraints and opportunities that were available over time to each individual and to society globally.

Behavioral changes: widespread changes in the attitudes of, or opportunities available to, the public at large. Changes in the country's economic position, whether due to its intrinsic productive capacity, foreign help, or other factors, led to widespread changes in patterns of income and consumption and to general changes in the standard of living of the population. Changes in educational attainment, namely, the general diffusion of elementary and secondary schooling, fundamentally affected the training patterns of the younger generation toward meeting the manpower needs of an industrialized nation.[140] Large-scale changes in values and norms of the population took place as a result of continued exposure to mass-communication channels, whether originating from within or outside the country. The results of these changes can be observed in many areas, such as preferred family size, propensities to attend school at various educational levels, occupational preferences reflecting the evolving prestige of different occupations, individual attitudes toward religion, political behavior, and so on.

One further significant factor of social change, whose impact goes beyond its basically compositional nature, has been the role of Israeli non-Jews in processes of Jewish immigrant absorption, ethnic integration, and socioeconomic stratification. While these effects could not be dealt with in any detail in this study, it is quite obvious that Jews in Israeli society do not live in a vacuum. The presence of relatively important Arab minorities within the State of Israel inside the pre-1967 Green Line and, even more significantly, the contiguity with a large Arab population in the areas administered since 1967, deeply impinged on socioeconomic and political processes among the Jewish population. The major effect probably was the sudden availability of a relatively large and unsophisticated labor force that could fulfill roles at the bottom of the social ladder, thus enabling the lower sectors of the Jewish labor force (mostly of Asian-African origin) to move toward other endeavors. Further important effects concerned the definition of Jewish group identity and that part of political behavior more directly connected with identificational factors.

These varied and complementary factors of change exerted conflicting effects on the characteristics and trends of the Jewish population. Some of these factors, e. g., laws aiming at equalization, probably tended to reduce preexisting gaps. Other factors, such as mass immigration or even certain mechanisms inherent in a free-market society, at times enhanced inequality. In particular, the shock of the mass immigration experience appears to have had longer-term effects on life chances among the immigrants themselves, as well as among their children. In the final analysis, what can be evaluated is the product of the continuing interactions between these different factors of change and the ever evolving social reality.

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[140] Adler, "Jewish Education in Israel: A Sociological Perspective," pp. 485–504.

The product seems to be an ethnicity which, much less than in the past, constitutes a universal and primordial differentiator of Israel's Jewish population. Varying intensities of the ethnic factor coexist today in society, ranging from a relative minority for whom homogeneous cultural and socioeconomic environments reinforce the permanence of a strong and nearly all-encompassing ethnic bond; through a majority for whom ethnic origin is a definite frame of reference and an enriching element but which nevertheless is oriented toward more neutral and homogeneous Israeli socioeconomic goals and cultural ways of expression; down to a further group for whom any cultural remnant of, or interest in, the past ethnic origin has been completely lost (whether or not that origin can be genealogically traced). These various coexisting situations define, respectively, a coherent and cohesive ethnic community, a meaningful social group, or a mere statistical category.

While the effects of time and generation operate toward enhancing the presence of the weaker types just listed, the role of ethnicity is not bound to be lost completely. Different cultural traditions and tastes, different modes of functioning in familial and other social networks, and other similar variables continue to operate as significant factors of differentiation in Israeli society.[141] To this must be added the factor of rising expectations. Whatever social equality among Israeli ethnic-origin groups has been achieved might strengthen the demand for even greater parity. At the same time, a possibility remains that ethnic-origin stereotypes will become somewhat associated with social status. If this were to happen, the socially mobile Israeli-born of Asian-African origin, or more significantly the mobile children of interethnic marriages, might come to be identified by themselves or by others according to a neutral Israeli identity, while their socially stagnant or downwardly mobile homologues might be perceived as of Asian-African origin. To what extent this type of crystallization, which currently exists at the margins of the ethnic stratification system, might persist or intensify is difficult to say at this point.

It may be expected that the further evolution of the ethnic dimension, whether toward greater equalization or in the opposite direction, will reflect the nature of overall developments in the Israeli economy and the availability of socioeconomic opportunities. Judging from developments over the last few decades, relative prosperity and stability may be conducive to a continuation of integrative trends, thanks especially to the crucial catching-up pattern on the part of Asian-Africans. On the other hand, economic or political crises and the consequent public tensions and competition for limited resources may lead to intensification of the persisting potentialities for ethnic polarization and conflicts. In this respect, the present prospect for intensified immigration from Eastern Europe may well constitute a test of existing trends. At any given time, people belonging to different origin groups in Israel may perceive that their socioeconomic characteristics and interests differ. In considering the future of the ethnic dimension in Israeli society, it is the objective socioeconomic situations underlying such diverging perceptions—much more than ethnic attitudes per se—that seem to constitute the main focus for concern and possible public intervention.

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[141] Pnina Morag-Talmon, "The Integration Processes of Eastern Jews in Israeli Society, 1948–1988," in Medding, ed., *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 5, pp. 25–38; Eliezer Ben-Rafael, "The Changing Experience, Power and Prestige of Ethnic Groups in Israel: The Case of the Moroccans," in Medding, ed., ibid., pp. 39–58.

In any event, as Israeli society continues to evolve, the ethnic dimension will continue to represent one of the constituting factors, and not the least one, of the ongoing transformations. Several more generations may be necessary before the final results of the whole saga of Jewish immigration and absorption in Israel, and the consequent long-term processes of ethnic and social stratification, can be appropriately assessed.

APPENDIX

Statistical Tables

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NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

"Origin" refers to the regional division used in Israel's official statistics: Israel, Asia-Africa (or each of these continents separately), and Europe-America. "Major origin groups" means Asian-African and European-American, omitting the Israeli origin group. "Dichotomous origin groups" likewise means Asian-Africans and European-Americans, but with the Israeli origin group having been divided according to ultimate origin abroad.

NOTATION

—	No respective cases exist.
. .	Cases exist but their number is not known.
()	Data are derived from small numbers of cases or are otherwise of limited reliability, such as estimates.
x	Even smaller numbers of cases are available, which cannot be relied on for meaningful results.

Because of rounding of figures, particular items may not add to a given (sub)total.

TABLE 1. JEWISH IMMIGRANTS,[a] BY CONTINENT OF LAST RESIDENCE AND PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION, 1948[b]–1988

Period of Immigration	In Thousands			Percent[c]						
	Total in Period	Cumulative	Annual Average	Total	Asia-Africa			Europe-America		
					Total	Asia	Africa	Total	Europe	America-Oceania
1948[b]–1988										
In thousands	1,804.4	1,804.4	44.4	1,804.4[d]	784.7	357.3	427.4	994.4	824.6	169.8
Percent				100.0	44.1	20.1	24.0	55.9	46.4	9.5
1948[b]–1951	686.7	686.7	189.2	100.0	50.0	35.8	14.2	50.0	49.3	0.7
1952–1954	54.1	740.8	18.0	100.0	76.4	24.6	51.8	23.6	18.1	5.5
1955–1957	164.9	905.7	55.0	100.0	68.3	5.3	63.0	31.7	29.5	2.2
1958–1960	75.5	981.2	25.2	100.0	36.1	17.6	18.5	64.0	59.2	4.8
1961–1964	228.0	1,209.2	57.0	100.0	59.5	8.6	50.9	40.5	34.0	6.5
1965–1968	81.3	1,290.5	20.3	100.0	49.7	18.5	31.2	50.3	38.9	11.4
1969–1971	116.5	1,407.0	38.8	100.0	27.4	17.0	10.4	72.5	43.3	29.1
1972–1974	142.8	1,549.8	47.6	100.0	9.2	4.4	4.8	90.8	72.0	18.8
1975–1979	124.8	1,674.6	25.0	100.0	14.3	9.5	4.8	85.7	62.1	23.6
1980–1984	83.6	1,758.2	16.7	100.0	27.1	8.3	18.8	72.9	42.6	30.3
1985–1988	46.2	1,804.4	11.5	100.0	24.4	11.7	12.7	75.7	42.8	32.9

[a] As from 1970 including non-Jewish family members of immigrants.

[b] As from May 15, 1948.

[c] Except for first line.

[d] Including "unknown" cases.

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (hereafter, CBS), *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1989.

TABLE 2. FOREIGN-BORN JEWS, BY CONTINENT OF BIRTH AND PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION, 1961–1988 (PERCENT)

Period of Immigration	Total	Asia-Africa			Europe-America
		Total	Asia	Africa	
			1961		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Up to 1947	26.6	10.2	16.0	2.8	39.5
1948–1954	53.6	63.5	76.0	47.2	45.8
1955+	19.8	26.2	8.0	50.0	14.7
			1972		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Up to 1947	19.4	7.0	12.4	2.1	30.4
1948–1954	40.0	46.1	65.2	28.8	34.5
1955–1964	27.5	35.3	11.8	56.6	20.6
1965+	13.1	11.6	10.6	12.5	14.5
			1983		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Up to 1947	15.4	6.5	11.1	2.2	22.3
1948–1954	34.0	43.7	61.3	27.6	26.5
1955–1964	23.7	33.4	11.2	53.6	16.1
1965–1974	16.3	11.9	11.0	12.6	19.8
1975+	10.6	4.6	5.3	3.9	15.3
			1988		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Up to 1947	13.4	5.8	10.3	2.0	19.6
1948–1954	32.4	41.9	60.4	25.8	24.7
1955–1964	23.2	32.6	11.3	51.1	15.6
1965–1979	22.3	14.0	14.4	13.6	29.1
1980+	8.6	5.6	3.6	7.4	11.0

Sources: CBS: 1961 census, vol. 13; 1972 census, vol. 10; 1983 census, vol. 7; Special Publication 215; *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1989; unpublished data.

TABLE 3. FOREIGN-BORN JEWS, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION, 1983 (PERCENT)

Country of Birth	Total	Up to 1947	1948–1954	1955–1964	1965–1974	1975+
Total	100.0	15.4	34.0	23.7	16.3	10.6
Asia, total	100.0	11.1	61.3	11.2	11.0	5.3
Turkey	100.0	13.3	47.5	16.1	17.2	5.8
Syria, Lebanon	100.0	41.9	18.0	16.2	15.1	8.7
Iraq	100.0	6.0	90.1	1.8	1.8	0.3
Yemen, S. Yemen	100.0	20.6	76.3	2.1	0.7	0.3
Iran	100.0	4.0	37.0	26.3	17.4	15.4
India	100.0	0.7	14.8	24.7	50.2	9.7
Other Asia	100.0	18.8	54.2	10.6	9.6	6.7
Africa, total	100.0	2.2	27.6	53.6	12.6	3.9
Morocco	100.0	0.8	17.0	67.2	13.6	1.5
Tunisia, Algeria	100.0	1.5	34.4	44.4	14.5	5.2
Libya	100.0	3.8	85.2	3.4	7.1	0.5
Egypt, Sudan	100.0	11.5	46.8	35.9	4.6	1.3
Other Africa	100.0	3.3	6.2	14.3	20.8	55.4
Europe-America, total	100.0	22.3	26.5	16.1	19.8	15.3
USSR	100.0	15.5	7.3	7.3	40.9	29.1
Poland	100.0	43.1	35.8	14.8	4.3	1.9
Czechoslovakia	100.0	37.9	49.5	4.1	6.4	2.0
Hungary	100.0	26.2	41.8	23.6	5.0	3.4
Romania	100.0	9.8	37.2	35.0	12.8	5.2
Bulgaria, Greece	100.0	26.4	67.6	3.2	1.7	1.0
Germany, Austria	100.0	60.3	25.7	3.7	5.7	4.5
Other Europe	100.0	10.2	21.7	14.7	23.9	29.6
North America, Oceania	100.0	2.7	3.4	6.2	36.1	51.6
Latin America	100.0	1.6	5.4	20.3	37.8	34.8

Source: CBS, 1983, census vol. 7.

TABLE 4. GROWTH OF JEWISH POPULATION, BY COMPONENTS, 1948[a]–1988

Period[b]	Annual Growth Rate (per 1,000)	Components of Growth (%)	
		Migration Balance	Natural Increase
1948[a]–1988	44	46.2	53.8
1948[a]–1960	92	68.9	31.1
1961–1971	30	45.0	55.0
1972–1982	21	25.1	74.9
1983–1988	15	5.4	94.6

[a] As from May 15, 1948.

[b] Approximately corresponding to intervals between censuses (except for last line).

Source: CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1989.

TABLE 5. JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGION OF BIRTH OR ORIGIN, 1948–2000 (IN THOUSANDS)

Region	All Ages						Ages 15+	
	1948	1961	1972	1983[a]	1988	% Change 1961–88	1988	2000[b]
				Region of Birth				
All Jews	716.7	1,932.4	2,686.7	3,371.0	3,659.0	89.4	2,577.1	3,103.3
Israeli-born, total	253.7	730.4	1,272.3	1,946.1	2,315.9	217.1	1,273.8	2,016.4
Father born in:								
Israel	. .	106.9	225.8	540.0	786.3	635.5	245.0	619.9
Asia-Africa	. .	288.5	608.9	863.4	940.3	225.9	618.0	863.3
Asia	. .	189.8	339.8	446.8	468.7	146.9	339.8	436.8
Africa	. .	98.7	269.1	416.6	471.6	377.8	278.2	426.5
Europe-America	. .	335.0	437.6	542.7	589.4	75.9	410.8	533.1
Foreign-born, total	468.0	1,201.9	1,414.4	1,424.9	1,343.1	11.7	1,303.2	1,087.0
Asia-Africa	70.0	529.8	665.0	622.9	601.3	13.5	591.9	485.9
Asia	57.8	300.1	316.1	297.3	278.8	−7.1	276.1	216.3
Africa	12.2	229.7	348.9	325.6	322.5	40.4	315.8	269.6
Europe-America	393.0	672.1	749.4	802.0	741.8	10.4	711.3	601.1

TABLE 5.—*(Continued)*

Region	All Ages						Ages 15+	
	1948	1961	1972	1983[a]	1988	% Change 1961–88	1988	2000[b]
				Origin, by Region of Birth				
All Jews	. .	1,932.4	2,686.7	3,371.0	3,659.0	89.4	2,577.1	3,103.3
Israel	. .	106.9	225.8	540.0	786.3	635.5	245.0	619.9
Asia-Africa, total	. .	818.3	1,273.9	1,486.3	1,541.6	88.4	1,209.9	1,349.2
Foreign-born	. .	529.8	665.0	622.9	601.3	13.5	591.9	485.9
Israeli-born	. .	288.5	608.9	863.4	940.3	225.9	618.0	863.3
Asia, total	. .	490.0	655.9	744.1	747.5	52.6	615.9	653.1
Foreign-born	. .	300.1	316.1	297.3	278.8	−7.1	276.1	216.3
Israeli-born	. .	189.9	339.8	446.8	468.7	146.8	339.8	436.8
Africa, total	. .	328.3	618.0	742.2	794.1	141.9	594.0	696.1
Foreign-born	. .	229.7	348.9	325.6	322.5	40.4	315.8	269.6
Israeli-born	. .	98.6	269.1	416.6	471.6	378.3	278.2	426.5
Europe-America, total	. .	1,007.1	1,187.0	1,344.7	1,331.2	32.2	1,122.1	1,134.2
Foreign-born	. .	672.1	749.4	802.0	741.8	10.4	711.3	601.1
Israeli-born	. .	335.0	437.6	542.7	589.4	75.9	410.8	533.1
				Origin, Condensed				
All Jews	—	1,932.4	2,686.7	3,371.0	3,659.0	89.4	2,577.1	3,103.3
Israel	—	106.9	225.8	540.0	786.3	635.5	245.0	619.9
Asia-Africa	—	818.4	1,273.9	1,486.3	1,541.6	88.4	1,209.9	1,349.2
Europe-America	—	1,007.1	1,187.0	1,344.7	1,331.2	32.2	1,122.1	1,134.2
				Origin, Dichotomous				
All Jews	—	1,932.4	2,686.7	3,371.0	3,659.0	89.4	2,577.1	3,103.3
Asia-Africa	—	841.3	1,346.5	1,700.7	1,889.3	124.5	1,287.9	1,612.6
Europe-America	—	1,091.1	1,340.2	1,670.3	1,769.7	62.2	1,289.2	1,490.7

[a] Adjusted census data.

[b] Projection.

Sources: CBS: 1961 census, vol. 13; 1972 census, vol. 6; 1983 census, vol. 7; Special Publications 215, 791, 828; *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1989; unpublished data.

Jewish from 5

TABLE 6. JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGION OF BIRTH, 1948–2000 (PERCENT)

Region	All Ages					Ages 15+	
	1948	1961	1972	1983[a]	1988	1988	2000[b]
				Region of Birth			
All Jews	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Israeli-born, total	35.4	37.8	47.4	57.7	63.3	49.4	65.0
Father born in:							
Israel	. .	5.5	8.4	16.0	21.5	9.5	20.0
Asia-Africa	. .	14.9	22.7	25.7	25.7	24.0	27.8
Asia	. .	9.8	12.7	13.3	12.8	13.2	14.1
Africa	. .	5.1	10.0	12.4	12.9	10.8	13.7
Europe-America	. .	17.3	16.3	16.1	16.1	15.9	17.2
Foreign-born, total	64.6	62.2	52.7	42.3	36.7	50.5	35.1
Asia-Africa	9.8	27.4	24.8	18.5	16.4	22.9	15.7
Asia	8.1	15.5	11.8	8.8	7.6	10.7	7.0
Africa	1.7	11.9	13.0	9.7	8.8	12.2	8.7
Europe-America	54.8	34.8	27.9	23.8	20.3	27.6	19.4
				Foreign-born, by Region of Birth			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Asia-Africa	15.1	44.0	47.0	43.7	44.8	45.4	44.7
Asia	12.5	24.9	22.3	20.9	20.8	21.2	19.9
Africa	2.6	19.1	24.7	22.8	24.0	24.2	24.8
Europe-America	84.9	55.9	53.0	56.3	55.2	54.6	55.3
				Israeli-born, by Father's Region of Birth			
Total	. .	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Israel	. .	14.6	17.7	27.7	34.0	19.2	30.7
Asia-Africa	. .	39.5	47.9	44.4	40.6	48.5	42.9
Asia	. .	26.0	26.7	23.0	20.2	26.7	21.7
Africa	. .	13.5	21.2	21.4	20.4	21.8	21.2
Europe-America	. .	45.9	34.4	27.9	25.4	32.2	26.4

[a], [b]See notes a and b to table 5.
Source: Same as table 5.

TABLE 7. JEWISH POPULATION, BY ORIGIN AND REGION OF BIRTH, 1961–2000 (PERCENT)

Origin, Region of Birth	All Ages				Ages 15+	
	1961	1972	1983[a]	1988	1988	2000[b]
			Origin			
All Jews	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Israel	5.5	8.4	16.0	21.5	9.5	20.0
Asia-Africa, total	42.3	47.4	44.0	42.1	46.9	43.5
Asia	25.3	24.4	22.0	20.4	23.9	21.1
Africa	17.0	23.0	22.0	21.7	23.0	22.4
Europe-America, total	52.1	44.2	39.9	36.4	43.5	36.6
			Origin, Dichotomous			
All Jews	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Asia-Africa	43.5	50.1	50.4	51.6	50.0	52.0
Europe-America	56.5	49.9	49.6	48.4	50.0	48.0
			Region of Birth, by Dichotomous Origin			
Israeli-born, father born in Israel[c]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Asia-Africa	32.9	32.2	39.7	44.2	31.8	42.5
Europe-America	67.1	67.8	60.3	55.8	68.2	57.5
Israeli-born, father foreign-born	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Asia-Africa	46.2	58.2	61.4	61.4	60.0	61.8
Europe-America	53.7	41.8	38.6	38.5	39.9	38.2
Foreign-born	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Asia-Africa	44.0	47.0	43.7	44.8	45.4	44.7
Europe-America	55.9	53.0	56.3	55.2	54.6	55.3
			Percent Israeli-born, by Origin			
All Jews	37.8	47.4	57.7	63.3	49.4	65.0
Israel	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Asia-Africa	35.2	47.7	58.1	61.0	51.1	64.0
Asia	38.8	51.8	60.0	62.7	55.2	66.9
Africa	30.0	43.5	56.1	59.4	46.8	61.3
Europe-America	33.3	36.9	40.4	44.3	36.6	47.0

[a], [b] See notes a and b to table 5.

[c] Origin distribution partly conjectural.

Source: Same as table 5.

TABLE 8. JEWISH POPULATION,[a] by Country of Origin and Place of Birth, 1961 and 1988

Country	In Thousands			Percent Distribution						% Israeli-born		% Change		
	1988			1961			1988			1961	1988	1961–1988		
	Total	Foreign-born	Israeli-born	Total	Foreign-born	Israeli-born	Total	Foreign-born	Israeli-born			Total	Foreign-born	Israeli-born
Total	2,872.7[a]	1,343.1	1,529.6[a]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	34.2	53.2	57.4	11.7	145.3
Asia, total	747.5	278.8	468.7	26.9	24.8	30.4	26.0	20.7	30.7	38.8	62.7	52.5	−7.1	146.7
Turkey	90.4	39.5	50.9	3.6	3.4	3.8	3.2	2.9	3.3	36.3	56.3	38.7	−4.8	114.9
Iraq	264.7	92.5	172.2	10.2	10.3	10.0	9.2	6.9	11.3	33.6	65.0	42.3	−25.1	175.1
Yemen, S. Yemen	163.1	47.2	115.9	6.7	5.1	9.7	5.7	3.5	7.6	49.5	71.1	33.0	−23.7	90.8
Iran	130.6	57.4	73.2	3.3	3.1	3.7	4.5	4.3	4.8	38.1	56.0	115.8	53.3	217.0
India	98.8	19.4	56.5	3.1	0.5	3.2	3.4	1.4	3.7	35.6	57.2	77.1	196.0	184.2
Other		22.9			2.4			1.7					−22.0	
Africa, total	794.0	322.5	471.5	18.0	19.2	15.8	27.6	24.0	30.7	30.0	93.4	141.9	40.4	378.6
Morocco	491.7	195.9	295.8	9.1	9.9	7.5	17.1	14.6	19.3	28.1	60.2	197.0	64.6	535.0
Tunisia, Algeria	126.1	48.9	77.2	3.3	3.6	2.8	4.4	3.6	5.0	29.3	61.2	108.8	14.6	335.4
Libya	76.6	24.4	52.2	2.7	2.6	3.0	2.7	1.8	3.4	38.0	68.1	52.7	−21.6	174.0
Egypt	64.9	26.9	38.0	2.7	2.9	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.5	28.9	58.6	32.2	−23.0	168.0
Other	34.6	26.4	8.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.2	2.0	0.5	32.3	23.7	1,051.4	1,197.9	744.5

TABLE 8.—*(Continued)*

Country	In Thousands			Percent Distribution						% Israeli-born		% Change		
	1988			1961			1988			1961	1988	1961–1988		
	Total	Foreign-born	Israeli-born	Total	Foreign-born	Israeli-born	Total	Foreign-born	Israeli-born			Total	Foreign-born	Israeli-born
Europe-America, total	1,331.2	741.8	589.4	55.1	55.9	53.7	46.4	55.2	38.6	33.3	44.3	32.2	10.4	75.9
USSR	293.8	181.6	112.2	10.4	9.3	12.6	10.2	13.5	7.3	41.2	38.2	54.1	62.2	42.7
Poland	290.6	136.4	154.2	18.1	17.3	19.6	10.1	10.2	10.1	37.1	53.1	−11.9	−34.3	26.1
Romania	274.2	161.2	113.0	10.6	12.9	6.2	9.6	12.0	7.4	20.0	41.2	41.1	3.6	191.3
Bulgaria, Greece	62.8	29.6	33.2	3.7	4.1	3.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	28.7	52.9	−8.2	−39.3	69.1
Germany, Austria	89.2	40.5	48.7	4.7	4.5	5.2	3.1	3.0	3.2	37.2	54.6	3.3	−25.3	51.4
Czechoslovakia	84.6	19.3	43.9	2.2	2.1	2.4	3.0	1.4	2.9	36.3	51.9	1.4	−24.9	54.9
Hungary		21.4		2.4	2.4	2.2		1.6		31.8			−27.1	
Other Europe	235.9	59.4	84.2	2.2	2.4	1.8	8.2	4.4	5.5	28.1	35.7	337.3	108.2	456.7
North America-Oceania		48.5		0.8	0.9	0.6		3.6		27.9			796.4	
Latin America		43.8						3.3						

[a]Excluding the Israeli origin group (i.e., Israeli-born whose father was also born in this country).

Sources: CBS: 1961 census, vols. 13, 22; Special Publication 274; *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1989.

TABLE 9. JEWISH IMMIGRANTS,[a] BY CONTINENT OF BIRTH AND AGE, SELECTED IMMIGRATION PERIODS, 1948–1988 (PERCENT AND MEDIAN)

Age	1948–1951		1961–1964		1969–1972		1984–1988	
	Asia-Africa	Europe-America	Asia-Africa	Europe-America	Asia-Africa	Europe-America	Asia-Africa	Europe-America
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
0–4	12.9	10.5	14.0	6.3	6.4	6.6	9.9	8.1
5–14	24.2	9.3	29.5	15.1	19.0	14.6	20.3	10.8
15–24	23.8	15.9	19.5	14.1	27.0	24.4	24.4	23.0
25–34	13.6	19.6	10.8	10.9	13.9	15.0	15.7	22.7
35–44	10.0	18.0	10.0	16.3	10.6	11.5	8.9	10.8
45–54	7.6	13.2	7.5	16.8	9.3	10.5	5.6	5.4
55–64	4.4	8.3	5.4	12.6	7.4	8.6	7.1	7.9
65–74	2.4	3.9	2.5	5.7	4.6	6.4	5.3	6.8
75+	1.0	1.2	0.7	2.3	1.7	2.4	2.7	4.5
Median age	20.0	31.8	17.8	37.3	24.0	27.5	23.0	28.0

[a] As from 1970 including non-Jewish family members of immigrants.

Sources: CBS: Special Publications 489, 777, 790, 808, 833, 858.

TABLE 10. JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGION OF BIRTH AND AGE, 1988 (PERCENT AND MEDIAN)

Age	All Jews	Israel	Asia-Africa			Europe-America	% All Jews Born in Israel
			Total	Asia	Africa		
All ages	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	63.3
0–4	10.2	18.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.7	98.4
5–14	19.4	31.8	1.4	0.8	1.9	3.4	95.2
15+, total	70.4	50.0	98.5	99.1	97.9	95.9	49.4
15–24	16.4	24.6	3.4	2.9	3.7	6.5	88.6
25–34	14.4	15.7	12.4	6.7	17.3	9.5	72.4
35–44	13.6	6.3	25.3	23.0	27.4	16.1	45.5
45–54	8.1	1.8	22.4	24.7	20.4	10.9	27.3
55–64	7.6	1.0	18.5	21.4	16.0	17.9	12.8
65–74	6.0	0.4	10.6	12.3	9.2	19.5	4.8
75+	4.2	0.2	5.8	8.0	3.9	15.5	3.4
Median age	27.8	13.0	48.2	51.6	44.8	56.8	

Sources: CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1989; unpublished data.

TABLE 11. MEDIAN AGE OF JEWISH POPULATION, BY ORIGIN (DICHOTOMOUS) AND SEX, 1961–2000

Year	Asia-Africa			Europe-America		
	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
All ages						
1961	19.0	18.7	19.3	32.9	33.0	32.8
1972	20.4	20.0	20.8	32.8	31.2	34.2
1983[a]	23.6	23.1	24.2	32.5	31.3	33.7
1988	24.8	24.2	25.4	32.2	30.5	33.9
Ages 15+						
1961	32.4	32.4	32.4	42.7	43.5	41.9
1972	31.8	31.4	32.3	43.6	43.1	44.1
1983[a]	33.1	32.6	33.6	42.9	41.2	44.4
1988	34.4	34.0	34.9	41.8	40.8	42.9
2000[b]	37.2	36.6	37.9	41.2	39.8	42.7

[a] Adjusted census data.
[b] Projection.
Source: Same as table 5.

TABLE 12. JEWISH POPULATION, BY ORIGIN (DICHOTOMOUS) AND AGE, 1961, 1988, 2000 (PERCENT AND MEDIAN)

Age	All Ages				Ages 15+			
	Asia-Africa		Europe-America		Asia-Africa		Europe-America	
	1961	1988	1961	1988	1988	2000[a]	1988	2000[a]
All ages	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				
0–4	15.3	11.1	7.9	9.2				
5–14	27.2	20.7	20.9	18.0				
15+, total	57.5	68.2	71.2	72.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
15–24	17.4	18.5	12.0	14.1	27.2	24.1	19.4	21.7
25–34	14.9	16.5	11.9	12.2	24.1	21.7	16.8	18.9
35–44	9.8	12.9	14.9	14.4	18.9	18.8	19.8	15.1
45–54	7.1	8.3	16.3	7.9	12.1	15.9	10.9	17.5
55–64	4.8	6.5	9.9	8.9	9.5	9.3	12.2	9.4
65–74	3.6	3.6	6.2	8.6	5.3	6.7	11.7	8.7
75+		1.9		6.7	2.8	3.4	9.2	8.7
Medians:								
All ages	19.0	24.8	32.9	32.2				
Ages 15+	32.4	34.4	42.7	41.8	34.4	37.2	41.8	41.2

[a] Projection.

Source: Same as table 5.

TABLE 13. PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN ORIGIN IN THE JEWISH POPULATION (DICHOTOMOUS ORIGIN GROUPS), BY AGE, 1961–2000

Age	1961	1972	1983[a]	1988	2000[b]
All ages	43.5	50.1	50.4	51.6	—
0–4	60.0	60.5	55.9	56.5	—
5–14	50.1	64.0	56.4	55.1	—
15+, total	38.4	44.8	48.0	50.0	52.0
15–24	52.6	54.9	60.7	58.3	54.6
25–34	49.1	53.0	54.1	59.0	55.4
35–44	33.7	51.1	49.5	48.8	57.5
45–54	25.1	36.7	49.1	52.7	49.5
55–64	27.2	27.4	35.4	43.7	51.7
65–74	30.7	27.3	26.6	30.9	45.4
75+		29.2	24.4	23.6	30.0

[a], [b] See notes a and b to table 11.

Source: Same as table 5.

TABLE 14. JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGION OF BIRTH/ORIGIN GROUP[a] AND SUBDISTRICT, 1953, 1961,[b] AND 1983 (PERCENT)

District and Subdistrict	Geographical Distribution				Percent of Asian-African Jews in (Sub) District		
	Total		Origin, 1983				
	1961	1983[c]	Asia-Africa	Europe-America	1953	1961	1983
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	36.1	43.1	52.4
Jerusalem district	9.7	10.4	10.2	8.8	50.7	57.0	56.2
Northern district	10.0	9.8	10.7	8.6	43.1	53.2	57.6
Zefat sd.	2.2	1.8	2.3	1.1	47.7	64.2	69.2
Kinneret sd.	1.8	1.4	1.6	0.8	58.8	60.3	67.6
Yizreel sd.	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.4	40.4	47.3	53.6
Akko sd.	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.1	33.9	48.0	52.4
Golan sd.	—	0.2	0.1	0.2	—	—	39.4
Haifa district	16.7	13.9	10.7	17.8	23.5	28.9	39.9
Haifa sd.	13.3	11.1	7.8	15.2	17.6	25.7	36.2
Hadera sd.	3.4	2.7	2.9	2.6	44.0	41.9	55.0
Central district	19.7	22.8	23.9	21.3	46.7	50.6	55.3
Sharon sd.	4.4	4.5	4.8	4.4	44.7	44.9	54.6
Petah Tiqwa sd.	6.8	8.5	8.5	8.1	44.5	48.3	53.8
Ramla sd.	3.3	2.9	4.0	2.0	51.5	62.7	68.4
Rehovot sd.	5.2	6.9	6.6	6.8	46.6	50.0	51.7
Tel Aviv district	35.9	29.5	25.8	33.6	27.1	34.4	45.9
Southern district	8.0	12.9	18.2	9.2	62.2	69.1	68.6
Ashqelon sd.	3.9	6.0	8.6	4.4	61.5	67.0	68.4
Beer Sheva sd.	4.1	6.9	9.6	4.8	63.1	70.9	68.6
Judea, Samaria, Gaza	—	0.7	0.5	0.7	—	—	43.5

[a] 1953 and 1961—foreign-born only; 1983—according to origin groups (here and in all analogous data for 1983 in tables 15–25, excluding Israeli origin).

[b] From 20-percent sample.

[c] Including the Israeli origin group.

Sources: CBS: 1961 census, vol. 22; 1983 census, vol. 12; B. Gil (see note 28 to text).

TABLE 15. JEWISH POPULATION, BY ORIGIN GROUP AND SUBDISTRICT, 1983 (PERCENT)

District and Subdistrict	Row Percentages				Column Percentages			
	Total[a]	Asia	Africa	Europe-America	Total[a]	Asia	Africa	Europe-America
Total	100.0	26.3	26.1	47.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Jerusalem district	100.0	31.9	24.3	43.8	9.5	11.5	8.8	8.8
Northern district	100.0	17.2	40.4	42.4	9.7	6.3	15.0	8.7
Zefat sd.	100.0	15.4	53.8	30.8	1.8	1.0	3.6	1.1
Kinneret sd.	100.0	22.7	45.1	32.3	1.2	1.1	2.1	0.8
Yizreel sd.	100.0	19.0	34.7	46.3	3.5	2.5	4.6	3.4
Akko sd.	100.0	13.8	38.6	47.6	3.1	1.6	4.6	3.1
Golan sd.	100.0	19.1	20.3	60.6	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
Haifa district	100.0	15.0	24.9	60.1	14.1	8.1	13.4	17.8
Haifa sd.	100.0	13.2	23.0	63.8	11.3	5.7	9.9	15.2
Hadera sd.	100.0	22.4	32.6	45.0	2.8	2.4	3.5	2.6
Central district	100.0	32.9	22.4	44.7	22.7	28.4	19.5	21.3
Sharon sd.	100.0	25.0	29.6	45.4	4.6	4.4	5.2	4.4
Petah Tiqwa sd.	100.0	39.1	14.7	46.2	8.3	12.4	4.7	8.1
Ramla sd.	100.0	28.7	39.7	31.6	3.1	3.3	4.7	2.0
Rehovot sd.	100.0	32.5	19.2	48.3	6.7	8.3	4.9	6.8
Tel Aviv district	100.0	31.8	14.1	54.2	29.5	35.7	15.9	33.6
Southern district	100.0	18.0	50.6	31.4	13.9	9.5	27.0	9.2
Ashqelon sd.	100.0	18.9	49.5	31.5	6.6	4.7	12.5	4.4
Beer Sheva sd.	100.0	17.1	51.5	31.4	7.3	4.8	14.5	4.8
Judea, Samaria, Gaza	100.0	22.3	21.2	56.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.7

[a] Excluding the Israeli origin group.

Source: CBS, 1983 census, vol. 12.

TABLE 16. JEWS, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND SUBDISTRICT (THREE SUBDISTRICTS WITH HIGHEST REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRY IN THEIR JEWISH POPULATIONS, AND TOTAL ISRAEL), 1983 (PERCENT)

Country of Origin	Highest		2nd Highest		3rd Highest		Israel (percent)
	Sub-district	Percent	Sub-district	Percent	Sub-district	Percent	
Turkey	Ramla	5.5	Tel Aviv	5.0	Petah Tiqwa	4.0	3.3
Syria, Lebanon	Tel-Aviv	2.4	Haifa	2.0	Golan	1.7	1.4
Iraq	Kinneret	15.4	Jerusalem	13.4	Tel Aviv	12.8	9.4
Yemen	Petah Tiqwa	14.9	Rehovot	13.8	Sharon	10.2	5.8
Iran	Jerusalem	8.1	Zefat	5.4	Tel Aviv	5.3	4.3
India, Pakistan	Ramla	6.0	Beer Sheva	4.9	Ashqelon	3.3	1.3
Morocco	Zefat	37.7	Beer Sheva	33.8	Ashqelon	33.1	16.2
Tunisia, Algeria	Beer Sheva	12.5	Ramla	11.0	Zefat	10.5	4.3
Libya	Sharon	11.5	Hadera	5.6	Ashqelon	5.1	2.7
Egypt	Tel Aviv	3.3	Beer Sheva	2.7	Haifa	2.5	2.3
USSR	Haifa	13.6	Ramla	13.4	Yizreel	12.5	10.5
Poland	Tel Aviv	16.6	Haifa	15.0	Golan	12.8	11.3
Romania	Haifa	19.2	Akko	13.4	Rehovot	11.6	10.0
Bulgaria, Greece	Tel Aviv	4.8	Rehovot	2.6	Ramla	2.5	2.4
Germany, Austria	Golan	7.5	Judea, Samaria	5.5	Haifa	4.8	3.3
Czechoslovakia	Golan	3.0	Sharon	2.5	Haifa	2.1	1.5
Hungary	Golan	3.3	Judea, Samaria	2.9	Jerusalem	2.2	1.6
North America	Judea, Samaria	11.0	Golan	6.3	Jerusalem	6.0	1.7
Latin America	Golan	3.8	Yizreel	3.2	Beer Sheva	3.2	1.9

Source: Same as table 15.

TABLE 17. NATURAL REGIONS AND THEIR JEWISH POPULATION BY DISTRICT AND PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN ORIGIN IN JEWISH POPULATION, 1983

District	Percentage of Asian-African Origin						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
Natural Regions							
Total	45	5	26	7	10	9	14
Jerusalem	2	—	1	—	1	—	1
Northern	19	5	9	3	3	3	5
Haifa	5	—	5	1	1	3	—
Central	6	—	5	1	3	1	1
Tel Aviv	1	—	1	—	1	—	—
Southern	10	—	3	1	—	2	7
Judea, Samaria, Gaza	2	—	2	1	1	—	—
Jewish Population							
Total (in thousands)	3,350.0	16.4	2,824.6	597.8	1,803.7	423.1	509.0
Percent	100.0	0.5	84.2	17.8	53.8	12.6	15.2

Source: Same as table 15.

TABLE 18. JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGION OF BIRTH/ORIGIN GROUP[a] AND TYPE OF LOCALITY, 1961[b] AND 1983 (PERCENT)

Type of Locality	Geographical Distribution				Percent of Asian-African Jews in Type of Locality	
	Total		Origin, 1983			
	1961	1983[c]	Asia-Africa	Europe-America	1961	1983
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	43.1	52.4
Urban, total	87.0	90.2	91.8	90.2	42.7	52.9
Jerusalem	8.5	9.1	8.3	8.2	52.4	52.9
Tel Aviv-Yafo	19.7	9.5	7.4	11.9	29.9	40.8
Haifa	9.0	6.2	3.4	9.3	20.2	28.4
Others	49.8	65.4	72.7	60.8	50.2	56.8
Rural, total	13.0	9.8	8.2	9.8	46.7	48.0
Moshavim	6.4	4.5	5.4	3.2	57.7	65.3
Kibbutzim	4.0	3.4	1.0	5.0	12.4	18.0
Others	2.6	1.9	1.8	1.6	68.4	54.7

[a] 1961—foreign-born only; 1983—according to origin groups (excluding Israeli origin).

[b] From 20-percent sample.

[c] Including the Israeli origin group.

Sources: CBS: 1961 census, vol. 22; 1983 census, vol. 12.

TABLE 19. URBAN JEWISH LOCALITIES WITH 10,000+ INHABITANTS[a] AND THEIR JEWISH POPULATION, BY TYPE OF LOCALITY AND PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN JEWS,[b] 1961 AND 1983

Type of Locality	Percentage of Asian-African Jews						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
				Localities			
1961, total	30	5	19	9	4	6	6
Main cities	3	2	1	—	1	—	—
Other towns	27	3	18	9	3	6	6
Old	13	2	11	8	3	0	0
New	14	1	7	1	0	6	6
1983, total	56	6	28	8	10	10	22
Main cities	3	1	2	1	1	—	—
Other towns	53	5	26	7	9	10	22
100,000–199,999	7	—	7	—	5	2	—
50,000–99,999	5	—	3	2	1	—	2
20,000–49,999	20	4	11	3	3	5	5
10,000–19,999	21	1	5	2	—	3	15
				Jewish Population (Percent)			
1961, total	100.0	47.9	43.7	19.3	18.0	6.4	8.4
Main cities	100.0	77.2	22.8	—	22.8	—	—
Other towns	100.0	18.8	64.4	38.5	13.1	12.8	16.8
Old	100.0	26.2	73.8	53.3	20.5	—	—
New	100.0	5.6	47.8	12.2	—	35.6	46.6
1983, total	100.0	12.0	72.3	21.1	36.0	15.2	15.7
Main cities	100.0	25.2	74.8	38.1	36.7	—	—
Other towns	100.0	6.6	69.0	13.8	34.7	20.5	24.5
100,000–199,999	100.0	—	100.0	70.9	29.1	—	—
50,000–99,999	100.0	—	66.1	48.0	18.1	—	33.9
20,000–49,999	100.0	20.4	57.0	16.2	15.4	25.4	22.5
10,000–19,999	100.0	3.8	25.5	9.8	—	15.7	70.6

[a] See note 41 to text.

[b] 1961—foreign-born only (for specification see note 36 to text); 1983—according to origin groups.

Sources: Computations from 1961 census data, vol. 12; and special tabulations from 1983 census file.

TABLE 20. URBAN STATISTICAL AREAS[a] AND THEIR JEWISH POPULATION, BY TYPE OF LOCALITY AND PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN JEWS,[b] 1961

Type of Locality	Percentage of Asian-African Jews						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
			Statistical Areas (Percent)				
Total	100.0	51.6	25.9	9.0	9.5	7.4	22.5
Main cities	100.0	62.5	18.7	5.8	8.0	4.9	18.7
Other towns	100.0	36.7	35.5	13.3	11.4	10.8	27.7
Old	100.0	52.5	33.3	13.1	12.1	8.1	14.2
New	100.0	13.5	38.7	13.4	10.4	14.9	47.8
			Jewish Population (Percent)				
Total	100.0	52.7	26.1	10.0	9.3	6.8	21.2
Main cities	100.0	66.6	16.9	6.3	6.8	3.8	16.5
Other towns	100.0	38.9	35.3	13.7	11.8	9.8	25.8
Old	100.0	53.5	32.2	13.6	13.0	5.6	14.3
New	100.0	12.8	40.9	13.8	9.7	17.4	46.3

[a] Excluding areas with fewer than 20 Jews.

[b] Foreign-born only (for specification see note 36 to text).

N: Statistical areas—390; Jewish population—1,440,400.

Source: Computations from 1961 census data, vol. 12.

TABLE 21. SMALL RESIDENTIAL AREAS[a] AND THEIR JEWISH POPULATION, BY TYPE OF LOCALITY AND PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN ORIGIN IN JEWISH POPULATION, 1983

Type of Locality	Percentage of Asian-African Origin						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
	Small Areas (Percent)						
Total	100.0	36.9	30.8	12.1	9.9	8.8	32.3
Urban statistical areas:							
Total	100.0	26.5	43.3	15.7	14.6	13.0	30.3
Main cities	100.0	43.6	37.3	13.0	14.2	10.1	19.1
Other towns	100.0	16.7	46.6	17.2	14.8	14.6	36.6
100,000–199,999	100.0	13.6	61.8	22.0	22.0	17.8	24.6
50,000–99,999	100.0	26.3	37.4	14.1	8.1	15.2	36.4
20,000–49,999	100.0	22.3	40.2	14.7	13.0	12.5	37.5
Up to 19,999	100.0	3.3	30.0	13.3	6.7	10.0	66.7
Small localities:							
Total	100.0	50.3	14.9	7.5	4.0	3.4	34.8
Semi-urban	100.0	(9.1)	(30.3)	(9.1)	(3.0)	(18.2)	(60.6)
Rural, total	100.0	52.2	14.2	7.4	4.1	2.7	33.7
Moshavim	100.0	37.2	13.2	7.0	3.9	2.3	49.6
Kibbuzim	100.0	86.9	12.2	8.1	2.7	1.4	0.9
Others	100.0	33.6	22.1	7.7	7.7	6.7	44.2
	Jewish Population (Percent)						
Total	100.0	27.4	41.6	15.3	13.8	12.5	31.0
Urban statistical areas:							
Total	100.0	25.5	44.9	16.5	15.1	13.3	29.6
Main cities	100.0	44.3	37.6	12.9	14.7	10.0	18.0
Other towns	100.0	17.9	47.8	17.9	15.3	14.6	34.2
100,000–199,999	100.0	13.3	61.7	21.7	21.8	18.2	24.9
50,000–99,999	100.0	28.3	40.5	16.3	8.8	15.4	31.2
20,000–49,999	100.0	24.9	41.7	15.8	13.9	12.0	33.4
Up to 19,999	100.0	3.2	30.0	13.6	7.3	9.1	66.8

TABLE 21.—*(Continued)*

Type of Locality	Percentage of Asian-African Origin						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
Small Localities:							
Total	100.0	39.8	20.1	7.6	5.1	7.4	40.0
Semi-urban	100.0	6.8	31.7	8.7	6.0	17.0	61.4
Rural, total	100.0	54.5	15.1	7.2	4.7	3.2	30.4
Moshavim	100.0	34.8	14.1	7.1	4.7	2.3	51.1
Kibbuzim	100.0	89.9	9.4	6.5	2.2	0.7	0.7
Others	100.0	32.6	29.4	8.9	9.8	10.7	38.0

[a] Urban statistical areas and Jewish localities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants (see note 41 to text); excluding areas and localities with fewer than 100 Jews.

N: Total small areas—1,701; Jewish population—3,329,000; urban statistical areas—955; Jewish population—2,880,400.

Source: Special tabulations from 1983 census file.

TABLE 22. JEWISH POPULATION IN URBAN STATISTICAL AREAS,[a] BY TYPE OF LOCALITY, ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), PERIOD OF ENTRY INTO DWELLING,[b] AND PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN ORIGIN AMONG JEWS OF STATISTICAL AREA, 1983

Origin of Persons and Period of Entry into Dwelling	Percentage of Asian-African Origin in Area						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
	All Statistical Areas (Percent)						
Asia-Africa, total							
Total[c]	100.0	11.2	42.2	12.3	14.6	15.3	46.5
Until 1963	100.0	7.4	29.9	7.5	9.9	12.5	62.6
1964–1973	100.0	11.2	41.6	12.2	14.7	14.7	47.1
1974–1983	100.0	12.1	46.4	13.3	16.4	16.7	41.4
Europe-America, total							
Total[c]	100.0	38.8	47.1	20.0	15.9	11.2	14.0
Until 1963	100.0	47.9	38.9	16.5	13.6	8.8	13.1
1964–1973	100.0	40.7	45.2	18.9	15.2	11.1	14.1
1974–1983	100.0	33.6	52.0	21.8	17.8	12.4	14.4
	Main Cities (Percent)						
Asia-Africa, total							
Total[c]	100.0	22.1	43.5	12.1	17.5	13.9	34.3
Until 1963	100.0	20.7	34.3	10.0	12.8	11.5	45.0
1964–1973	100.0	21.0	40.6	10.3	17.1	13.2	38.2
1974–1983	100.0	23.6	45.9	11.3	19.5	15.1	30.5
Europe-America, total							
Total[c]	100.0	61.0	31.9	12.6	12.5	6.8	7.0
Until 1963	100.0	70.2	24.9	10.2	10.2	4.5	4.7
1964–1973	100.0	65.3	27.1	10.0	11.3	5.8	7.6
1974–1983	100.0	56.1	35.9	13.1	14.5	8.3	7.8

TABLE 22.—*(Continued)*

Origin of Persons and Period of Entry into Dwelling	Percentage of Asian-African Origin in Area						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
			Other Towns (Percent)				
Asia-Africa, total							
Total[c]	100.0	8.1	41.9	12.4	13.8	15.7	50.0
Until 1963	100.0	3.7	28.6	6.8	9.0	12.8	67.6
1964–1973	100.0	8.2	41.9	12.8	13.9	15.2	49.9
1974–1983	100.0	9.1	46.7	13.9	15.6	17.2	44.2
Europe-America, total							
Total[c]	100.0	27.6	54.8	23.7	17.7	13.4	17.6
Until 1963	100.0	28.9	50.8	21.8	16.6	12.4	20.3
1964–1973	100.0	29.1	53.7	23.1	17.0	13.6	17.1
1974–1983	100.0	24.7	58.3	25.3	19.0	14.0	17.0

[a] Excluding areas with fewer than 100 Jews.

[b] According to head of household.

[c] Including unspecified period of entry.

Source: Same as table 21.

TABLE 23. JEWISH POPULATION IN URBAN STATISTICAL AREAS,[a] BY TYPE OF LOCALITY, ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), PERIOD WHEN MOST DWELLINGS IN AREA WERE CONSTRUCTED,[b] AND PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN ORIGIN AMONG JEWS OF STATISTICAL AREA, 1983

Origin of Persons and Period of Construction of Area	Percentage of Asian-African Origin in Area						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
			All Statistical Areas (Percent)				
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	11.2	42.2	12.3	14.6	15.3	46.5
Old areas	100.0	11.4	39.4	11.2	13.1	15.1	49.3
New areas	100.0	10.3	60.0	19.2	24.1	16.7	29.7
Europe-America, total	100.0	38.8	47.1	20.0	15.9	11.2	14.0
Old areas	100.0	41.0	44.2	18.4	14.6	11.2	14.9
New areas	100.0	26.8	64.2	29.1	23.7	11.4	9.0
			Main Cities (Percent)				
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	22.1	43.5	12.1	17.5	13.9	34.3
Old areas	100.0	23.1	42.3	12.0	17.1	13.2	34.6
New areas	100.0	15.1	51.8	12.8	20.5	18.5	33.1
Europe-America, total	100.0	61.0	31.9	12.6	12.5	6.8	7.0
Old areas	100.0	62.8	30.4	12.2	12.0	6.2	6.7
New areas	100.0	46.2	44.6	16.3	16.7	11.6	9.3
			Other Towns (Percent)				
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	8.1	41.9	12.4	13.8	15.7	50.0
Old areas	100.0	8.0	38.5	11.0	11.9	15.6	53.5
New areas	100.0	9.1	62.1	20.8	25.1	16.2	28.8
Europe-America, total	100.0	27.6	54.8	23.7	17.7	13.4	17.6
Old areas	100.0	29.0	51.6	21.8	15.9	13.9	19.4
New areas	100.0	21.1	69.9	32.8	25.7	11.4	9.0

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[a] See note a to table 22.

[b] "New areas"—if more than half of the 1983 Jewish population lived in dwellings whose construction terminated during 1975–1983; "old areas"—all other areas.

Source: Same as table 21.

TABLE 24. JEWISH POPULATION (AGED 15 AND OVER) IN URBAN STATISTICAL AREAS,[a] BY TYPE OF LOCALITY, ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), YEARS OF STUDY, AND PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN ORIGIN AMONG JEWS OF STATISTICAL AREA, 1983

Origin of Persons and Years of Study	Percentage of Asian-African Origin in Area						
	Total	Up to 34.9	35.0–64.9				65.0+
			Total	35.0–44.9	45.0–54.9	55.0–64.9	
	All Statistical Areas (Percent)						
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	11.5	41.9	12.1	14.6	15.2	46.6
0–8	100.0	7.2	37.8	9.5	13.4	14.9	55.0
9–12	100.0	11.9	43.6	12.9	15.0	15.7	44.5
13+	100.0	23.2	47.0	16.9	16.4	13.7	29.7
Europe-America, total	100.0	40.2	46.2	19.7	15.7	10.8	13.6
0–8	100.0	31.6	48.1	18.2	17.4	12.5	20.2
9–12	100.0	39.6	46.5	19.6	15.7	11.2	13.8
13+	100.0	46.8	44.3	20.8	14.4	9.1	8.9
	Main Cities (Percent)						
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	22.4	42.5	11.6	17.5	13.4	35.0
0–8	100.0	14.1	40.6	10.0	17.0	13.6	45.1
9–12	100.0	23.2	43.8	12.1	17.6	14.1	32.9
13+	100.0	40.2	43.0	13.9	18.4	10.7	16.7
Europe-America, total	100.0	62.8	30.4	12.0	12.1	6.3	6.8
0–8	100.0	54.4	34.8	13.6	13.6	7.6	10.6
9–12	100.0	64.5	28.7	11.1	11.6	6.0	6.7
13+	100.0	65.4	29.7	12.0	11.8	5.9	4.8
	Other Towns (Percent)						
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	8.1	41.7	12.3	13.7	15.7	50.2
0–8	100.0	5.0	36.9	9.4	12.3	15.2	58.1
9–12	100.0	8.7	43.5	13.1	14.3	16.1	47.8
13+	100.0	15.8	48.8	18.2	15.5	15.1	35.4
Europe-America, total	100.0	27.8	54.8	23.9	17.6	13.3	17.4
0–8	100.0	21.4	54.2	20.4	19.1	14.7	24.4
9–12	100.0	27.6	55.1	23.8	17.7	13.6	17.2
13+	100.0	33.4	54.7	27.1	16.2	11.4	11.9

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[a] See note a to table 22.

Source: Same as table 21.

TABLE 25. AVERAGE SOCIOECONOMIC SCORES[a] OF JEWISH POPULATION (AGED 15 AND OVER) IN URBAN STATISTICAL AREAS,[b] BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), YEARS OF STUDY, AND PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN ORIGIN AMONG JEWS OF STATISTICAL AREA, 1983

Origin of Persons	Percentage of Asian-African Origin in Area									
and Years of Study	5–14.9	15–24.9	25–34.9	35–44.9	45–54.9	55–64.9	65–74.9	75–84.9	85–94.9	95.0+
Asia-Africa, total	1.18	1.17	0.82	0.46	0.44	0.18	−0.12	−0.14	−0.48	−0.95
0–8	1.09	0.97	0.60	0.24	0.23	0.04	−0.23	−0.19	−0.54	−0.95
9–12	1.20	1.17	0.84	0.49	0.50	0.24	−0.05	−0.11	−0.42	−0.95
13+	1.21	1.31	1.02	0.75	0.73	0.36	0.13	0.01	−0.32	−0.95
Europe-America, total	1.19	1.16	0.86	0.46	0.45	0.20	−0.10	−0.08	−0.44	−0.95
0–8	1.12	0.87	0.46	0.05	0.03	−0.04	−0.31	−0.20	−0.55	−0.95
9–12	1.18	1.11	0.85	0.37	0.44	0.14	−0.13	−0.11	−0.46	−0.95
13+	1.23	1.33	1.05	0.76	0.71	0.41	0.19	0.10	−0.30	—

[a] See CBS, 1983 census, vol. 15.
[b] Excluding areas with small Jewish population in private households.
Source: Same as table 21.

TABLE 26. JEWISH MARRIAGES IN ISRAEL, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS) OF SPOUSES AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE

Origin	1961 Census			1983 Census	
	Until 1945	1946–1955	1956–1961[a]	1964–1973	1974–1983[a]
	Couples (Percent)				
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Inmarried, total	95.0	91.4	87.4	82.3	79.0
Both Asia-Africa	9.9	29.7	45.5	44.2	49.3
Both Europe-America	85.1	61.7	41.9	38.1	29.7
Outmarried, total	5.0	8.6	12.6	17.7	21.0
Husband Asia-Africa	2.4	3.2	4.1	9.0	9.4
Husband Europe-America	2.6	5.4	8.5	8.7	11.6
	Spouses (Percent)				
Husbands, total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Asia-Africa	12.3	32.9	49.6	53.2	58.7
Europe-America	87.7	67.1	50.4	46.8	41.3
Wives					
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Asia-Africa	12.5	35.1	54.0	52.9	60.9
Europe-America	87.5	64.9	46.0	47.1	39.1
	Percentages of Outmarrying Spouses				
Husbands, total	5.0	8.6	12.6	17.7	21.0
Asia-Africa	19.5	9.7	8.2	16.9	16.0
Europe-America	3.0	8.0	16.9	18.6	28.1
Wives					
Total	5.0	8.6	12.6	17.7	21.0
Asia-Africa	21.0	15.3	15.7	16.5	19.1
Europe-America	2.7	4.9	8.9	19.1	24.0
	Index of Marital Attraction[b]				
Asia-Africa/Europe-America[c]	.777	.851	.821	.648	.590

[a] Here as well as in tables 27–29: until May 1961 and until May 1983, respectively.

[b] See explanations in note 53 to text.

[c] If there are only two groups, the index is equal for both.

Sources: Computations from 1961 census data, vol. 36; and special tabulations from 1983 census file.

TABLE 27. OUTMARRIAGE AMONG JEWS IN ISRAEL, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS) OF SPOUSES AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE

Period of Marriage	Percentage Outmarrying					Index of Marital Attraction
	Couples	Husbands		Wives		
		Asia-Africa	Europe-America	Asia-Africa	Europe-America	
			1961 Census			
Total	8.7	10.1	8.1	16.1	4.9	.847
Up to 1945	5.0	19.5	3.0	21.0	2.7	.777
1946–1955	8.6	9.7	8.0	15.3	4.9	.851
1956–1961	12.6	8.2	16.9	15.7	8.9	.821
			1983 Census			
Total	16.2	14.7	17.7	16.9	15.4	.695
Up to 1948	6.2	19.6	3.8	21.6	3.4	.769
1949–1953	8.4	9.2	7.9	13.6	5.2	.854
1954–1958	11.8	9.1	14.4	14.1	9.4	.809
1959–1963	13.1	9.5	17.5	13.4	12.6	.773
1964–1968	15.9	15.8	16.0	13.8	18.3	.698
1969–1973	19.0	17.8	20.4	18.4	19.7	.624
1974–1978	20.1	16.0	25.8	18.7	22.3	.609
1979–1983	22.3	16.0	31.8	19.6	26.7	.560

Source: Same as table 26.

TABLE 28. PERCENTAGES OUTMARRYING AMONG JEWISH SPOUSES IN ISRAEL, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), REGION OF BIRTH, AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE

Period of Marriage	Husbands				Wives			
	Asia-Africa		Europe-America		Asia-Africa		Europe-America	
	Israeli-born	Foreign-born	Israeli-born	Foreign-born	Israeli-born	Foreign-born	Israeli-born	Foreign-born
				1961 Census				
Total	21.4	8.6	10.6	7.6	31.2	13.6	8.0	4.0
Up to 1945	20.7	19.2	10.9	2.4	23.7	19.8	6.0	2.4
1946–1955	22.6	8.1	10.4	7.7	32.5	12.7	7.4	4.3
1956–1961	21.0	6.8	10.7	19.9	34.5	13.4	9.4	8.4
				1983 Census				
Total	19.2	12.7	22.6	14.3	21.5	13.8	19.4	12.2
Up to 1948	25.4	17.8	8.6	3.4	22.3	21.3	6.9	2.9
1949–1953	18.3	8.4	9.8	7.7	29.8	11.8	6.8	4.9
1954–1958	28.3	7.4	12.7	15.0	37.4	11.2	10.9	8.5
1959–1963	24.2	7.8	13.2	20.3	29.4	11.1	13.0	12.3
1964–1968	30.5	13.9	13.8	17.9	24.8	11.6	18.0	18.4
1969–1973	22.9	16.4	20.4	20.4	21.5	16.3	19.6	19.9
1974–1978	17.2	14.8	28.4	21.4	20.2	16.1	23.4	20.5
1979–1983	16.7	14.7	35.6	24.5	20.0	18.5	28.7	23.7

Source: Same as table 26.

TABLE 29. DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF JEWISH SPOUSES IN ISRAEL, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS) AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE

Period of Marriage	Percentage of Asian-African Origin Among Spouses		Percentage of Israeli-born in Origin Group		Husbands Less Wives (Percent Difference)	
	Husbands	Wives	Asia-Africa	Europe-America	Asia-Africa	Europe-America
			1961 Census			
Total	31.9	34.2	14.2	19.4	−6.7	3.5
Up to 1945	12.3	12.5	27.6	9.0	−1.9	0.3
1946–1955	32.9	35.1	13.2	17.7	−6.2	3.4
1956–1961	49.6	54.0	11.7	40.3	−8.2	9.6
			1983 Census			
Total	50.5	51.8	36.3	43.9	−2.6	2.8
Up to 1948	14.7	15.1	28.0	20.5	−2.4	0.4
1949–1953	35.7	37.5	9.9	15.8	−4.9	2.9
1954–1958	49.2	52.1	10.4	31.0	−5.4	5.9
1959–1963	55.6	58.1	12.1	45.2	−4.3	5.9
1964–1968	54.3	53.0	14.6	47.5	−2.4	−2.7
1969–1973	52.4	52.8	31.6	56.5	−0.8	0.8
1974–1978	57.2	59.1	57.0	63.4	−3.2	4.6
1979–1983	60.8	63.5	70.6	64.8	−4.3	7.4

Source: Same as table 26.

TABLE 30. JEWISH MARRIAGES IN ISRAEL, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE

Country of Origin	Index of Marital Attraction					Percent Outmarrying, 1974–1983	
	Total	Until 1948	1949–1963	1964–1973	1974–1983	Husbands	Wives
Turkey	.354	.463	.569	.288	.201	80.7	78.8
Syria-Lebanon	.269	.579	.380	.215	.111	89.2	88.6
Iraq	.524	.736	.796	.508	.293	65.4	65.8
Yemen, South Yemen	.652	.865	.826	.657	.511	48.1	48.0
Iran	.505	.553	.679	.509	.426	56.7	61.7
India	.657	—	.732	.715	.612	40.1	40.0
Rest of Asia	.182	.529	.353	.094	.112	89.5	88.7
Morocco	.570	.428	.701	.606	.458	46.0	50.6
Tunisia, Algeria	.372	x	.630	.380	.222	74.8	76.2
Libya	.423	.681	.733	.402	.255	74.4	72.6
Egypt	.274	(.212)	.440	.249	.169	83.3	82.1
Rest of Africa	.218	x	x	(.266)	.222	79.5	83.4
USSR	.354	.427	.230	.216	.517	49.1	46.9
Poland	.355	.526	.443	.261	.230	75.6	71.2
Czechoslovakia	.156	.376	.240	.103	.061	93.9	93.0
Hungary	.188	.312	.336	.131	.094	90.7	90.0
Romania	.407	.474	.534	.423	.267	73.4	69.8
Bulgaria, Greece	.377	.661	.544	.208	.139	88.0	85.6
Germany, Austria	.207	.492	.228	.094	.099	90.2	88.8
Rest of Europe	.146	.253	.213	.125	.097	88.8	91.2
North America	.256	x	(.241)	.215	.266	75.7	84.2
Latin America	.360	—	.427	.409	.301	70.2	73.9

Source: Special tabulations from 1983 census file.

TABLE 31. OUTMARRYING JEWISH SPOUSES IN ISRAEL, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF ONE SPOUSE AND CONTINENT OF ORIGIN OF THE OTHER (PERCENT)

Country of Origin	Outmarrying Husbands, by Wife's Continent				Outmarrying Wives, by Husband's Continent			
	Total	Asia	Africa	Europe-America	Total	Asia	Africa	Europe-America
Turkey	100.0	34.2	35.6	30.2	100.0	31.3	33.7	34.9
Syria-Lebanon	100.0	39.1	30.0	30.9	100.0	35.2	26.2	38.6
Iraq	100.0	27.3	44.0	28.7	100.0	27.5	37.5	35.0
Yemen, South Yemen	100.0	33.4	44.7	21.9	100.0	33.3	34.5	32.2
Iran	100.0	35.4	39.0	25.6	100.0	37.2	36.7	26.1
India	100.0	44.2	34.0	21.8	100.0	31.1	32.9	36.0
Rest of Asia	100.0	40.0	18.2	41.8	100.0	38.8	19.7	41.4
Morocco	100.0	41.3	28.3	30.4	100.0	42.1	27.1	30.8
Tunisia, Algeria	100.0	30.6	47.8	21.6	100.0	29.0	44.6	26.4
Libya	100.0	38.0	40.7	21.3	100.0	40.9	33.7	25.4
Egypt	100.0	35.9	32.8	31.3	100.0	32.9	27.8	39.2
Rest of Africa	100.0	24.4	19.8	55.8	100.0	20.5	18.8	60.7
USSR	100.0	19.5	15.7	64.8	100.0	19.6	13.7	66.7
Poland	100.0	21.3	18.4	60.3	100.0	17.4	15.3	67.4
Czechoslovakia	100.0	13.4	12.1	74.5	100.0	8.3	10.7	81.0
Hungary	100.0	17.7	17.0	65.3	100.0	14.9	15.9	69.2
Romania	100.0	19.1	21.6	59.3	100.0	18.0	17.4	64.6
Bulgaria, Greece	100.0	31.9	25.6	42.5	100.0	38.4	19.7	41.8
Germany, Austria	100.0	17.0	13.5	69.5	100.0	14.2	13.4	72.4
Rest of Europe	100.0	21.6	31.2	47.2	100.0	19.2	30.9	49.8
North America	100.0	15.7	12.2	72.2	100.0	17.7	16.7	65.6
Latin America	100.0	18.9	20.2	60.9	100.0	14.7	18.9	66.3

Source: Same as table 30.

TABLE 32. INDEXES OF MARITAL ATTRACTION IN JEWISH MARRIAGES IN ISRAEL, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), YEARS OF STUDY OF SPOUSES, AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE

Years of Study[a]		Period of Marriage				
Husbands	Wives	Total	Until 1948	1949–1963	1964–1973	1974–1983
Total	Total	.695	.769	.814	.648	.590
0–8	Total	.773	.843	.872	.562	.513
9–12	Total	.664	.690	.780	.600	.532
13+	Total	.541	.444	.672	.545	.513
Total	0–8	.820	.848	.869	.547	.612
Total	9–12	.665	.575	.755	.602	.528
Total	13+	.532	.428	.515	.512	.513
0–8	0–8	.834	.868	.883	.514	.601
0–8	9–12	.696	.581	.826	.592	.447
9–12	0–8	.791	.765	.838	.561	.605
9–12	9–12	.651	.655	.743	.584	.502
9–12	13+	.540	.787	.496	.479	.514
13+	9–12	.612	.429	.685	.561	.549
13+	13+	.474	—	.504	.470	.455
9+	0–8	.654	.596	.730	.593	.534
13+	9–12	.521	.348	.634	.528	.508

[a] Combination of 0–8 and 13+ years of study by husbands and wives respectively were not listed, because of small absolute numbers.

Source: Same as table 30.

TABLE 33. INMARRYING AND OUTMARRYING JEWISH SPOUSES IN ISRAEL, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), YEARS OF STUDY, AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE (PERCENT)

Origin	Years of Study							
	Husbands				Wives			
	Total	0–8	9–12	13+	Total	0–8	9–12	13+
				Total Periods				
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	33.3	51.7	15.0	100.0	33.8	51.5	14.7
Inmarrying	100.0	36.6	51.7	11.7	100.0	37.8	51.3	10.9
Outmarrying	100.0	14.2	51.6	34.2	100.0	17.4	54.8	27.8
Europe-America, total	100.0	13.8	44.4	41.8	100.0	14.3	45.5	40.1
Inmarrying	100.0	13.4	42.2	44.4	100.0	13.7	43.6	42.8
Outmarrying	100.0	15.8	54.8	29.4	100.0	10.9	52.3	36.8
				Until 1948				
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	64.8	27.3	7.9	100.0	74.7	21.1	4.2
Inmarrying	100.0	71.7	23.6	4.7	100.0	83.0	15.2	1.8
Outmarrying	100.0	36.4	42.4	21.2	100.0	55.6	36.3	8.1
Europe-America, total	100.0	28.4	47.8	23.7	100.0	33.7	51.6	14.6
Inmarrying	100.0	27.7	48.4	23.9	100.0	32.9	52.2	14.9
Outmarrying	100.0	47.1	33.6	19.3	100.0	40.9	45.4	13.6
				1949–1963				
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	53.9	35.7	10.3	100.0	64.3	29.9	5.8
Inmarrying	100.0	57.2	34.6	8.1	100.0	68.6	28.1	3.4
Outmarrying	100.0	21.6	46.9	31.5	100.0	41.0	44.2	14.8
Europe-America, total	100.0	24.2	45.1	30.8	100.0	24.3	46.7	29.0
Inmarrying	100.0	22.4	44.8	32.8	100.0	21.8	47.1	31.1
Outmarrying	100.0	36.3	46.4	17.3	100.0	22.8	48.1	29.1
				1964–1973				
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	32.6	51.5	15.9	100.0	32.8	52.6	14.6
Inmarrying	100.0	36.5	51.6	11.9	100.0	37.4	52.6	10.0
Outmarrying	100.0	13.8	50.7	35.4	100.0	14.8	56.0	29.2
Europe-America, total	100.0	6.4	43.2	50.4	100.0	5.8	44.7	49.4
Inmarrying	100.0	4.9	40.0	55.0	100.0	3.8	42.2	54.0
Outmarrying	100.0	12.7	56.8	30.4	100.0	10.3	52.7	37.0
				1974–1983				
Asia-Africa, total	100.0	18.6	63.6	17.7	100.0	12.5	66.2	21.3
Inmarrying	100.0	20.3	65.3	14.4	100.0	14.0	68.6	17.5
Outmarrying	100.0	10.1	54.8	35.1	100.0	5.7	60.2	34.1
Europe-America, total	100.0	4.3	43.4	52.3	100.0	4.0	42.3	53.7
Inmarrying	100.0	3.5	37.4	59.1	100.0	3.3	35.3	61.4
Outmarrying	100.0	6.2	58.7	35.1	100.0	4.8	53.9	41.2

Source: Same as table 30.

TABLE 34. JEWISH COUPLES MARRYING IN ISRAEL, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), YEARS OF STUDY OF SPOUSES, AND SELECTED PERIODS OF MARRIAGE (PERCENT)

Years of Study		Total	Inmarrying		Outmarrying	
Husbands	Wives		Asia-Africa	Europe America	Husband's Origin	
					Asia-Africa	Europe-America
			Total Periods			
Total	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
0–8	0–8	14.9	24.5	7.6	5.8	9.0
	9–12	7.9	11.2	5.0	7.1	6.0
	13+	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.3	0.7
9–12	0–8	8.2	12.0	5.0	4.5	7.3
	9–12	31.2	34.3	26.0	34.4	36.8
	13+	8.7	5.3	11.2	12.6	10.7
13+	0–8	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.6	1.1
	9–12	9.5	5.8	12.6	10.8	11.9
	13+	17.7	4.7	30.7	22.9	16.4
			1949–1963			
Total	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
0–8	0–8	29.2	48.6	13.3	12.9	24.2
	9–12	8.1	8.1	7.7	7.2	10.6
	13+	1.0	0.6	1.4	1.5	1.4
9–12	0–8	12.2	17.6	7.3	8.8	14.4
	9–12	22.3	15.7	27.4	28.9	25.5
	13+	6.1	1.3	10.2	9.3	6.5
13+	0–8	1.8	2.4	1.3	1.1	2.4
	9–12	8.4	4.2	12.0	12.0	8.1
	13+	10.8	1.4	19.5	18.3	6.9
			1974–1983			
Total	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
0–8	0–8	4.5	7.4	1.4	2.3	1.9
	9–12	7.4	11.9	1.7	6.5	3.9
	13+	0.8	1.0	0.4	1.2	0.5
9–12	0–8	4.2	6.2	1.6	2.3	3.4
	9–12	39.6	50.0	21.8	37.9	42.8
	13+	11.4	9.1	14.0	14.6	12.5
13+	0–8	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.5
	9–12	9.3	6.7	11.8	9.5	13.5
	13+	22.5	7.4	47.1	25.5	21.1

Source: Same as table 30.

TABLE 35. PERCENTAGES OUTMARRYING AMONG JEWISH SPOUSES IN ISRAEL, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), YEARS OF STUDY, AND PERIOD OF MARRIAGE

Origin	Years of Study							
	Husbands				Wives			
	Total	0–8	9–12	13+	Total	0–8	9–12	13+
Total Periods								
Asia-Africa	14.7	6.3	14.7	34.6	16.9	8.6	17.8	34.1
Europe-America	17.7	20.2	21.8	12.4	15.4	12.7	17.9	13.6
Until 1948								
Asia-Africa	19.6	11.0	30.5	52.5	21.6	15.6	39.7	54.5
Europe-America	3.8	6.3	2.7	3.1	3.4	4.2	3.0	3.1
1949–1963								
Asia-Africa	9.3	3.7	12.2	28.4	13.7	8.6	20.0	41.1
Europe-America	13.0	19.5	13.4	7.3	8.8	9.2	9.0	8.3
1964–1973								
Asia-Africa	16.9	7.2	16.7	37.8	16.5	7.2	17.3	36.5
Europe-America	18.6	37.1	24.5	11.2	19.1	39.2	22.8	13.9
1974–1983								
Asia-Africa	16.0	8.7	13.8	31.7	19.1	8.8	17.2	31.5
Europe-America	28.1	41.1	38.0	18.9	24.0	31.7	32.6	17.5

Source: Same as table 30.

TABLE 36. PERCENTAGES OUTMARRYING AMONG JEWISH SPOUSES, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS), YEARS OF STUDY OF SPOUSES, AND SELECTED PERIODS OF MARRIAGE

Years of Study[a]		Outmarrying per 100 Husbands of—					
		Asian-African Origin			European-American Origin		
Husbands	Wives	Total Periods	1949–1969	1974–1983	Total Periods	1949–1969	1974–1983
0–8	0–8	3.9	2.6	5.7	20.4	21.4	34.2
0–8	9–12	9.8	8.3	9.5	20.7	17.0	47.0
9–12	0–8	6.1	4.9	6.7	23.7	22.8	44.6
9–12	9–12	14.7	15.9	12.6	23.3	12.2	43.4
9–12	13+	29.1	42.0	23.4	17.0	8.7	25.9
13+	9–12	24.4	22.6	21.4	16.9	9.1	31.0
13+	13+	45.7	56.5	39.8	10.3	5.0	14.9

Years of Study[a]		Outmarrying per 100 Wives of—					
		Asian-African Origin			European-American Origin		
Wives	Husbands	Total Periods	1949–1963	1974–1983	Total Periods	1949–1963	1974–1983
0–8	0–8	7.0	7.3	5.6	12.3	8.6	34.6
0–8	9–12	11.0	11.5	11.2	14.0	10.5	31.2
9–12	0–8	9.9	17.2	7.1	20.6	8.2	54.8
9–12	9–12	17.9	20.5	16.8	19.4	9.2	35.4
9–12	13+	29.6	23.1	32.3	13.4	8.9	20.4
13+	9–12	29.0	43.9	24.4	17.1	8.1	24.8
13+	13+	41.5	43.0	40.4	11.9	8.3	14.6

[a] Combinations of 0–8 and 13+ years of study by husbands and wives respectively were not listed, because of small absolute numbers.

Source: Same as table 30.

TABLE 37. TOTAL FERTILITY RATES OF JEWISH WOMEN IN ISRAEL BY REGION OF BIRTH, 1926–1988

Year	Region of Birth			
	Total	Asia-Africa	Israel	Europe-America
1926–1927	3.86	. .	. .	. .
1928–1930	3.35	. .	. .	. .
1931–1933	2.84	. .	. .	. .
1934–1936	2.67	. .	. .	. .
1937–1939[a]	2.35	4.55	3.94	1.82
1940–1942	2.36	. .	. .	. .
1943–1945[b]	3.35	4.79	3.68	2.91
1946–1947	3.44	. .	. .	. .
1948–1949	3.25	4.47	3.57	3.20
1950–1953	3.94	6.09	3.52	3.10
1954–1957	3.63	5.61	2.83	2.64
1958–1960	3.46	5.11	2.76	2.39
1961–1964	3.37	4.68	2.73	2.42
1965–1969	3.36	4.35	2.83	2.59
1970–1974	3.28	3.92	3.05	2.83
1975–1979	3.00	3.40	2.91	2.80
1980–1984	2.80	3.09	2.82	2.76
1985–1988	2.81	3.17	2.84	2.69

[a] 1938–1940 for separate regions of birth.

[b] 1944–1945 for separate regions of birth.

Sources: R. Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1977), p. 196.; CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1989.

TABLE 38. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ABROAD PER MARRIED[a] JEWISH WOMAN (IMMIGRATED 1948–1954), BY SELECTED COUNTRIES OF BIRTH AND AGES AT IMMIGRATION, 1961

Country of Birth	Age at Immigration 30–34	40–44	45–49
Asia-Africa, total	4.0	5.7	6.1
Thereof:			
Turkey	2.5	3.9	4.0
Iraq	4.0	6.3	6.4
Yemen, South Yemen	4.5	6.4	6.8
Iran	4.8	5.6	7.1
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria	5.6	6.1	7.5
Libya	4.8	7.0	7.5
Egypt	2.5	4.2	(6.2)
Europe-America, total	1.3	1.8	1.9
Thereof:			
Bulgaria, Greece	1.4	2.1	2.2
USSR	1.3	1.8	1.6
Poland	1.3	1.9	2.1
Romania	1.1	1.6	1.8
Hungary	1.2	(1.5)	(1.8)
Czechoslovakia	1.1	(1.6)	(1.9)
Germany, Austria	0.8	1.5	1.9

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[a] Here and in tables 39, 40, 41, 44, and 45: women married in first marriage.

Sources: CBS, 1961 census, vol. 32; and special tabulations from 1961 census file.

TABLE 39. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER MARRIED JEWISH WOMAN, BY WOMAN'S ORIGIN, REGION OF BIRTH, SELECTED AGES, AND MARRIAGE DURATIONS, 1961, 1972, 1983

Origin	Region of Birth	Age		Duration of Marriage	
		30–34	45–49	10–14	25–29
			1961 Census		
Total		2.98	3.12	2.71	3.36
Africa	Abroad	4.82	6.74	4.29	7.07
Asia	Abroad	3.98	5.81	3.71	6.20
Asia[a]	Israel	3.09	5.11	3.20	5.51
Israel	Israel	2.59	3.40	2.65	3.61
Europe-America	Israel	2.18	2.88	2.29	2.86
Europe-America	Abroad	2.05	2.15	1.99	2.24
			1972 Census		
Total		3.10	3.36	2.97	3.01
Africa	Abroad	4.08	6.26	3.71	6.44
Asia	Abroad	3.45	5.03	3.36	5.02
Asia[a]	Israel	2.83	4.23	2.93	3.95
Israel	Israel	2.72	3.21	2.80	3.20
Europe-America	Israel	2.44	2.62	2.57	2.62
Europe-America	Abroad	2.29	2.16	2.22	2.05
			1983 Census		
Total		2.61	3.64	2.77	3.49
Africa	Abroad	3.11	5.22	3.18	5.13
Asia	Abroad	2.89	4.26	3.00	4.12
Africa	Israel	2.82	3.06	3.03	x
Asia	Israel	2.60	3.48	2.88	3.50
Israel	Israel	2.50	3.23	2.72	3.24
Europe-America	Israel	2.37	2.92	2.59	2.93
Europe-America	Abroad	2.33	2.56	2.44	2.42

[a] Including some Israeli-born women of African origin.

Sources: Special tabulations from 1961 and 1972 census files; CBS, 1983 census, vol. 14.

TABLE 40. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER MARRIED FOREIGN-BORN JEWISH WOMAN, BY WOMAN'S REGION OF BIRTH, PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION, PLACE OF MARRIAGE, AND SELECTED MARRIAGE DURATIONS, 1961, 1972, 1983

Region of Birth	Period of Immigration	Duration of Marriage					
		10–14			25–29		
		Total	Married		Total	Married	
			Abroad	In Israel		Abroad	In Israel
				1961			
Africa	1948–1954	4.31	4.66	3.52	7.28	7.28	—
	1955–1961	4.45	4.45	—	7.11	7.11	—
Asia	Up to 1947	3.13	3.00	3.13	5.79	5.61	6.00
	1948–1954	3.80	4.02	3.15	6.37	6.37	—
Europe-America	Up to 1947	2.09	2.27	2.08	2.33	2.27	2.40
	1948–1954	1.96	1.94	1.99	2.02	2.02	—
	1955–1961	1.77	1.77	—	2.08	2.08	—
				1972			
Africa	1948–1954	3.60	—	3.60	6.42	6.42	—
	1955–1960	3.66	3.96	3.64	6.39	6.39	—
	1961–1964	3.99	4.06	3.08	7.44	7.44	—
Asia	Up to 1947	2.79	—	2.79	4.04	3.94	4.07
	1948–1954	3.43	—	3.43	5.40	5.40	—
Europe-America	Up to 1947	2.27	—	2.27	2.23	2.27	2.21
	1948–1954	2.32	—	2.32	2.04	2.04	—
	1955–1960	2.16	2.27	2.13	2.00	2.00	—
	1961–1964	2.01	2.02	1.91	1.68	1.68	—
	1965–1972	2.21	2.21	—	1.95	1.95	—
				1983			
Africa	1948–1954	3.21	—	3.21	4.69	5.79	4.67
	1955–1960	3.14	—	3.14	5.14	5.35	4.91
	1961–1964	3.31	—	3.31	6.39	6.39	—
Asia	Up to 1947	2.95	—	2.95	3.50	—	3.50
	1948–1954	3.03	—	3.03	4.17	6.00	4.17
Europe-America	Up to 1947	2.49	—	2.49	2.55	—	2.55
	1948–1954	2.65	—	2.65	2.44	3.21	2.43
	1955–1960	2.50	—	2.50	2.63	2.51	2.95
	1961–1964	2.32	—	2.32	1.80	1.80	—
	1965–1971	2.44	2.62	2.40	2.25	2.25	—
	1972–1974	2.38	2.38	2.35	2.55	2.55	—
	1975–1983	2.25	2.25	—	2.40	2.40	—

Source: Same as table 39.

TABLE 41. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER MARRIED EUROPEAN-AMERICAN-BORN JEWISH WOMAN, BY SELECTED PERIODS OF IMMIGRATION AND AGE, 1961, 1972, 1983

Period of Immigration	Reference Date	Age at Time of Immigration/Census									
		20–24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40–44	45–49	50–54	55–59	60–64	65+
Up to 1947	At immigr.[a]	0.20	0.54	1.22	1.91	2.28	2.74	2.92	3.11	x	x
	1961	0.90	1.81	2.18	2.34	2.34	2.30	2.10	2.14	2.42	3.18
	1972	1.38	1.68	2.55	2.71	2.49	2.44	2.38	2.19	2.05	2.11
	1983	—	—	—	3.00	2.89	2.91	2.51	2.41	2.35	2.21
1948–54	At immigr.[a]	0.59	0.95	1.29	1.59	1.80	1.92	2.37	2.81	3.14	3.58
	1961	1.01	1.68	2.01	2.11	2.00	1.93	1.83	2.02	2.46	3.11
	1972	1.10	1.66	2.38	2.49	2.36	2.13	1.92	1.76	1.67	2.08
	1983	—	1.80	2.58	2.78	2.87	2.62	2.37	2.17	1.93	1.83
1955–60	At immigr.[a]	0.47	1.15	1.65	1.71	1.87	1.66	1.49	1.96	2.39	2.90
	1961	0.88	1.33	1.79	1.87	1.99	1.87	1.64	1.89	2.28	3.17
	1972	0.91	1.62	2.41	2.52	2.16	2.09	1.88	1.79	1.58	1.75
	1983	1.34	1.79	2.38	2.65	2.98	2.75	2.34	1.97	1.95	1.79
1961–64	At immigr.[b]	0.41	0.93	1.38	1.48	1.53	1.32	1.54	1.60	2.09	3.58
	1972	0.91	1.65	2.05	2.04	1.74	1.65	1.47	1.39	1.81	3.11
	1983	0.87	1.59	2.36	2.58	2.67	1.90	1.73	1.72	1.55	2.08

[a] According to 1961 census.

[b] According to 1972 census.

Source: Same as table 39.

TABLE 42. ATTITUDES OF MARRIED JEWISH WOMEN, BY ORIGIN, CONCERNING NUMBER OF CHILDREN, 1974–1975 AND 1987–1988

Survey and Type of Information	Origin			
	Total	Asia-Africa	Israel	Europe-America
	Average Number of Children per Woman			
1974–1975				
Ideal number	4.3[a]	5.0	—	3.7
Israeli norm	3.8[a]	4.1	—	3.5
1987–1988				
Desired number	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.2
Ideal number	4.2	4.4	4.1	4.0

[a] Excluding Israeli origin group.

Source: See note 76 to text.

TABLE 43. AGE-SPECIFIC BIRTHRATES OF JEWISH WOMEN, BY REGION OF BIRTH, 1980–1984 AND 1985–1988

Age	Region of Birth							
	Total		Asia-Africa		Israel		Europe-America	
	1980–1984	1985–1988	1980–1984	1985–1988	1980–1984	1985–1988	1980–1984	1985–1988
Up to 19	22.8	14.8	44.4	42.2	18.4	12.1	53.6	35.3
20–24	156.3	135.4	183.4	167.8	151.9	132.2	159.9	138.8
25–29	181.5	191.9	184.0	196.4	183.5	193.6	168.9	177.4
30–34	127.0	137.6	129.7	141.2	132.9	140.3	111.5	123.4
35–39	60.8	68.0	64.0	71.2	65.5	75.4	50.7	52.0
40–44	10.5	13.3	12.2	14.8	10.9	13.8	6.9	10.5
45–49	0.6	0.9	0.8	1.2	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.7
TFR	2.80	2.81	3.09	3.17	2.82	2.84	2.76	2.69

Source: CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* and unpublished data.

TABLE 44. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER MARRIED JEWISH WOMAN, BY WOMAN'S ORIGIN, REGION OF BIRTH, YEARS OF STUDY, AND SELECTED MARRIAGE DURATIONS, 1961, 1972, 1983

Origin	Region	Years of Study						
	of Birth	Total	0–4	5–8	9–10	11–12	13–15	16+
				MARRIED 10–14 YEARS				
				1961 Census				
Total		2.71	4.04	2.51	2.18	2.05	2.03	1.76
Africa	Abroad	4.29	4.97	3.94	3.18	2.44	2.30	x
Asia	Abroad	3.71	3.69	3.08	2.74	2.71	2.45	x
Asia[a]	Israel	3.20	4.29	3.08	2.86	2.52	x	x
Israel	Israel	2.65	3.04	2.89	2.56	2.37	2.23	x
Europe-America	Israel	2.29	x	2.48	2.23	2.29	2.20	2.03
Europe-America	Abroad	1.99	2.13	2.03	1.97	1.88	1.91	1.67
				1972 Census				
Total		2.97	4.00	3.29	2.73	2.56	2.50	2.33
Africa	Abroad	3.71	4.51	3.84	3.13	2.87	2.96	2.39
Asia	Abroad	3.36	3.95	3.36	2.98	2.76	2.62	x
Asia[a]	Israel	2.96	3.15	3.13	2.89	2.96	2.65	x
Israel	Israel	2.80	x	3.07	2.74	2.75	2.67	2.63
Europe-America	Israel	2.57	1.43	2.75	2.48	2.64	2.56	2.41
Europe-America	Abroad	2.22	2.04	2.16	2.31	2.21	2.26	2.25
				1983 Census				
Total		2.77	3.33	3.24	2.90	2.69	2.65	2.46
Africa	Abroad	3.18	3.52	3.46	3.19	3.06	2.85	2.81
Asia	Abroad	3.00	3.11	3.27	2.98	2.82	2.94	2.77
Africa	Israel	3.03	(3.44)	3.38	3.02	2.88	2.76	2.47
Asia	Israel	2.88	(3.69)	3.09	2.94	2.73	2.90	2.51
Israel	Israel	2.72	x	3.18	2.91	2.61	2.73	2.51
Europe-America	Israel	2.59	x	2.92	2.58	2.56	2.67	2.50
Europe-America	Abroad	2.44	(2.63)	2.75	2.50	2.43	2.44	2.35

TABLE 44.—*(Continued)*

Origin	Region of Birth	Years of Study						
		Total	0–4	5–8	9–10	11–12	13–15	16+
					MARRIED 25–29 YEARS			
					1961 Census			
Total		3.36	5.89	2.86	2.35	2.14	2.13	1.83
Africa	Abroad	7.07	7.80	6.15	5.21	3.47	x	x
Asia	Abroad	6.20	6.66	4.89	4.39	3.39	x	x
Asia[a]	Israel	5.51	5.85	5.70	x	x	x	x
Israel	Israel	3.61	5.77	3.97	2.26	2.27	x	x
Europe-America	Israel	2.86	x	3.02	2.55	2.40	2.60	x
Europe-America	Abroad	2.24	2.86	2.28	2.14	2.07	2.10	1.74
					1972 Census			
Total		3.01	5.35	2.76	2.39	2.12	2.09	2.00
Africa	Abroad	6.44	7.45	5.92	5.19	3.49	3.77	x
Asia	Abroad	5.02	6.06	4.13	3.48	3.14	3.21	x
Asia[a]	Israel	3.99	4.90	3.95	4.08	2.57	x	x
Israel	Israel	3.20	4.88	3.47	2.93	2.70	2.44	2.31
Europe-America	Israel	2.62	x	2.75	2.64	2.51	2.62	2.64
Europe-America	Abroad	2.05	2.14	2.12	2.08	1.92	1.92	1.86
					1983 Census			
Total		3.49	5.26	3.79	3.20	2.87	2.75	2.53
Africa	Abroad	5.13	6.48	4.97	4.48	4.12	3.72	(3.22)
Asia	Abroad	4.12	5.05	3.99	3.39	3.26	3.12	2.59
Asia	Israel	3.50	(3.61)	3.77	3.61	3.18	2.52	(2.81)
Israel	Israel	3.24	(3.25)	3.71	3.23	2.98	3.23	2.76
Europe-America	Israel	2.93	(3.80)	3.36	2.75	2.88	3.03	2.85
Europe-America	Abroad	2.42	2.54	2.47	2.57	2.34	2.38	2.30

[a] Including some Israeli-born women of African origin.

Sources: Special tabulations from 1961 and 1972 census files; CBS, 1983 census, vol. 14.

TABLE 45. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER JEWISH WOMAN MARRIED 10–14 YEARS, BY WOMAN'S ORIGIN, REGION OF BIRTH, SELECTED YEARS OF STUDY, AND LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION, 1961, 1972, 1983

Origin	Region of Birth	Total	Selected Years of Study 5–8	9–10	11–12	13–15
			1961 CENSUS			
			In Labor Force			
Total		2.22	2.24	2.09	1.98	1.97
Africa	Abroad	3.56	3.37	3.31	2.35	2.33
Asia	Abroad	3.12	2.88	2.30	2.32	x
Asia[a]	Israel	2.63	2.62	2.40	2.50	x
Israel	Israel	1.70	2.60	2.38	2.00	2.19
Europe-America	Israel	2.22	2.24	2.23	2.32	2.12
Europe-America	Abroad	1.91	1.97	1.95	1.82	1.89
			Not in Labor Force			
Total		2.86	2.56	2.22	2.10	2.12
Africa	Abroad	4.41	4.02	3.14	2.48	2.27
Asia	Abroad	3.79	3.11	2.84	2.87	2.93
Asia[a]	Israel	3.33	3.17	3.04	x	x
Israel	Israel	2.80	2.93	2.63	2.60	2.33
Europe-America	Israel	2.35	2.53	2.23	2.26	2.33
Europe-America	Abroad	2.02	2.04	1.99	1.91	1.93
			1972 CENSUS			
			In Labor Force			
Total		2.48	2.95	2.40	2.34	2.38
Africa	Abroad	3.07	3.47	2.77	2.40	2.85
Asia	Abroad	2.79	3.02	2.43	2.40	2.42
Asia[a]	Israel	2.54	2.52	2.48	2.72	2.52
Israel	Israel	2.51	3.05	2.37	2.42	2.55
Europe-America	Israel	2.47	2.44	2.20	2.57	2.49
Europe-America	Abroad	2.08	2.22	2.21	1.99	2.09
			Not in Labor Force			
Total		3.24	3.37	2.89	2.74	2.74
Africa	Abroad	3.90	3.91	3.28	3.21	3.09
Asia	Abroad	3.49	3.42	3.09	2.98	3.00
Asia[a]	Israel	3.16	3.25	3.10	3.19	3.00
Israel	Israel	3.01	3.07	2.95	3.01	2.89
Europe-America	Israel	2.69	2.81	2.66	2.71	2.72
Europe-America	Abroad	2.35	2.14	2.36	2.38	2.60

TABLE 45.—*(Continued)*

Origin	Region of Birth	Selected Years of Study				
		Total	5–8	9–10	11–12	13–15
				1983 CENSUS		
				In Labor Force		
Total		2.57	3.04	2.67	2.54	2.57
Africa	Abroad	2.87	3.12	2.92	2.81	2.76
Asia	Abroad	2.82	3.22	2.78	2.67	2.90
Africa	Israel	2.75	3.12	2.79	2.68	2.65
Asia	Israel	2.73	3.08	2.83	2.59	2.77
Israel	Israel	2.60	2.79	2.64	2.52	2.70
Europe-America	Israel	2.51	2.84	2.45	2.47	2.60
Europe-America	Abroad	2.32	2.56	2.29	2.32	2.34
				Not in Labor Force		
Total		3.07	3.31	3.07	2.91	2.97
Africa	Abroad	3.45	3.58	3.36	3.38	3.18
Asia	Abroad	3.17	3.29	3.11	3.00	3.06
Africa	Israel	3.27	3.47	3.19	3.10	3.14
Asia	Israel	3.03	3.10	3.01	2.91	3.26
Israel	Israel	2.94	3.34	3.14	2.74	2.83
Europe-America	Israel	2.79	2.94	2.69	2.71	2.97
Europe-America	Abroad	2.74	2.84	2.76	2.66	2.83

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[a] Including some Israeli-born women of African origin.

Source: Same as table 44.

TABLE 46. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER JEWISH WOMAN (AGED 30–34 AND CURRENTLY GIVING BIRTH), BY WOMAN'S ORIGIN, REGION OF BIRTH, AND RELIGIOSITY: JERUSALEM, 1975–1976 AND 1983–1984

Indicators of Religiosity	Origin and Region of Birth					
	Total	Asia-Africa		Israel	Europe-America	
		Abroad	Israel	Israel	Abroad	Israel
		Maternity Ward Interview Study, 1975–1976				
Total	3.7	4.1	3.3	4.2	3.2	3.3
Woman does not go to mikveh	3.0	3.6	3.0	2.9	2.4	2.6
Woman goes to mikveh and husband is:						
not in yeshivah	4.3	4.5	3.8	4.4	4.0	3.8
in yeshivah	5.2	4.7	(5.6)	5.5	5.3	4.9
		Ecological Study, 1983–1984				
Religiosity of residential region:						
Total	3.8	3.5	3.3	4.5	3.8	4.1
Very low	3.0	3.3	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.6
Rather low	3.7	3.6	3.1	3.6	3.6	3.9
Rather high	5.1	4.8	3.7	5.7	5.4	5.1
Very high	5.9	4.8	5.3	6.0	6.0	6.0

Source: U.O. Schmelz (see note 78 to text).

TABLE 47. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER JEWISH WOMAN (AGED 30–34 AND CURRENTLY GIVING BIRTH), BY WOMAN'S ORIGIN, REGION OF BIRTH, YEARS OF STUDY, WORK STATUS, AND RELIGIOSITY[a]: JERUSALEM, 1983–1984

Origin, Birth Region, and Selected Years of Study	Working, by Religiosity				Not-Working, by Religiosity			
	Very Low	Rather Low	Rather High	Very High	Very Low	Rather Low	Rather High	Very High
Total	2.6	3.2	4.6	5.0	3.7	4.3	5.6	6.3
9–12	2.9	3.2	4.7	5.2	3.7	4.1	5.7	6.4
13+	2.5	3.3	4.5	4.9	3.3	4.5	5.2	6.0
Asian-African origin								
Born abroad	2.9	3.4	4.0	(3.8)	3.9	4.0	5.4	5.5
9–12	2.9	(3.4)	x	x	3.9	(4.0)	x	(5.4)
13+	2.7	(3.5)	(4.1)	x	3.2	(3.9)	x	x
Born in Israel	2.8	2.7	(3.8)	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.7	6.1
9–12	2.9	2.8	x	x	3.7	(3.6)	(3.4)	(5.7)
13+	2.6	2.7	x	(4.2)	x	x	x	(6.7)
Israeli origin	2.6	2.9	5.1	5.4	3.4	(5.4)	6.2	6.2
9–12	2.7	x	x	(4.8)	3.6	x	(6.3)	5.9
13+	2.5	3.0	5.0	5.7	(3.3)	x	(5.9)	6.0
European-American origin								
Born abroad	2.5	3.5	4.3	4.9	3.7	4.3	5.9	6.4
9–12	2.8	x	x	x	4.0	(4.5)	(6.9)	7.2
13+	2.4	3.5	4.2	4.1	3.5	4.1	5.0	5.6
Born in Israel	2.4	3.4	4.7	5.2	3.1	4.8	5.9	6.5
9–12	2.8	(3.8)	x	x	3.4	(4.5)	(6.4)	6.7
13+	2.4	3.4	4.5	5.0	2.9	4.8	5.4	6.0

[a] Religiosity of residential area.

Source: Same as table 46.

TABLE 48. JEWS AGED 15+, BY SEX, ORIGIN, AND AGE—SELECTED EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS, 1983

Origin and Age	Total (Thousands)	Years of Schooling			% with Secondary or Higher Certific. (A)	% with Academic Degree (B)
		% 0–4	% 13+	Median		
				Men		
Asia						
Total	276.6	10.2	12.7	10.8	40.5	3.8
15–24	72.4	0.9	8.1	12.0	50.9	0.3
25–34	66.6	1.7	19.7	11.6	53.5	6.5
35–44	47.4	4.5	16.8	10.6	41.0	6.2
45–54	39.6	18.3	10.2	8.8	26.2	3.8
55–64	26.1	25.9	9.4	8.3	24.0	3.4
65–74	15.4	38.1	7.5	6.9	16.2	2.5
75+	9.0	48.9	4.6	5.3	9.6	1.0
Africa						
Total	252.7	9.2	11.8	10.8	39.4	3.0
15–24	79.2	1.2	7.2	11.7	46.7	0.3
25–34	66.0	2.2	17.4	11.3	50.6	4.7
35–44	38.8	5.2	16.7	10.6	39.9	5.5
45–54	30.6	17.3	10.9	8.9	25.6	3.3
55–64	21.5	27.7	8.7	8.4	19.1	2.6
65–74	12.0	40.4	7.4	6.9	12.8	2.0
75+	4.6	57.3	5.2	4.1	9.3	1.5
Europe-America						
Total	535.1	4.3	35.5	12.4	60.7	17.4
15–24	79.7	0.6	20.5	12.3	61.9	1.9
25–34	107.8	0.6	54.1	13.5	81.6	25.7
35–44	84.3	0.9	54.6	13.7	77.1	31.1
45–54	67.9	4.3	38.4	12.4	61.0	23.2
55–64	80.4	6.3	24.6	10.8	45.5	12.6
65–74	73.2	9.2	21.4	10.5	40.4	9.9
75+	41.7	14.7	18.6	8.9	33.3	9.4

TABLE 48—*(Continued)*

Origin and Age	Total (Thousands)	Years of Schooling			% with Secondary or Higher Certific. (A)	% with Academic Degree (B)
		% 0–4	% 13+	Median		
			Women			
Asia						
Total	279.8	20.0	11.0	10.3	37.9	1.9
15–24	68.0	0.6	11.5	12.1	57.8	0.9
25–34	68.4	1.6	20.4	11.8	58.3	4.6
35–44	48.4	9.6	12.7	10.0	34.4	2.7
45–54	40.7	38.1	4.1	7.1	14.8	0.7
55–64	27.6	54.8	2.7	4.0	11.1	0.6
65–74	17.3	68.4	2.1	0.8	6.7	0.4
75+	9.5	79.2	1.1	0.7	3.6	0.1
Africa						
Total	258.8	18.0	10.9	10.5	38.0	2.0
15–24	75.4	1.0	10.6	12.0	54.2	0.9
25–34	68.7	2.4	18.9	11.4	52.7	4.1
35–44	40.7	11.9	11.0	9.8	31.8	2.7
45–54	32.6	40.7	5.2	7.7	16.2	1.1
55–64	22.9	57.7	2.7	1.0	10.8	0.9
65–74	13.4	66.2	2.2	0.8	6.4	0.6
75+	5.1	76.4	1.2	0.7	4.6	0.4
Europe-America						
Total	583.6	5.4	32.6	12.2	60.2	12.8
15–24	74.8	0.7	27.3	12.4	66.5	4.3
25–34	113.4	0.6	57.3	14.1	84.5	25.0
35–44	89.3	1.0	53.5	13.5	78.6	22.7
45–54	76.3	5.5	31.6	12.1	57.6	12.7
55–64	97.1	7.0	16.6	10.3	41.6	6.5
65–74	85.3	11.2	13.8	10.1	39.6	4.8
75+	47.3	18.3	10.9	8.7	34.1	4.7

TABLE 48—*(Continued)*

Origin and Age	Years of Schooling			% with Secondary or Higher Certific.	% with Academic Degree
	% 0–4	% 13+	Median		
	Origin-Specific Ratios (Europe-America = Base 1.00)				
			Men		
Asia					
Total	2.37	.36	.87	.67	.22
15–24	1.50	.40	.98	.82	.16
25–34	7.50	.36	.86	.66	.25
35–44	5.00	.31	.77	.53	.20
45–54	4.26	.26	.71	.43	.16
55–64	4.11	.38	.77	.53	.27
65–74	4.14	.35	.66	.40	.25
75+	3.33	.25	.60	.29	.11
Africa					
Total	2.14	.33	.87	.65	.17
15–24	2.00	.35	.95	.75	.16
25–34	3.67	.32	.84	.62	.18
35–44	5.78	.31	.77	.52	.18
45–54	4.02	.28	.72	.42	.14
55–64	4.40	.35	.78	.42	.21
65–74	4.39	.35	.66	.32	.20
75+	3.90	.28	.46	.28	.16
			Women		
Asia					
Total	3.70	.34	.84	.63	.15
15–24	.86	.42	.98	.87	.21
25–34	2.67	.36	.84	.69	.18
35–44	9.60	.24	.74	.44	.12
45–54	6.92	.13	.59	.26	.06
75–64	7.83	.16	.39	.27	.09
65–74	6.11	.15	.08	.17	.08
75+	4.33	.10	.08	.11	.02

TABLE 48—*(Continued)*

Origin and Age	Years of Schooling			% with Secondary or Higher Certific.	% with Academic Degree
	% 0–4	% 13+	Median		
Africa					
Total	3.33	.33	.86	.63	.16
15–24	1.43	.39	.97	.82	.21
25–34	4.00	.33	.81	.62	.16
35–44	11.90	.21	.73	.40	.12
45–54	7.40	.16	.64	.28	.09
55–64	8.24	.16	.10	.26	.14
65–74	5.91	.16	.08	.16	.12
75+	4.17	.11	.08	.13	.09

Source: CBS, 1983 census, vol. 10.

TABLE 49. MEDIAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING AMONG ISRAELI-BORN JEWS AGED 15+,^{a} BY SEX, AGE, AND ORIGIN,^{b} 1961, 1972, 1983

Age	Men				Women			
	Total^{c}	Asia	Africa	Europe-America	Total^{c}	Asia	Africa	Europe-America
1961								
Total	10.7	8.3		11.4	10.4	8.0		11.4
14–29	10.9	8.6		11.4	10.8	8.7		11.5
30–44	10.1	7.6		11.6	9.7	7.0		11.3
45–64	9.3	7.4		10.5	7.3	5.4		8.6
65+	8.5	(6.1)		10.9	1.0	(0.8)		5.9
1972								
Total	11.3	10.0	9.6	12.3	11.4	10.2	9.9	12.4
14–29	11.1	10.1	9.6	12.2	11.4	10.3	9.9	12.4
30–44	12.3	9.9	10.1	12.8	12.2	8.9	10.3	12.8
45–64	10.7	8.7	8.7	11.9	9.8	8.2	8.4	11.8
65+	9.0	(8.2)	(8.4)	10.4	8.1	(0.8)	(3.0)	8.5
1983								
Total	12.2	11.6	11.5	12.8	12.3	12.0	11.8	12.9
15–24	12.1	11.9	11.6	12.3	12.2	12.1	11.9	12.5
25–44	12.5	11.5	11.4	13.7	12.7	11.8	11.7	14.2
45–64	12.3	10.1	10.2	12.8	12.2	8.8	8.8	12.8
65+	10.5	8.6	(8.5)	11.5	8.6	5.3	(6.4)	10.0

TABLE 49—*(Continued)*

Age	Men		Women	
	Asia	Africa	Asia	Africa
Origin-Specific Ratios (Europe-America = Base 1.00)				
1961				
Total	.73		.70	
14–29	.75		.76	
30–44	.66		.62	
45–64	.70		.63	
65+	(.56)		(.14)	
1972				
Total	.81	.78	.82	.80
14–29	.83	.79	.83	.80
30–44	.77	.79	.70	.80
45–64	.73	.73	.69	.71
65+	(.79)	(.81)	(.09)	(.35)
1983				
Total	.91	.90	.93	.91
15–24	.97	.94	.97	.95
25–44	.84	.83	.83	.82
45–64	.79	.80	.69	.69
65+	.75	(.74)	.53	(.64)

[a] 1961, 1972—ages 14+.

[b] In parentheses—cells with N < 500.

[c] Including Israeli-born, father also born in Israel.

Sources: CBS, 1961 census, vol. 15; 1972 census, unpublished tabulations; 1983 census, vol. 10.

TABLE 50. MEDIAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING AMONG FOREIGN-BORN JEWS AGED 15+,[a] BY SEX, AGE, AND ORIGIN, 1961, 1972, 1983

Age	Men				Women			
	Total	Asia	Africa	Europe-America	Total	Asia	Africa	Europe-America
1961								
Total	8.4	6.9		9.5	7.3	3.7		8.8
14–29	8.4	7.7		9.9	7.8	6.7		9.8
30–44	8.4	6.8		9.4	7.5	1.4		8.8
45–64	8.6	5.5		9.5	7.3	0.7		8.7
65+	7.3	2.5		8.4	4.0	0.6		6.4
1972								
Total	9.7	8.5	8.8	10.8	8.8	6.7	8.3	10.3
14–29	..	10.1	10.0	12.2	..	9.6	9.7	12.3
30–44	..	8.5	8.6	11.6	..	6.5	7.8	10.8
45–64	..	7.2	7.7	10.4	..	0.8	0.9	9.7
65+	..	3.0	1.0	8.9	..	0.6	0.6	8.5
1983								
Total	10.8	9.1	10.3	12.0	10.2	8.2	8.9	11.2
15–24	12.2	12.2	12.1	12.2	12.3	12.2	12.2	12.3
25–44	12.0	10.8	10.9	13.5	11.8	10.2	10.5	13.3
45–64	10.2	8.5	8.7	11.3	8.7	5.2	5.6	10.6
65+	8.8	6.3	6.2	10.2	8.5	0.7	0.8	9.0

TABLE 50—*(Continued)*

Age	Men		Women	
	Asia	Africa	Asia	Africa
	Origin-Specific Ratios (Europe-America = Base 1.00)			
	1961			
Total	.73		.42	
14–29	.78		.68	
30–44	.72		.16	
45–64	.58		.08	
65+	.30		.09	
	1972			
Total	.79	.81	.65	.81
14–29	.83	.82	.78	.79
30–44	.73	.74	.60	.72
45–64	.69	.74	.08	.09
65+	.34	.11	.07	.07
	1983			
Total	.76	.86	.73	.79
15–24	1.00	.99	.99	.99
25–44	.80	.81	.77	.79
45–64	.75	.77	.49	.53
65+	.62	.61	.08	.09

[a] 1961, 1972—ages 14+.

Sources: Same as table 49.

TABLE 51. ISRAELI-BORN JEWS AMONG ACADEMIC GRADUATES, BY SEX, AGE, AND ORIGIN, 1974 AND 1984 (RATES PER 1,000 IN SPECIFIED POPULATION GROUP)

Sex and Age	Total[a]	Asia-Africa (A)	Europe-America (B)	Ratio[b] (A)/(B)
			1974	
Both sexes, total	73	7	119	.06
Thereof:				
20–24	7	—	15	—
25–29	125	19	172	.11
30–34	163	18	225	.08
35–44	135	12	195	.06
45–54	77	(15)	122	x
			1984	
Both sexes, total	107	29	197	.15
Thereof:				
20–24	17	8	29	.28
25–29	93	38	171	.22
30–34	145	45	248	.18
35–44	205	37	278	.13
45–54	171	49	236	.21
Men, total	115	32	216	.15
Thereof:				
20–24	8	(2)	(18)	x
25–29	85	31	160	.19
30–34	148	62	241	.26
35–44	246	53	331	.16
45–54	239	(86)	329	x
Women, total	99	27	178	.15
Thereof:				
20–24	27	14	41	.34
25–29	102	46	182	.25
30–34	141	28	255	.11
35–44	165	(22)	226	x
45–54	105	(14)	146	x

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[a] Including Israeli-born, father also born in this country.

[b] Ratios per 1.00.

Sources: CBS, *Persons with Academic and Post-Secondary Education, 1974*, Special Series, no. 643, 1981; *University and Post-Secondary Education Graduates, 1984*, vol. B, Special Series, no. 820, 1988.

TABLE 52. JEWS AGED 25–44, BY SEX, ORIGIN AND REGION OF BIRTH, AGE AT CENSUS, AGE AT IMMIGRATION, AND EDUCATION, 1983

Origin and Age at Census	Total	Israeli-born	Foreign-born Who Immigrated at the Age of:		
			0–14	15–24	25+
			MEN		
			Thousands		
Asia					
25–34	66.6	48.9	14.2	2.9	0.6
35–44	47.4	9.2	32.5	3.6	2.1
Africa					
25–34	66.0	28.5	33.6	3.2	0.7
35–44	38.8	1.4	22.3	12.9	2.1
Europe-America					
25–34	107.8	67.9	18.4	14.6	6.9
35–44	84.3	34.4	25.8	9.3	14.8
			Median Years of Schooling		
Asia					
25–34	11.6	11.6	11.3	12.2	(14.2)
35–44	10.6	11.0	10.5	10.5	11.8
Africa					
25–34	11.3	11.4	11.1	12.4	(12.9)
35–44	10.6	11.3	10.5	10.6	12.5
Europe-America					
25–34	13.5	13.4	12.9	13.9	15.7
35–44	13.7	14.2	12.8	13.5	15.0
			Percentage of University Graduates		
Asia					
25–34	6.5	5.8	6.2	14.2	(33.6)
35–44	6.2	6.0	5.5	5.8	17.7
Africa					
25–34	4.7	3.6	4.2	13.9	(32.4)
35–44	5.5	10.0	4.6	4.5	19.8
Europe-America					
25–34	25.7	24.4	20.8	27.5	47.5
35–44	31.1	34.1	22.4	24.8	43.2

TABLE 52—*(Continued)*

Origin and Age at Census	Total	Israeli-born	Foreign-born Who Immigrated at the Age of:		
			0–14	15–24	25+
			MEN		
			Origin-Specific Ratios of Median Years of Schooling[a]		
Asia					
25–34	.86	.87	.88	.88	(.90)
35–44	.77	.77	.82	.78	.79
Africa					
25–34	.84	.85	.86	.89	(.82)
35–44	.77	.80	.82	.79	.83
			Origin-Specific Ratios of Percentages of University Graduates[a]		
Asia					
25–34	.25	.24	.30	.52	(.71)
35–44	.20	.18	.25	.23	.41
Africa					
25–34	.18	.15	.20	.51	(.68)
35–44	.18	.29	.21	.18	.46
			WOMEN		
			Thousands		
Asia					
25–34	68.4	49.9	14.3	3.5	0.7
35–44	48.4	10.3	31.3	4.1	2.7
Africa					
25–34	68.7	28.6	35.1	4.2	0.9
35–44	40.7	1.5	22.3	14.6	2.2
Europe-America					
25–34	113.4	67.9	18.7	19.6	7.2
35–44	89.3	35.6	26.0	11.8	16.0
			Median Years of Schooling		
Asia					
25–34	11.8	12.0	10.9	11.5	(12.2)
35–44	10.0	10.9	9.0	9.0	9.8
Africa					
25–34	11.4	11.7	11.0	12.2	(12.8)
35–44	9.8	11.4	9.4	9.2	12.0

TABLE 52—*(Continued)*

Origin and Age at Census	Total	Israeli-born	Foreign-born Who Immigrated at the Age of:		
			0–14	15–24	25+
			WOMEN		
Europe-America					
25–34	14.1	14.2	12.9	13.9	15.5
35–44	13.5	14.2	12.7	13.0	14.2
			Percentage of University Graduates		
Asia					
25–34	4.6	4.6	3.4	7.3	(12.4)
35–44	2.4	3.2	1.9	2.8	5.1
Africa					
25–34	4.1	3.8	2.7	14.6	(22.4)
35–44	2.7	7.9	1.7	2.1	12.7
Europe-America					
25–34	25.0	24.0	19.2	26.7	45.2
35–44	22.3	23.1	15.1	20.7	35.6
			Origin-Specific Ratios of Median Years of Schooling[a]		
Asia					
25–34	.84	.84	.84	.83	(.79)
35–44	.74	.77	.71	.69	.69
Africa					
25–34	.81	.82	.85	.88	(.83)
35–44	.73	.80	.74	.71	.84
			Origin-Specific Ratios of Percentages of University Graduates[a]		
Asia					
25–34	.18	.19	.18	.27	(.27)
35–44	.11	.14	.13	.14	.14
Africa					
25–34	.16	.16	.14	.55	(.50)
35–44	.12	.34	.11	.10	.36

[a] Europe-America = base 1.00.

Source: Special tabulations from 1983 census file.

TABLE 53. FOREIGN-BORN JEWS EDUCATED IN ISRAEL,[a] BY REGION OF BIRTH, PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION, SELECTED AGES AT IMMIGRATION, AND EDUCATION, 1983

Region of Birth and Period of Immigration	Median Years of Schooling		% of University Graduates	
	0–4	10–14	0–4	10–14
Asia, total	10.7	8.8	4.1	2.1
Thereof:				
1948–1954	10.6	8.5	4.5	1.7
Africa, total	11.4	10.4	2.6	3.1
Thereof:				
1948–1954	10.4	8.9	2.9	2.4
1955–1964	12.0	10.4	2.2	2.7
Europe-Amer., total	12.6	12.2	16.0	11.7
Thereof:				
1948–1954	12.9	12.0	20.5	11.8
1955–1964	12.8	12.7	13.1	18.8
1965–1974	11.3	12.6	0.2	10.6
		Origin-Specific Ratios[b]		
Asia, total	.85	.72	.26	.18
Thereof:				
1948–1954	.82	.71	.22	.14
Africa, total	.91	.85	.16	.26
Thereof:				
1948–1954	.81	.74	.14	.20
1955–1964	.94	.82	.17	.14

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[a] Immigrated at the ages of 0–4 or 10–14.

[b] Europe-America = base 1.00.

Source: CBS, 1983 census, vol.10.

TABLE 54. FOREIGN-BORN JEWS WHO IMMIGRATED AT THE AGE OF 25+, BY SEX, REGION OF BIRTH, AGE AT CENSUS, AND EDUCATION, 1983

Age at Census	Men			Women		
	Asia	Africa	Europe-America	Asia	Africa	Europe-America
			Thousands			
Total	41.7	43.6	168.0	46.5	51.2	196.2
25–34	0.6	0.7	6.9	0.7	0.9	7.2
35–44	2.1	2.1	14.8	2.7	2.2	16.0
45–54	3.8	8.3	19.2	4.8	11.5	22.4
55–64	14.9	16.6	41.6	15.9	19.1	54.7
65+	20.3	15.9	85.6	22.4	17.5	95.9
			Percentage with 0–4 Years of Schooling			
Total	34.1	34.4	10.4	60.1	58.7	12.1
25–34	(1.7)	(18.6)	0.5	(5.0)	(15.6)	0.6
35–44	7.3	9.6	2.2	12.8	12.0	1.8
45–54	18.1	24.6	7.1	30.7	47.9	8.9
55–64	29.4	31.6	9.2	60.9	61.3	9.3
65+	44.4	46.5	13.9	73.2	71.0	17.0
			Median Years of Schooling			
Total	7.6	8.2	10.7	0.9	0.9	10.2
25–34	(14.2)	(12.9)	15.7	(12.3)	(12.8)	15.5
35–44	11.8	12.5	15.0	9.8	12.0	14.2
45–54	8.9	8.7	12.6	7.2	6.1	12.1
55–64	8.1	8.3	10.5	0.9	0.9	10.1
65+	6.1	6.0	8.9	0.7	0.8	8.8
			Percentage of University Graduates			
Total	4.2	3.9	17.9	1.0	1.7	11.9
25–34	(33.6)	(32.4)	47.5	(12.4)	(22.4)	45.2
35–44	17.7	19.8	43.2	5.1	12.7	35.6
45–54	6.3	5.1	30.8	1.9	1.5	21.4
55–64	3.9	2.2	14.0	0.6	0.7	7.9
65+	1.8	1.8	10.0	0.3	0.5	5.3

TABLE 54—*(Continued)*

Age at Census	Men		Women	
	Asia	Africa	Asia	Africa
	Origin-Specific Ratios (Europe-America = Base 1.00)			
	Percentage with 0–4 Years of Schooling			
Total	3.28	3.31	4.97	4.85
25–34	(3.40)	x	(8.33)	x
35–44	3.32	4.36	7.11	6.67
45–54	2.55	3.46	3.45	5.38
55–64	3.20	3.43	6.55	6.59
65+	3.19	3.35	4.31	4.18
	Median Years of Schooling			
Total	.71	.76	.09	.09
25–34	(.90)	(.82)	(.79)	(.83)
35–44	.78	.83	.69	.85
45–54	.71	.69	.60	.50
55–64	.77	.79	.09	.09
65+	.68	.67	.08	.09
	Percentage of University Graduates			
Total	.23	.22	.08	.14
25–34	(.71)	(.68)	(.27)	(.50)
35–44	.41	.46	.14	.36
45–54	.20	.17	.09	.07
55–64	.28	.16	.08	.09
65+	.18	.18	.06	.09

Source: Special tabulations from 1983 census file.

TABLE 55. FOREIGN-BORN JEWS WHO IMMIGRATED AT THE AGE OF 25+, BY SEX, REGION OF BIRTH, PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION, AND EDUCATION, 1983

Period of Immigration	Men			Women		
	Asia	Africa	Europe-America[a]	Asia	Africa	Europe-America[a]
			Thousands			
Total	41.7	43.6	157.0	46.5	51.2	183.3
Up to 1947	3.0	0.5	22.3	3.1	0.5	21.7
1948–1954	23.9	10.1	47.2	26.0	10.8	53.8
1955–1964	4.8	23.2	29.7	6.1	27.8	37.6
1965–1974	6.7	7.0	33.7	7.4	8.8	40.9
1975+	3.4	2.8	24.1	3.9	3.3	29.3
			Percentage with 0–4 Years of Schooling			
Total	34.1	34.4	10.4	60.1	58.7	12.1
Up to 1947	39.6	(26.5)	5.3	72.6	50.5	6.7
1948–1954	41.4	35.0	11.8	73.7	65.2	13.9
1955–1964	31.5	40.2	15.4	52.9	65.6	15.1
1965–1974	18.6	21.2	9.9	32.4	42.6	11.7
1975+	12.6	18.7	7.3	24.8	22.7	9.9
			Median Years of Schooling			
Total	7.7	8.2	10.5	0.9	1.0	10.1
Up to 1947	6.6	(8.5)	10.7	0.8	(4.9)	10.5
1948–1954	6.5	8.0	8.9	0.7	0.9	8.8
1955–1964	7.2	7.4	9.0	4.3	0.8	8.8
1965–1974	8.9	9.4	11.4	7.4	7.0	10.5
1975+	10.7	12.3	12.6	8.5	10.8	11.6
			Percentage of University Graduates			
Total	4.2	3.9	15.6	1.0	1.7	10.1
Up to 1947	0.7	(2.1)	11.0	0.5	(3.0)	6.9
1948–1954	2.5	1.7	6.0	0.4	0.5	2.5
1955–1964	3.1	1.6	12.3	0.3	0.4	6.3
1965–1974	7.4	7.5	23.9	2.3	2.9	16.5
1975+	14.4	22.4	30.8	4.1	12.9	21.9

TABLE 55—*(Continued)*

Period of Immigration	Men		Women	
	Asia	Africa	Asia	Africa
	Origin-Specific Ratios (Europe-America = Base 1.00)			
	Percentage with 0–4 Years of Schooling			
Total	3.28	3.31	4.97	4.85
Up to 1947	7.47	(5.00)	10.84	(7.54)
1948–1954	3.51	2.97	5.30	4.69
1955–1964	2.05	2.61	3.50	4.34
1965–1974	1.88	2.14	2.77	3.64
1975+	1.73	2.56	2.51	2.29
	Median Years of Schooling			
Total	.73	.78	.09	.09
Up to 1947	.63	(.79)	.08	(.47)
1948–1954	.73	.90	.08	.10
1955–1964	.80	.82	.49	.09
1965–1974	.78	.82	.70	.67
1975+	.85	.98	.73	.93
	Percentage of University Graduates[a]			
Total	.27	.25	.09	.17
Up to 1947	.06	(.19)	.07	(.43)
1948–1954	.42	.28	.16	.20
1955–1964	.25	.13	.05	.06
1965–1974	.31	.31	.14	.18
1975+	.47	.73	.19	.59

[a] Small discrepancies in comparison with table 54 are due to the different sources.

Source: CBS, 1983 census, *Educational and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Population* (in preparation).

TABLE 56. PERCENTAGES OF ACADEMIC GRADUATES AMONG FOREIGN-BORN JEWS WHO IMMIGRATED FROM EUROPE-AMERICA AT THE AGE OF 25+, BY AGE AT CENSUS AND PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION, 1983

Period of Immigration	Total	Age at Census 25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Total	14.7	46.3	39.2	25.7	10.5	7.6
Up to 1947	9.1	—	—	—	4.9	9.6
1948–1954	4.4	—	—	—	4.6	4.3
1955–1964	9.5	—	(14.3)	16.0	9.3	7.2
1965–1974	22.3	(37.4)	37.2	28.1	18.5	10.2
1975+	30.1	46.7	42.2	32.7	19.2	12.4

Source: Same as table 55.

TABLE 57. ENROLLMENT RATES IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS AMONG JEWS AGED 17, BY SEX AND ORIGIN, 1966–67, 1974–75, 1981–82[a]

Sex and Origin	1966–67	1974–75	1981–82
		Total	
Total	37.0	52.9	68.8
Israel	45.6	66.6	82.7
Asia-Africa	20.7	42.0	62.6
Europe-America	50.1	67.8	73.4
		Boys	
Total	33.7	46.7	60.2
Israel	40.9	63.7	76.1
Asia-Africa	19.8	35.0	52.4
Europe-America	44.9	61.4	67.1
		Girls	
Total	40.5	59.7	77.8
Israel	50.3	69.5	89.8
Asia-Africa	21.8	49.4	73.3
Europe-America	55.5	74.7	80.2

[a] Rates per 100 in specified population group. The rates for 1987–88 were: total—79.9%; boys—72.0%; girls—88.3%.

Source: CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* no. 36, 1985, p. 621, table 12.

TABLE 58. ENROLLMENT RATES[a] IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS AMONG JEWS AGED 17, BY SEX, ORIGIN, AND TYPE OF SCHOOL, 1966–67, 1974–75, 1981–82

Sex and Origin	General School			Vocational or Agricultural School		
	1966–67	1974–75	1981–82	1966–67	1974–75	1981–82
				Total		
Total	25.8	28.2	35.2	11.2	24.7	33.6
Israel	33.3	44.8	54.8	12.3	21.8	27.9
Asia-Africa	12.0	15.6	24.5	8.7	26.4	38.1
Europe-America	38.2	45.1	45.8	11.9	22.7	27.5
				Boys		
Total	20.5	21.1	25.6	13.2	25.6	34.6
Israel	26.4	36.0	42.7	14.5	27.7	33.4
Asia-Africa	10.3	10.7	16.6	9.5	24.3	35.8
Europe-America	30.0	34.2	34.1	14.9	27.2	33.0
				Girls		
Total	31.5	36.0	45.3	9.0	23.7	32.5
Israel	40.3	53.5	67.6	10.0	16.0	22.1
Asia-Africa	13.9	20.8	32.8	7.9	28.6	40.6
Europe-America	46.9	57.1	58.5	8.6	17.6	21.7

TABLE 58—*(Continued)*

Year	Type of School Specific Ratios[b]				Origin-Specific Ratios[c]		
	Total	Israel	Asia-Africa	Europe-American	Total	General	Vocational or Agricultural
				Total			
1966–67	.43	.37	.73	.31	.41	.31	.73
1974–75	.88	.49	1.69	.50	.62	.35	1.16
1981–82	.95	.51	1.56	.60	.85	.53	1.39
				Boys			
1966–67	.64	.55	.92	.50	.44	.34	.64
1974–75	1.21	.77	2.27	.80	.57	.31	.89
1981–82	1.35	.78	2.16	.97	.78	.49	1.08
				Girls			
1966–67	.29	.25	.57	.18	.39	.30	.92
1974–75	.66	.30	1.38	.31	.66	.36	1.62
1981–82	.72	.33	1.24	.37	.91	.56	1.87

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[a] Rates per 100 in specified population group. The rates for 1987–88 were for general schools: total—42.7%; boys—33.5%; girls—52.6%; for vocational and agricultural schools: 37.2%, 38.6% and 35.7%, respectively.

[b] General schools = base 1.00.

[c] Europe-America = base 1.00.

Source: Same as table 57.

TABLE 59. ADULT JEWS OF SELECTED AGE GROUPS, BY SEX, ORIGIN, AND TYPE OF LAST SCHOOL ATTENDED, 1972 AND 1983

Sex and Origin	Total (Thousands)	Rates by Type of School:[a] General (A)	Rates by Type of School:[a] Vocational or Agricultural (B)	Ratio (B)/(A)
		1972, Ages 14–29		
Men, total[b]	387.8	22.9	35.3	1.54
Thereof:				
Asia	102.5	16.9	37.4	2.21
Africa	97.8	16.2	35.8	2.21
Europe-America	162.9	29.7	33.5	1.13
Women, total[b]	375.5	32.5	23.3	.72
Thereof:				
Asia	99.9	25.7	28.7	1.12
Africa	93.6	24.6	26.7	1.09
Europe-America	159.2	40.0	18.3	.46
		1983, Ages 15–24		
Men, total[b]	273.1	28.1	44.1	1.57
Thereof:				
Asia	72.5	20.9	53.8	2.57
Africa	79.3	19.8	51.9	2.62
Europe-America	79.7	35.0	32.9	.94
Women, total[b]	257.4	40.2	32.1	.80
Thereof:				
Asia	68.0	35.2	41.2	1.17
Africa	75.4	32.7	41.5	1.27
Europe-America	74.8	44.5	20.0	.45

[a] Rates per 100 in specified population group.
[b] Including Israeli-born, father also born in this country.
Sources: CBS, 1972 census, unpublished data; 1983 census, vol. 10.

TABLE 60. ENROLLMENT RATES[a] IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS AMONG JEWS AGED 17, BY SEX, ORIGIN, AND COURSE OF STUDIES, 1981–82

Sex and Origin	Total	Studying for Matriculation Certificate			Studying for Other Certificates	Ratios	
	(A)	Total (B)	General (C)	Vocational (D)		$\frac{(B)}{(A)}$	$\frac{(C)}{(B)}$
				Total			
Total	68.9	56.2	35.4	20.8	12.7	.82	.63
Israel	83.1	75.4	55.3	20.1	7.8	.91	.73
Asia-Africa	62.6	45.9	24.6	21.3	16.7	.73	.54
Europe-America	73.6	66.4	46.1	20.3	7.1	.90	.69
				Boys			
Total	60.5	47.3	25.9	21.4	13.1	.78	.55
Israel	76.7	67.5	43.4	24.1	9.3	.88	.64
Asia-Africa	52.5	36.1	16.8	19.3	16.4	.69	.47
Europe-America	67.4	58.7	34.4	24.3	8.7	.87	.59
				Girls			
Total	77.9	65.7	45.5	20.2	12.2	.84	.69
Israel	90.0	83.8	68.0	15.8	6.2	.93	.81
Asia-Africa	73.3	56.3	32.9	23.4	17.1	.77	.58
Europe-America	80.2	74.8	58.7	16.1	5.5	.93	.78

[a] Rates per 100 in specified population group. Small differences in comparison with tables 57 and 58 are due to different sources.

Source: CBS, unpublished data.

TABLE 61. PERCENTAGES OF SUCCESS IN MATRICULATION EXAMINATIONS, BY COURSE OF STUDIES AND ORIGIN, 1986–87 (PERCENT)

Origin	Total	General	Vocational	Ratio
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(C)/(B)
Total examinees	62.8	70.5	45.4	.64
Israel	71.2	76.2	54.2	.71
Asia-Africa	53.3	62.3	38.8	.62
Europe-America	69.8	76.3	53.4	.70
Ratio:				
Asia-Africa/Europe-America	.76	.82	.73	

Source: CBS, *Matriculation Examinations, 1986–87* (in preparation).

TABLE 62. JEWISH STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITIES, BY ORIGIN, 1964–65 TO 1988–89

Origin	1964–65	1969–70	1974–75	1984–85	1988–89
	Rates per 100 Jews Aged 20–29 in Specified Population Group				
Total	3.8	6.3	7.2	7.6	8.2
Israeli-born, total	8.1	9.9	9.5	8.2	11.3
Father born in:					
Israel	5.2	7.5	10.0	13.4	15.2
Asia-Africa (A)	1.6	2.5	3.0	3.7	6.6
Europe-America (B)	10.7	12.6	14.0	14.9	15.3
Born in Asia-Africa (C)	0.8	1.6	2.1	2.8	2.8
Born in Europe-America (D)	5.3	9.8	8.4	8.3	8.2
	Origin-Specific Ratios				
(A)/(B)	.15	.20	.21	.25	.43
(C)/(D)	.15	.16	.25	.34	.34

Sources: CBS, *Statistical Abstract*, no. 40, 1989, p. 613, table 14; for 1988–89—*Statistical Abstract*, no. 41 (in preparation).

TABLE 63. JEWISH ADULTS AGED 25–34 WITH MATRICULATION CERTIFICATES,[a] WHO CONTINUED STUDIES, BY SEX, ORIGIN, AND TYPE OF LAST SCHOOL ATTENDED, 1983

Type of Last School Attended	Men			Women		
	Asia	Africa	Europe-America	Asia	Africa	Europe-America
	Rates of Study in Specified Last School[b,c]					
Total	35.2	37.0	45.9	21.2	25.1	35.3
Postsecondary	9.3	8.6	9.3	8.0	11.7	11.2
University	25.9	28.4	36.6	13.2	13.4	24.1
	Origin-Specific Ratios[d]					
Total	.77	.81		.63	.71	
Postsecondary	1.00	.92		.71	1.04	
University	.71	.78		.55	.56	

[a] Highest certificate attained at census date.
[b] Per 100 holders of matriculation certificates in specified population group.
[c] Attended at census date or before.
[d] Europe-America = base 1.00.
Source: Same as table 55.

TABLE 64. VOTES FOR MAIN PARTIES, KNESSET ELECTIONS, 1955, 1965, 1977, 1988 (PERCENT)

Major Political Sectors and Parties[a]	3rd Knesset 1955	6th Knesset 1965	9th Knesset 1977	12th Knesset 1988
Eligible voters	1,057,795	1,499,709	2,236,293	2,894,267
Percent actual voters	82.8	83.0	79.2	79.7
Valid votes	853,219	1,206,728	1,771,726	2,283,123
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Labor	47.7	51.2	24.6	32.5
Mapam (United Workers' party)	7.3	6.6	—	2.5
Ma'arakh (Alignment)—Israel Labor party	32.2[b]	36.7	24.6	30.0
Achdut Ha'avoda (Unity of Labor)	8.2	—	—	—
Rafi (Israel Workers' List)	—	7.9	—	—
Liberal-Radical	4.7	5.0	15.6	6.0
Independent Liberal party—Progressives	4.7	3.8	1.2	—
Center Movement—Shinui (Change)	—	—	—	1.7
Dash (Democratic Movement for Change)	—	—	11.6	—
Ratz (Citizens' Rights Movement)	—	—	1.2	4.3
Ha'olam Hazeh (This World)	—	1.2	—	—
Shelli (Peace for Israel)	—	—	1.6	—
Religious	13.8	14.0	13.9	14.6
Mafdal (National Religious party)	9.1	8.9	9.2	3.9
Agudat Israel (United Orthodox Religious)	4.7	3.3	3.4	4.5
Poalei Agudat Israel (Agudat Is. Workers)	—	1.8	1.3	—
Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians)	—	—	—	4.7
Degel Hatorah (Torah Flag)	—	—	—	1.5

TABLE 64—*(Continued)*

Major Political Sectors and Parties[a]	3rd Knesset 1955	6th Knesset 1965	9th Knesset 1977	12th Knesset 1988
Center-Right to Right	22.8	21.3	37.3	38.1
General Zionists-Liberal party	10.2	—	—	—
Herut (Freedom)	12.6	—	—	—
Likud—Herut/Liberal party	—	21.3[c]	33.4	31.1
Shlomzion (Peace to Zion)	—	—	1.9	—
Flatto-Sharon	—	—	2.0	—
Tehiya (Renaissance)	—	—	—	3.1
Tzomet (Zionist Renewal Movement)	—	—	—	2.0
Moledet (Homeland)	—	—	—	1.9
Communist and Arab	8.9	7.2	6.0	6.4
Maki (Israel Communist party)	4.5	1.1	—	—
Rakah—Hadash—Israel Communist party	—	2.3	4.6	3.7
Progressive List for Peace	—	—	—	1.5
Minorities' List	4.4	3.8	1.4	—
Arab Democratic party	—	—	—	1.2
Other[d]	2.4	1.3	2.9	2.3

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[a] Parties listed separately won at least one seat. Several parties changed their names from election to election. In general, the first name listed is the most recent version.
[b] Mapai.
[c] Gahal.
[d] Won no seats.
Source: CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* 1989.

TABLE 65. DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES FOR MAIN PARTIES, BY TYPE OF LOCALITY, 12TH KNESSET (1988) (PERCENT)

Party[a]	No. of Seats Won	Total Valid Votes	Jewish Localities								Arab Localities	
			Jerusalem	Tel Aviv	Haifa	Development Towns	Other Urban	Moshavim	Kibbutzim	Other Rural	Urban	Other
Total	120	100.0	7.6	9.2	6.1	9.2	49.5	3.9	3.3	1.8	7.8	1.5
Mapam	3	100.0	5.2	6.8	3.8	5.0	25.5	1.6	37.1	0.8	9.2	4.9
Alignment—Labor	39	100.0	5.0	10.4	8.1	7.1	52.2	4.5	6.0	1.4	4.1	1.2
Shinui	2	100.0	7.2	12.2	8.8	3.6	46.1	3.6	1.8	1.9	12.4	2.3
Ratz	5	100.0	10.0	14.3	8.3	4.2	43.3	3.4	5.0	2.0	7.4	2.1
Mafdal	5	100.0	8.9	5.6	4.3	10.5	48.6	8.2	1.5	5.0	5.6	1.7
Agudat Israel	5	100.0	14.6	6.9	3.3	15.0	53.3	4.8	0.3	1.4	0.3	0.1
Shas	6	100.0	13.6	8.1	2.5	16.6	52.0	4.6	0.1	1.6	0.7	0.2
Degel Hatorah	2	100.0	32.7	2.8	2.6	4.2	53.4	1.7	0.1	1.1	1.2	0.3
Likud	40	100.0	7.5	10.2	5.5	12.0	57.5	3.3	0.2	1.7	1.5	0.6
Tehiya	3	100.0	9.5	8.7	5.4	7.7	55.9	5.1	1.5	5.7	0.4	0.1
Tzomet	2	100.0	7.2	7.5	8.5	12.3	52.0	7.1	1.5	3.1	0.6	0.2
Moledet	2	100.0	9.4	8.6	5.7	9.9	55.6	5.6	0.7	3.9	0.2	0.4
Rakah—Hadash	4	100.0	0.5	2.3	5.0	4.0	4.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	78.1	5.7
Progressive List for Peace	1	100.0	0.9	1.4	2.2	3.3	2.3	0.1	0.3	0.1	84.5	4.9
Arab Democratic party	1	100.0	0.8	2.1	2.2	0.9	5.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	65.1	23.6
Other	—	100.0	12.3	9.4	6.5	6.0	45.4	4.6	2.6	1.9	7.5	3.8

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[a] Listed in the same order as in table 64.

Source: Adapted from Uri Avner, "Voting at the Elections for the 12th Knesset in Comparison to Previous Elections" (in Hebrew), CBS, Ministry of the Interior—Inspector General of Elections, Malam Systems Ltd., *Results of Elections to the Twelfth Knesset 1.11.1988, Vol. A*, 1989; CBS, Special Series, no. 855, pp. 25–42.

TABLE 66. VOTES FOR MAIN PARTIES, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS) AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF POPULATION IN URBAN JEWISH LOCALITIES,[a] 12TH KNESSET (1988) (PERCENT)

Party[b]	Total Valid Votes	Origin of Majority of Area's Inhabitants (Major Groups)				Area's Socioeconomic Status (Quintiles)				
		Europe-America	Asia-Africa[c]	Asia[d]	Africa[e]	1 (Highest)	2	3	4	5 (Lowest)
Total	100.0	53.2	10.8	15.3	16.8	21.4	19.2	20.7	20.5	18.2
Shinui	100.0	76.0	7.4	7.7	5.3	46.7	24.2	15.9	9.3	4.0
Ratz	100.0	74.1	7.9	8.1	5.8	43.7	25.0	16.6	10.3	4.4
Degel Hatorah	100.0	71.1	5.1	13.9	8.5	7.0	10.8	16.4	38.6	27.3
Alignment—Labor	100.0	64.8	10.0	10.7	10.4	29.1	23.5	22.0	15.9	9.5
Mapam	100.0	64.1	9.7	10.6	11.1	29.8	24.2	19.6	16.5	9.9
Tsomet	100.0	56.2	12.0	12.7	15.2	22.6	21.9	22.7	19.7	13.2
Tehiya	100.0	54.2	11.6	16.7	13.1	23.3	21.7	22.3	19.0	13.8
Moledet	100.0	50.5	12.1	16.8	15.9	20.2	20.6	23.2	20.5	15.5
Mafdal	100.0	50.3	9.8	16.6	20.2	17.0	18.9	21.1	21.8	21.3
Agudat Israel	100.0	48.1	9.9	16.5	22.8	7.1	11.5	18.9	29.4	33.2
Likud	100.0	43.0	12.3	19.2	21.5	16.1	16.9	21.1	22.8	23.0
Shas	100.0	27.1	11.8	24.9	33.1	5.1	10.0	17.7	28.8	38.5

[a] Based on a total of 810 statistical areas in urban Jewish localities over 10,000 inhabitants. See also note 41 to text.

[b] Parties with a majority of Jewish voters, ranked according to proportion of party's votes obtained in residential areas with plurality of Jews of European-American origins.

[c] Asian-African origins combined include larger share of total population than European-American origins, without either Asia or Africa alone reaching a plurality.

[d] Plurality of Asian origin alone.

[e] Plurality of African origin alone.

Source: Same as table 65.

TABLE 67. PERCENT OF CHANGE IN VOTE FOR MAJOR GROUPS OF PARTIES IN STATISTICAL AREAS IN URBAN JEWISH LOCALITIES,[a] BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS) AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF POPULATION, 12TH KNESSET (1988) IN COMPARISON TO 11TH KNESSET (1984)

Group of Parties[b] and Percent of Change, 1984–1988	Total	Origin of Majority of Area's Inhabitants (Major Groups)[c]				Area's Socioeconomic Status (Quintiles)				
		Europe-America	Asia-Africa	Asia	Africa	1 (Highest)	2	3	4	5 (Lowest)
No. of statistical areas	810	417	88	123	149	157	154	165	165	169
Alignment—Labor, Mapam, Ratz, Shinui	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Lost 10% or more	26.4	19.0	21.6	30.8	48.3	3.8	6.5	18.7	42.4	57.4
Stable[d]	50.4	53.0	53.4	53.7	36.3	49.1	61.1	67.3	44.3	31.4
Gained 10% or more	23.2	28.1	25.0	15.4	15.4	47.1	32.4	13.9	13.3	11.2
Religious parties	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Lost 10% or more	3.8	7.0	1.1—	0.6	12.7	5.8	0.6—	0.6		
Stable[d]	11.2	19.4	2.3	3.3	0.7	27.4	20.1	4.2	1.8	4.2
Gained 10% or more	85.0	73.6	96.6	96.7	98.7	59.9	73.1	95.2	98.2	95.2
Likud, Tehiya, Tzomet, Moledet	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Lost 10% or more	12.4	9.1	7.9	15.4	22.8	1.9	4.5	6.6	12.8	34.9
Stable[d]	41.7	37.0	38.6	50.4	52.4	26.8	38.3	37.6	53.9	50.9
Gained 10% or more	45.8	53.9	53.4	34.2	24.8	71.3	57.1	55.7	33.3	14.2

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[a] Based on a total of 810 statistical areas in urban Jewish localities.

[b] Does not include parties which did not win seats in the 12th Knesset, or parties which won seats in the 11th Knesset and did not participate in the 12th Knesset elections.

[c] See notes c, d, e to table 66.

[d] Lost or gained less than 10%.

Source: Same as table 65.

TABLE 68. INDEXES OF VOTE CONCENTRATION FOR MAJOR GROUPS OF PARTIES, BY ORIGIN (MAJOR GROUPS) AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF POPULATION IN URBAN JEWISH LOCALITIES,[a] 12TH KNESSET (1988)

Parties and Origin of Majority of Area's Inhabitants (Major Groups)[b]	Area's Socioeconomic Status (Quintiles) Total	1 (High)	2	3	4	5 (Low)	Row Max/Min Ratio[c]
Alignment—Labor							
Total	100	136	122	106	77	52	2.6
Europe-America	122	**139**	127	115	76	50	2.8
Asia-Africa	93	68	102	100	92	65	1.6
Asia	70—	84	95	74	**48**	2.0	
Africa	62—	87	87	69	53	1.6	
Column max/min ratio[d]	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.4	**2.9**[e]
Mapam, Ratz, Shinui							
Total	100	243	110	84	57	30	8.1
Europe-America	141	**243**	135	87	49	**28**	8.7
Asia-Africa	77	123	112	83	61	35	3.5
Asia	57—	121	83	62	30	2.0	
Africa	42—	99	70	51	29	3.4	
Column max/min ratio[d]	3.4	2.0	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.3	**8.7**[e]
Religious parties							
Total	100	41	66	90	139	173	4.2
Europe-America	83	**39**	63	97	214	**307**	7.9
Asia-Africa	93	88	82	83	92	146	1.8
Asia	125—	88	77	117	166	2.2	
Africa	144—	110	106	129	160	1.5	
Column max/min ratio[d]	1.7	2.3	1.7	1.4	2.3	2.1	**2.9**[e]

TABLE 68—*(Continued)*

Parties and Origin of Majority of Area's Inhabitants (Major Groups)[b]	Area's Socioeconomic Status (Quintiles)						Row Max/Min Ratio[c]
	Total	1 (High)	2	3	4	5 (Low)	
Likud							
Total	100	75	88	102	111	126	1.7
Europe-America	81	74	85	90	80	**73**	1.2
Asia-Africa	114	115	102	110	120	126	1.2
Asia	125—	108	118	124	132	1.2	
Africa	128—	106	117	124	**133**	1.3	
Column max/min ratio[d]	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.8	**1.8**[e]
Tehiya, Tzomet, Moledet							
Total	100	104	112	109	96	77	1.5
Europe-America	100	101	109	104	79	**52**	2.1
Asia-Africa	109	**162**	119	117	99	72	2.3
Asia	101—	121	127	107	89	1.4	
Africa	87—	108	104	99	76	1.4	
Column max/min ratio[d]	1.3	1.6	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.7	**3.1**[e]

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[a] Based on a total of 810 statistical areas in urban Jewish localities. Each cell in this table represents a given combination of the predominant origin (major group) and socioeconomic status of the voters in such areas. Indexes of vote concentration are ratios between the percent of votes won by a given group of parties in the statistical areas included in a given cell of the table and the percent of votes obtained nationally by the same parties. Indexes above 100 indicate overrepresentation of voters with the indicated combination of origin and socioeconomic status among voters for a given party; indexes below 100 indicate underrepresentation. The highest and lowest indexes of vote concentration for each party appear in bold.

[b] See notes c, d, e to table 66.

[c] Ratio between highest and lowest index of vote concentration in each row.

[d] Ratio between highest and lowest index of vote concentration in each column, relative to given party or group of parties.

[e] Ratio between highest and lowest index of vote concentration, relative to given party or group of parties.

Source: same as table 65.

Jewish Population in the United States, 1989

THE JEWISH POPULATION OF the United States in 1989 was estimated to be 5,944,000, which represents hardly any change from the figure reported for 1988. (The renewal of large-scale Soviet immigration that took place in 1989 will be reflected in next year's estimate.) The current estimate is for the resident Jewish population of the country, including that both in private households and in institutional settings. Non-Jewish family members have been excluded from this total.

While the Jewish federations are the chief reporting bodies, their service areas vary in size and may represent several towns, one county, or an aggregate of several counties. In some cases we have subdivided federation areas to reflect the more natural geographic boundaries. Some estimates, from areas without federations, have been provided by local rabbis and other informed Jewish community leaders. In still other cases, the figures that have been updated are from past estimates provided by United Jewish Appeal field representatives.

The state and regional totals shown in Appendix tables 1 and 2 are derived by summing the individual estimates shown in table 3 and making three adjustments. First, communities of less than 100 are added. Second, duplicated counts within states are eliminated. Third, communities whose populations reside in two or more states (e.g., Kansas City and Washington, D.C.) are distributed accordingly.

The reader should be aware that population estimating is not an exact science and that collection procedures can result in annual fluctuations in community or state totals. In most cases where a figure differs from that shown last year, the increase or decrease did not come about in one year but occurred over a period of time and has just now been substantiated. Similarly, the results of a completed local demographic study often change the previously reported Jewish population figure. This should be understood as either an updated calculation of gradual demographic change or a correction of a faulty older estimate.

In determining Jewish population, communities count both affiliated and nonaffiliated residents. In most cases, counts are made by households, with that number multiplied by the average number of self-defined Jewish persons per household. Most communities also include those born and raised as Jews but who at present consider themselves of no religion. As stated above, non-Jews living in Jewish households, primarily the non-Jewish spouses and any non-Jewish children, are not included in the 1989 estimates presented in the appendix below.

The community reporting the largest documented numeric gain since the last estimate was completed was Dallas, Texas, whose increase—based on a 1988 demographic survey—exceeded 10,000 persons. The Norfolk-Tidewater area of Virginia also raised its estimate, following a demographic survey. Four other southern communities—Atlanta, Georgia; Fort Worth, Texas; Raleigh, North Carolina; and Savannah, Georgia; and one other western community—Sacramento, California—have experienced recent growth and raised their estimates accordingly. Small but significant increases were also reported by Port Angeles and Bellingham, both in Washington State, and Ventura County and San Luis Obispo in California. The increase reported for Connecticut's Norwalk-Westport area is due to both real growth and expanded geographic parameters of that community. In Orange County, New York, the increase is due primarily to the growth of a Hassidic community near Monroe.

The Jewish population has grown in resort communities such as Palm Springs and Murietta Hot Springs, California; Port Charlotte-Punta Gorda, Florida; and the Pocono Mountain area (Pike and Wayne counties) of Pennsylvania. The latter is becoming an exurban extension of the New York City suburbs, as is Dekalb, Illinois, in relation to Chicago.

While the New York area's large numeric decline reported in last year's AJYB was due to the elimination of the non-Jews in Jewish households, this year's largest decline, that of 12,000 in Miami-Dade County, Florida, is the result of actual demographic change in recent years. The primary features of this change are an aging population, an increase in the numbers of non-Jewish immigrants settling in Jewish areas, and a preference by Jewish newcomers to Florida to locate further up the coast in Broward and Palm Beach counties.

More moderate declines have occurred in some of the older, medium- and small-sized cities in the Northeast and Midwest, part of a long-term trend in these regions. The affected communities include Evansville, Indiana; Wheeling and Huntington, West Virginia; Bayonne, New Jersey; Auburn and Cortland, New York; Mansfield, Ohio; and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Declines reported for the aging resort towns of Elsinore and Sun City, California, were offset by growth in the aforementioned newer resort areas.

Finally, Hawaii's decrease is due to a correction of a previous overcount.

BARRY KOSMIN
JEFF SCHECKNER

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989

State	Estimated Jewish Population	Total Population*	Estimated Jewish Percent of Total
Alabama	9,300	4,023,000	0.2
Alaska	2,400	525,000	0.5
Arizona	69,600	3,386,000	2.1
Arkansas	2,000	2,388,000	0.1
California	909,000	27,663,000	3.3
Colorado	49,000	3,296,000	1.5
Connecticut	115,000	3,211,000	3.6
Delaware	9,500	644,000	1.5
District of Columbia	25,400	622,000	4.1
Florida	585,300	12,023,000	4.9
Georgia	67,500	6,222,000	1.1
Hawaii	7,000	1,083,000	0.6
Idaho	400	998,000	0.1
Illinois	258,000	11,582,000	2.2
Indiana	18,300	5,531,000	0.3
Iowa	6,400	2,834,000	0.2
Kansas	14,000	2,476,000	0.6
Kentucky	11,800	3,727,000	0.3
Louisiana	15,800	4,461,000	0.4
Maine	8,500	1,187,000	0.7
Maryland	209,600	4,535,000	4.6
Massachusetts	276,000	5,855,000	4.7
Michigan	84,300	9,200,000	0.9
Minnesota	30,500	4,246,000	0.7
Mississippi	2,100	2,625,000	0.1
Missouri	61,700	5,103,000	1.2
Montana	450	809,000	0.1
Nebraska	7,400	1,594,000	0.5
Nevada	19,500	1,007,000	1.9
New Hampshire	7,000	1,057,000	0.7
New Jersey	411,000	7,672,000	5.4
New Mexico	6,400	1,500,000	0.4
New York	1,844,000	17,825,000	10.3

State	Estimated Jewish Population	Total Population*	Estimated Jewish Percent of Total
North Carolina	15,800	6,413,000	0.2
North Dakota	800	672,000	0.1
Ohio	130,900	10,784,000	1.2
Oklahoma	5,300	3,272,000	0.2
Oregon	12,300	2,724,000	0.5
Pennsylvania	345,800	11,936,000	2.9
Rhode Island	16,100	986,000	1.6
South Carolina	8,700	3,425,000	0.3
South Dakota	350	709,000	0.1
Tennessee	19,600	4,855,000	0.4
Texas	107,300	16,789,000	0.6
Utah	3,300	1,680,000	0.2
Vermont	4,600	548,000	0.8
Virginia	67,700	5,904,000	1.1
Washington	22,800	4,538,000	0.5
West Virginia	2,400	1,897,000	0.1
Wisconsin	35,800	4,807,000	0.7
Wyoming	450	490,000	0.1
U.S. TOTAL	**5,941,000	243,400,000	2.5

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

*Resident population, July 1, 1987. (*Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports,* series p. 22, no. 26.)

**Exclusive of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which previously reported Jewish populations of 1,500 and 350, respectively.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. JEWISH POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1989

Region	Total Population	Percent Distribution	Jewish Population	Percent Distribution
Northeast	50,278,000	20.7	3,028,000	50.9
New England	12,844,000	5.3	427,200	7.2
Middle Atlantic	37,443,000	15.4	2,600,800	43.8
North Central	59,538,000	24.5	648,450	10.9
East North Central	41,904,000	17.2	527,300	8.9
West North Central	17,634,000	7.2	121,150	2.0
South	83,884,000	34.5	1,165,100	19.6
South Atlantic	41,684,000	17.1	991,900	16.7
East South Central	15,290,000	6.3	42,800	0.7
West South Central	26,910,000	11.1	130,400	2.2
West	49,700,000	20.4	1,102,600	18.6
Mountain	13,167,000	5.4	149,100	2.5
Pacific	36,533,000	15.0	953,500	16.0
TOTALS	243,400,000	100.0	5,944,000	100.0

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 3. COMMUNITIES WITH JEWISH POPULATIONS OF 100 OR MORE, 1989 (ESTIMATED)

State and City	Jewish Population
ALABAMA	
*Birmingham	5,100
Decatur (incl. in Florence total)	
*Dothan	150
Florence	150
Huntsville	750
**Mobile	1,100
**Montgomery	1,300
Selma	100
Sheffield (incl. in Florence total)	
Tuscaloosa	300
Tuscumbia (incl. in Florence total)	
ALASKA	
**Anchorage	2,000
***Fairbanks	210
Juneau	100
Ketchikan (incl. in Juneau total)	
ARIZONA	
*Flagstaff	250
*Phoenix	50,000
Prescott	150
*Tucson	19,000
Yuma	100
ARKANSAS	
Fayetteville	120
**Ft. Smith	160
Hot Springs	200
**Little Rock	1,300
Pine Bluff	100
CALIFORNIA	
Alameda County (listed under San Francisco Bay area)	
Antelope Valley	700
Bakersfield (incl. in Kern County)	
Berkeley (incl. in Contra Costa County total)	
*Chico	500
Contra Costa County (listed under S.F. Bay area)	
Corona (incl. in Riverside total)	
***El Centro	125
*Eureka	500
Fairfield	800
Fontana (incl. in San Bernardino total)	
*Fresno	2,000
Kern County	1,400
Lancaster (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
Long Beach (also incl. in Los Angeles total)[N]	13,500
Los Angeles Metro area	501,000
Merced	170
*Modesto	450
Monterey Peninsula	1,500
Murietta Hot Springs	400
*Napa	450
Oakland (incl. in Alameda County)	
Ontario (incl. in Pomona Valley)	
Orange County	85,000
Palmdale (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
Palm Springs[N]	9,600
Palo Alto (incl. in South Peninsula)	
Pasadena (also incl. in L.A. Metro area)	2,000
Petaluma (incl. in Sonoma County)	
Pomona Valley[N]	6,750
*Redding	145
Riverside	1,620
Sacramento[N]	12,000
Salinas	500
San Bernardino area	2,800
*San Diego	70,000
San Francisco Bay area[N]	196,000
San Francisco	45,500
N. Peninsula	22,000
S. Peninsula	19,500
San Jose	32,000
Alameda County	30,500
Contra Costa County	21,000
Marin County	17,000
Sonoma County	8,500

[N] See Notes below. *Includes entire county. **Includes all of 2 counties. ***Figure not updated.

State and City	Jewish Population
*San Jose (listed under San Francisco Bay area)	
*San Luis Obispo	1,500
*Santa Barbara	3,800
*Santa Cruz	1,200
Santa Maria	300
Santa Monica (also incl. in Los Angeles total)	8,000
Santa Rosa (incl. in Sonoma County)	
Sonoma County (listed under San Francisco Bay area)	
*Stockton	1,600
Sun City	200
Tulare & Kings counties	500
***Vallejo	400
*Ventura County	8,000
COLORADO	
Aspen	250
Boulder (incl. in Denver total)	
Colorado Springs	1,500
Denver^N	45,000
*Ft. Collins	1,000
Grand Junction	250
Greeley (incl. in Ft. Collins total)	
Loveland (incl. in Ft. Collins total)	
Pueblo	250
Vail	100
CONNECTICUT	
Bridgeport^N	18,000
Bristol	200
Cheshire (incl. in Meriden total)	
Colchester	575
Danbury^N	3,500
Danielson	100
Darien (incl. in Stamford total)	
Greenwich	3,800
Hartford^N	28,000
Hebron (incl. in Colchester total)	
Lebanon (incl. in Colchester total)	
Lower Middlesex County^N	1,475
Manchester (incl. in Hartford)	
Meriden^N	3,000
Middletown	1,300
New Britain (incl. in Hartford)	
New Haven^N	28,000
New London^N	4,000
New Milford	400
Newtown (incl. in Danbury)	
Norwalk^N	9,500
Norwich (also incl. in New London total)	1,800
Putnam	100
Rockville (incl. in Hartford)	
Shelton (incl. in Valley area)	
Southington (incl. in Meriden total)	
Stamford/New Canaan	11,100
Storrs (incl. in Willimantic total)	
Torrington	560
Valley area^N	550
Wallingford (also incl. in Meriden total)	500
Waterbury^N	2,700
Westport (incl. in Norwalk total)	
Willimantic area	700
DELAWARE	
Dover^N	650
Wilmington (incl. rest of state)	9,500
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	
Greater Washington	165,000
FLORIDA	
Boca Raton-Delray Beach (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
Brevard County	3,000
*Crystal River	100
Dade County (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
**Daytona Beach	2,000
Fort Lauderdale (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
Fort Myers (incl. in Lee County)	
Fort Pierce	500
Gainesville	1,200
Hollywood (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
**Jacksonville	7,300
Key West	170
*Lakeland	800
Lee County	3,500
*Miami (incl. in Dade County)	
Naples	750
***Ocala	100
Orlando^N	18,000
Palm Beach County (listed under Southeast Fla.)	
**Pasco County	1,000
**Pensacola	775
*Port Charlotte-Punta Gorda	400
**Sarasota	9,500

State and City	Jewish Population
*St. Petersburg (incl. Clearwater)	9,500
Southeast Florida	512,000
Dade County	226,000
Hollywood[N]	60,000
Ft. Lauderdale[N]	116,000
Boca Raton-Delray Beach	52,000
Palm Beach County (excl. Boca Raton-Delray Beach)	55,000
Stuart-Port St. Lucie	3,000
Tallahassee	1,500
*Tampa	12,500
Venice (incl. in Sarasota total)	
*Vero Beach	300
Winter Haven (incl. in Lakeland total)	
GEORGIA	
Albany	400
Athens	300
Atlanta Metro area	60,000
Augusta[N]	1,400
Brunswick	100
**Columbus	1,000
**Dalton	225
Fitzgerald-Cordele	125
Macon	900
*Savannah	2,750
**Valdosta	110
HAWAII	
Hilo	280
Honolulu (includes all of Oahu)	6,400
Kuaii	100
Maui	210
IDAHO	
**Boise	220
Lewiston	100
Moscow (incl. in Lewiston total)	
ILLINOIS	
Aurora area	500
Bloomington-Normal	170
Carbondale (also incl. in S. Ill. total)	100
*Champaign-Urbana	2,000
Chicago Metro area[N]	248,000
**Danville	130
*Decatur	210
*DeKalb	200
East St. Louis (incl. in S. Ill.)	
Elgin[N]	600
Freeport (incl. in Rockford total)	
Galesburg	100
*Joliet	850
Kankakee	200
*Peoria	1,000
Quad Cities[N]	1,350
**Quincy	125
Rock Island (incl. in Quad Cities)	
Rockford[N]	1,000
Southern Illinois[N]	825
*Springfield	1,000
Waukegan	500
INDIANA	
Bloomington	1,000
Elkart (incl. in South Bend total)	
Evansville	520
Ft. Wayne	1,125
**Gary-Northwest Indiana	2,300
**Indianapolis	10,000
**Lafayette	500
Marion	100
*Michigan City	280
Muncie	160
South Bend[N]	1,800
*Terre Haute	325
IOWA	
Ames (also incl. in Des Moines total)	200
Cedar Rapids	430
Council Bluffs (also incl. in Omaha total)	150
Davenport (incl. in Quad Cities, Ill.)	
*Des Moines	2,800
*Iowa City	1,200
**Sioux City	630
*Waterloo	235
KANSAS	
Kansas City (incl. in Kansas City, Mo.)	
Lawrence	175
Manhattan	100
*Topeka	500
Wichita[N]	1,000
KENTUCKY	
Covington/Newport (incl. in Cincinnati, Ohio total)	
Lexington[N]	2,000
*Louisville	9,200
Paducah (incl. in S. Ill. total)	

State and City	Jewish Population
LOUISIANA	
Alexandria	350
Baton Rouge[N]	1,200
Lafayette (incl. in S. Central La.)	
Lake Charles	300
Monroe	525
**New Orleans	12,000
*Shreveport	1,000
South Central La.[N]	250
Tallulah (incl. in Vicksburg, Miss. total)	
MAINE	
Augusta	500
Bangor	1,250
Biddeford-Saco (incl. in So. Maine)	
Brunswick-Bath (incl. in So. Maine)	
Lewiston-Auburn	500
Portland	3,900
Rockland	110
Southern Maine (incl. Portland)[N]	5,500
Waterville	300
MARYLAND	
*Annapolis	2,000
**Baltimore	93,000
Cumberland	265
***Easton Park area[N]	100
*Frederick	600
*Hagerstown	300
*Harford County	1,000
Howard County	7,200
Montgomery and Prince Georges counties	104,500
Ocean City	100
**Salisbury	400
Silver Spring (incl. in Montgomery County)	
MASSACHUSETTS	
Amherst	750
Andover[N]	3,000
Athol area (also incl. in Worcester County total)	300
Attleboro	200
Beverly (incl. in Lynn total)	
Boston Metro Region[N]	228,000
Brockton[N]	8,000
Brookline (also incl. in Boston total)	26,000
Cape Cod (incl. all of Barnstable County)	2,900
Clinton (incl. in Worcester County total)	
Fall River	1,780
Falmouth (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Fitchburg (also incl. in Worcester County total)	300
Framingham[N]	10,800
Gardner (incl. in Athol total)	
Gloucester (also incl. in Lynn total)	450
Great Barrington (incl. in Pittsfield total)	
*Greenfield	900
Haverhill	1,500
Holyoke	550
*Hyannis (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Lawrence (incl. in Andover total)	
Leominster (also incl. in Worcester County total)	700
Lowell Area	2,000
Lynn-North Shore area[N]	25,000
*Martha's Vineyard	260
New Bedford[N]	3,000
Newburyport	280
Newton (also incl. in Boston total)	34,000
North Adams (incl. in N. Berkshire total)	
North Berkshire County	750
Northampton	700
Peabody (incl. in Lynn total)	
Pittsfield (incl. all Berkshire County)	3,100
Plymouth	500
Provincetown (incl. in Cape Cod)	
Salem (incl. in Lynn total)	
Southbridge (also incl. in Worcester County total)	105
Springfield[N]	11,000
Taunton area	1,200
Webster (also incl. in Worcester County total)	125
Worcester area[N]	10,100
*Worcester County	13,700
MICHIGAN	
*Ann Arbor	4,500
Battle Creek	180
Bay City	280
Benton Harbor	500
**Detroit	70,000
*Flint	2,000
*Grand Rapids	1,500

State and City	Jewish Population
**Jackson	325
*Kalamazoo	1,000
*Lansing	2,100
*Marquette County	150
Midland	200
**Mt. Clemens	500
Mt. Pleasant^{N}	120
*Muskegon	235
*Saginaw	200
MINNESOTA	
**Duluth	500
*Minneapolis	22,000
Rochester	400
**St. Paul	7,500
Winona (incl. in LaCrosse, Wis. total)	
MISSISSIPPI	
Biloxi-Gulfport	150
Clarksdale	100
**Cleveland	120
**Greenville	480
**Hattiesburg	120
**Jackson	700
**Vicksburg	105
MISSOURI	
Columbia	350
Hannibal (incl. in Quincy, Ill. total)	
Joplin	100
Kansas City Metro area	19,100
Springfield	285
*St. Joseph	280
**St. Louis	53,500
MONTANA	
*Billings	200
Butte	110
Helena (incl. in Butte total)	
NEBRASKA	
Grand Island-Hastings (incl. in Lincoln total)	
Lincoln	1,000
Omaha^{N}	6,500
NEVADA	
Carson City (incl. in Reno total)	
*Las Vegas	18,000
**Reno	1,400
NEW HAMPSHIRE	
Bethlehem	100
Claremont	200
Concord	450
Dover	450
Hanover-Lebanon	360
***Keene	105
**Laconia	270
Littleton (incl. in Bethlehem total)	
Manchester	3,000
Nashua area	480
Portsmouth area	1,100
Salem (also incl. in Andover, Mass. total)	150
NEW JERSEY	
Asbury Park (incl. in Monmouth County)	
*Atlantic City (incl. Atlantic County)	15,800
Bayonne (listed under Hudson County)	
Bergen County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	85,000
***Bridgeton	325
Bridgewater (incl. in Somerset County)	
Camden (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
Cherry Hill^{N}	28,000
Edison (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Elizabeth (incl. in Union County)	
Englewood (incl. in Bergen County)	
Essex County^{N} (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	76,200
North Essex	15,600
East Essex	10,800
South Essex	20,300
Livingston	12,600
West Orange-Orange	16,900
Flemington	900
Freehold (incl. in Monmouth County)	
Gloucester (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
Hoboken (listed under Hudson County)	
Hudson County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	13,750
Bayonne	2,500
Jersey City	5,500
Hoboken	750
North Hudson County^{N}	5,000
Jersey City (listed under Hudson County)	
Lakewood (incl. in Ocean County)	
Livingston (incl. in Essex County)	
Middlesex County^{N} (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	40,000
Millville	135

State and City	Jewish Population
Monmouth County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	33,600
Morris County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	33,500
Morristown (incl. in Morris County)	
Mt. Holly (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
Newark (incl. in Essex County)	
New Brunswick (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Northeastern N.J.^{N}	351,650
Ocean County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	9,500
Passaic County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	18,700
Passaic-Clifton (also incl. in Passaic County total)	8,000
Paterson (incl. in Passaic County)	
Perth Amboy (incl. in Middlesex County)	
Phillipsburg (incl. in Easton, Pa. total)	
Plainfield (incl. in Union County)	
Princeton	2,600
Salem	100
Somerset County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	4,900
Somerville (incl. in Somerset County)	
Sussex County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	4,100
Toms River (incl. in Ocean County)	
Trenton^{N}	8,500
Union County (also incl. in Northeastern N.J. total)	30,000
Vineland^{N}	2,500
Warren County	400
Wayne (incl. in Passaic County)	
Wildwood	425
Willingboro (incl. in Cherry Hill total)	
NEW MEXICO	
*Albuquerque	4,500
Las Cruces	525
Los Alamos	250
Santa Fe	900
NEW YORK	
*Albany	12,000
Amenia (incl. in Dutchess County)	
Amsterdam	450
*Auburn	175
Beacon (incl. in Dutchess County)	
*Binghamton (incl. all Broome County)	3,000
Brewster (incl. in Putnam County)	
*Buffalo	18,500
Canandaigua (incl. in Geneva total)	
Catskill	200
Corning (incl. in Elmira total)	
*Cortland	200
Dunkirk	120
Ellenville	1,600
Elmira^{N}	1,100
Fleischmanns	115
Fredonia (incl. in Dunkirk total)	
Geneva	300
Glens Falls^{N}	800
*Gloversville	420
*Herkimer	180
Highland Falls (incl. in Orange County)	
Hudson	470
*Ithaca	1,250
Jamestown	100
Kingston^{N}	4,500
Lake George (incl. in Glens Falls total)	
Liberty (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	2,100
***Massena	140
Middletown (incl. in Orange County)	
Monroe (incl. in Orange County)	
Monticello (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	2,400
New York Metro area^{N}	1,671,000
Bronx	85,000
Brooklyn	418,900
Manhattan	274,300
Queens	321,200
Staten Island	31,000
Nassau County	311,700
Suffolk County	106,200
Westchester County	122,600
New Paltz (incl. in Kingston total)	
Newark (incl. in Geneva total)	
Newburgh (incl. in Orange County)	

State and City	Jewish Population
Niagara Falls	395
Olean	120
**Oneonta	250
Orange County	10,000
Pawling	105
Plattsburg	260
Port Jervis (also incl. in Orange County total)	560
Potsdam	250
*Poughkeepsie	6,500
Putnam County	1,000
**Rochester	23,000
Rockland County	60,000
Rome	205
Saratoga Springs	500
**Schenectady	5,200
South Fallsburg (also incl. in Sullivan County total)	1,100
Sullivan County	7,425
Syracuse^{N}	9,000
Troy area	800
Utica^{N}	1,900
Walden (incl. in Orange County)	
Watertown	170
Woodstock (incl. in Kingston total)	
NORTH CAROLINA	
Asheville^{N}	1,350
**Chapel Hill-Durham	2,800
Charlotte^{N}	4,000
Elizabethtown (incl. in Wilmington total)	
*Fayetteville area	300
Gastonia	240
Goldsboro	120
*Greensboro	2,700
Greenville	300
Hendersonville	135
**Hickory	100
High Point (incl. in Greensboro total)	
Jacksonville (incl. in Wilmington total)	
Raleigh	2,500
Whiteville (incl. in Wilmington total)	
Wilmington area	500
Winston-Salem	440
NORTH DAKOTA	
Fargo	500
Grand Forks	150
OHIO	
**Akron	6,000
Athens	100
Bowling Green (also incl. in Toledo total)	120
Butler County	900
**Canton	2,400
Cincinnati^{N}	23,000
**Cleveland^{N}	65,000
*Columbus	15,000
**Dayton	6,000
East Liverpool	200
Elyria	250
Fremont (incl. in Sandusky total)	
Hamilton (incl. in Butler County total)	
*Lima	365
Lorain	600
Mansfield	250
Marietta (incl. in Parkersburg, W.Va. total)	
Marion	110
Middletown (incl. in Butler County total)	
New Philadelphia (incl. in Canton total)	
**Newark	105
Norwalk (incl. in Sandusky total)	
Oberlin (incl. in Elyria total)	
Oxford (incl. in Butler County total)	
**Sandusky	130
Springfield	250
*Steubenville	180
Toledo^{N}	6,300
Warren (also incl. in Youngstown total)	400
Wooster	125
Youngstown^{N}	4,000
*Zanesville	120
OKLAHOMA	
Norman (also incl. in Oklahoma City total)	350
**Oklahoma City	2,300
*Tulsa	2,750
OREGON	
*Corvallis	150
Eugene	2,300
**Medford	500
Portland	9,000
**Salem	250
PENNSYLVANIA	
Allentown	6,000
*Altoona	480
Ambridge^{N}	350
Beaver Falls (incl. in Upper Beaver County)	
Bethlehem	810
**Bradford	110
Brownsville (incl. in Uniontown total)	
Bucks County (lower portion)^{N}	14,500

State and City	Jewish Population
*Butler	285
**Chambersburg	470
Chester (incl. in Phila. total)	
Chester County (also incl. in Phila. total)	4,000
Coatesville (incl. in Chester County total)	
Easton area	1,200
*Erie	800
Farrell (incl. in Sharon total)	
Greensburg (also incl. in Pittsburgh total)	425
**Harrisburg	6,500
Hazleton area	410
Honesdale (incl. in Wayne County)	
Jeanette (incl. in Greensburg total)	
**Johnstown	485
Lancaster	2,100
*Lebanon	400
Lewisburg (incl. in Sunbury total)	
Lock Haven (incl. in Williamsport total)	
McKeesport (incl. in Pittsburgh total)	
New Castle	200
New Kensington (incl. in Pittsburgh total)	
Norristown (incl. in Philadelphia total)	
**Oil City	145
Oxford-Kennett Square (incl. in Chester County)	
Philadelphia area^{N}	250,000
Phoenixville (incl. in Chester County)	
Pike County	300
Pittsburgh^{N}	45,000
Pottstown	700
Pottsville	250
*Reading	2,800
*Scranton	3,150
Shamokin (incl. in Sunbury total)	
Sharon (also incl. in Youngstown, Ohio total)	260
State College	550
*Stroudsburg	400
Sunbury^{N}	160
Tamaqua (incl. in Hazleton total)	
Uniontown area	290
Upper Beaver County	200
**Washington (also incl. in Pittsburgh total)	250
Wayne County	500
Waynesburg (incl. in Washington total)	
West Chester (also incl. in Chester County)	300
Wilkes-Barre^{N}	3,500
**Williamsport	415
York	1,500
RHODE ISLAND	
Cranston (incl. in Providence total)	
Kingston (incl. in Washington County total)	
Newport-Middletown	700
Providence area	14,200
Washington County	1,200
Westerly (incl. in Washington County total)	
SOUTH CAROLINA	
*Charleston	4,000
**Columbia	2,000
Florence area	210
Georgetown (incl. in Myrtle Beach total)	
Greenville	800
Kingstree (incl. in Sumter total)	
**Myrtle Beach	425
***Orangeburg County	105
Rock Hill (incl. in Charlotte total)	
*Spartanburg	320
Sumter^{N}	175
SOUTH DAKOTA	
Sioux Falls	135
TENNESSEE	
Bristol (incl. in Johnson City total)	
Chattanooga	2,000
Jackson	100
Johnson City	210
Kingsport (incl. in Johnson city total)	
Knoxville	1,350
Memphis	10,000
Nashville	5,520
Oak Ridge	200
TEXAS	
Amarillo^{N}	190
*Austin	5,000
Bay City (incl. in Wharton total)	
Baytown	300
Beaumont	800

State and City	Jewish Population
*Brownsville	325
College Station-Bryan	400
*Corpus Christi	1,400
**Dallas	34,000
El Paso	4,800
*Ft. Worth	5,000
Galveston	800
Harlingen (incl. in Brownsville total)	
**Houston^{N}	42,000
Kilgore (incl. in Longview total)	
Laredo	200
Longview	200
*Lubbock	225
Lufkin (incl. in Longview total)	
Marshall (incl. in Longview total)	
*McAllen	475
Midland-Odessa	150
Paris (incl. in Sherman-Denison total)	
Port Arthur	100
San Angelo	100
*San Antonio	9,000
Sherman-Denison	125
Tyler	450
Waco^{N}	500
**Wharton	130
Wichita Falls	260
UTAH	
Ogden	150
*Salt Lake City	3,000
VERMONT	
Bennington	100
Brattleboro	150
**Burlington	3,000
Montpelier-Barre	500
Newport (incl. in St. Johnsbury total)	
Rutland	550
**St. Johnsbury	100
VIRGINIA	
Alexandria (incl. Falls Church, Arlington, and Fairfax counties)	35,100
Arlington (incl. in Alexandria total)	
Blacksburg	300
Charlottesville	950
Chesapeake (incl. in Portsmouth total)	
Colonial Heights (incl. in Petersburg total)	
Danville	100
Fredericksburg	140
Hampton (incl. in Newport News)	
Harrisonburg (incl. in Staunton total)	
Lynchburg area	275
**Martinsville	130
Newport News (incl. Hampton)^{N}	2,500
Norfolk-Virginia Beach	18,000
Petersburg area	550
Portsmouth-Suffolk (also incl. in Norfolk total)	1,900
Radford (incl. in Blacksburg total)	
Richmond^{N}	8,000
Roanoke	1,050
Staunton^{N}	375
Williamsburg (incl. in Newport News total)	
Winchester^{N}	145
WASHINGTON	
Bellingham	300
Ellensburg (incl. in Yakima total)	
Longview-Kelso (incl. in Portland total)	
Olympia	300
Port Angeles	100
Pullman (incl. in Moscow, Idaho total)	
*Seattle^{N}	19,500
Spokane	800
*Tacoma	1,100
Tri Cities^{N}	180
Vancouver (incl. in Portland total)	
**Yakima	100
WEST VIRGINIA	
Bluefield-Princeton	250
*Charleston	1,025
Clarksburg	115
Fairmont (incl. in Clarksburg total)	
Huntington^{N}	275
Morgantown	150
**Parkersburg	100
**Wheeling	300
WISCONSIN	
Appleton	250
Beloit	120
Green Bay	260
*Kenosha	200
LaCrosse	150
*Madison	4,500
Manitowoc	100
Milwaukee^{N}	29,000
Oshkosh	150
*Racine	375
Sheboygan	160
Superior (also incl. in Duluth, Minn. total)	100

State and City	Jewish Population	State and City	Jewish Population	State and City	Jewish Population
Waukesha (incl. in Milwaukee total)		WYOMING		Laramie (incl. in Cheyenne total)	
		Casper	100		
Wausau[N]	240	Cheyenne	230		

Notes

CALIFORNIA

Long Beach–includes in L.A. County Long Beach, Signal Hill, Cerritos, Lakewood, Rosmoor, and Hawaiian Gardens. Also includes in Orange County Los Alamitas, Cypress, Seal Beach, and Huntington Harbor.

Palm Springs–includes Palm Springs, Desert Hot Springs, Cathedral City, Palm Desert, and Rancho Mirage.

Pomona Valley–includes Alta Loma, Chino, Claremont, Cucamonga, La Verne, Montclair, Ontario, Pomona, San Dimas, and Upland. Portion also included in Los Angeles total.

Sacramento–includes Yolo, Placer, El Dorado, and Sacramento counties.

San Francisco Bay area–North Peninsula includes northern San Mateo County. South Peninsula includes southern San Mateo County and towns of Palo Alto and Los Altos in Santa Clara County. San Jose includes remainder of Santa Clara County.

COLORADO

Denver–includes Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, and Jefferson counties.

CONNECTICUT

Bridgeport–includes Monroe, Easton, Trumbull, Fairfield, Bridgeport, Shelton, Stratford, and part of Milford.

Danbury–includes Danbury, Bethel, New Fairfield, Brookfield, Sherman, Newtown, Redding, Ridgefield, and part of Wilton; also includes Brewster and Goldens Bridge in New York.

Hartford–includes most of Hartford County and Vernon, Rockville, Ellington, and Tolland in Tolland County.

Lower Middlesex County–includes Branford, Guilford, Madison, Clinton, Westbrook, Old Saybrook. Portion of this area also included in New London and New Haven totals.

Meriden–includes Meriden, Southington, Cheshire, and Wallingford. Portion also included in New Haven total.

New Haven–includes New Haven, East Haven, Guilford, Branford, Madison, North Haven, Hamden, West Haven, Milford, Orange, Woodbridge, Bethany, Derby, Ansonia, and Cheshire.

New London–includes central and southern New London County. Also includes part of Lower Middlesex County and part of Windham County.

Norwalk–includes Norwalk, Weston, Westport, East Norwalk, Darien, Wilton, part of Georgetown and part of New Canaan.

Valley area–includes Ansonia, Derby, Shelton, Oxford, Seymour and Beacon Falls. Portion also included in Bridgeport and New Haven totals.

Waterbury–includes Middlebury, Southbury, Naugatuck, Watertown, Waterbury, Oakville, and Woodbury.

DELAWARE

Dover–includes most of central and southern Delaware.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Greater Washington–includes Montgomery and Prince Georges counties in Maryland; Arlington County, Fairfax County, Falls Church, and Alexandria in Virginia.

FLORIDA

Ft. Lauderdale–includes Ft. Lauderdale, Pompano Beach, Deerfield Beach, Tamarac, Margate, and other towns in northern Broward County.

Hollywood–includes Hollywood, Hallandale, Dania, Davie, Pembroke, and other towns in southern Broward County.

Orlando–includes all of Orange and Seminole counties and part of Lake County.

GEORGIA

Augusta–includes Burke, Columbia and Richmond counties and part of Aiken County, South Carolina.

ILLINOIS

Chicago–includes all of Cook and DuPage counties and Southern Lake County. For a total of Jewish population of the Chicago Metropolitan region, please include Northwest Indiana, Joliet, Aurora, Elgin, and Waukegan totals.

Elgin–includes Northern Kane County, Southern McHenry County, and western edge of Cook County.

Quad Cities–includes Rock Island, Moline (Ill.), Davenport, and Bettendorf (Iowa).

Rockford–includes Winnebago, Boone, and Stephenson counties.

Southern Illinois–includes lower portion of Illinois below Carlinville, adjacent western portion of Kentucky, and adjacent portion of southeastern Missouri.

INDIANA

South Bend–includes St. Joseph and Elkhart counties and part of Berrien County, Mich.

KANSAS

Wichita–includes Sedgwick County and towns of Salina, Dodge City, Great Bend, Liberal, Russel, and Hays.

KENTUCKY

Lexington–includes Fayette, Bourbon, Scott, Clark, Woodford, Madison, Pulaski and Jessamin counties.

LOUISIANA

Baton Rouge–includes E. Baton Rouge, Ascencion, Livingston, St. Landry, Iberville, Pt. Coupee, and W. Baton Rouge parishes.

South Central–includes Abbeville, Lafayette, New Iberia, Crowley, Opelousus, Houma, Morgan City, Thibadoux, and Franklin.

MAINE

Southern Maine–includes York, Cumberland, and Sagadahoc counties.

MARYLAND

Easton Park area–includes towns in Caroline, Kent, Queen Annes, and Talbot counties.

MASSACHUSETTS

Andover–includes Andover, N. Andover, Boxford, Lawrence, Methuen, Tewksbury, Dracut, and town of Salem, New Hampshire.

Boston Metropolitan region–includes all towns south and west of Boston within approximately 35 miles, and all towns north of Boston within approximately 20 miles.

Brockton–includes Avon, Brockton, Easton, Bridgewater, Whitman, and West Bridgewater. Also included in Boston total.

Framingham–includes Maynard, Stow, Hudson, Marlborough, Framingham, Southborough, Ashland, Hopkinton, Holliston, Milford, Medway, Millis, Medfield, Billingham, and Franklin. Also included in Boston total.

Lynn–includes Lynn, Saugus, Nahant, Swampscott, Lynnfield, Peabody, Salem, Marblehead, Beverly, Danvers, Middleton, Wenham, Topsfield, Hamilton, Manchester, Ipswich, Essex, Gloucester, and Rockport. Also included in Boston total.

New Bedford–includes New Bedford, Dartmouth, Fairhaven, and Mattapoisett.

Springfield–includes Springfield, Longmeadow, E. Longmeadow, Hampden, Wilbraham, Agwam, and West Springfield.

Worcester–includes Worcester, Northborough, Westborough, Shrewsbury, Boylston, West Boylston, Holden, Paxton, Leicester, Auburn, Millbury, and Grafton. Also included in the Worcester County total.

MICHIGAN

Mt. Pleasant–includes towns in Isabella, Mecosta, Gladwin, and Gratiot counties.

NEBRASKA

Omaha–includes Douglas and Sarpy counties. Also includes Pottawatomie County, Iowa.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Laconia–includes Laconia, Plymouth, Meredith, Conway, and Franklin.

Manchester–includes Manchester, Hookset, Merrimac, Amherst, Goffstown, Auburn, Derry, and Londonderry.

NEW JERSEY

Cherry Hill–includes Camden, Burlington, and Gloucester counties.

Essex County–East Essex includes Belleville, Bloomfield, East Orange, Irvington, Newark, and Nutley in Essex County, and Kearney in Hudson County. North Essex includes Caldwell, Cedar Grove, Essex Fells, Fairfield, Glen Ridge, Montclair, North Caldwell, Roseland, Verona, and West Caldwell. South Essex includes Maplewood, Millburn, Short Hills, and South Orange in Essex County, and Springfield in Union County.

Middlesex County–includes in Somerset County, Kendall Park, Somerset, and Franklin; in Mercer County, Hightstown; and all of Middlesex County.

Northeastern N.J.–includes Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Morris, Passaic, Somerset, Union, Hunterdon, Sussex, Monmouth, and Ocean counties.

North Hudson County–includes Guttenberg, Hudson Heights, North Bergen, North Hudson, Secaucus, Union City, Weehawken, West New York, and Woodcliff.

Somerset County–includes most of Somerset County and a portion of Hunterdon County.

Trenton–includes most of Mercer County.

Union County–includes all of Union County except Springfield. Also includes a few towns in adjacent areas of Somerset and Middlesex counties.

Vineland–includes most of Cumberland County and towns in neighboring counties adjacent to Vineland.

NEW YORK

Elmira–includes Chemung, Tioga, and Schuyler counties. Also includes Tioga and Bradford counties in Pennsylvania.

Glen Falls–includes Warren and Washington counties, lower Essex County and upper Saratoga County.

Kingston–includes eastern half of Ulster County.

New York Metropolitan area–includes the five boroughs of New York City, Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk counties. For a total Jewish population of the New York metropolitan region, please include Fairfield County, Connecticut; Rockland, Putnam, and Orange counties, New York; and Northeastern New Jersey.

Syracuse–includes Onondaga County, Western Madison County, and most of Oswego County.

Utica–southeastern third of Oneida County.

NORTH CAROLINA

Asheville–includes Buncombe, Haywood, and Madison counties.

Charlotte–includes Mecklenberg County. Also includes Lancaster and York counties in South Carolina.

OHIO

Cincinnati–includes Hamilton and Butler counties. Also includes Boone, Campbell, and Kenton counties in Kentucky.

Cleveland–for a total Jewish population of the Cleveland metropolitan region, please include Elyria, Lorain, and Akron totals.

Toledo–includes Fulton, Lucas, and Wood counties. Also includes Monroe and Lenawee counties, Michigan.

Youngstown–includes Mahoning and Trumbull counties. Also includes Mercer County, Pennsylvania.

PENNSYLVANIA

Ambridge–includes lower Beaver County and adjacent areas of Allegheny County.

Bucks County (lower portion)–includes Bensalem Township, Bristol, Langhorne, Levittown, New Hope, Newtown, Penndel, Warrington, Yardley, Richboro, Feasterville, Middletown, Southampton, and Holland.

Philadelphia–includes Philadelphia City, Montgomery, Delaware County, Chester County, and central and upper Bucks County. For a total Jewish population of the Philadelphia metropolitan region, please include lower Bucks County; the Cherry Hill area and Salem and Mercer counties, New Jersey; and the Wilmington area of Delaware.

Pittsburgh–includes all of Allegheny County and adjacent portions of Washington, Westmoreland, and Beaver counties.

Sunbury–includes Shamokin, Lewisburg, Milton, Selinsgrove, and Sunbury.

Wilkes-Barre–includes all of Lucerne County except southern portion, which is included in Hazleton totals.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Sumter–includes towns in Sumter, Lee, Clarendon, and Williamsburg counties.

TEXAS

Amarillo–includes Canyon, Childress, Borger, Dumas, Memphis, Pampa, Vega, and Hereford in Texas; and Portales, New Mexico.

Houston–includes Harris, Montgomery and Ft. Bend counties and parts of Brazoria and Galveston counties.

Waco–includes Mclellan, Coryell, Bell, Falls, Hamilton, and Hill counties.

VIRGINIA

Newport News–includes Newport News, Hampton, Williamsburg, James City, York County, and Poquosson County.

Richmond–includes Richmond City, Henrico County, and Chesterfield County.

Staunton–includes towns in Augusta, Page, Shenendoah, Rockingham, Bath, and Highland counties.

Winchester–includes towns in Winchester, Frederick, Clark and Warren counties, Virginia; and Hardy and Jefferson counties, West Virginia.

WASHINGTON

Seattle–includes King County and adjacent portions of Snohomish and Kitsap counties.

Tri Cities–includes Pasco, Richland, and Kennewick.

WEST VIRGINIA

Huntington–includes nearby towns in Ohio and Kentucky.

WISCONSIN

Milwaukee–includes Milwaukee County, eastern Waukesha County, and southern Ozaukee County.

Wasau–includes Stevens Point, Marshfield, Antigo, and Rhinelander.

Israel

The Year of the Intifada

Virtually no area of Israeli life was untouched, directly or indirectly, by the uprising in the occupied territories in 1988. The *intifada* (literally, "shaking off"), as the Palestinians in the territories called their multifaceted revolt against Israel's generation-long rule over them which began on December 9, 1987, impinged on the Israeli polity as few events had in the state's history, short of full-scale war. Ironically, the uprising occurred precisely in the year that Israel was celebrating the 40th anniversary of its establishment. The festivities went ahead largely as planned, but the tourists stayed home—a development that also contributed to the economic malaise, itself due in no small part to the *intifada*—and the general mood was muted.

Israel's major ally, the United States, tried to seize the opportunity to get Israel to embark on the road to a settlement with the Palestinians and Jordan as the first stage in a comprehensive Middle East settlement. However, the fact that 1988 was an election year both in Israel and the United States was not calculated to make Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his colleagues forsake their status-quo politics. Movement, however, was visible on the other side, near the end of the year. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat recited the litany of declarations which the United States had demanded since 1975 as the condition for launching a dialogue with the organization. Arafat's move, and the PLO's earlier declaration of a Palestinian state in the territories, were both results of the pressures generated by the *intifada*.

The confusion, fears, and uncertainty that were pervasive in Israel in 1988 were clearly reflected in the results of the November general election. The new government, which was essentially the old government—reconstituted after six weeks of coalition give-and-take—appeared ill equipped to deal with the urgent problems on the national agenda.

THE *INTIFADA*

The First Phase: "Force, Might, and Blows"

In its initial phase the *intifada* was impelled by sheer force of numbers and the unleashing of pent-up fury. Throughout the territories, in cities and towns, in villages and refugee camps, tens of thousands of people took to the streets and engaged Israeli troops in mass confrontations. Briefly, around the beginning of January, when the demonstrations tapered off, the Israeli military thought their assessment had been vindicated that the huge and bloody demonstrations in December—in which 22 Palestinians had been killed and scores wounded by live fire—had in fact been one more "wave of riots," albeit on an unprecedented scale, such as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had coped with sporadically over the past two decades. On January 4, Prime Minister Shamir told Israel Radio: "I do not believe that the wave of disturbances will resume. . . . I do not believe that a new situation has been created. . . . [The Arab population in the areas] wants a return to normalcy, because it sees that these disturbances, acts of incitement and stone throwing do not lead anywhere."

Within days, however, of Shamir's reassuring statement, correspondents were describing the Gaza Strip as "looking like a war zone" after the army rushed in forces on a large scale, including armored personnel carriers, to put down a renewal of the violent mass demonstrations.

In addition, there were incipient signs that the uprising was seeking new directions, and that the demonstrations and riots were the prelude to more institutionalized forms of civil revolt. On January 7, Hanna Siniora, the editor of the East Jerusalem daily *al-Fajr*, urged the residents of the territories to launch a phased boycott of Israeli-made goods, culminating in a refusal to work for Israeli employers. Around the same time, the first leaflet of the "United National Command of the Uprising" was circulated in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It called on the population to observe a general strike from January 11–13, to "include all forms of revolutionary escalation." January 15, a Friday, the Muslim sabbath, was declared a "day of unity and solidarity," to be devoted to "commemorating the fallen of the uprising in requiem prayers and symbolic funerals." Thirty more leaflets were issued in 1988 by this shadowy leadership group, and all attempts by the security forces to put a stop to the phenomenon—by deportations, mass arrests, outlawing of organizations, and uncovering of clandestine printing presses—were unavailing.

The United National Command (UNC) was a coalition of Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestine Communist party. The group's close identification with the PLO was indicated by the motto that appeared at the head of each leaflet, beginning with the third one (January 18):

No voice rises above the voice of the uprising,
No voice rises above the voice of the Palestinian people
—the people of the Palestine Liberation Organization

Similarly, Hamas, the Gaza-based Islamic Resistance Movement, issued 33 leaflets in 1988, and occasional leaflets were issued by some of the smaller left-wing and religious organizations.

The ideological message of the leaflets was that the Palestinians could achieve their aim of hastening Israel's departure from the territories by engaging in a combination of violent and nonviolent activity. The former included stone-throwing, gasoline-bomb attacks, erecting barricades, the use of knives and axes, and actions against "collaborators." Nonviolent activity would include breaking off contact with Israel in the economic and service sectors, refusing to obey Israeli laws and regulations, and heightening internal solidarity.

In the first stage of the uprising, however, these long-term political objectives, whose culmination would be the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, were obscured by violence: a hail of rocks and other objects—often propelled with powerful slingshots from behind a thick curtain of acrid black smoke created by barricades of burning tires and accompanied by jeering, taunts, and curses—that greeted Israeli patrols in the territories. Israeli soldiers, unprepared and untrained in riot-control techniques, responded in the first instance with a liberal use of tear gas, including (as confirmed by Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin in the Knesset) a more toxic type of gas than had previously been used by the IDF. Palestinians and groups such as Amnesty International alleged, and Israel denied, that tear gas was sometimes used in confined or semiconfined spaces, such as rooms in houses or schools, reportedly causing asphyxiation in some cases.

When tear gas failed to produce the desired effect, troops resorted to the use of live fire in "life-threatening situations." Rubber bullets, introduced in January, had no perceptible mitigating effect on the high casualty rates resulting from officers having to make instant interpretations of the phrase "life-threatening situation" when confronted with rampaging mobs who had lost all fear of the military and were masters of their own turf. It was in an effort to stem the tide of adverse media reports, domestic and external, that Defense Minister Rabin announced a new policy means to reduce the number of fatalities among Palestinian demonstrators. In the event, this proved even more controversial and more damaging to Israel's international image.

On January 19, during a tour of the West Bank, Rabin told reporters that the security forces' "top priority" was "to use force, might, and blows" [*makot*] to quell the violent demonstrations in the territories. A week later *Ha'aretz* quoted Rabin as telling defense reporters that the beatings policy had actually been in effect since January 4, and that, in combination with other measures including curfews and "hot pursuit" of demonstrators, it had "brought about calm which was more obvious in Gaza and less so in Judea-Samaria." In addition, Rabin said, this combination of measures had "created the impact we wanted: the fear of the population." Another, less fortuitous, result of the new approach was a surge in media reports about what were officially termed "deviations" or "excesses" perpetrated by soldiers against the local population. Rabin himself conceded that some soldiers were "keen to deliver beatings," but insisted that, overall, troops were obeying the orders prohibiting the use of force after a riot had been dispersed and its instigators apprehended.

The problem was that, by the time the orders filtered down to the field units, they had become diffuse and vague. Young officers and soldiers took advantage of the unwritten rules to vent on the local population their frustrations caused, in essence, by their being called on to act as policemen in situations for which nothing in their combat training had prepared them. A Health Ministry report, cited by the Citizens' Rights Movement, stated that by the end of April, nearly 2,000 persons had been treated in local hospitals in the territories, the majority suffering from broken bones, after being beaten with truncheons.

The backlash inside Israel was reflected in the relatively large attendance—an estimated 40,000 people—at a Peace Now rally held in Tel Aviv on January 23. Speakers at the gathering called for the renewal of the peace process and an end to the "iron fist" policy in the territories. On January 29, an unusual petition, signed by nearly 500 Israeli mental-health practitioners, appeared in the Hebrew press. The signatories asserted that beyond the "fear and humiliation" suffered by the Palestinians in the territories during the two decades of the occupation, the situation was having "a horrendous impact upon the Jewish population as well. . . . We are being swept into an existence marked by fear, violence and racism. We are losing our sensitivity to human suffering." In the same vein, 600 of the country's leading academics and intellectuals, including the sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt, the historian Shmuel Ettinger, and the writers Amos Oz and A. B. Yeshoshua, signed a petition expressing "profound concern" about Israel's future, urging the government to "reevaluate" its policy."

Within the IDF, too, concern was voiced at the long-term effects, especially on young soldiers, of the behavioral norms they were internalizing due to the nature of their service in the territories. The IDF's chief education officer, Brig. Gen. Nehemiah Dagan, initiated an information campaign against the dehumanization of the Palestinians. At the end of January, the army's military advocate-general, Brig. Gen. Amnon Strashnow, stated that he had ordered investigations into "recent incidents in which troops went beyond the use of reasonable force." Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, the O/C Central Command (whose area of responsibility included the West Bank), told reporters that some soldiers had been court-martialed and reassigned for beating Palestinians indiscriminately.

Defense Minister Rabin, replying in the Knesset on February 16 to motions for the agenda submitted by Mapam and the Citizens' Rights Movement on the implementation of "manifestly illegal" orders in the territories, denied having used the phrase "to break bones" or having sanctioned beatings as a punitive measure. Rabin explained that the first priority was to prevent outbreaks of violence; if nevertheless a violent situation developed, tear gas was to be used in the first stage, then rubber bullets, and if these tactics failed, soldiers were to charge the rioters using force, including riot clubs. However, blows were to be administered only during the operation itself or during hot pursuit of rioters; if a stone thrower or other agitator took refuge in a house, soldiers were at liberty to enter that house, forcibly if necessary. Rabin acknowledged that "irregularities" had occurred and revealed that in two cases officers who had been involved in such incidents were under investigation. Rabin asserted that an "information campaign" had been launched in the IDF to ensure that soldiers understood the policy.

TWO CASES OF BRUTALITY

Nevertheless, "irregularities," "deviations," and "excesses" continued to be rumored and reported. (Some of the incidents became public knowledge only toward the end of the year, when those involved went on trial following lengthy Military Police investigations—see below.) Two of the most heavily publicized cases of brutality in the first part of the year occurred in February. In one, following a demonstration at the village of Kafr Salem, near Nablus, four young villagers were forced by soldiers to lie on the ground and were buried under a foot of wet earth by a bulldozer. They were dug out and revived by villagers after the troops left. General Mitzna, who did not learn about the incident until a week after it happened, was quoted as saying the incident was "beyond his worst dreams." (Three soldiers—two privates and a master sergeant from the Civil Administration, were tried in connection with the incident. The privates were sentenced on March 29 to four and five months, respectively, in prison. Their prison terms were halved by an appeals court on May 17, two days after the master sergeant received a four-month prison term and was demoted to the rank of private.)

The second incident was revealed to the world on February 25, when CBS-TV screened a report showing Israeli soldiers viciously beating two Arabs sitting helplessly on the ground, hands tied behind their backs. Israeli TV screened only a brief segment from the full CBS report, followed by an interview with General Mitzna, who said he had been "shocked" by the incident and wanted to assure the public that "this behavior is still the exception." Israeli embassies in Europe were deluged with protests from individuals, human rights organizations, and governments, and American Jewish leaders said it would be difficult to defend Israeli policy after this incident, which seemed to confirm the worst reports about what was going on in the territories. (An officer and two corporals faced trial in connection with the beating incident. As in the "burial" case, the charges against the three were mitigated in a plea-bargaining deal from "aggravated assault" to "shameful behavior" and "unbecoming conduct." In April the three received suspended sentences, and the two corporals, who had done most of the beating, were demoted to the rank of private. The three judges noted that, given the conditions in the territories, especially the provocative behavior of the local residents, "even the finest, the wisest and the most restrained of soldiers will find it difficult to muster the psychological strength and the forbearance enabling him to remain calm, cool and collected. . . .")

That such incidents, while extreme, were not as "exceptional" as Rabin and others claimed, was implicitly confirmed by Attorney General Yosef Harish. In a letter to the defense minister, made public on February 22, Harish wrote that the "large number of complaints about acts of abuse" in the territories received by his office "raises the suspicion that classification of these incidents as irregularities no longer reflects reality." Following the publication of Harish's letter, the chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Shomron, broke the public silence he had maintained on the subject of the "aberrations." In a message to IDF commanders issued on February 23, Shomron noted that the "broad wave of violent riots and disturbances" in the territories had confronted the IDF with "one of the most complex and sensitive missions" it had ever faced. "The execution of this mission requires the use of force," Shomron continued, but its implementation must be tempered with the "self-control, restraint and sensitivity commensurate with the high norms of behavior incumbent upon IDF soldiers and commanders."

CONTINUING VIOLENCE; ESCALATING RESPONSE

Despite Defense Minister Rabin's declared justification for introducing the policy of beatings—that it would reduce the number of persons killed by firearms (and thus, it was hoped, lessen the pressure on Israel)—17 Palestinians were killed in January, 13 of them in the Gaza Strip, while February saw a dramatic increase to 32 deaths, this time the vast majority (27) occurring in the West Bank. One reason for the surge in casualties was that, in a concerted effort to break the uprising, more troops were dispatched to the territories with orders to confront Palestinian demonstrators more aggressively, as called for by the beatings policy, even in previously ignored remote villages, thus broadening and intensifying the cycle of violence.

March brought a rising number of Palestinian casualties and April even more; at least 40 Palestinians were killed by Israeli troops, including 16 on April 16, following the assassination in Tunis of Khalil al-Wazir, code-named "Abu Jihad," Yasir Arafat's deputy for military operations in Fatah. While the high number of casualties in April was in part a backlash from the Tunis operation, the surge in fatalities and wounding actually began during the final week of March as the Israeli authorities began to change their tactics in dealing with the uprising.

In mid-March, with firebomb attacks coming at an average rate of 4–5 a day, primarily in the West Bank, where settlers were more easily targeted, the regulations for opening fire in the territories were relaxed. Troops could now shoot at persons about to throw, or holding, or suspected of holding firebombs, on the ground that these devices were lethal weapons and hence constituted an immediate threat to soldiers' lives.

Another cause of the steep rise in Palestinian casualties was the new, explicit orders to officers to confront violent demonstrators "aggressively and assertively," not to back away from clashes with rioters even if this course of action placed the troops in a situation of concrete danger obligating them to open fire. This reversal of the previous policy, which had called for avoidance of confrontations with demonstrators, was meant to enable the security forces to demonstrate the qualities that had gained the IDF its reputation on the field of battle: tactical originality, improvisational ability, adherence to mission, and carrying the battle to the enemy.

The difference was that, in the occupied territories, as often as not, the "enemy" consisted of rock-throwing children. In an interview with *Davar* on March 18, Chief of Staff Dan Shomron articulated the dilemma facing the military: "[T]he long-term solution is entirely political," he explained. "There is no possibility of bringing about a solution through the use of military force, given the restrictions and limitations we have imposed on ourselves." Shomron added: "As long as we do not decide to alter the code of behavior of the State of Israel by employing firearms against unarmed civilians in the territories, there is no possibility of bringing about total calm through the use of the army."

CURFEW AND DEPORTATION

From the start of the uprising, one of the first Israeli countermeasures was to impose curfew on trouble spots, compounding the impact of the permanent commercial strike conducted by the Palestinians. Increasingly during the year, curfews, some continuing for extended periods and often aggravated by the authorities' severing of phone and other communications links to the outside, took on the character of a purely punitive measure and were utilized by the military to carry out search-and-arrest operations. Residents complained that they were prevented from receiving urgent medical treatment during curfews, and in some cases there were reports of food shortages, allegations that were denied by the IDF.

Probably there was not a curfew-free day in the territories during all of 1988. The Shati refugee camp in the Gaza Strip and the Tulkarm refugee camp in the West Bank spent 149 and 143 days, respectively, under full curfew. An indefinite night curfew (10 P.M. until 3 A.M.) was imposed on the entire Gaza Strip on March 14. The city of Nablus, with a population of more than 80,000, was under curfew for a total of more than two months in 1988. By the end of the year, even this measure was no longer a guarantee of quiet as it was increasingly defied, particularly by inhabitants of refugee camps.

A major cause of the renewed demonstrations in early 1988 was the IDF's announcement, on January 3, that deportation orders had been served that day to nine residents of the territories, five from the West Bank and four from the Gaza Strip. According to the communiqué, the nine were "leading activists and organizers involved in incitement and subversive activity on behalf of terrorist organizations." Ignoring both U.S. admonitions and a unanimous UN Security Council resolution adopted on January 5, citing the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on "the protection of civilian persons in time of war," and calling on Israel "to refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilian from the Occupied Territories," Israel on January 13 expelled four of those on the list to Lebanon, the first of 32 Palestinians deported from the territories during 1988 (see also below).

Among those in the January 13 group was Jibril al-Rujoub, aged 35, from the town of Doura, near Hebron, who was one of the 1,500 security prisoners released in the 1985 deal with the Ahmed Jibril organization in return for three Israelis; before becoming deputy editor of a West Bank women's magazine, he was employed at the Center for Palestine Studies, in East Jerusalem, where he became, according to an IDF communiqué, the "right-hand man" of the institution's director, Faisal al-Husseini, himself described as "a senior Fatah activist now under administrative detention."

The deportation triggered a second Security Council resolution (January 14), this one passed by a vote of 14–0 (the United States abstained) and expressing "deep regret" at Israel's "defiance" of the earlier resolution. A no-confidence motion against the government on the same issue submitted in the Knesset by four left-wing parties (Mapam, Citizens' Rights, Communists, Progressive List for Peace) had been resoundingly defeated by the coalition on January 6. (The other five persons on the list of nine were deported on April 11, some ten weeks after dropping their appeals to the High Court of Justice, a step they took, according to their lawyer, "in order not to legitimize the court's authority to decide their fate following the submission of secret evidence that they will not be allowed to see.")

Jerusalem—"Scars and Coexistence"

One of the entrenched Israeli conceptions undermined by the *intifada* was that of a reunited Jerusalem, its Jewish and Arab populations living in separate but equal—and peaceful—coexistence. (East Jerusalem was sovereign Israeli territory, having been formally annexed in 1967.)

Jerusalem had remained relatively quiet during the first month or more of the *intifada*. This situation came to a dramatic and violent end on Friday, January 15, when police and Border Police clashed with worshipers who streamed out of the Al Aqsa mosque on the Temple Mount, following the weekly prayers, chanting anti-Israel slogans, throwing rocks, and burning the Israeli flag. Police wearing gas masks and face shields fired dozens of canisters of tear gas at the rioters and charged them, riot clubs flailing. About 70 Palestinians and 6 policemen were hurt in the melee, and 8 demonstrators were arrested. The sensitivity of the site and the massive presence of the foreign media ensured that the event would receive extensive coverage abroad. Israeli officials vehemently denied reports that tear gas had been fired directly into the Al Aqsa mosque, although conceding that tear gas might have wafted into the building from outside.

A week later, on January 22, the previously unthinkable happened: for the first time since the Six Day War, curfew was imposed in one of the capital's neighborhoods, A-Tur, lying between Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives. The step was especially galling for Mayor Teddy Kollek, as it was taken without informing him, via an emergency order issued by the O/C Central Command, General Mitzna, at the request of the police. At Kollek's urging, the curfew was lifted about 20 hours after being declared. It had been imposed after youngsters from the village blocked the road to the Al-Maqassed Hospital and the Intercontinental Hotel for four consecutive days by burning tires, erecting barriers, and stoning vehicles. While the curfew was in effect, all males in A-Tur between the ages of 10 and 50 were ordered to gather in the local schoolyard where they were checked by security personnel; four were arrested.

Sporadic violence continued throughout the year in East Jerusalem—whose status as sovereign Israeli territory ironically enabled it to become, in effect, the political-intellectual center of the uprising—and in outlying refugee camps and villages incorporated within the municipal boundaries after the 1967 war. The commercial strike in East Jerusalem intensified, although a leaflet issued by the leadership of the uprising permitted stores to open for three hours a day so that residents would not have to shop in the city's western section—where, just minutes from the Arab area, life went on normally, at least on the surface.

On February 5, the Jerusalem municipality decided, for the first time ever, to close down all 31 public schools in East Jerusalem for a week, due to their part in the unrest, low attendance by the 16,000 pupils, and threats to the lives of headmasters by the organizers of the commercial strike (private schools in East Jerusalem had been closed for some time).

Residents of some of the Jewish neighborhoods built after 1967 in former Jordan-held territory could corroborate Kollek's plaint that "coexistence in the city is collapsing." In East Talpiot, large numbers of police and Border Police fired tear gas canisters and rubber bullets on February 7 to repulse hundreds of youngsters who marched into the neighborhood from the adjacent Arab village of Jabel Mukaber, carrying Palestinian flags, chanting nationalist slogans, and throwing rocks through windows of houses and a school. A similar march by about 500 youngsters from the Shuafat refugee camp toward the nearby Pisgat Ze'ev neighborhood was forcibly broken up. The No. 25 bus, connecting the city to the Neve Ya'akov quarter on the road to Ramallah, was stoned 40 times in the first two months of the uprising.

Serious disturbances were also reported within the walls of the Old City. On July 3, workers in an archeological dig sponsored by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the Western Wall area dug a hole on a Muslim Quarter street (adjacent to the Via Dolorosa, where Christian pilgrims were touring) to gain better access to a water tunnel from the Hasmonean period. Immediately, rumors spread—fanned by the *muezzin* using the powerful loudspeakers on the Temple Mount—that "the Jews" were trying to seize control of one of the gates to the mount and to undermine Muslim structures. Fifteen local residents and one policeman were injured in a fierce two-hour riot that ensued in the Old City.

On July 19, Jerusalem experienced its first fatal casualty of the uprising. Sixteenyear-old Nidal Rabadi, from the Old City's Christian Quarter, was shot and killed, reportedly after a bus was stoned on the Jerusalem-Ramallah road and passengers, including soldiers, opened fire at fleeing Arabs. Rabadi's funeral, held on Mount Zion following a procession through the Christian Quarter, triggered serious rioting. Attendance at the Western Wall for the traditional 9th of Av fast-day prayers (July 23–24) marking the destruction of the Temple was down by 80 percent as compared with previous years.

The statistics relating to Jerusalem were as astonishing as those for the territories. According to official data, Jerusalem—more specifically, East Jerusalem—in 1988 experienced 114 firebomb attacks, 283 cases of tire burning, 1,766 incidents of stone throwing, and 708 incidents of road blocking. Besides these 2,963 violent incidents (of which more than 20 percent occurred in the final month of the year, in a pattern similar to the events in the territories), on 1,229 occasions the Palestinian flag was hoisted in the capital.

In effect, Jerusalem in 1988 was once more a divided city. Few Jewish Jerusalemites or other Israelis ventured into the city's eastern section, including the Old City, and even at the Western Wall fewer worshipers turned up on holy days. Jerusalem also suffered in other ways from the *intifada*. The general decline in foreign tourism to Israel during the year affected Jerusalem disproportionately. But it was hard to blame foreigners when even Israelis stayed away—school trips to the capital from all over the country, a staple of the curriculum, were nearly all canceled under pressure from parents fearful for their children's safety. Businesses in the Jerusalem area that were dependent on workers from the territories, particularly garages and the construction industry, had to cope with frequent employee absenteeism due to curfews imposed by the military and/or general strikes called by the leadership of the uprising. Mayor Teddy Kollek seemed to be on the mark when he said, in mid-February, that the situation in the capital had "changed in a fundamental way," adding: "Coexistence is not dead, but I'm sure there will be deep scars left when this is over."

Israel's Image—The Media Connection

A mid-January meeting with President Chaim Herzog (scheduled before the uprising began) gave a delegation of the Foreign Press Association in Israel the opportunity to protest at the highest level against what they described as a "campaign of vilification" against foreign media representatives in Israel due to their reporting on the events in the territories. In part, they charged, Israeli government officials were the cause of this climate of opinion, which had resulted in physical attacks on journalists by settlers and soldiers. In his response, President Herzog voiced the long-standing Israeli complaint that media reporting did not provide the "full perspective" on the situation in the territories, such as the considerable rise in the living standard of the inhabitants there since 1967. Herzog noted further that the alternative was not between violence and negotiations, "but to contain the trouble and see that it does not get out of hand, or deteriorate into another Teheran or Beirut."

For Israeli policymakers, who feared in the initial phase of the *intifada* that the situation was about to lurch out of control, the media became a popular scapegoat. Thus, just days after the start of the uprising, Prime Minister Shamir suggested that a connection existed between the events and the presence of journalists in the territories. At that time, however, Chief of Staff Shomron came to the support of the press by persuading Shamir that closure of the territories to the press would be both impractical and counterproductive.

As the first serious attempt by the politico-military establishment to cope with the problem, on January 24 the defense establishment opened a "Media Information Center on Events in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza" to provide the Israeli press, but primarily the foreign media—the 200 correspondents regularly stationed in Israel and the more than 700 others who had arrived to cover the uprising—with "accurate and reliable information on the activity in the territories on a daily basis."

A practical problem was that information was to be given out only "after it had been corroborated by all relevant Civil Administration and IDF units," to ensure that information was both comprehensive and correct. In practice, the cumbersome army bureaucracy, compounded by stringent field-security considerations, often delayed official reactions to events, enabling Palestinian sources to put out their own versions of events first and meet journalists' deadlines. In some cases, the IDF Spokesman's Unit was itself the unwitting victim of false reporting and misinformation from the field. Thus, an initial denial about the "bulldozer burying incident" later had to be retracted. The Media Information Center operated for about seven weeks during the height of the mass violence (January 24–March 18), issuing a daily "Operational Update" sheet summing up the day's events in the territories. Such efforts, however well-intentioned, could not overcome the gap between official pronouncements and the situation in the field as it was documented by the media and other foreign observers.

The information center's closure came, coincidentally or not, in conjunction with a shift in the overall Israeli approach toward the uprising. In late March the army began imposing new, collective measures—emergency orders of various kinds—that impinged on journalists as well as on the Palestinian population.

In connection with Land Day—an annual event (March 30) on the calendar of Israeli Arabs, commemorating a violent general strike held in 1976 to protest land expropriations—residents of the territories would not be permitted to enter or leave Israel proper for three days, and a full curfew was imposed. Journalists could enter the territories and move about in them "only upon authorization of the IDF Spokesman's Office [and then] only if escorted by an IDF representative." Informally it was explained that media presence was known to trigger rioting. The IDF said that it would organize "press pools," an arrangement in which small groups of journalists could cover a story and share the material with their colleagues.

This unprecedented move, amounting to the reinstatement of the pre-1967 Green

Line, led the Foreign Press Association to take an unprecedented move of its own: the association petitioned the High Court of Justice against the IDF. The closure of the territories to the media, the petition argued, "constitutes a grave and unprecedented infringement of freedom of the press and the public's right to know." At the hearing, held on March 30, Nili Arad, from the State Attorney's Office, representing the IDF and the defense establishment, declared without embellishment, "This is a real war. The situation in the field is the same as in a war. Therefore the military commander found it necessary to close the area and declare it a military zone." The justices did not grant an interim order allowing the press into the territories that day, though they did commit the court to deal with the principles involved at a later date. Effectively, the army had its way.

In the event, neither the absence of the media from the territories on Land Day (with the exception of two pool teams totaling about 15 journalists), nor the stringent measures imposed by the military—including orders to the heavily reinforced troops to act "firmly and forcefully" against all attempts to disrupt public order—prevented the outbreak of widespread violent disturbances, particularly in the rural areas of the West Bank. The day's toll: 4 persons killed (all in West Bank villages) and at least 50 wounded in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (where refugee-camp residents defied the curfew and demonstrated) by IDF gunfire. Six Israelis—three soldiers and three civilians—were injured by stones.

Besides the blanket sealing off of the area for several consecutive days at critical times—notably around Land Day and Independence Day, during the Palestine National Council session in November that proclaimed an "independent Palestinian State," and when Arafat appeared at the UN in December—curfew was routinely imposed over whole populations, and the authority to declare an area a "closed military zone" was granted to the "senior officer" at the site, whatever his rank, instead of "military commanders." This measure was frequently resorted to on an "instant" basis to keep the press at bay during disturbances: officers reportedly took to carrying closure orders prepared in advance, which they brandished at the first sign of trouble.

Palestinian Press

Paralleling the process through which the military exercised growing control over media access to the territories, the authorities continued to target, far more intensively than in past years, the East Jerusalem-based Palestinian press. Four of the 32 Palestinians deported in 1988 were journalists, including two, Bashir Nafeh (April 11) and Samir Sbeihat (August 1), from the East Jerusalem daily *al-Fajr*. The exponential increase in the recourse to "administrative detention" (arrest without trial based on classified material under the 1945 Defense [Emergency] Regulations promulgated by the British Mandate government and not repealed by Israel) to suppress the intellectual leadership of the uprising netted at least 20 Palestinian journalists.

Both the Gaza Press Service and *al-Awda* magazine were closed down by the authorities (the former for six months) in 1988, as were the English-language version of *al-Awdah* and its parent company, Palestine Press Services, for six months on March 31, extended for an additional year on September 30. The latter had been especially valued by the foreign press as a source of information about the territories. Several other press and information offices were also shut down for periods ranging from three months to a year. In all these cases, the authorities charged that the publications and information officers were "tools" or "fronts" for various Palestinian terrorist organizations and were funded by them.

Inside Israel, for the second year running, an Israeli-Palestinian publication based in West Jerusalem, legally registered with the Interior Ministry, abiding by military censorship regulations and supplying reliable information on the occupied territories, was shut down and its staff arrested and accused of security offenses. In 1987 this had been the fate of the fortnightly *News from Within*, published by the Alternative Information Center (see AJYB 1989, p. 376), while in 1988 the publication in question was a radical left-wing fortnightly called *Derekh Hanitzotz* ("by means of the spark") in its Hebrew version and *Tariq al-Sharara* in its Arabic version. On February 16, Ribhi Arouri, the paper's Palestinian editor, was arrested, interrogated for three weeks, and placed under administrative detention. Two days after his arrest the weekly was shut down by order of the commissioner of the Jerusalem District on the ground that it had ties with Nayef Hawatmeh's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). However, only when the paper's Jewish editorial staff of four were detained one by one during April and May did the story make headlines in Israel.

The four, all in their 30s, were Ya'akov Ben-Efrat and his estranged wife, Roni Ben-Efrat; Michal Schwartz, the daughter of a distinguished Israeli historian, Prof. (emeritus) Yehoshua Arieli; and Assaf Adiv, who had been the paper's publisher and the brother of Ehud Aviv, paroled in 1985 after serving a lengthy prison term for spying on behalf of the Syrians. Like the case of the Alternative Information Center the previous year, the closure of *Derekh Hanitzotz* and the arrest of its editors attracted international attention and gave rise to charges that "national security" was being falsely brandished in order to stifle press freedom and deny the public information.

On May 25, the four Israelis under arrest were charged with a number of security violations, including membership in a terrorist organization and contact with a foreign agent. According to the charge sheet, they had made contact with DFLP personnel in London in late 1983 or early 1984 and had agreed to publish a paper in Israel with DFLP funding and to set up a Jewish-Arab political organization—as indeed they had done. On June 16, Supreme Court justice Aharon Barak accepted the appeal of the State and overturned a decision by the Jerusalem district court to release three of the four detainees on bail. Citing the extreme gravity of the charges, Barak ordered that all four be held in custody until the end of the proceedings against them. The trial began in September before a tribunal in the Jerusalem district court, with the prosecution announcing that it would call 29 witnesses, including 17 Shin Bet (General Security Service) agents whose testimony would be heard *in camera*, although the rest of the proceedings were open to the public.

Second Phase—Fighting the "Alternative Government"

By mid-March the emerging perception of the Israeli defense establishment was that in the territories Israel faced a situation of "war by other means." The ultimate aim of the uprising was, as the leaflets issued by the United National Command suggested, not to throw the Jews into the sea but to replace the Israeli administration in the territories with an "alternative government" run by the Palestinians. As early as March, Palestinian employees of the Civil Administration, particularly policemen and tax-department clerks, had obeyed the leadership's call to resign. Leaflet No. 10 (March 10, 1988), for example, declared: "We renew our call for merchants to refrain from paying taxes . . . . The popular committees, including the merchant committees, should supervise the implementation of this directive." Furthermore, "our shopkeepers" were urged "to boycott both Israeli and foreign products where there is a locally produced alternative." Businesses and professionals—doctors, pharmacists, and lawyers—were urged to lower their prices: "Now is the time for real solidarity between all sections of our society."

From the Palestinians' standpoint, a major achievement of the uprising was the forging of this sense of solidarity and of a shared destiny among all sectors of their society. The different political camps overcame their differences to form the United National Command of the Uprising, and virtually all the social strata in the territories took part in the insurrection, in one form or another. Writing in the *Jerusalem Post* in September, Shukri B. Abed, an Israeli Arab researcher at the Hebrew University's Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, argued that the events in the territories should be seen in part as a "social revolution" within Palestinian society:

> The *intifada* is a multifaceted phenomenon. It is, to be sure, a *political* phenomenon, an "uprising" against the long years of oppressive occupation. But it is also a *social and psychological* phenomenon: an awakening, a self-cleansing, a breaking away from the Palestinians' own past, from the heavy weight of inherited social structures that have outlived their usefulness. [Emphases in the original.]

It was the security forces' struggle against the growing manifestations of autonomy in the territories, chiefly through the use of bureaucratic and administrative measures, that dominated the second phase of Israel's struggle against the *intifada*.

PREVENTING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

On March 19, the Shabiba youth movement was outlawed in the territories, several hundred of its activists—nearly all from the West Bank—were arrested, and a number of youth clubs that had served as centers of activity for the Shabiba were closed down by administrative fiat. For some years, the Shabiba ("youth" in Arabic) had, in effect, filled the vacuum created by the absence of a recognized leadership in the territories. Over the years—well before the *intifada*—the Shabiba had become a dominant force in the territories, especially in West Bank high schools and refugee camps. In the camps, they engaged in communal and cultural activity, though this was tinged with heavy ideological-nationalist overtones.

According to the military, the Shabiba was outlawed because it was a "front organization" for Fatah, and its activists were instigators of violence. Beyond this, it was noted, the move was part of a concerted drive by the Israeli authorities to suppress attempts aimed at escalating the civil revolt and creating independent, Palestinian-run administrative structures as an alternative to the Civil Administration.

Exactly five months after the outlawing of the Shabiba movement, on August 18, the so-called popular committees that had sprung up in the territories were also declared illegal. Members of the committees, persons attending meetings sponsored by them, found in possession of leaflets issued by them, or donating money to them were liable to a ten-year prison term. Unlike the Shabiba, the popular committees were a distinctly *intifada*-related phenomenon, although in some cases their origins preceded the uprising. The committees, which had been set up in virtually every village, refugee camp, and urban neighborhood in the territories, were responsible at the grass-roots level for providing various social and communal services to the population in the emergency situation engendered by the uprising.

The legal problem faced by the authorities in combating these essentially mutual-aid activities was that they were not manifestly criminal or unlawful or violent in character. Thus, for example, "medical assistance committees" based in Ramallah, which had operated openly for some time before the uprising, expanded their work during the *intifada* within the framework of the popular committees. The popular committees also organized classes in private homes for school-aged children in the wake of the extended closure of the educational system in the territories.

What particularly troubled the defense establishment was the process by which these committees were undermining the Civil Administration by creating alternative institutions, in this case at the level of community services, and imbuing the population with a growing sense of independence. In an Israel Radio interview on August 18, Defense Minister Rabin—who on more than one occasion had complained that existing laws prevented the military from dealing with the uprising efficiently—stated that the outlawing of the popular committees (under a special order drawn up by defense establishment legal advisers based on the 1945 Defense [Emergency] Regulations) provided "a convenient legal tool" for dealing with the problem. Rabin explained that the security authorities had decided to act against the popular committees because "they constitute a basis for the continuation and institutionalization of the uprising."

In fact, the committees continued to function, as did two other bodies that were also banned: the "regional guidance committees," which organized demonstrations and disturbances against the Israeli authorities at the local level; and the "strike forces," groups of young toughs who acted as "enforcers" for the United National Command of the Uprising and operated against "collaborators" with the Israeli authorities. (A number of suspected or known "collaborators" were killed by other Palestinians during the year—see below.)

Other organizations targeted in 1988 included trade unions and various charitable societies. Such associations had been closed down sporadically in previous years, but as the uprising took root in the territories, the drive against them appeared to become more systematic. Among the charitable, social, and educational organizations closed down—on June 20, for a two-year period—was the In'ash al-Usra (family rehabilitation) society in the town of el-Bireh, the largest body of its kind in the West Bank. It had been operating for 23 years and was run by a well-known woman activist in the territories, Samiha Khalil, aged 65. The closure order (which excluded the orphanage and kindergarten) followed a raid on the organization's premises on June 8, while el-Bireh was under curfew, in which the Israeli authorities reported that they had seized inflammatory and anti-Semitic material, including videotapes and printed literature. In a press conference held on June 21, the society's staff denied all the charges and asserted that the closure would deprive thousands of Palestinian women of their earnings from various community projects and hundreds of underprivileged children of vital services. The society subsequently petitioned the High Court of Justice to rescind the closure order, shortly after Khalil was charged with incitement and distribution of "hostile material."

DEPORTATIONS

In addition to closing down institutions, the authorities also took administrative measures against individual activists. The harshest of these was deportation. As already mentioned, 32 Palestinians were deported in 1988—the most in a single year since 1972—and expulsion orders were pending against another 27 persons at year's end. Besides journalists, the list of deportees included trade-union and campus activists. Six of the eight persons expelled on April 19 were from the West Bank village of Beita, having been singled out for their involvement in the catastrophic incident there two weeks earlier (see below). The vast majority (25) of the still-pending deportation orders were against persons who, according to the IDF communiqué, were "directly involved in the actions and operations of the 'popular committees' according to instructions from the terrorist organizations, whose aim is for these committees to replace the Civil Administration in the territories."

The legal proceedings involving three of the deportees—Abd al-Nasser al-Affo, aged 32, Jamal Ahati al-Hindi, aged 30, both from Jenin and both activists at an-Najah University in Nablus; and Abd al-Aziz Uda Rafih, a leading "ideologue and spiritual mentor" of the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip, according to the IDF—predated the *intifada*. They had appealed the expulsion order to the High Court of Justice (even though the High Court had never blocked a deportation order), arguing that deportations from the territories constituted a violation of Article 49 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.

In a benchmark decision handed down on April 10, the court, sitting in an expanded panel of five justices headed by Supreme Court president Meir Shamgar, dismissed the petition. The court found that the relevant paragraph of Article 49 had to be read in the context of the World War II situation. The idea, according to the Israeli justices, had been to prevent mass transfers such as those carried out by the Nazis for extermination or forced labor, and therefore Article 49 did not refer to expulsions for security reasons.

MUBARAK AWAD

The High Court was also called on to rule in a deportation case of a different category, one which became a cause célèbre. Mubarak Awad, aged 44, a self-proclaimed disciple of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, and the director of the East Jerusalem-based Center for the Study of Nonviolence, had been targeted by the security authorities even before the *intifada* as a fomenter of unrest in the territories. However, there were both technical and political problems. Awad was a Jerusalem native who held American citizenship and enjoyed the protection of the American embassy and the intercession on his behalf of the highest levels of the State Department. In other circumstances Awad might have been left alone—especially as he was said to have little personal following in the territories—but with the *intifada* raging, his ideas could be depicted as helping to ignite a full-scale civil revolt.

As a native of Jerusalem, Awad had been granted permanent residence in Israel but had declined citizenship when East Jerusalem was annexed in 1967. In 1970 he went to study in the United States, eventually receiving a doctoral degree in psychology. He was granted resident status in 1973 and U.S. citizenship five years later. He visited Israel some 15 times after 1983, entering as a tourist on his U.S. passport, and in 1985 he established the Center for the Study of Non-Violence in East Jerusalem. On May 5, 1988, Prime Minister and Acting Interior Minister Yitzhak Shamir signed an order for Awad's deportation on the ground that Awad had been in the country illegally since November 1987, when his visa expired. Moreover, according to a May 6 communiqué issued by the prime minister's media adviser, Aviezer Pazner, via the Government Press Office—one of a series of position papers issued in the case, due to the American connection and intense media interest: "Awad caused harm to the security of the state and to public order," the center he headed "received [funds] from terror organization sources abroad," and its purpose was "to develop in Judea, Samaria and Gaza a widespread movement of 'passive resistance' that would stir up a civilian uprising and force Israel to retreat from these areas."

His avowed nonviolent philosophy notwithstanding, Awad was also accused of supporting the PLO's "armed struggle" and of "having contacts with the PLO leadership." He was described as being "one of the main contributors" to the uprising in the territories, having helped to draft leaflets of the United National Command.

Awad was arrested on May 6; on May 8 he appealed the deportation order to the High Court of Justice, but lost the appeal. Awad was deported to the United States on June 13, where he immediately became a media star, carrying his message to the American public. On June 15, *Ha'aretz* reported that the O/C Central Command, General Mitzna, then in the States on a lecture tour, had told Israeli embassy staff that it was difficult to know where Awad was doing more damage to Israel—in Jerusalem or in the United States.

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

One of the principal measures resorted to by the authorities to eradicate the *intifada* involved the use of administrative detention on an unprecedented scale. Under the Israeli occupation, the practice had been widespread until the late 1970s but was nearly abandoned between 1980 and 1985. Moreover, in 1980 the procedures for implementing administrative detention were tightened in the wake of assurances given by Prime Minister Menahem Begin to U.S. president Jimmy Carter (at Egypt's request). Under the amended ordinance, only a "regional commander" (a major general) could issue an administrative-detention order (until then, this prerogative belonged to any "military commander" holding the rank of colonel or above), incarceration was limited to six months, and judicial review was provided for beyond what the Geneva Convention required.

Like other measures, such as deportations and house demolitions, reinstituted by Defense Minister Rabin after all but being jettisoned under the Begin government, administrative detention was restored as an active deterrent measure in mid-1985. Over 300 persons were administratively detained in the following 30 months, until the outbreak of the *intifada*, and some 70 persons were serving terms of detention on December 9, 1987, when the uprising began. On March 17, 1988 (the day before the Shabiba movement was outlawed), Chief of Staff Shomron approved a harsher version of the regulations governing administrative detention than that in force before 1980. Under the new rules, any military commander could issue an administrative detention order for a six-month period with the possibility of its extension. The entire judicial review process was abolished, and the detainee's only recourse was to appeal the order—at his own initiative—before a military appeals committee possessing limited powers.

Again Israel was willing to brave American and international criticism and to violate its own pronouncements concerning its principles in the territories—in this case, that administrative detention was an exceptional measure and was implemented, in accordance with the stipulates of the Geneva Convention, only in special cases—to achieve its goal of quelling the uprising. No fewer than 4,000 administrative-detention orders were issued in the course of 1988 (the figure was given by the military advocate-general, Brig. Gen. Amnon Strashnow, in an interview with the IDF weekly *Bamahaneh*, November 23), the vast majority against Palestinian intellectuals and professionals—lawyers, human-rights monitors, journalists, and campus, trade-union, and community activists. At year's end, some 1,500 persons were still being held in administrative detention, more than 20 times the figure on the eve of the uprising.

Once more, the most prominent Palestinian held in administrative detention was Faisal al-Husseini, who had been imprisoned without charge almost consecutively since April 1987. Husseini was released on June 9 from two successive periods of administrative detention totaling nine months, but was again detained, this time for six months, on July 31 by order of the defense minister. At the same time, the East Jerusalem-based Arab Studies Society founded and headed by Husseini was closed down for a year by order of the O/C Central Command under the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations. According to the police announcement, Husseini had "renewed his subversive and hostile activities within the framework of the Fatah organization" immediately after being released in June, and had engaged in "coordination, incitement [and] institutionalization of the uprising." The Arab Studies Society was said to be "controlled and financed by Fatah" and to have served as the venue for "meetings of activists in terrorist organizations." Following a past pattern, Husseini's July arrest came four days after he spoke at a Peace Now meeting and advocated a two-state solution.

The huge number of arrests in 1988—in addition to the 4,000 administrative detainees, 17,000 other Palestinians were taken into custody at some point during the year (according to a briefing by Defense Minister Rabin to the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee on December 28)—placed a tremendous strain on the existing detention facilities in the territories. At any given time 5,000 persons were in prison for *intifada*-related offenses, of whom about a quarter were administrative detainees.

To cope with the overload, new military prisons were set up, including one in December 1987 at Dahariya, near Hebron, on the grounds of an IDF base, and in mid-March 1988 at Ketziyot, in the Negev desert—inside Israel proper—not far from the border with Egypt. Complaints about serious overcrowding at both installations as well as intolerable physical conditions and abusive treatment by prison guards were voiced frequently during the year.

On December 20, an officer and four soldiers, one of them a woman, were sentenced to prison terms after being convicted on 22 counts of assaulting and maltreating bound and blindfolded detainees at Dahariya in March. The court, basing itself on testimony given during the trial, concluded that abuse of prisoners was "the norm" at Dahariya. On December 28, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel made public a report on Dahariya drawn up following a visit by an ACRI delegation a month earlier. The group had found that, despite efforts to improve conditions, in its present state the facility remained "unfit for human beings."

At Ketziyot, where nearly all the administrative detainees were incarcerated, it took a visit by three Supreme Court justices before improvements were reported. On April 27, a petition to the High Court of Justice was filed by 14 administrative detainees at Ketziyot. They argued that their incarceration outside the occupied territories was unlawful because the order under which they were detained specified that the detention facility must be located in an area subject to military command—Israel in fact declared the detention site a "closed military area"—and violated Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibited the transfer of residents of occupied zones to the territory of the occupying power. The petition also referred to the "inhuman" physical conditions in the huge tent complex and the "brutal" behavior of the guards. The 14 were joined by 3 other detainees, incarcerated in the West Bank, who asked the court to block their transfer to Ketziyot.

On September 1, the three justices sitting in the case, led by Supreme Court president Meir Shamgar, took the unusual step of visiting the facility. Of the 2,750 prisoners there at the time, all but 312 were administrative detainees. The judges, attired in black suits despite the searing heat, heard inmates' complaints about living conditions, punishments for infractions of the rules, and the inability of the review boards to cope with the volume of appeals—fewer than half of the appeals submitted had been heard. In its decision, handed down on November 8, the High Court rejected the detainees' petition but was critical of the conditions at the facility and recommended establishment of an advisory committee to monitor conditions at the camp (this was duly set up, headed by a military judge).

COLLECTIVE MEASURES

The IDF consistently denied that it employed collective punishments (prohibited under the Geneva Convention) in the territories. When Chief of Staff Shomron was asked point-blank, in an interview (October 28) with Israel TV's Arabic Language Service, whether "the policy of collective punishment [will] continue," he declared unequivocally that "no policy of collective punishment exists." He then added: "Anyone who claims that this is a popular uprising should not be surprised if some of the punishments are directed against large groups. . . . Whoever contends that an entire village is involved in the uprising has to understand that, unfortunately, some [IDF] responses will entail harm to the entire village."

Probably the most sweeping and sustained action of this kind taken in the occupied territories, primarily in the West Bank, was the shutting down of the educational system for most of the year. To begin with, all the institutions of higher learning throughout the territories were closed early in 1988, "until further notice," and were not permitted to reopen for the rest of the year. This measure affected about 18,000 students in the West Bank and 3,500 in Gaza, as well as several thousand faculty and administrative staff. As in other spheres, the measures against this sector took to a logical extreme patterns that had evolved previously: in the years leading up to the *intifada*, the universities and colleges had been targeted with growing frequency by the military as "hotbeds of incitement."

Measures against the lower educational system, however, were implemented with a methodical intensity different from anything that had gone before. The 1,194 government (i.e., Civil Administration), private, and UNRWA schools in the West Bank—at the elementary, junior-high, and high-school levels—with a total enrollment of some 310,000 pupils, were closed down on February 4 and allowed to reopen (on a staggered basis) starting at the end of May, were shut down for two days in mid-June, and closed again from July 21 until November 30, reopening on December 1. Effectively, the entire 1987–88 school year was lost in the West Bank. By contrast, in the Gaza Strip the school system continued to function normally. Indeed, in Gaza an extra three weeks were added to the school year in June to partially compensate for the large number of days lost, even when schools were open, due primarily to extended curfews. Even in East Jerusalem, more than 35 different closure orders were issued, and for all but kindergarten and first-grade pupils the school year opened late in the fall of 1988.

To the Palestinians, at least, the most convincing proof that the Israeli claim that the closures were necessitated by security considerations was a mere pretext was the military's relentless drive against all forms of "alternative education" or "popular education." Troops raided small classes held in private homes, often arresting those present. Indeed, from this point of view, the shutting down of the educational system was counterproductive for the Civil Administration, since the establishment of independent educational frameworks helped the Palestinians cut themselves off from the Civil Administration. At the same time, the leadership of the uprising was also unhappy with this state of affairs. Even though three-quarters of the pupils in the West Bank attended government-run schools—run, that is, by the Civil Administration—Palestinians at all levels demanded the reopening of the schools to prevent what they feared would be irreversible damage to the young generation.

The Bureaucratic War

The Israeli authorities recognized that even if the struggle for the hearts and minds of the populace was a lost cause, the outward trappings of orderly relations had to be retained. This was essential, in the short term, to ensure the smooth functioning of the Military Government—including the collection of taxes from the residents, the Civil Administration's primary source of revenue. In the longer term, the authorities sought to prevent the creation of a vacuum that would be filled by the PLO and eventuate in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

COMMERCE; TAXES

The commercial sector was an early and ongoing arena of struggle. The commercial strike in the territories and in East Jerusalem, which was launched immediately after the start of the *intifada*, was one of the most blatant signs of the population's defiance of the authorities as well as of Palestinian solidarity. The defense establishment spared no efforts, therefore, to break the strike. Initially, methods used in previous years were tried: shopkeepers were ordered to open for business; if this failed to produce the desired result, troops forced open their shops and/or welded them shut. Various other tactics were tried during the year with equally little success.

Measures were taken by the Civil Administration to prevent the PLO from injecting funds into the territories in order to fuel the uprising and partially offset the self-inflicted economic hardships that affected all social levels in the territories. In February and March, the amount of money a person could bring in who entered the territories via the Jordan River bridges or an Israeli port of entry was drastically reduced; a permit was required in advance, and routinely refused, for sums exceeding about $1,000. Licensed Palestinian money changers were forbidden to visit Jordan. The authorities at Ben-Gurion International Airport seized $500,000 and opened 46 criminal files against incoming residents of the territories who were found in possession of sums exceeding the permitted amount. Palestinians claimed that the primary sufferers from these blanket sanctions would be, on the one hand, educational, health, and welfare institutions in the territories that received outside funding, and, on the other hand, the many families who were dependent on support from relatives working abroad.

The revenues collected by the Civil Administration from the local population plummeted. This was due primarily to outright refusals to pay taxes, especially VAT, and to the resignation of Palestinians employed in the Civil Administration's tax department, as well as to a ripple effect from the economic slowdown. As a result, essential services were cut and an intensive campaign was launched to offset the budget shortfall by other means. Thus, besides withholding salaries from teachers laid off by the school closures, the Civil Administration made sharp cuts in the health budget. More than 10 percent of all hospital personnel were dismissed, funds for treatment of Palestinians from the territories in Israeli hospitals were slashed by at least 80 percent, and patients admitted to government-run hospitals in the territories for treatment of wounds sustained in disturbances had to pay for three days of hospitalization in advance at about $150 per day. The whole sphere of tax collection in the territories became an arena of battle. With a shortfall of 40 percent in anticipated revenues from taxes in the first half of the year, administrative fiats were introduced to halt the tax revolt. The issuing of essential permits—drivers' licenses, birth certificates, ID cards, export-import licenses, and many others—was made contingent on proof of payment of all outstanding taxes, including income tax, VAT, property tax, municipal tax, and in some cases even traffic tickets. Cars of residents found to be in arrears to the authorities were impounded at roadblocks; tax-collection sweeps were carried out in which property of persons who could not prove payment of all taxes was confiscated or attached.

The most widely publicized case in this realm was that of Beit Sahour, an affluent town of some 9,000 Christian Arabs near Bethlehem. On July 7, the authorities mounted a large-scale tax-collection raid in the town, where some 300 residents had responded to tax claims by returning their government-issued ID cards to the municipality. A curfew imposed on Beit Sahour during the tax raid was lifted ten days later, shortly after the Association for Civil Rights in Israel informed the Central Command legal adviser that it intended to petition the High Court of Justice against the prolonged closure.

In a letter dated October 24 to the Ramallah-based al-Haq Law in the Service of Man group, which had charged that Israeli tax-collection tactics in the territories were "arbitrary" and "extra-judicial," the Judea and Samaria Region legal adviser, Col. David Yahav, wrote that soldiers accompanied tax collectors "only for security reasons" and that the Beit Sahour curfew had been imposed "only after a riot by the residents took place, for security reasons and to safeguard public order."

In the Gaza Strip a more comprehensive tactic was employed to facilitate control over the population. Beginning on May 10, the Civil Administration in Gaza began replacing the ID cards of some 450,000 adult local residents with new color-coded cards to make identification of the bearer easier at roadblocks or during search operations. The fact that access to Israel would be denied to those without cards guaranteed the success of the operation, since nearly 50 percent of Gaza's working population was employed in Israel, generally in menial labor. However, in order to receive a new card, residents had to pay a fee and show proof of payment of all taxes and other levies, and proof, in the form of a stamped document, that they were not wanted for questioning by the security forces.

One of the harshest punitive economic sanctions applied against the Palestinians in an effort to break the uprising was the issuing of sporadic bans on growing, harvesting, and/or exporting agricultural crops. Also, during prolonged curfews in a number of villages, crops rotted on the ground when residents were denied access to their fields. Most damaging were the measures taken against the West Bank's agricultural mainstay, the olive crop. On a number of occasions, the military uprooted olive trees, usually groves along roadsides which had been giving cover to persons throwing stones or firebombs at Israeli vehicles, or as sheer punishment, notably in the case of Beita, where some seven acres of trees were dug up following the incident there in April (see below). During the olive harvest itself, beginning in October, picking and marketing of the fruit were often prohibited, and olive presses were shut down in various locales, particularly in the Jenin area, following unrest or as a means of coercing villagers to cooperate with the Civil Administration.

FOREST FIRES

If the Israeli authorities uprooted trees, Palestinians burned them. In the period from May to September there were some 1,200 forest and brush fires throughout the country, which ravaged about 38,000 acres of woodlands, fields, and fruit orchards. This was four times the number of fires in 1987. At the height of the summer, the Jewish National Fund, the body responsible for planting and maintaining forests, had to cope with some 50 big fires a week. It was estimated that about half the fires were being deliberately set by hostile arsonists, in the main, Palestinians from the territories, though also some Israeli Arabs, often children—for nationalist reasons. On at least one occasion the United National Command of the Uprising urged the population to torch Israeli targets. Leaflet No. 19 of June 8 designated June 22 as a general-strike day and a "return to the land" on which the soil was to be "enriched and sown" and "enemy industrial and agricultural property is to be destroyed and burned."

In fact, although this "day of burnings," as it was dubbed in media headlines, did not produce many fires, it did have the effect of stretching Israeli resources and manpower to the limit. Anticipating intense arson efforts, the army and the police, along with about 1,500 staff and volunteers from the JNF and the Nature Conservation Authority, declared a countrywide alert. Ground and air patrols operated across broad areas. The day's count was 14 minor fires of which 8 were deliberately set—well below the average (in the week beginning June 12, 132 fires were reported in the country).

ECONOMIC EFFECTS

While the economic damage caused by forest fires was largely indirect and of a long-term character, the cumulative economic consequences of the actions and counteractions taken by the Palestinians and the Israeli authorities were direct and immediate for both Israel (see below) and the territories. Allowing for difficulties in collecting data in the territories, the Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that in 1988 in the West Bank, available per capita private income declined by 16 percent in fixed prices, following an increase of 12 percent in each of the two preceding years. The GNP in the West Bank fell by 12–15 percent after a per annum growth of 8 percent in 1986–1987; the figures for Gaza were substantially the same. Residents of the territories put in about 25 percent fewer workdays, both locally and in Israel, than in 1987. The decline in work hours in Israel was twice as high in industry (35 percent) as it was in agriculture (18 percent). In the West Bank itself, however, work in the agricultural sector increased by some 15 percent, as did agricultural production, reflecting both the drive toward self-sufficiency and sheer necessity. Agricultural production remained stable in the Gaza Strip, where topography and tradition precluded the option of the "return to the land" that existed in Judea and Samaria: fully 96 percent of the Gazans who worked in Israel had no recourse to agriculture that could sustain them without work in Israel, while the comparable figure in the West Bank was 68 percent.

Public consumption (the value of the services given by the Civil Administration and the local authorities) decreased by 16 percent in the West Bank, following 9-percent increases in each of the preceding two years, and by 3 percent in Gaza, following an average per annum increase of 11 percent in the previous two years. Likewise, investments in fixed assets fell by about a quarter in the West Bank after an average per annum increase of 15 percent in 1986 and 1987. A particularly steep decline—44 percent—occurred in investments by the Civil Administration and the local authorities (in road building, construction, and equipment), following a 26-percent growth in the previous two years. In the Gaza Strip, investments in fixed assets were off by 13 percent and in public investments by 28 percent. Industrial production in the West Bank dropped by 8 percent, but by 23 percent without the production of olive oil; the Gaza Strip registered a 20-percent fall in industrial production. Construction in the West Bank was down by about 30 percent, following a 12-percent growth in the two preceding years, while in Gaza it fell by 13 percent.

Compounding this already harsh state of affairs was a drastic decline of more than 40 percent in the value of the Jordanian dinar. The overall result was that the standard of living in the occupied territories fell by about a third in the course of a single year.

Terrorism and Vigilantism

Blood feuds and other forms of intracommunal violence were traditional in Palestinian society, and the uprising added to them a new element, political assassination. Primarily, this took the form of attacks against known or suspected "collaborators" with Israel by the "strike forces," the "commando" units of the popular committees, or by entire villages. As the uprising became more institutionalized, such assaults increased in frequency and intensified in brutality. For many Israelis the killings, and especially the savagery which attended them, tended to validate their perception of Arabs in general as violence-prone and confirmed their worst fears of what would be in store if an independent Palestinian state were established on Israel's doorstep.

Of the approximately 20 killings of Palestinians by Palestinians in 1988, virtually all in the West Bank, perhaps the most barbaric was the first, the lynching of a 42-year-old resident of the West Bank village of Kabatiya, Muhammad al-Ayed, said to have sired 15 children by three wives. On February 24, hundreds of villagers surrounded Ayed's home, shouting that he was a traitor and demanding that he come out. Ayed defended himself against the mob with an automatic weapon (issued to him, as to others who worked with the Israeli authorities, by the Shin Bet), killing a 14-year-old boy and wounding 15 other persons before he was seized and his home set ablaze. When Israeli security forces finally reached the scene they found Ayed's battered body hanging from an electricity pole with a Palestinian flag flying above. In a predawn punitive action the next day, troops and Shin Bet personnel arrested about 100 villagers suspected of participating in the murder and demolished the houses of the two main suspects.

Subsequently, two more houses were blown up and several hundred persons arrested. In an effort to deter more attacks on "collaborators," the IDF sealed Kabatiya from the outside world for 37 consecutive days, cut off its supplies of water, electricity, and cooking gas, and closed its principal source of revenue, stone quarries. Nevertheless, Israeli journalists who entered the town through back roads reported that morale was high and that the events had intensified the inhabitants' sense of solidarity. For subsistence they had resorted to the ways of their ancestors, drawing water from wells, using wood for fuel, living off the land, and employing medicinal herbs in the absence of proper medical treatment. They had also smuggled in supplies from nearby villages through the surrounding hills.

On March 2, Leaflet No. 9 of the United National Command of the Uprising congratulated "heroic" Kabatiya for "teaching a lesson to the betrayers of the homeland" and called on all Palestinian employees of the Civil Administration and all Palestinian policemen "to resign immediately and join the popular masses in their heroic struggle." Five days later a Jericho policeman was murdered near his home, evidently as an example to others. Some 300 policemen in the territories promptly resigned.

The first week of October saw the murder of three more "collaborators," including Mustafa Abu Bakr, the mukhtar (headman) of the village of Bidya, near Kalkilya, who was suspected by villagers of cooperating with the Israeli authorities and of being involved in land sales to Jewish buyers. Immediately after Bakr's killing, Bidya was placed under curfew for four days and the army blew up five houses of suspects. An IDF announcement on December 7—see also below—stated that members of a "local terrorist cell" had confessed to the crime. On the day of Bakr's murder a man from the village of Anin, near Jenin, was shot to death while sitting in a cafe in the Israeli-Arab town of Umm al-Fahm. Residents of Anin celebrated the murder of the "treacherous dog."

Settlers

The long-term significance of such attacks, the *Jerusalem Post*'s Yehuda Litani wrote after the Abu Bakr killing, was to "seriously impair Israel's ability to control the territories through surrogates." To no one did this development appear more menacing than to the Jewish settlers in the areas, whose sheer physical well-being depended on the Palestinians "knowing their place" as that conception dictated. The two types of Jewish settlers in the territories, those who were driven by a mystical, quasi-messianic yearning for the biblical Land of Israel and those—the overwhelming majority of the Jewish inhabitants of the territories—who had been lured there by government-subsidized housing, now found themselves locked into a true "pioneering" situation. The latter were for the most part nonreligious and cared little for abstract ideologies; they wanted only a quiet life in country villas set in tight-knit communities where the air was clean and the streets were safe and the children had space to grow—suburbia in Samaria. As for their indigenous neighbors, the Palestinian Arabs, the settlers were part of a generation of Jews that had become accustomed to looking at Arabs, if at all, as garbage collectors, construction workers, street sweepers, and dishwashers in restaurants. It came as a profound shock to the new suburbanites when these previously invisible Arabs suddenly turned into highly visible "Palestinians" and launched a concerted campaign to drive them out of their newfound Eden.

The ideological settlers of Gush Emunim, on the other hand, tended to view the Arabs as the incarnation of the biblical "Amalek," the adversary of the Hebrews who was to be expunged from the Land of Israel, or, at best, as bearing the halakhic status of "resident stranger." They also looked at the unfolding events as fulfilling the Divine Plan, perhaps the onset of the cataclysms traditionally associated with the "birth pangs of the Messiah." Therefore, taking a millenarian approach, they were able to evince a modicum of forbearance, at least in the early part of the uprising, certain that though their triumph might tarry, it would surely come.

By definition, the nonideological settlers lacked a sustaining vision of this kind. If the IDF, whose manifest task it was to keep the "locals" in place, could not or would not suppress the Arab troublemakers, then the settlers would fend for themselves. The upshot was that, as the *intifada* intensified, the nonideological settlers (along with the Kahanists of Kiryat Arba, who were beyond the pale even for the other groups) increasingly spearheaded "reprisals," "patrols," "vigilante" actions, and other aggressive "self-defense" tactics. Far more frequently than in past years, therefore, Israeli soldiers found themselves having to act as a buffer between enraged settlers and Palestinians. From this point of view, the situation was far more volatile in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, where fewer than 3,000 Jews, including children, resided in 14 settlements, and "bypass" roads enabled the settlers to reach their homes as though the local population did not exist. In the West Bank, however, many of the roads to Jewish settlements ran next to or through Arab towns and villages, and the potential for confrontation was ever present.

Another factor in the West Bank equation was the O/C Central Command, Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, who was said to be "soft" on Arabs—a reputation he had picked up in 1982, when he objected to IDF actions in Beirut during the Lebanon War. Six years later Mitzna served as a lightning rod for much of the settlers' wrath at what they believed was the military's deliberate refusal to stamp out the uprising. In the Gaza Strip, in contrast, the O/C Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Mordechai, a no-nonsense type who could "speak to the Arabs in their own language" and had a well-developed public relations sense to boot, was generally perceived to be the right person in the right place.

Toward the end of January, at the height of the stage of violent mass confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli troops, Yisrael Harel, editor of the settlers' journal *Nekudah*, told a *Jerusalem Post* reporter: "Everything has been going on during this period like always. . . . We've even had Arabs from the area coming to shop for food in our grocery because of the commercial strike which has kept [Arab businesses] shut down. For us, it's been business as usual." Yet within two weeks (February 4), a fellow resident of Harel's from the Gush Emunim settlement of Ofra, Meshulam Moskowitz, a 30-year-old immigrant from Brooklyn, suffered a fractured skull when he was hit by a rock in an ambush at Kafr Malik in Samaria. Four days earlier a 32-year-old Beit El man, Dov Kalmanovich, had suffered severe burns when a firebomb turned his car into a blazing inferno near el-Bireh. The two attacks were part of a pattern of escalating violence against Israeli vehicles in the West Bank.

When settlers warned that they would act on their own if they did not receive more protection, Defense Minister Rabin reiterated his stand that they should take an example from Israel's northern border settlements and restrain themselves. Rabin said, "It's impossible to station a soldier to guard every settler." Taking Rabin at his word, ultranationalist settlers from Hebron and Kiryat Arba, including activists from Meir Kahane's Kach movement, began operating night patrols in the area between Hebron and Jerusalem, claiming it was their right to employ legitimate self-defense in reaction to stoning or firebomb attacks.

As the settlers became more aggressive, mere rumors of raids by them were sufficient to trigger rioting in towns and villages. On February 4, loudspeakers of mosques in Tulkarm broadcast that Jewish settlers had kidnapped local residents and urged the population to protest. As a result, several thousand persons poured into the streets, erected barricades, burned tires and garbage bins, and attacked an IDF patrol. A 26-year-old local man was shot to death when he attacked an Israeli officer.

On March 22, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin told the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee that the permission granted soldiers to open fire on Palestinians throwing or apparently about to throw firebombs was valid also for the settlers, but "only in instances of danger to life and as long as that danger lasts." This further relaxation of the rules for opening fire followed a dramatic escalation in Palestinian violence against Jewish civilians in the territories and retaliations by settlers, on both an individual and an organized basis. According to data of the IDF Spokesmans's Office, the period from February 9 to March 8 saw 2,247 violent incidents (not including firebomb attacks or the use of firearms) perpetrated in the territories against the IDF and Israeli civilians—1,730 in the West Bank and 517 in the Gaza Strip—an average of more than 75 incidents per day, and an increase of nearly 1,000 incidents over the previous month.

While settlers were occasionally questioned following attacks on Arab property—most common were night raids in which Arab-owned vehicles were vandalized, primarily in the Hebron area—investigations were usually perfunctory and charges were rarely pressed. This and a number of serious incidents demonstrated that the "dual system of justice" in the territories, documented earlier in the decade in an official report by the State Attorney's Office (the "Karp Report"—see AJYB 1986, pp. 340–341), was still in force. Arabs who stoned Israeli vehicles in and around Jerusalem were theoretically liable for 20 years' imprisonment under the section of the penal code that was invoked in such cases, and throughout the territories stone-throwers were routinely given up to a year in prison and a stiff fine. Similarly, Arabs throwing firebombs with intent to maim and murder, even if no one was hurt in the attack, usually found themselves serving up to ten years in jail. Release on bail was unheard of.

In contrast, after Pinhas Wallerstein, aged 39, a leading Gush Emunim activist and the head of the Binyamin Regional Council, was detained for questioning on January 11 in connection with the shooting death that day of Rabeh Hussein Ghanem, aged 17, and the wounding of his cousin in the village of Beitin, near the settlement of Ofra, he was released on his own surety of NIS 5,000, apparently following the intervention of one or more cabinet ministers. Wallerstein was eventually charged with manslaughter and aggravated assault, though not before the High Court intervened and the attorney general heard arguments by Wallerstein's lawyer in a rarely used procedure. On October 11, exactly ten months after the incident, Wallerstein pleaded not guilty, by reason of self-defense, when his trial opened.

On September 30, Rabbi Moshe Levinger, leader of the Jewish community in Hebron and the spearhead of the entire settlement movement in the territories since 1967, was questioned briefly by police following an incident in the center of the city in which a shop owner was shot to death and at least one other person was wounded. Reportedly, when the car in which Levinger was traveling with other members of his family was stoned, he got out of the vehicle and opened fire with his pistol. On November 22, the police recommended that Levinger be charged in connection with the incident, but a week later the State Attorney's Office returned the file to the police saying that the evidence was insufficient.

In most cases the investigations into such incidents—some 15 Palestinians died at the hands of settlers during the year—either dragged on interminably or were eventually dropped for lack of evidence. The only Jewish civilian in the territories against whom legal proceedings were completed during the year in the wake of a shooting death was Israel Ze'ev, a 37-year-old American-born resident of the Shilo settlement. On May 5, Ze'ev killed a shepherd, Jouda Awad, from the nearby village of Turmus Ayya, and wounded another while they were grazing their flock just outside the settlement. Ze'ev claimed he had acted in self-defense. The investigation revealed that the Palestinians had done nothing to provoke the firing but also that Ze'ev had intended only to scare them off. On December 4, he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and two years' suspended and ordered to pay the victim's widow NIS 30,000 in compensation. While this was considered a stiff sentence by the settlers, it fell far short of the maximum permitted—the charges were manslaughter and aggravated assault, for which Ze'ev could have received 20 and 6 years, respectively.

Despite the violence in the territories, the number of settlers continued to increase. Although nonsettler Israelis ceased almost entirely to travel to the territories, even to visit relatives and friends, about 1,000 families (4,000 persons) moved to the West Bank and Gaza during the year. While the 6.5-percent population growth was down from the previous year's 10.7-percent rise—and both of these figures represented major decreases from the early 1980s—the fact that any increase at all was registered in the conditions of 1988 was touted as a major accomplishment by the settlement leadership. At year's end the Jewish population of the territories stood at about 71,000 (at least half of them children), as compared with at least 1.5 million Arabs.

BEITA INCIDENT

One episode in particular in 1988 demonstrated how swiftly the volcanic passions of both Israelis and Palestinians could be unleashed, and how profound were the mistrust and blinkered perceptions on both sides. One Israeli and two Palestinians were killed in the incident, and three persons, including an Israeli guard, were seriously wounded.

On April 6, during the Passover holiday, a group of 16 teenagers from Elon Moreh, a Gush Emunim settlement in Samaria, set out on a walking hike through the surrounding countryside. The Elon Moreh hikers were accompanied by two armed escorts: Roman Aldoubi, aged 26, the founder of the yeshivah at "Joseph's Tomb" in Nablus, whose militancy had led to his banishment in 1987 from Nablus for six months under a special—and unprecedented—order of the O/C Central Command; and Menachem Ilan, aged 55, who in 1984 had been convicted of destroying evidence in a fatal shooting incident for which fellow settlement member Yosef Harnoi was sentenced to ten years in prison (see AJYB 1987, p. 311; in December 1988 the Supreme Court rejected Harnoi's appeal). It was Ilan who "initiated, planned and was responsible for the hike," according to the official IDF report on the events of that day (issued April 27), written by General Mitzna following the investigation by the police, the IDF, and the Shin Bet.

As the hikers, moving through a wadi, drew near the village of Beita, the loudspeakers of the local mosque blared out a warning of their approach. Villagers later said they thought a party of armed settlers was about to attack them. Stones were thrown at the hikers from a hilltop at a distance of about 100 meters. Aldoubi fired several shots at them with his Uzi submachinegun, and then, as more villagers appeared, he exchanged his weapon for Ilan's more accurate M-16 rifle and fired a "warning shot . . . at a distance of about 50 meters," killing Moussa Salah Daoud, aged 20, and wounding another man. Villagers now surrounded the hikers and "forced" them to enter the village, "albeit without employing physical violence." The hikers formed a protective circle around Aldoubi to prevent villagers from grabbing his rifle.

The situation erupted into what the report called a "mass riot" when Mounira

Daoud, the distraught sister of the dead man and wife of the wounded man, threw a rock that struck Aldoubi in the head. "In an instinctive reaction . . . Aldoubi fired several bullets while turning around"; more shots were fired "during a struggle over Aldoubi's weapon," and the second guard, Menachem Ilan, who had earlier tried to restrain Aldoubi, was knocked senseless. The riot that ensued, in which the hikers were attacked with rocks, clubs, "and anything within reach," ended within a few minutes, and many of the villagers involved in the melee fled into the hills. As the bruised and battered hikers picked themselves up, they saw to their horror that a 15-year-old girl named Tirza Porat, daughter of Rabbi Yosef Porat, a founder of Elon Moreh, had been killed—the first Israeli civilian death of the *intifada*. A villager, Hatam Ahmed al-Jaber, aged 22, also lay dead. A second villager had been injured, and Aldoubi was unconscious (he had suffered brain damage, and remained in a coma in the hospital following surgery).

The Israeli public in general, and the settlers in particular, were shocked and appalled by the events in Beita. However, the settlers forfeited some sympathy when it emerged that the group had failed to coordinate this hike with the IDF—indeed, it was remarked that parents who sent their children on an outing of this kind seemed willing to put their lives at risk just to prove that Jews could go wherever they pleased in the Land of Israel. Senior officers, including the chief of staff, also let it be known that, contrary to the version of events put out by the hikers, who claimed immediately after the event and in a subsequent press conference that Tirza Porat had been killed either by a rock or by villagers' gunfire, the actual cause of death was a bullet from the rifle of Roman Aldoubi, who had fired wildly when he was struck in the head.

Still, the army's report placed the brunt of the blame squarely on the villagers: "The motivation and aggression evinced by the local Arabs and their readiness to harm a group of Jewish hikers constitute the primary elements in the unfolding of the incident and its tragic ending." The conclusion, together with the atmosphere of hysteria in the settlements, virulent denunciations of senior IDF officers by right-wing politicians, and, as the chief of staff told the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee on April 12, a desire to deter other villages from harassing hikers, evidently constituted the rationale for the unprecedented punitive measures taken against Beita. The village and the surrounding area were declared a closed military zone and sealed off from the outside world for more than three weeks. In Beita a weeklong curfew was imposed. All the males in the village of some 4,200 residents were rounded up and about 60 were taken into custody, while the others were held in a local school for five days. Air Force helicopters were called in to flush out villagers hiding in the surrounding hills, and nearby villages were warned not to shelter the fugitives.

The Beita incident afforded right-wing politicians an opportunity to vent their frustration and rage. Justice and Tourism Minister Avraham Sharir (Likud-Liberal) called for Beita to be razed to the ground. Such sentiments found ready echoes at Tirza Porat's funeral, attended by thousands of settlers as well as the prime minister, five other cabinet ministers, and many MKs and public figures.

The security forces swiftly acted against villagers suspected of having been involved in the incident. In the two days following the events, the IDF blew up at least 13 houses in the village, including, accidentally, the house of one of the villagers who had come to the hikers' aid (it was announced that he would be compensated). Until this time, the High Court of Justice had consistently refused to intervene in house demolitions, not recognizing this measure as collective punishment. When the Association for Civil Rights in Israel on April 10 petitioned the High Court against further demolitions in Beita, pointing out that the military was acting solely on the basis of one side's version of the events, a panel of three justices engineered a compromise. The IDF agreed to give 48 hours' notice to any family in the village whose house was targeted for demolition so that it could turn to the court. (This applied exclusively to Beita—the army had no obligation to provide advance notification of intent to demolish a house, and in most cases the occupants were allowed a short time to remove personal effects.) One of the first houses to be demolished was that of Mounira Daoud, who had thrown the rock that struck Aldoubi in the head. (Daoud, who was nursing an infant at the time, was arrested and denied bail; on August 11 she was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment, including the four she had already spent in jail awaiting trial. Twenty other Beita residents went on trial in connection with the incident later in the year.)

Other Intifada-Related Violence

Inside Israel, on June 12, three firebombs exploded on the street after being thrown from the roof of the Dizengoff Shopping Center in the heart of Tel Aviv. The incident caused no interruption to the city's booming night life, which was, outwardly at least, unaffected by the uprising.

Elsewhere more vicious methods were employed. On June 20, Eli Cohen, a 33-year-old farmer from Moshav Shekef, in the Lachish district on the Israeli side of the Green Line near Kiryat Gat, died when he was savagely beaten and stabbed while working in his vineyard. When General Mitzna arrived at the settlement, residents lashed out at him, complaining that the army had taken no action despite a series of sabotage attacks on the area. About six weeks later, on August 3, a 69-year-old woman, Rachel Weiss, was found murdered in her home on Moshav Shafir, also in the Lachish district. Three youths from the Jebalya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip were arrested in connection with the attack.

The 2 Lachish district residents were among the 16 Israeli Jews who died in Israel and the territories in 1988 in *intifada*-related violence. (About 400 Jewish civilians, almost all of them settlers, were wounded, a few seriously, in attacks in the territories, the vast majority—370—in the West Bank.) The first Israeli death occurred on March 20 in Bethlehem when a reserve soldier, Moshe Katz, aged 28, was shot twice in the head at close range with a pistol while doing guard duty. On June 2, an 18-year-old yeshivah student, Eliezer Schlesinger, was shot to death while walking in a Jerusalem park with a fellow student after late-night studies; the assailant, who confessed to the crime, was a teenaged Arab prostitute. On August 15, the battered and partially burned body of Ziva Goldovsky, an 18-year-old high-school senior from Holon and an activist in a Jewish-Arab group who spent much time in the occupied territories, was found near Ramallah. The police arrested a 26-year-old man from el-Bireh with a criminal record, an acquaintance of the dead woman, who confessed to the murder, which he said was committed for "nationalistic" reasons.

In the year's worst outrage, perpetrated on the evening of October 30 (and which probably influenced the outcome of the Knesset elections, held two days later), several incendiary bombs were thrown into a Tiberias–Jerusalem bus as it passed through Jericho. Four persons died in the ensuing blaze—a Jerusalem woman, Rachel Weiss, and her three children, all under four years old. David Delarosa, a 19-year-old soldier who suffered critical lung damage when he reentered the bus in an effort to rescue Rachel Weiss, died on December 22 in a London hospital, before he could undergo lung-transplant surgery. Five other passengers were hospitalized. Within hours of the attack, three Jericho residents reportedly confessed to the crime. The following day the army blew up seven houses of suspects in Jericho and a nearby village; army bulldozers uprooted scores of fruit-bearing trees on both sides of the road in the vicinity from which the bombs were thrown.

A week after the bus incident, on November 7, a reservist, David Danieli, was stabbed to death while guarding the settlement of Massuah in the Jordan Rift Valley. The assailant was shot to death on the spot by a member of the settlement; his family's house, near Nablus, was demolished within hours of the murder. Another reservist, Arturo Herstig, aged 42, originally from Argentina, was killed on December 13 in the aftermath of an incident near the Samaria settlement of Har Bracha. A member of the settlement and an Arab shepherd were killed as a result of a quarrel between the two over the ownership of a disputed 300-acre plot of land. Herstig was killed when the army vehicle he was riding in was fired on by the shepherd.

Three Israeli civilians were killed in a terrorist attack of the classic kind, which was indirectly related to the *intifada*. On March 7, three heavily armed gunmen who had infiltrated across the border with Egypt commandeered a military car from five unarmed IDF officers near Mitzpe Ramon in the Negev. The gunmen broke through a police roadblock at Yeroham and then engaged a pursuing police van in a gun battle along the highway near Dimona, while firing at passing civilian vehicles. Finally, a police bullet hit one of the car's tires and the terrorists leaped out, just as a bus carrying staff workers to the nearby Nuclear Research Center came on the scene. The driver and most of his passengers managed to escape before the terrorists reached the bus, but some were trapped inside and held hostage. Negotiations began in which the gunmen demanded that Israel release Arab security prisoners. After more than two hours of give-and-take, shots were heard from the bus, and the order was given for the antiterrorist unit of the Border Police to storm the vehicle. The three gunmen, as well as two of the women hostages, were killed in the 30-second operation. Besides the two women who died—Miriam Ben-Yair, aged 42, mother of three, and Rina Shratzky, aged 30, mother of two—Victor Rahm, aged 38, a widower and father of three whose wife had recently died of cancer, was shot in cold blood by the gunmen.

Responsibility for the attack was claimed by PLO headquarters in Tunisia, which issued a communiqué that the organization's military wing had carried out "the heroic attack against the Zionist atomic scientists at Dimona." Most observers, however, believed the action's true purposes were to sabotage the Shultz peace mission (see below) and to demonstrate that the PLO based outside the territories was also actively involved in the *intifada*. The raid in fact followed a number of failed attempts by Arafat's Fatah organization to send murder squads into Israel via Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt; a month earlier, another Fatah squad had been captured near Mitzpe Ramon after crossing the Egyptian border. For the PLO, however, the bus outrage proved counterproductive: it enabled Israel to score propaganda points by depicting the PLO as a terrorist organization, and hence the leadership of the uprising, who identified with the PLO, as terrorists by association, with all that this entailed.

Much of the hostile activity in Israel proper was perpetrated by Israeli Arabs. The most serious incident occurred on August 20, when 25 persons were wounded—one seriously, an 8-year-old boy who lost a leg—by a grenade that was thrown on Haifa's pedestrian mall. On December 6, it was announced that 13 Israeli Bedouin from Galilee villages, two of them soldiers, had been arrested and charged with organizing as a Fatah squad to perpetrate a series of terrorist attacks, including the Haifa operation. The group was also alleged to have torched parked buses and thrown incendiary bombs at buses traveling in the area.

The principal venue for such incidents was the Wadi Ara road, a major Galilee artery passing through an area populated almost exclusively by Israeli Arabs. Buses and other vehicles traveling on this highway were frequently attacked with stones or firebombs. Galilee forests were also a favorite target for arsonists, some of them Israeli Arabs. Other areas in which Israeli Arabs evinced solidarity with the *intifada* and hostility toward the Jewish population were around Mount Tabor and, in the Negev, near the large Bedouin villages and encampments in the Beersheba area. Overall, little physical damage and few injuries resulted from these incidents, which were perpetrated mainly by youths and children.

All told, 1,468 incidents of stone throwing were registered inside the Green Line, along with 169 firebomb attacks, 37 cases in which the Palestinian flag was raised, 94 of "incitement to rebellion," and about 80 cases in which roadblocks were erected. Besides these incidents, the Israel Police counted more than 400 instances of what the security forces termed "hostile terrorist activity" within the Green Line.

Antiterrorist Activity

The Shin Bet, which along with other Israeli security arms had been caught unprepared when the uprising erupted, reportedly improved its intelligence capabilities in the territories by adding a new department for situation appraisals. In the field, at all events, the Shin Bet scored some big successes in uncovering terrorist cells, although, without saying so, the defense establishment broadened the operative definition of "terrorism" to include attacks not only on Jewish civilians but also on other Palestinians and against the military. The weapons that were included under the revised rubric ranged from stones and incendiary bombs to grenades and firearms, but the new classification encompassed also the distribution of leaflets or even the scrawling of nationalist graffiti on walls. Similarly, after the popular committees and other forms of local organization were outlawed, they were added to the traditional list of PLO-affiliated groups who perpetrated "hostile terrorist activity."

Some of the successes involved incidents from the pre-*intifada* period. In January the security forces announced the capture of a terrorist cell suspected of murdering Yigal Shahaf in Jerusalem in October 1987 (AJYB 1989, p. 377); on February 17, the Lod military court sentenced an unrepentant 50-year-old-man, Wasfi Mansour, from the village of Tira, to life imprisonment for planting a bomb on an interurban bus just over a year previously, which exploded and injured nine persons (AJYB 1989, p. 377); the same sentence was imposed by the same court on May 8 against two Arab residents of the city, Muhammad Ziyada, aged 34, and Mukhias Bourgal, aged 26, for throwing a grenade at a bus on a highway near the city on June 5, 1987, the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Six Day War; and on November 1, a military court in the Gaza Strip sentenced a Rafah resident, Fat'hi Zakout, to five life sentences for planting bombs on Israeli buses on a number of occasions in 1987, one of which wounded a driver.

In May a Fatah cell was uncovered in the Gaza Strip while planning a suicide-bombing operation at the Tel Aviv central bus station. A Hebron gang caught in June was accused of employing violence against Palestinians going to work in Israel and against Israeli-appointed village council members. An Israel Police communiqué on June 26 announced the uncovering in Jerusalem of "terrorist cells affiliated with Naif Hawatmeh's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and local groups with affiliation with the Islamic Jihad." Those detained were "suspected of having taken part in disturbances in Jerusalem, distributing leaflets, writing slogans [on walls] and of carrying out a series of attacks," including the throwing of a firebomb at the car of Industry Minister Ariel Sharon in the Old City. On August 16, the IDF spokesman announced the uncovering of a number of terrorist squads in the Hebron and Bethlehem areas suspected of belonging to Fatah/Arafat, Fatah/Abu Moussa, and Islamic Jihad. The gangs were accused of carrying out more than 20 attacks dating back to 1980.

One facet of the tight cooperation between the army and the Shin Bet in combating the uprising consisted of operations undertaken by the army against urban neighborhoods, villages, or refugee camps. The military usually moved in stealthily, in the predawn hours, to gain the element of surprise. Curfew was declared, all the males were ordered to assemble at a central place, house-to-house searches were conducted for suspects and weapons, and local residents were made to remove roadblocks, erase wall graffiti, and take down Palestinian flags from buildings and electricity poles (at least one youth was electrocuted during the year as a result of this practice). Generally, an informer, hooded to prevent identification, accompanied the troops to facilitate their seizure of "wanted" persons, based on lists prepared by the Shin Bet, whose agents were also present.

IDF-initiated operations were increasingly frequent in the second half of the year, after the mass demonstrations had declined. The biggest IDF operation of the kind took place—in the second week of September—in the town of Kalkilya (population 25,000), just across the Green Line from Kfar Sava. General Mitzna admitted that one reason for the big search-and-arrest action was complaints by Jewish settlers, who had to drive through the town to reach their homes, of unremitting harassment by stone-throwing youths. A bypass road was under construction but not yet serviceable, and a night curfew imposed in the two months preceding the operation had proved ineffective. The IDF decided to act. At 4 A.M. on September 6, Kalkilya was placed under total curfew, all roads to the town were blocked, and all phone lines cut off. Hundreds of troops moved in, armed with lists of wanted persons, and conducted house-to-house searches. Dozens of military vehicles took part in the sweep, along with helicopters, to locate suspects who took refuge in the countryside. Some 200 persons were arrested within 48 hours, including members of Hamas, the Gaza-based Islamic Resistance Movement. In the later stages of the operation, which lasted for more than a week (September 6–14), troops escorted personnel from internal revenue and other departments of the Civil Administration who collected overdue taxes, levies, fines, and other monies owed, or confiscated property in lieu of payment.

Some senior military sources professed to see the massive Kalkilya operation (and a parallel thrust in Gaza: see below) as a "turning point" in the IDF's battle against the uprising. However, no sooner had the curfew been lifted than violence erupted in large parts of the town, and on September 17, at least nine residents were wounded in clashes with troops in demonstrations to mark the sixth anniversary of the Beirut refugee-camp massacre in the Lebanon War.

By no means were all the operations of the security forces massive and overt. Persistent reports in 1988 suggested that in some instances the authorities resorted to "dirty tricks." One of these was the seizure of cars of local residents, bearing license plates from the territories, to be used, sometimes for an entire day, for a variety of missions before being returned to their owner. The primary reason for this ruse was to enable the security forces to gain unhindered access to locales where Israeli vehicles of any kind would inevitably receive a hostile reception. Israeli and especially foreign journalists complained that undercover agents were also posing as reporters to enter villages, not only giving the profession a bad name but placing genuine journalists in physical danger from jittery local residents.

Toward the end of the year, as the first anniversary of the uprising approached, preceded by the declaration of "Palestinian statehood" in Algiers in mid-November (see below), the apprehension of terrorist squads seemed to move into high gear. On December 7, two days before the first anniversary of the start of the *intifada*, the Defense Ministry announced that, during October and November, the security forces had uncovered no fewer than 93 terrorist cells—62 in Judea and Samaria, 27 in the Gaza District, and 4 inside Israel. A total of 610 persons were in custody, 310 in the West Bank, 283 in the Gaza Strip, and 17 in Israel. It was noted that "the large number of arrests was due to the extensive uncovering of 'popular committees' and 'shock units.' "

The Defense Ministry communiqué of December 7 provided a revealing breakdown of the organizational affiliation of the 93 terrorist cells: half of them (47), it turned out, were local, i.e., unaffiliated, and established at the initiative of local activists. In the West Bank, the proportion of local groups was even higher, with 39 of the 62 cells uncovered there falling into that category—while 23 were said to be affiliated with Fatah. Oddly, of the 27 cells uncovered in the Gaza Strip, where Islamic fundamentalism was dominant, fully half (13) were identified with Fatah, and 10 of those were popular committees or shock units. Hamas accounted for five cells, three in Gaza, and Islamic Jihad for another three, of which two were Gaza-based. (Hamas was established shortly after the start of the *intifada*, utilizing an already existing network of Islamic educational and cultural organizations in the Gaza Strip—which, ironically, had been encouraged to operate by the Israeli authorities in Gaza, as a countermeasure to the PLO. (According to its Covenant, published on August 18, 1988, Hamas was "a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine" and "a link in the chain of *jihad* [holy war] against the Zionist invasion [of Palestine]"; its goal was "to unfurl the banner of Allah over every centimeter of Palestine.")

Arguably, the year's major antiterrorist action occurred far from Israeli shores. On Saturday, April 16, Khalil al-Wazir, better known by his *nom de guerre* Abu Jihad ("father of the holy war"), was gunned down by unknown assailants in Tunis. As Yasir Arafat's top lieutenant and as commander of the PLO's military arm and chairman of its Committee on the Occupied Territories, the 52-year-old Ramle-born al-Wazir was believed to be one of the masterminds of the *intifada*. His name was also linked with some of the most horrific atrocities perpetrated against Israel in recent years, including the Savoy Hotel attack in 1975, the coastal-road massacre in 1978, and, most recently, the takeover of a bus in the Negev five weeks before his assassination.

Although there was no official reaction of any kind from Jerusalem, observers claimed to detect several indicators possibly implicating Israel. About a week later the Government Press Office temporarily suspended the press credentials of two foreign correspondents, the Israel bureau chiefs of NBC and the *Washington Post*, for failing to submit to prior censorship reports about the assassination purporting to reveal details of how the Israeli politico-defense establishment had planned and executed the operation. Minister Without Portfolio Ezer Weizman, said to have voted against the operation, told Israel Army Radio: "If it had been up to me, it wouldn't have been done." Asked directly whether Israel was responsible for the assassination, Weizman replied: "Guess for yourself."

The Third Phase—Plastic Bullets and Politics

The major decision-making body dealing with the *intifada* was neither the cabinet (which did not hold a single comprehensive discussion on the subject) nor the General Staff, but an *ad hoc* group known as the "Territories Forum." Its 30 or so members, including senior General Staff officers, the military advocate-general and other legal advisers, the coordinator of activities in the territories, and regional heads of the Civil Administration, the director of the Shin Bet, a representative of the Israel Police, and the prime minister's military aide, convened once a week, usually on Friday, in the office of the defense minister. Defense Minister Rabin paid regular visits to the territories, had input even in minor decisions, and was the final arbiter on policy for combating the uprising. The defense minister was dubbed the "chief of staff" of the *intifada*—a state of affairs which did not seem to faze Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, who projected a pronounced sense of distaste for having to devote so much of his and the army's time to suppressing a civilian uprising.

It was the Territories Forum, presumably, which gave the go-ahead to the use of plastic bullets in the territories, beginning in the summer. (Except that their heads were made of hard plastic, these cartridges were identical to conventional ammunition. However, their muzzle velocity was lower than regular bullets and, while able to penetrate the body, they lacked the internal spin that was a major cause of serious injuries and fatalities.) The rationale for the move was explained by Yitzhak Rabin in a press conference at Beit El military HQ on September 27, some two months after the new ammunition had become standard issue for troops stationed in the West Bank and Gaza. "The problem we faced," Rabin said, "arose after it was found that clubs, tear gas and rubber bullets were inadequate in confrontations with stone throwers at a distance of 30–50 meters. We had to develop means which would be effective at this range but which would not have the lethal impact of live fire."

In fact, the number of Palestinian fatalities was reduced, or at least stabilized, following the introduction of plastic bullets in August; an average of about 20 Palestinians a month died at Israeli hands during the summer and fall months. However, the number of wounded climbed dramatically, running into hundreds a month—555 in September, up from 343 in August and 228 in July, according to official IDF statistics (which related only to gunfire wounds and even then were incomplete, since many residents chose not to be treated at hospitals to avoid registration). Many were critically hurt or maimed for life. It was the new ammunition's capacity to cause injury that had caused the military advocate-general—in his role as the IDF's legal adviser—to delay his approval for the use of plastic bullets. Indeed, if fired from too close, or if they hit a vital organ, plastic bullets could kill. Thus, the original orders accompanying their introduction as standard-issue ammunition stated that they could be fired only by an officer who had undergone special training or at his explicit instructions, and then only from a distance of at least 70 meters and only at the legs of perceived agitators.

As the efficacy of the plastic bullets in quelling demonstrations proved itself in the field, these directives were relaxed. The resulting quantum leap in casualties, far from upsetting the defense minister, prompted him to declare, in the press conference already mentioned, that he was "not concerned about the large number of persons who had been wounded, as long as [this occurred] as a result of their active participation in violent actions, whether as organizers, instigators or in the activity itself."

Others were less sanguine. "We can see no justification for a policy admittedly designed to cause an increase in casualties," the State Department spokeswoman said in Washington. Closer to home, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel on September 29 asked Attorney General Yitzhak Harish to examine the legality of the defense establishment's policy regarding the use of plastic bullets. ACRI's legal adviser told the press that if the new ammunition was being used as a punitive or deterrent measure, such a policy would be "manifestly illegal." In its letter to the attorney general, the civil rights group recalled that Harish's intervention earlier in the year regarding the beatings policy had resulted in the chief of staff's clarifying letter. However, on October 10, *Ha'aretz* reported that Harish had informed ACRI that "the orders issued to IDF commanders and soldiers [for the use of plastic bullets] underwent my prior examination and were given following my go-ahead."

On October 8, with the casualty rate in the territories spiraling upward, Rabin asserted: "In every confrontation with rioters we are interested not only in arresting whoever needs to be arrested, but if the violence persists, that they should emerge from it with scars, with casualties. I am the defense minister and I am responsible for the [policy]."

PUNISHMENT OF SOLDIERS

The question of responsibility became an acutely personal one for a few dozen soldiers in 1988. By year's end, some 45 soldiers and officers had been court-martialed or were facing military trial for offenses ranging from manslaughter and maltreatment of civilians to theft and causing property damage. Another 200–300 soldiers had been tried by their direct superiors in disciplinary hearings for so-called "excesses" or "deviations." One well-publicized incident occurred on November 20, when a bus carrying paratroopers from a squad commanders' course, who had just completed a period of service in the territories, was stoned while passing the Kalandia refugee camp north of Jerusalem. While pursuing the perpetrators, who slipped away, the paratroopers smashed car windshields and windows, vandalized property, entered houses, and reportedly also beat up some of the occupants. Five days later all those who took part in the incident were sentenced to 20 days' detention.

Asked about the event in a radio interview, the chief of staff said that these were "our finest youth" and that they had "gone a little too far" while giving chase—in itself, a laudable initiative. Backing him up, Defense Minister Rabin wrote to the worried parents of one of the paratroopers who had contacted him about the incident. In his reply, made public on November 29, evoking "the values which have always characterized the IDF in its combat missions," Rabin explained that "your son, together with his comrades, deviated from the norms of behavior that we demand from those in uniform" and was therefore punished. However, "this does not mean that your son is unworthy to hold a command post in the IDF. . . . I am certain that the unfortunate incident will not adversely affect your son's continued military service, and that after justice has been done and the punishment completed, things will return to normal."

The decision to make Rabin's letter public spoke volumes. At the same time, his and Shomron's implicit sanctioning of the paratroopers' action as a youthful letting off of steam may help account for the fact that, despite a growing number of reports about "irregularities," no officer holding a rank higher than captain was brought to trial. In addition, the military advocate-general, Brig. Gen. Strashnow, was said to be under pressure from his superiors to avoid court-martialing senior officers. Thus, in the case of "Colonel G.," as he was dubbed in the press, a brigade commander who had allegedly opened fire from a range of 200 meters at fleeing West Bank demonstrators after giving pursuit in a helicopter, killing a villager of Bani Na'im, near Hebron, Strashnow decided—following consultations with Defense Minister Rabin and others—not to court-martial the colonel for manslaughter. Instead, he was brought before the deputy chief of staff in a disciplinary proceeding, given a severe reprimand, and removed from his post. (He subsequently left army service.)

Some cases involving deaths of Palestinians began to reach the trial stage toward the end of the year, following lengthy Military Police investigations. The harshest sentence handed down in 1988 was against Private Eli Yedidya, who received 21 months' imprisonment and 24 months' suspended for killing a resident of Bidu village, near Ramallah, in a March incident. The court found that Yedidya had shot the victim in the head with a rubber bullet at a range of 20 centimeters, and that he had also perjured himself and suborned witnesses.

The most widely publicized case was that of four soldiers—a master sergeant and three privates—from the Givati infantry brigade, who went on trial for manslaughter in September. The charge sheet stated that on August 22, after stones were thrown at them in Gaza's Jebalya refugee camp, they forced their way into the home of the al-Shami family and brutally beat the father, Hani al-Shami, aged 41, a suspect, using rifle butts and a broom stick; they also kicked him and jumped on him from a bed. The victim died a few hours later at the Jebalya army base of internal wounds and massive hemorrhaging. In their defense, the four said that they had beaten the man because they were "uptight" and "to let off steam" after the stones were thrown. They also claimed that they had acted in accordance with explicit standing orders to beat suspects before detaining them "so the Arabs will learn not to riot." On December 8, after a pathologist testified that in his opinion the beating administered by the Givati soldiers had left the victim "half-dead" but that the fatal blows had been delivered at the Jebalya base, the four soldiers were released from custody, although the court recommended that they not be permitted to rejoin their unit "until the military court decides on the charge attributed to them."

At year's end (December 1), the military advocate-general, addressing cadets in an officers' course, found it necessary to remind them that soldiers were duty-bound not to obey a "manifestly illegal order," such as an order to beat innocent persons or to perform any action contravening fundamental moral values. General Strashnow said that no illegality attached to the current orders about when it was permissible to open fire or to strike demonstrators. "It is permitted to fire in order to kill during battle, but once the battle ends, wounded and prisoners must not be harmed," he explained. However, because the fight to suppress the *intifada* was by definition not a "battle" in the conventional sense, the IDF found itself in uncharted gray areas in which actions once considered "aberrations" gradually became the norm, and what seemed to be purely military operations ineluctably had political ramifications.

Thus, when Defense Minister Rabin was asked, in an interview with Israel TV's Arabic Service in December, on the eve of the first anniversary of the uprising, for his "interim assessment" of what the interviewer chose to call "the disturbances in the territories," three of the points he made were of a political nature. First, in an apparent turnaround from Jerusalem's long-standing official line that the Arab-Israeli conflict involved only the Arab states, and that the Palestinian issue was not the "heart of the conflict," Rabin acknowledged that in the 1980s, and more specifically in the aftermath of the peace treaty with Egypt and the Lebanon War, the conflict had become, essentially, a "Palestinian-Israeli confrontation." The Palestinians, by employing "civilian violence"—Rabin, again in contrast to Shamir, drew a distinction between this phase of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and an earlier stage of "terrorism in the territories"—had once more placed the Palestinian issue high on the international agenda.

Second, the Palestinians were able to gain sympathy for their cause "because the Western democracies do not like to see clashes between women and children—civilians—and an army." Beyond these general outcomes of the first year of the uprising, Rabin pointed to a third, more concrete result. The Palestinians, he said, had succeeded in "forcing Jordan's hand." Their actions, combined with the failure of the U.S. diplomatic initiative, had brought about Amman's decision to disengage from the territories, thereby shifting the political spotlight to the PLO. Had Rabin been interviewed a week later he might have cited as perhaps the major achievement, however indirect, of the *intifada*, the U.S. decision to enter into a dialogue with the PLO in the wake of declarations made by Yasir Arafat (see below).

The Peace Process

The initiative of U.S. secretary of state George Shultz, which played itself out in the first half of the year, from late February until early June, was at least in part the victim of bad timing. As it happened, 1988 was an election year in both Israel and the United States, so that the secretary of state was perceived to represent a lame-duck administration, while the Israeli prime minister was less inclined than ever to budge from his status-quo politics. The basic problem, though, was that by the time the Shultz initiative got off the ground, it was an anachronism.

Shultz addressed himself to the pre-*intifada* situation; by February 1988 the territories had undergone a sea change. Shultz came to Israel at the height of the mass violence of the uprising's first phase, and his presence seemed only to intensify that violence. On the day of his arrival, February 25, three Palestinians were killed by IDF gunfire in clashes and at least ten wounded, the territories observed a complete general strike, the military began its punitive reprisals in Kabatiya, where villagers had lynched the local headman for "collaborating" with the security forces, and CBS-TV screened its report of Israeli soldiers brutalizing two hapless prisoners. The United National Command of the Uprising called for protest demonstrations against Shultz, and public figures in the territories refused to meet with him, saying that to do so would undercut the standing of the command.

The Israeli political establishment showed no sign of altering its views. Its right wing in particular seized on every negative security development, and the *intifada* was such a development *par excellence*, to dig in more deeply. An exchange of letters between Shultz and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in mid-January had left the U.S. official in no doubt about what Shamir thought concerning key elements of his plan. These included the concept of "peace for territory," which, although it derived from UN Security Council Resolution 242, formally endorsed by Israel at the time of its passage in 1967, again in Resolution 338 of 1973, and a third time in the Camp David accords of 1978, was anathema to the entire Israeli Right-religious bloc; the idea of an "international opening" prior to direct talks between the sides, which Shamir had been fighting bitterly ever since the notion was advanced by Labor party leader and foreign minister Shimon Peres as the only means of bringing King Hussein to the negotiating table; and a new feature, the "telescoping" of the Camp David process from five years to nine months.

Furthermore, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust that prevailed in Jerusalem was not conducive to a political breakthrough. Following talks held in Israel by U.S. assistant secretary of state Richard Murphy prior to Shultz's arrival, Shamir accused Peres, without naming him, of "run[ning] every day and every minute to the other side [i.e., the Americans] and say[ing]: 'Don't listen to what Shamir says, I'll sell it to you cheaper!' "

Nevertheless, upon his arrival in Israel—the first of four visits in 1988, each shorter than the last—Shultz exuded optimism, declaring that he had drafted a "workable plan" toward a settlement and adding: "If we can work together with commitment and determination, we can make 1988 a year of peace in the region." Shultz's first meeting with Shamir (February 26) demonstrated how far apart the two were. The Israeli leader again rejected the "peace for territory" principle which underlay the entire Shultz plan. Instead, he tried to sell the secretary of state the notion, concocted by the premier's aides and floated in the Israeli press, that Israel had already fulfilled the relevant article of Resolution 242 when it returned the Sinai, which constituted more than 90 percent of the territories captured in 1967, to Egypt. It followed, according to this logic, that the solution in the West Bank should not and could not be "territorial" but must be "administrative," meaning the "autonomy" regime stipulated in Camp David. Shamir also said no to the idea of an "interlock" between negotiations on an interim agreement and the start of the talks on the final status of the occupied territories, this as part of the "telescoping" process.

Besides Israel, the secretary of state's energetic pursuit of his mission took him, in the course of nine days, to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, London (where he met with King Hussein on March 1), Brussels (for consultations with President Reagan on March 2), London again, and then back for a second visit to Israel, Syria, and Egypt, all on March 4, where he formally presented his plan in writing to each country's leadership before leaving the region.

THE SHULTZ PLAN

Two days later the mass-circulation *Yediot Aharonot* published on its front page a photostat of Shultz's letter to Shamir. The document summarized in some detail the "statement of understandings" that had emerged from the talks Shultz held with "regional leaders" in order "to achieve the prompt opening of negotiations." The "agreed objective" of such talks was "a comprehensive peace providing for the security of all the States in the region and for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" (a concept Israel had accepted in the Camp David accords). Negotiations were to commence at "an early date"—May 1 was specified—between Israel "and each of its neighbors which is willing to do so." The parties to each set of bilateral talks "will determine the procedure and agenda of their negotiation." In an apparent endeavor to reassure King Hussein that the United States adhered to the "peace for territory" principle implicit in Resolutions 242 and 338, Shultz emphasized that each bilateral negotiation would be based on those two resolutions "in all their parts." This was reiterated in the context of the negotiations between Israel and "the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation," which, the letter said, "will be based on all the provisions and principles of . . . Resolution 242."

Shultz proposed that the first stage of the crucial Israeli–Jordanian/Palestinian negotiations last no longer than six months and that they should produce "arrangements for a transitional period." Then,

> [s]even months after transitional negotiations begin [i.e., on December 1], final status negotiations will begin, with the objective of completing them within one

> year. . . . Final status talks will begin before the transitional period begins. The transitional period will begin three months after the conclusion of the transitional arrangement and will last for three years. The United States will participate in both negotiations and will promote their rapid conclusion.

The letter made it plain that Shamir had failed to bring Shultz around to his view that an international conference constituted a threat to Israel; instead, clearly the secretary of state had been persuaded, whether by his Arab interlocutors or in recent talks with his Soviet counterpart, to overcome his reluctance to bringing the Soviet Union into the Middle East peace process. Thus, two weeks before the start of the negotiating process—i.e., on April 15, in just six weeks' time—an "international conference" was to be convened. The mechanics were simple: the UN secretary-general would issue invitations "to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict" and to the permanent members of the Security Council. All the participants would have to declare their acceptance of 242 and 338 "and renounce violence and terrorism"—a sop to Israel and an attempt to force the PLO's hand. Another Israeli fear was addressed when Shultz wrote that, while the sides could "refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference [forum] in a manner to be agreed," that forum "will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached."

Shultz's explicit assertion that "[t]his statement of understandings is an integral whole" pulled the rug from under Shamir's contention that modifications were still possible. Shultz also stated that he "look[ed] forward to the letter of reply of the Government of Israel in confirmation of this statement"—by March 15, according to press reports. The pressure on Israel was heightened because Shamir was scheduled to leave on March 13 for a weeklong visit to the United States, including a meeting with President Reagan. On March 9, Shamir offered the reply of his wing of the "unity" government. Addressing the Likud Knesset caucus, the prime minister blasted the Shultz initiative, listing what he called "the sins of the American capitulation," above all Washington's "surrender" to the riots in the territories as viewed through the distorting prism of international public opinion. Earlier that day, in a meeting of the inner cabinet, the country's senior policy-making forum, Shamir had rebuffed the demand of the body's Labor ministers, supported by Housing Minister David Levy, of Herut, that the Shultz document be put to a vote so that Shamir could speak "with one voice" during his U.S. visit and prevent a crisis in relations with that country.

On March 11, *Ha'aretz* quoted Shamir as telling the country's leading political columnist, Yoel Marcus: "The only word I accept in the Shultz document is his signature." Israel's safety and security were not ensured in the plan, Shamir said, and the "whole thing [was] an attempt to placate the Arabs." More substantively, Shamir complained that the wording of Shultz's letter left the way open for the UN secretary-general to invite the PLO to the international conference; that Israel's right to exist was nowhere mentioned; and that nothing was said about "direct" negotiations.

At the cabinet meeting on March 13, in which Defense Minister Rabin informed the ministers that the situation in the territories would require army reservists to serve more days and necessitate an increase in the defense budget, Prime Minister Shamir gave each minister ten minutes to speak his piece about the Shultz plan and again declined to put it to a vote. Following the meeting, Foreign Minister Peres sent Shamir a letter, on behalf of the Alignment ministers, asserting that it was "essential" for Israel to accept the Shultz initiative at this "critical" stage in the peace process. Peres said that Shamir's refusal to call for a vote on the Shultz plan had created an "unconscionable situation" and that "in the absence of an Inner Cabinet decision, your stands on the issue of the Shultz initiative do not represent the position of the government of Israel." In his reply, Shamir said he intended to seek "further clarifications" from President Reagan and Secretary Shultz, and pledged that "proximate to my return I will bring the issue without delay for a decision by the Inner Cabinet or the Cabinet plenum. . . ."

With talk rampant of a looming government crisis and possible early elections, something of the polarization in the country was indicated by two big demonstrations, each of which drew tens of thousands of participants, held in Tel Aviv on successive nights. On March 12, a rally organized by Peace Now called for "a change of direction" and urged Shamir to say "yes to peace," while 24 hours later, in the same plaza, a rally sponsored by Gush Emunim and the political Right urged Shamir to stand firm and tell the American people that "we do not want to commit suicide."

In the United States, Shamir was able to reiterate his objections to the Shultz plan in his talks with both Reagan and Shultz—emphasizing, pointedly, that the international conference element would automatically give both the Soviet Union and Communist China a voice in the proceedings—but finally left matters hanging in the air by not actually rejecting the initiative. Shamir also complained that it was unfair to ask Israel to respond first, when not a single Arab state had replied to the Shultz letter. Speaking to reporters after his meeting with Shamir (March 16), President Reagan indirectly revealed something of the Israeli premier's arguments when he stated: "The U.S. will not slice this initiative apart and will not abandon it." With Shamir standing beside him, the president added, tellingly: "And those who say no to the plan—and the prime minister has not used this word—need not answer to us. They need to answer to themselves and their people as to why they turned down a realistic and sensible plan to achieve negotiations."

Observers described Shamir's talks in Washington (March 14–17) as "inconclusive." In terms of the Shultz initiative this was so. But for Shamir's purposes the very inconclusiveness of the talks demonstrated conclusively that, despite everything, the widely anticipated—and by no one more than Shimon Peres—crisis in Israeli-U.S. relations had been averted. Moreover, the administration's unwillingness, for whatever reason, to push Shamir to the wall meant, as the Israeli premier well knew, the conclusive end of the Shultz initiative in all but name. Thus Shamir was able to deflate the opposition at home by announcing the simple truth. "Nobody has imposed anything on us, including a timetable," he declared triumphantly on his arrival at Ben-Gurion Airport on March 22.

At the inner cabinet meeting the following day, instead of holding a vote on the

Shultz plan "without delay" upon his return, as he had pledged to Peres, Shamir had little trouble persuading the ministers that it was in Israel's best interest to wait until Shultz returned to the region and could inform Israel whether either the Arabs or the Soviets accepted his plan. In fact, Shamir told a meeting of Likud ministers, Shultz had personally assured him that "as long as I am secretary of state, we will not drag you by force into an international conference." As for Shimon Peres, he was in a bind: if he submitted a formal motion for a vote, the certain result would be a stalemate (the inner cabinet consisted of five Likud and five Alignment ministers) which, under cabinet rules, would mean the motion's defeat, a consummation not devoutly wished by the Labor party chairman. Again, the structure of the national unity government had proved that it was the ideal instrument for standing pat.

The full dimensions of the chasm separating Shultz and Shamir were exposed when the prime minister, in a rare Knesset appearance (March 28), revealed the principles he had put forward in Washington. Most striking was the disparity between Shultz's vision of a comprehensive regional settlement, including "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and Shamir's version of the declared goal: "a peace treaty with Jordan, and the settlement of the problems of the Arabs in Eretz Israel." In line with this approach, Shamir asserted that the Palestinians in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation "must be acceptable to the parties to the negotiations," meaning that Israel reserved the right to veto anyone considered to be associated with the PLO. Instead of an "international event," the most Shamir would accept was the "symbolic presence of the two superpowers at the opening of direct peace negotiations between the sides," an idea first broached by Shultz himself the previous October. Shamir then played his unvarying trump card. In Washington, he said, both the president and the secretary of state had stressed that the Israeli-U.S. alliance was "unshakable, even if we have differences over how to promote the peace process."

In his speech Shamir referred to one of those "differences" when he remarked on a meeting Shultz had held in Washington on March 26 with two prominent Palestinian Americans, Professors Edward Said and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, both members of the Palestine National Council (the PLO's "parliament"). Shamir told the House that Israel would never conduct negotiations, "direct or indirect," with the PLO, and that "we take a grave view of American attempts to establish contacts with PLO members," including PNC delegates. If Shamir thought that the Shultz meeting indicated an evolving shift in U.S. policy and portended further developments in the same direction should the Shultz mission fail, he kept his apprehensions to himself. Indeed, Shultz's move and others like it in the international community played into Shamir's hands by enabling him to depict Israel as under threat from all quarters. Speaking to the Likud Knesset caucus, he warned that a "web of conspiracy" was being woven around Israel and "campaigns" were afoot which aimed to "dwarf" Israel and reduce it to "dimensions which would make its existence impossible."

Shultz himself was at extraordinary pains to deny that his plan was detrimental to Israel's security. Shortly after his arrival in Israel on April 3 to resume his mission, he addressed the editors of the Israeli press and told them that he accepted Shimon Peres's three "noes"—no to a Palestinian state, no to the PLO, and no to a return to the 1967 lines. (The first two positions were unacceptable to the Palestinians and the third, by leaving open the option of returning some land, was unacceptable to Shamir.) Shultz did nothing to ingratiate himself with the Shamir camp when, in an unprecedented step by a serving secretary of state, he took his case directly "to the Israeli people" by granting Israel TV two exclusive interviews within four days: one on the nightly news and the second on the prestigious weekly "*Moked*" (Focus) interview program. Although Shultz's performance had no perceptible impact, Shamir and his aides railed at Israel TV for "placing the screen at Shultz's disposal so he could make his pitch to the nation over the head of the prime minister."

Beyond Shultz's ability to make headway in Jerusalem, his failure to achieve progress in his talks with King Hussein in Amman and Hafez al-Assad in Syria contributed to the gathering sense of gloom about the fate of the initiative. A public statement of support for the plan from the vacillating Jordanian monarch was considered essential to swing public opinion in Israel. But Shultz left the region on April 7 in the same state as he had a month earlier. The traumatic Beita incident, which occurred the day before his departure, was not likely to induce flexibility among Israelis (see above).

In the meantime, Prime Minister Shamir was able to take advantage of the situation to persuade his erstwhile Herut ally, MK Moshe Arens, who had resigned from the cabinet to protest against the decision to scrap the Lavi aircraft project (AJYB 1989, pp. 394–396), to rejoin that body. Shamir, asserting that Arens's "skills and experience" were essential at this parlous juncture, thus bolstered his strength in the party with a view to the intraparty election of Knesset candidates, while Arens, as a minister, would be better placed to secure a higher ranking on the party's list. To maintain the sacred balance of the unity government, Shimon Peres approached Mordechai Gur, a former health minister, who had refused to serve under Shamir because of the latter's part in the No. 300 bus affair, with the same offer. Peres noted that Gur's "military experience"—he was a former chief of staff—was essential at this perilous moment, and Gur, like Arens, evidently decided that he had proved his point and that there was no reason to cut off his nose to spite his face. On April 18, following Knesset approval of a cabinet resolution of April 10, Arens and Gur became ministers without portfolio.

SHULTZ'S LAST TRIP

Such moves showed that the Israeli political level was already preoccupied with the looming election campaign. So it was not unexpected that Shultz's fourth—and last, as it turned out—visit to the region to promote his initiative was as unfruitful as the previous three. His arrival in Israel on June 5 for seven hours of talks, after already having met with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, triggered a three-day general strike in the occupied territories, motivated in part by the fact that June 5 was the 21st anniversary of the Six Day War.

Shultz arrived in the region after attending the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Moscow, but speculation that the superpowers had reached an understanding on the Middle East quickly proved unfounded. Shultz devoted a good deal of time during his one-day visit to Israel, notably almost the whole of his meeting with Defense Minister Rabin, to the issue of human rights in the territories. Accompanying Shultz this time was Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Richard Schifter, who, in the company of U.S. ambassador to Israel Thomas Pickering, toured the territories on June 6, after Shultz had left, hosted by the Coordinator of Government Activities Shmuel Goren. The Americans expressed special interest in judicial matters, arrest procedures, the imposition of curfew, and the use of tear gas. Shultz himself, before departing, reaffirmed in strong language Washington's long-standing position that Israel's "continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the frustration of Palestinian rights is a dead-end street. The belief that this can continue is an illusion."

Yet by the terms of that very analysis, Shultz's peace plan was equally illusory. By relegating the Palestinians in the territories to a secondary role and continuing to exclude the PLO, Shultz ignored the very forces that had impelled his initiative. The inevitable demise of the Shultz initiative left the way clear for those forces to set in motion the series of events that culminated in the PLO's proclamation of the "State of Palestine" and, a month later, the U.S. decision to enter into a dialogue with the PLO.

A hint of the PLO's modified position surfaced at the Arab summit meeting in Algiers, which convened in June immediately after Shultz's departure from the region. As expected, the summit reaffirmed that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, that as such it should participate as an equal in an international peace conference, and that the Palestinians had the right to establish an independent state. At the meeting, PLO representatives circulated copies of an article, originally published in the London-based *Middle East Mirror*, by the organization's spokesman and close adviser to Arafat, Bassam Abu Sherif. Sherif's article seemed to signal a radical PLO departure by calling for direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians in order to achieve a two-state solution. While Arafat, as usual, neither endorsed nor refuted the article, it was clear that it could not have been published without his approval.

U.S. assistant secretary of state Richard Murphy termed it "a contribution to a rational discussion of the problem," but in the recurring pattern of recent years, PLO hard-liners joined Israeli leaders in rejecting Sherif's ideas, the former because they were "deviationist" and the latter, including Shimon Peres, who was locked into a commitment to the Jordanian option, as an empty public-relations gimmick whose sole purpose was to secure U.S. recognition of the PLO. (In February Abu Sherif had been involved in the PLO's attempt to send a so-called "ship of return" carrying more than 100 Palestinians deported from the territories and a large contingent of journalists to Israel. The voyage, with its obvious evocation of the Jewish refugee ship *Exodus*, was intended to capitalize on the international sympathy for the Palestinians generated by the *intifada*. Jerusalem shrugged off the plan as a "propaganda stunt" but was sufficiently concerned to set up a ministerial committee to monitor the situation. In the event, an explosion that ripped through the vessel that had been chartered for the voyage, docked at Limassol, Cyprus, on February 15, a day after three senior PLO officials were killed in a car-bomb blast in the same city, persuaded the PLO to postpone the sailing. Both attacks were widely attributed to Israeli secret agents.)

HUSSEIN'S MOVE

Unexpectedly, it was the vacillating King Hussein who dropped the next bombshell. Taking his cue from the situation in the territories, the resolutions of the Arab summit, and emerging changes in the PLO, as indicated by Abu Sherif's article, Hussein went on Jordanian TV and radio on July 31 and announced that Jordan was disengaging from the West Bank and renouncing its claims to that territory. Amman's links with the area, both legal and administrative, were to be severed. Hussein had already canceled an ongoing five-year development scheme for the region and dissolved Jordan's lower house of Parliament, where half the members represented West Bank locales. As Prime Minister Shamir pointed out in a television interview the following day, Hussein's move "actually confirms the situation in the field—a situation in which the King of Jordan has no influence on developments" in the territories. More questionable was Shamir's standard conclusion—that "this step essentially changes nothing"—although this stance did enable him to reject demands by ultranationalist circles to take advantage of Hussein's move and annex the territories.

For the Palestinians in the territories, dependent on Jordan for key services (including international travel documents), and in thousands of cases for salaries, the move could hardly be said to have "changed nothing." On August 4, Amman decided to dismiss the more than 20,000 civil servants in the territories who were still on its payroll and to cease paying their salaries, which totaled some $40 million per year. This would clearly exacerbate the depressed economic situation in the areas and indirectly affect the Civil Administration, which relied on taxes collected from the inhabitants to maintain the civilian aspects of the occupation. Above all, however, Hussein's actions threw the ball squarely into the PLO court. That organization would henceforth be called upon to demonstrate that its designation by the Arab world as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" was more than just words. In the meantime, Leaflet No. 23 of the United National

Command of the Uprising, issued on August 5, hailed Jordan's disengagement as "one of the most important achievements" of the uprising.

"STATE OF PALESTINE" PROCLAIMED

With the political field left completely to the PLO, all eyes were on Arafat, to see if he would articulate the words necessary to fulfill the conditions for American recognition. In mid-September he spoke about accepting Resolution 242 in a speech to the European Parliament at Strasbourg, but ambivalently, and this was deemed to be insufficient by Peres and Shultz when they met in New York later that month to attend the UN General Assembly session. On September 28, a trilateral meeting took place in New York between Peres, U.S. president Reagan, and Egyptian foreign minister Esmat Abdel Meguid. They agreed that, in the pursuit of peace, Egypt's role should be to "encourage the Palestinians to adopt reasonable positions," while Israel should "find a way to reach out to the Palestinians."

In the event, the next development was that Palestinians reached out to other Palestinians. On November 15, with the Israeli political establishment mired deep in a coalition tangle following another inconclusive general election, the 19th Palestine National Council, meeting in Algiers, proclaimed the independent "State of Palestine," albeit without defining its exact boundaries, and declared that it supported the holding of an international conference "on the basis of Security Council [Resolutions] 242 and 338." This, together with the PNC's 40-year-late endorsement in its "Declaration of Independence" of General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947, which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, led the White House to speak of "positive elements" at the PNC meeting but to reject the declaration of statehood due to Washington's opposition to "unilateral action[s]" which "purport to change the status of the occupied territories" without "direct negotiations."

Like Jordan's disengagement and the American readiness to talk to the PLO, the PNC move undermined ingrained Israeli assumptions about the Palestinians. In the territories, the military, not knowing what to expect, braced for the worst. On November 11, the IDF declared a total curfew "until further notice" on the Gaza Strip; lifted only five days later, it was the longest curfew on such a large population since 1967. In addition, all telephone lines to the territories were cut (with the exception of hospitals and elements connected with the Military Government), Arabs were barred from entering or leaving Jerusalem, hundreds of persons were placed under preventive detention, and roadblocks were set up throughout the areas as troops were rushed in on a massive scale. Nablus, the hotbed of Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank, was declared a closed military zone and placed off-limits to reporters. The curfew declared in Kalkilya, Tulkarm, the Balata refugee camp near Nablus, and elsewhere was utilized by the IDF to force residents to remove Palestinian flags and paint over nationalist graffiti. Helicopters and light planes flew reconnaissance missions over the territories. Nevertheless, at least four persons from two Gaza refugee camps were wounded by IDF gunfire on November 13, when residents defied the curfew and clashed with the army, and in the West Bank, one man was killed and a number of West Bank inhabitants were wounded in confrontations with soldiers.

On November 14, the announced date of the declaration of Palestinian statehood (the proclamation finally came after midnight, on the 15th), Yitzhak Shamir was chosen to form the new government; he stated that his government would make a "tremendous effort" to advance the peace process with the Arab states, thus continuing to ignore the Palestinians. The IDF announced that 19 terrorist cells had been uncovered in the West Bank and Jerusalem and that the houses of some of the suspects had already been demolished. In the Gaza Strip, one person was killed and a number wounded by gunfire and beatings in widespread clashes which erupted despite the curfew. Defense Minister Rabin toured the West Bank where four persons were wounded by IDF gunfire and a firebomb was thrown into an Israeli bus en route to the settlement of Shilo (alert passengers put it out with a fire extinguisher). Rabin told reporters that troop reinforcements had been brought in to suppress "any attempt to violate law and order" in the territories and would "employ every means to achieve that goal." He was probably reacting to a leaflet of the United National Command of the Uprising urging the population to celebrate statehood at 4 P.M. on November 15th by holding parades, singing the "national anthem" "*Biladi, Biladi*" ("My Country, My Country"), and hoisting Palestinian flags.

As a result of Rabin's measures, a million persons found themselves under curfew in the West Bank and Gaza, army patrols were beefed up with half-tracks (there were more troops in the areas than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War), journalists were barred from entering the territories, the distribution of newspapers was banned, and, in a new twist, despite the bitter cold, the authorities cut off the power supply throughout the Gaza Strip and in most areas of the West Bank, including the entire cities of Nablus, Hebron, and Tulkarm and their adjacent refugee camps—thus to prevent inhabitants from viewing TV reports of the proceedings in Algiers. (No attempt was made to confiscate batteries to preclude the use of transistor radios.)

As it happened, at the defense minister's "request," Israelis too were permitted to see only a truncated report of the final PNC session and Arafat's concluding speech. The director-general of the State Broadcasting Authority, Uri Porat, a hard-line Likud appointee, explained that Rabin had "suggested" that coverage be muted after hearing IDF officers in the West Bank express their fear that televised reports of the Declaration of Independence ceremony from Algiers would inflame passions in the territories. (Porat made no reference to the fact that without electricity the Palestinians in the territories could not view the newscast in any case. He did, however, voice his concern that Israeli Arabs were liable to be influenced by Arafat's words.) Porat added a number of other restrictions on the news department's coverage of the Algiers meeting: reporters were not to say "Palestinian state" but "PLO state," the "PLO anthem" was not to be broadcast, speeches from the PNC session were to be paraphrased in the studio and not screened, and no expert commentators were to be brought in to analyze the events.

The massive IDF presence in the territories did its work, and although some 14 persons were wounded in incidents on November 15, the day passed relatively quietly. West Bank youths made a few feeble attempts to "celebrate" their "independence" in defiance of the curfew by scrawling a few slogans on walls, igniting fireworks, or floating balloons in the Palestinian colors, and elite IDF units chased children who lit firecrackers or sent aloft balloons. The IDF command in Gaza put out a leaflet prohibiting singing, dancing, or the use of noisemakers.

In Jerusalem the Foreign Ministry put out an official statement that accused the PLO of resorting to its traditional "ambiguity and double talk" in order "to obscure its advocacy of violence and terrorism." Prime Minister Shamir termed the PNC decisions "a deceptive propaganda exercise" with "no relevance to reality," and the cabinet, on November 20, called them "an additional attempt at disinformation [and] a jumble of illusions meant to mislead world public opinion."

Some opinion in Israel was shifting in response to events. The mainstream Peace Now organization, which had assiduously refrained from urging a dialogue with the PLO, now declared in newspaper ads that in Algiers the PLO had "forsaken the road of rejectionism and the Palestinian Covenant and embarked on the path of political compromise." The group called on the government to broaden "the opening to peace" and, explicitly, "to talk to the PLO." On November 30, hundreds of persons attended a public meeting in Jerusalem sponsored by Peace Now under the previously inconceivable slogan: "Talk peace with the PLO now." (On June 30, four peace activists who had met with PLO officials in Romania in November 1986 [AJYB 1988, p. 377] were sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a year suspended and fined NIS 3,000 each, for violating a controversial 1986 amendment to the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance prohibiting contact with members of terrorist organizations. The four were permitted to do community service in lieu of serving time in jail, but the start of the sentences was deferred for appeal and the case seemed certain to reach the Supreme Court.)

ARAFAT INITIATIVE

For the remainder of 1988 the Israeli government was relegated to the sidelines as the PLO retained the political initiative by "talking peace" and achieving a long-held objective: the onset of an official dialogue with the Americans. Thirteen years earlier, on September 1, 1975, in a Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel, Washington had pledged:

> The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with

> the [PLO] so long as the [PLO] does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy on this issue with the Government of Israel.

With the Israeli leadership unable or unwilling to respond to developments, the pragmatic wing of the PLO leadership was able to translate the accumulated momentum of the year-old *intifada*, the thwarted Shultz mission, and Jordan's disengagement from the territories into a major political and diplomatic coup on an international scale.

Having crossed the Rubicon by declaring a Palestinian state, PLO chairman Arafat met in Stockholm, on December 7, with a delegation of five Jews from the American branch of the Tel Aviv-based International Center for Peace in the Middle East. This encounter produced an untitled, unsigned document, ratified by Arafat but read out by Foreign Minister Sten Andersson of Sweden (who would play a key behind-the-scenes role in the events leading up to the U.S. decision to talk to the PLO), declaring that the recent PNC meeting in Algiers had accepted Israel's right to exist as an independent state, had committed the PLO to take part in an international peace conference on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338, and had condemned and rejected terrorism "in all its forms," including state terrorism (a reference to Israeli activity in the occupied territories and in Lebanon). This statement sparked a mixed bag of reactions. Asked in an Israel TV interview (December 7) whether he saw any positive change in PLO policy in the wake of the Stockholm declaration, Prime Minister Shamir, while admitting that he had not seen the "complete text" of the statement, said: "I do not see such a change, nor do I expect that I will ever see a substantive change, since their *raison d'être* is Israel's destruction. On the day they conclude that this is not possible or desirable, they will have to disband."

The day, although not the outcome predicted by Shamir, was closer at hand than the Israeli political hierarchy had believed possible. On December 13, Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly, meeting in Geneva because the State Department had refused the PLO chairman a visa to enter the United States. The PLO leader declared before the world forum that the Palestine National Council had "reaffirmed its rejection of terrorism in all its forms, including state terrorism," and that he, "as chairman of the [PLO], hereby once more declare that I condemn terrorism in all its forms." Invoking General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947, which "decided on the establishment of two states in Palestine, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish," Arafat presented a three-point "Palestinian peace initiative" calling for an international conference; the stationing of UN forces in "our occupied Palestinian land . . . to protect our people and, at the same time, to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces from our country"; and a "comprehensive settlement among the parties concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the State of Palestine, Israel, and her neighbors, within the framework of the international conference for peace in the Middle East on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338. . . ." Arafat called on "the leaders of Israel to come here under the sponsorship of the United Nations, so that, together, we can forge that peace."

It was still not enough for Washington. State Department spokesman Charles Redman said that, although Arafat's speech had contained "some interesting and positive developments . . . it continued to be ambiguous on the key issues which must be clearly addressed in order for the U.S. to enter a substantive dialogue with the PLO." Redman revealed that indirect contacts were under way between the United States and the PLO, with the Americans having conveyed "in very explicit, specific terms" to the PLO, through certain "third parties"—presumably Sweden—the conditions Arafat would have to meet before a dialogue with the United States could begin. Despite this coaching, Arafat had failed to deliver the goods.

In the territories, the Gaza Strip was again placed under total curfew prior to Arafat's speech, all telephone lines to the refugee camps were cut, and the power supply was turned off in some locales, although on nothing like the scale of the previous month. Five persons were wounded in clashes in the West Bank, three of them children aged 10, 13, and 16. Children in Gaza released balloons with Palestinian flags painted on them after Arafat's speech, and a few brief parades and demonstrations were held in the West Bank, primarily in the Nablus area.

In Jerusalem, within hours of Arafat's speech, Prime Minister Shamir released a statement describing Arafat's performance as "a monumental act of deception," and expressing his hope that "for the sake of promoting the chances of peace and advancing the struggle against terrorism and violence, the United States will never establish any contact with the PLO."

Defense Minister Rabin, who as prime minister in 1975 was a co-architect with then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of the PLO clause in the Memorandum of Agreement, told Army Radio on December 14 that at that time Washington had committed itself, at Israel's behest, to "formulations which I did not believe the PLO was capable of accepting." Asked what would happen if the PLO were, nevertheless, to state its acceptance of those conditions, Rabin, too, offered a variation on Shamir's theme. "The PLO would cease being the PLO if it were to accept all these [stipulations]." Foreign Minister Peres, speaking in the Knesset on December 14, said Arafat had "performed acrobatics" at Geneva, so it was "no wonder that the tense anticipation in Washington yesterday before the speech quickly turned into immediate disappointment after they read the speech."

U.S. RECOGNIZES PLO

Before the day was out, however, Washington had reversed its stand of 24 hours earlier, in the process delivering to Israel what the daily *Hadashot* called "the most resounding diplomatic slap-in-the-face" in its history. U.S. officials were listening closely when Arafat, speaking at a previously scheduled but delayed press conference in Geneva on December 14, made an opening statement in which he "clarified" the crucial points in his General Assembly speech. (Reportedly, Arafat rescheduled the event so that he could confer with Swedish foreign minister Andersson, who was in touch with the State Department to ensure coordination regarding Arafat's terminology.)

Thus, Arafat declared that the Palestinians' "desire for peace is a strategy and not an interim tactic" and "[s]elf-determination means survival for the Palestinians. And our survival does not destroy the survival of the Israelis as their rulers claim." Concretely, Arafat explained that by the references in his speech to Resolution 181 and to "our acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations with Israel" in an international conference,

> it was clear that we mean our people's right to freedom and national independence according to Resolution 181 and the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, and as I have mentioned including the State of Palestine and Israel and other neighbors according to the Resolution 242 and 338 [sic].

On the terrorism issue, Arafat said, "I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms and yet I repeat it for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism." (By adding the words "individual" and "group" Arafat had in fact significantly expanded his statement of the previous day.)

The *quid pro quo* was immediate. Within hours President Reagan declared:

> The Palestine Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism. These have long been our conditions for a substantive dialogue. They have been met. Therefore I have authorized the State Department to enter into a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives. The [PLO] must live up to its statements. In particular it must demonstrate that its renunciation of terrorism is pervasive and permanent.

The president termed the U.S. decision "an important step in the peace process, the more so because it represents the serious evolution of Palestinian thinking towards realistic and pragmatic positions on the key issues." Israel was assured that the "special commitment" of the United States to its security "remains unshakable." Moreover, a "major reason" that the United States was commencing a dialogue with the PLO was "to help Israel achieve the recognition and security it deserves."

On December 15, Secretary of State Shultz sent identical letters to Shamir and Peres, explaining that after "stud[ying] the text of Arafat's remarks carefully," he had concluded that they "satisfie[d] the long-standing American conditions for opening a substantive dialogue." Shultz wrote that he was aware of "how sensitive an issue this is for you and the people of Israel," and that the U.S. decision "was not taken lightly." He too emphasized that Washington was motivated by "the desire to see a safe and strong Israel, living in peace with its neighbors. Nothing will shake the foundations of our relationship." Shultz promised that the United States would keep Israel "fully informed of what transpires in our [dialogue] with the

PLO," which was to be conducted solely by the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia. (Ambassador Robert Pelletreau held his first meeting with a PLO delegation in Tunis on December 16.)

When Shamir, stunned by Washington's decision, disappeared from public view for two days after the U.S. announcement, his spokesman, Aviezer Pazner, issued a statement (December 15) "very much regret[ting]" the U.S. decision, "which will not advance the cause of peace" in the region. "We believe that the United States will discover very soon the true face of the PLO," Pazner added. In the same vein, Foreign Minister Peres told Israel Radio on the same day, in reference to Arafat's renunciation of terrorism, that "in my opinion, if one Molotov cocktail is thrown today in the territories this will nullify his entire commitment." Peres termed the development "a sad day for all of us" and did not miss the chance to rub salt in the wounds of "those who opposed Jordan[ian participation] and an international conference [and thereby] paved the way for the PLO."

Shamir broke his silence in an interview on Israel Radio on December 17, with words that seemed to betray (at best) a sense of sheer bewilderment. Shamir invoked the usual formulation in cases of divergent Israeli and U.S. approaches—"allies can have serious disagreements, but [these] do not affect the alliance itself"—only to call it into question: "This week something happened that puts this principle to a very serious test. The U.S. decided to commence talks with Israel's arch enemy. It is no wonder that we are all trying to decide what happened, why it happened, and what we should do about it." However, within two days Shamir had recovered sufficiently to tell the First World Conference of Children of Holocaust Survivors in Jerusalem that the international community was now witnessing a "worldwide spectacle of deception" in which the PLO chairman and his cohorts were trying with "satanic intent" to achieve by "political cunning what they were unable to bring about by means of weapons, blood, terrorism and violence." Israel, however, would not be taken in by this "show" and would not talk to "terrorists whose one goal is to establish another Arab state . . . in place of the Jewish state."

Defense Minister Rabin linked the U.S. decision to the *intifada* when he told Israel TV on December 16 that Washington's decision was "grave and mistaken," and that its effect was to "give legitimization to the uprising in the territories." Earlier that day, five persons, aged 18–22, were killed by IDF gunfire and about 20 wounded—three of whom later died—in a series of incidents in Nablus, some of which revolved around the funeral of a 15-year-old boy who had died of wounds sustained three weeks earlier. Some saw the events in Nablus as a jittery reaction by the Israeli defense establishment to the unexpected developments in Geneva and Washington; military sources said the violence was the work of extremists who opposed the PLO's diplomatic moves. Local residents claimed that soldiers opened fire without provocation. A three-day general strike was called in the territories to protest the shootings in Nablus. On the same day a nine-month-old infant girl from the settlement of Dolev, near Ramallah, suffered severe head wounds when she was hit by a rock thrown at the car in which she was a passenger.

There was no letup in the violence. On December 17, a husband and wife from the settlement of Ginot Shomron in Samaria were seriously injured when a rock smashed through the windshield of their car near Kalkilya. On December 18, three Palestinians were shot and killed by Israeli troops in the territories—one of them when he was spotted on the roof of a building holding a concrete block to be hurled down at a passing soldier—and about 30 others were wounded. The cabinet, at its weekly meeting that day, rejected a proposal from Labor ministers Moshe Shahal and Gad Yaakobi to introduce "unilateral autonomy" in the territories in the wake of the new situation created by the PLO's revised stands and Washington's decision to start a dialogue with the organization. Prime Minister Shamir said that "the government cannot make decisions today, but they will be made soon."

This was the final cabinet meeting of the outgoing government. The new government was approved in the Knesset four days later. Following the U.S. decision on the PLO, Shamir engineered a breakthrough in the deadlocked coalition talks. Arguing convincingly that only another unity government could rebuff the challenges facing Israel, he successfully brought the second consecutive such government into being (see below).

On December 24, tens of thousands of Israelis attended a Peace Now rally in Tel Aviv at which speakers—including MKs from Labor, Mapam, Citizens' Rights, and Shinui—called on the government to launch a dialogue with the PLO in pursuit of peace and an end to the occupation. The previous day the mass-circulation *Yediot Aharonot* had carried a poll suggesting that 54 percent of Israelis favored talks with the PLO.

At year's end two of the main adversaries in the arena voiced ideas that were at bottom similar about a possible way out of the vicious cycle of violence. In an interview in *Ha'aretz* (December 30), Prime Minister Shamir referred to the possibility of holding "democratic elections" in the territories, as envisaged in the Camp David accords, with the Arab residents there electing an "administrative council to run their internal affairs" but which would also become "the legitimate representative of the Palestinians in negotiations" with Israel. On December 29, *Davar* quoted Faisal al-Husseini, the most prominent Palestinian public figure in the territories and a supporter of Arafat's Fatah organization, as saying that if Israel were to permit "free, democratic, unconditional elections, unrelated to the autonomy plan, it is probable that the majority of the residents of the territories would take part in them and [thus] elect their representation for political talks with Israel." Husseini made these remarks to MK Yair Tzaban (Mapam), who was visiting him in prison, where he was still being held under an administrative detention order.

The gap between those two positions was probably more easily bridged than the chasm of mistrust, enmity, and sheer hatred that was generated by IDF activity in the territories in 1988, involving unremitting friction between troops and Civil Administration officials and the Palestinians. According to B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 293 Palestinians were killed by the Israeli security forces in the first year of the uprising (December

9, 1987–December 8, 1988). There were 199 fatalities in the West Bank and 94 in the Gaza Strip. Of these, 270 resulted from shootings (including plastic and rubber bullets), 20 from beatings (13 cases in the Gaza Strip), and 3 from other causes. Over half (55.6 percent) of the fatalities were in the 17–24 age group; 18.8 percent were aged 25–35, 14.3 percent were 13–16 year old, and 9 deaths (3.1 percent) were of children below the age of 12. The number of wounded was not known, but ran into the thousands.

In April Chief of Staff Dan Shomron said that unduly harsh measures in the territories would only stiffen solidarity and resistance among the population, necessitating even more stringent actions. "Bear in mind that we will have to live with these people," he cautioned then. In November Shomron acknowledged the double-bind situation in which Israel found itself when he told the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee that "every measure we take [to lower the level of the uprising] causes long-term damage"—but that failure to take those measures would also cause long-term harm. The real problem the IDF and the State of Israel faced in combating the uprising was encapsulated by O/C Central Command Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna in a November interview with the *Jerusalem Post*. "The *intifada*," he said, "is not so much throwing stones as it is a state of mind."

OTHER NATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Knesset Elections

Around the end of March, Labor party chairman Shimon Peres pronounced the Knesset elections scheduled for November 1 "the most important since the establishment of the state." Peres, who was addressing a meeting of Labor's Central Committee—which reelected him party chairman by acclamation—spoke against the background of nearly four months of violent mass demonstrations in the territories and the Shultz peace initiative, then at its height. His assumption that the peace question was the most crucial issue facing the country was broadly accepted. Peres himself hoped to ride the crest of the peace wave to victory in November or, alternatively, to score points by blaming the Likud for torpedoing the chance for peace.

THE PARTY LISTS

Both the Labor Alignment and Herut (the dominant element of the Likud) made efforts to rejuvenate their ranks and present a more attractive list of candidates. In Labor, a sweeping "democratization" process initiated largely by the party's general secretary, MK Uzi Baram, had eliminated many of the manifestations of internal "bossism" (although the first six slots were still reserved for the party's "elder statesmen"). On June 15, Labor's Central Committee exercised its new prerogatives, with the result that 17 of the party's MKs in the 11th Knesset were dropped (some by their own choice) from the 1988 ticket. They were replaced, in almost every instance, by young activists, many of Sephardi origin and some hailing from development towns. (Ultimately, of the 39 Labor candidates elected to the 12th Knesset, no fewer than 14 were new MKs.) Yet a price was paid: many Israelis, and not only Labor supporters, were shocked that the veteran parliamentarian and statesman Abba Eban was denied a realistic place on Labor's list—after 30 years in the Knesset and stints as education minister and foreign minister, acquiring in the process, as the *Jerusalem Post* noted, "an international reputation as Israel's most articulate spokesman." Similarly, women fared poorly in the final ranking, getting only 10-percent realistic representation (four places in the first 40).

Three weeks later (July 6), Herut's 2,100-member Central Committee, long since "democratized," put on a display of rough-and-tumble political infighting whose ultimate result, in the opinion of most observers, was to weaken the standing of party leader Yitzhak Shamir. In the jockeying for position by the three rival camps in the party, headed by David Levy, Ariel Sharon, and Shamir ally Moshe Arens, the Levy and Sharon blocs were able to unite long enough to outvote the Shamir camp and push Arens into fourth place behind Shamir, Levy, and Sharon. (In the final Likud ranking, about 10 percent of the slots went to Herut's Liberal party allies, and on August 25, the two parties formally merged, the new entity known as the "Likud National Liberal Movement.") New faces among the top ten on the Herut list were Binyamin Begin, the son of reclusive former prime minister Menachem Begin, and Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the end of March had abruptly resigned his post as UN ambasssador in order to stand for a place on the Likud list. Oddly enough, despite Herut's identification with the Sephardi and "oriental" Jewish communities, its list was top-heavy with Ashkenazim (in contrast to Labor). Besides this, only one woman (from the Liberals) was included among the first 40 candidates on the final Likud list and not a single Arab or Druze (Labor's list contained two Israeli Arabs).

Twenty-eight lists—many of them single-issue (and, it sometimes seemed, single-person) groups, seeking everything from abolition of the income tax to a better deal for pensioners/prisoners/development towns/demobilized soldiers/Yemenites—had officially applied to run by the registration deadline, September 27. However, only 27 survived the final cutoff. On October 5, the Central Elections Committee (composed of representatives from the parties in the outgoing Knesset and headed by Supreme Court justice Eliezer Goldberg) voted overwhelmingly, 28–5 with three abstentions, to bar MK Rabbi Meir Kahane's Kach party from running. The grounds adduced for the decision were that Kach incited to racism and rejected the "democratic character of the state," two of the criteria contained in a 1985 amendment to the Basic Law: Knesset—passed in the wake of Kahane's successful Knesset campaign in 1984—under which a list could be prevented from participating in Knesset elections. The votes against barring Kahane were cast by the religious parties—Kahane cited the Torah and Jewish religious law as the inspiration for his platform advocating a theocracy free of Arabs and "Hellenizing Jews"—while the abstentions came from the ultranationalist camp. Kahane was the only Kach MK in the outgoing Knesset, but he was given a good chance of winning at least three seats in 1988 because of an *intifada* backlash inside Israel in general and among Kahane's constituency in particular. Kahane lost no time in appealing the decision to the Supreme Court.

Following a pattern in recent years, every action taken by the Left against Kahane triggered measures by the Right against the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), an Arab-Jewish party advocating the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Thus, on the day following the vote to keep Kach out of the campaign, the Central Elections Committee voted on motions to similarly bar the PLP—but these were rejected, 20–19. The decisive vote was cast by Justice Goldberg, who was not persuaded by arguments that the PLP's platform "negated the existence of Israel as the state of the Jewish people," a provision of the 1985 amendment inserted at the demand of the religious–right-wing bloc and aimed explicitly at the PLP. However, in this case, too, the final decision was to rest with the Supreme Court, following a petition filed by the Likud, Tehiya, Agudat Israel, and the National Religious party to overturn the committee's decision.

In the event, the rulings by the Supreme Court, announced on October 18, upheld and mirrored the votes of the Central Elections Committee. Sitting in an expanded panel of five justices, the court voted unanimously to bar Kach from running and, 3–2, to allow the PLP to participate. The decision regarding Kach, which was written by Supreme Court president Meir Shamgar, rejected Kahane's contention that the Halakhah (Jewish religious law) was incompatible with a democratic Jewish state and found that Kach's goals and actions were "manifestly racist" in a manner that was "appallingly similar to the most horrific experience of the Jewish people." On the PLP petition, the court majority held that the written material submitted for its perusal in support of barring the list was insufficiently "clear, convincing, and unequivocal."

Although Kahane was out of the race, his ideas about Arabs were not. They were well represented in the form of the new Moledet (Homeland) party headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Rehavam Ze'evi. Like Kahane, Ze'evi played on deep-rooted fears of Israeli Jews, and taking as his point of departure the need to preserve Greater Israel, carried to its logical extreme the solution of the demographic problem that confronted those who wished to retain the occupied territories but also prevent the emergence of a binational state. Ze'evi called for a so-called voluntary transfer of the Arabs from the territories to Arab states. Not surprisingly, since the start of the uprising in the territories, opinion polls suggested that ever more Israelis were willing to entertain such a notion. Opponents of the scheme argued that, beyond the moral principles involved—since the Palestinians would obviously not "volunteer" to leave their homes, especially after their national consciousness had been raised by the *intifada*—the "transfer" in question was a mere euphemism for outright expulsion.

Ze'evi's stance was utterly devoid of a religious dimension; instead, he professed to find his inspiration in the national-liberation movement of the Jewish people, Zionism. (See also the section on "Extremism," below.) Besides the absence of the "Judaic" dimension in Ze'evi's ideas, what differentiated him from Kahane was that he was an authentic insider in the Israeli establishment. With his military background, his friends in high places, and his directorship of the Eretz-Israel Museum in Tel Aviv, Ze'evi made his pitch to a very different element of the population than Kahane, although he undoubtedly picked up votes from Kahane supporters after Kach was barred from the elections.

THE CAMPAIGN

At all events, the impact of the Palestinian uprising ensured that the "Arab question," in one form or another, became the central theme of the election campaign. The problem was that where the occupied territories were concerned, neither major party offered substantive, realistic, or innovative solutions. Both Likud and Labor were locked into their traditional platforms and clearly felt that a general election was not a propitious time to rock the boat. The Likud again resorted to guilt-by-association tactics against its chief rival. Its allegations that Labor would make a deal with the abhorred PLO were intended to create in the public's mind an identification between Labor and the PLO in order to discredit and demonize Labor. The tone was set in an article by Ariel Sharon (*Hadashot*, October 2), who asserted that the "Labor party leadership is engaged in a consistent endeavor to legitimize the PLO as a negotiating partner with Israel"—and then went on to equate Arafat with Hitler and the PLO with the Third Reich. The reader was left to draw the inference.

Labor, which for years had advocated the "Jordanian option," was nonplussed by King Hussein's formal disengagement from the West Bank virtually on the eve of the election campaign. This forced the party to abruptly drop from its campaign two of its principal planks: negotiations with Jordan (rather than with the Palestinians) to resolve the West Bank question, and an international peace conference framework (which no longer had a rationale now that Hussein was out of the picture). Still unwilling to address the real issues, Labor dredged up the 20-year-old Allon Plan for a "territorial compromise" in the West Bank. To demonstrate that a desire for peace was not tantamount to "wimpishness," and that Labor would not let itself be outdone by the Likud in projecting a tough image, the party turned to recently retired generals, notably Avigdor Ben-Gal and Ori Orr, who came up with a document stating that "the area to be relinquished by Israel in return for peace will be surrounded by Israeli forces on the west, the north, the south, and the east." One Labor party TV ad showed an electronic fence that would separate Israel from the Palestinian "enclave." The "generals' plan," as it was dubbed, was meant to demonstrate that the Allon Plan, far from being a "compromise out of weakness," was a scheme "that traps the Palestinians between a rock and a hard place without their being annexed but with peace."

The Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox parties, wracked by infighting that produced splits and splinter groups, enlisted "generals" of a different stripe. Agudat Israel ads (in the written press only—the Aguda shunned TV as immoral) featured the Brooklyn-based Lubavitcher Rebbe. Also supporting the all-Ashkenazi Aguda was the "Baba Baruch," a "wonder-working" rabbi with a zealous following among Israel's large Moroccan community. Both Shamir and Peres paid highly publicized (and ultimately futile) visits to his headquarters in the Negev development town of Netivot. A new list, Degel Hatorah (Torah Flag), was formed by Aguda breakaways guided by the venerable Rabbi Eliezer Schach, a bitter enemy of the Lubavitcher Rebbe and the Habad movement and a mentor of Shas. The latter, originally a Sephardi breakaway from Agudat Israel, used former Sephardi chief rabbi Ovadia Yosef in its TV ads. Shas played up the ethnic issue for all it was worth, railed against the disintegration of moral values in the modern society, and called for a return to religious fundamentals. One Shas TV ad, which stunned secular viewers and seemed to reveal the mind-set of at least part of the Shas constituency, showed a group of rabbis, clothed in traditional garb, intoning ritual incantations which were meant to release from their vows all persons who had taken an oath to vote for a specific party (i.e., a party other than Shas).

The religious-Zionist bloc, which had seen its ranks decimated in recent years by defections to both Herut (under Menachem Begin) and ultra-Orthodoxy, was able to hold its ground but little more. The ethnic factor crept into the National Religious party's selection of candidates when Prof. Avner Shaki, the hawkish leader of the NRP's Sephardi wing, scored an upset win over Religious Affairs Minister Zevulun Hammer in the fight for the top slot on the party's Knesset list. Of the NRP's first five candidates, two others besides Shaki were strongly identified with the Greater Israel movement.

The NRP's continuing tilt to the right produced a dovish backlash in the form of Meimad, a list headed by Rabbi Yehuda Amital, the dean of the *hesder* yeshivah (religious studies combined with army service) in the West Bank settlement of Alon Shvut. Despite these credentials, Amital expressed a readiness for territorial concessions in the territories, was against coercive religious legislation, and warned against the consequences of extremism. The NRP waged a bitter campaign against the new movement. Meimad's failure to obtain enough votes to enter the Knesset (1 percent of the total cast) spoke volumes about the mood among the religious-Zionist public in the Israel of 1988.

Feuding was also rife in the Arab sector, where the Communist party and the PLP (both ostensibly Arab-Jewish parties but which in practice drew nearly all their support from Israel's Arabs) were unable to overcome their differences long enough to sign a surplus-vote agreement to ensure that one of them would benefit from leftover votes after the allocation of seats, if those votes added up to another seat. (In the event, this failure cost the Communists, and hence Israel's Arabs, a fifth

MK.) A new feature on the Arab scene and also a sign of the times was the appearance of an all-Arab list, the Arab Democratic party, founded and headed by MK Abdel Wahab Darousha, who left Labor in protest at Defense Minister Rabin's policy toward the *intifada*. The campaigns of all three parties were focused largely on the occupation and the uprising—indeed, one PLP ad was banned by Justice Goldberg because it included a segment with PLO chief Yasir Arafat.

The uprising also featured prominently in the campaigns of the small established parties to the left of Labor and to the right of Likud. The Citizen's Rights Movement (CRM), Shinui, and Mapam—the latter ran independently of Labor for the first time in 23 years and was outraged when Labor signed a surplus-votes agreement with the CRM—urged that concessions be made for the sake of peace and called for an end to the occupation. Tehiya and Tzomet (the latter headed by former chief of staff Rafael Eitan, who broke with Tehiya), as well as Moledet, called for annexation of the territories, massive Jewish settlement, and the "eradication" of the *intifada*. These parties, and particularly the two largest, the CRM and Tehiya, laid a claim to ideological "purity," contending that they represented the unadulterated Left and Right, respectively. To demonstrate the point, they pooled some of their allotted television time to screen a debate between their leaders, MK Shulamit Aloni of the CRM and MK Yuval Ne'eman of Tehiya.

Economic and social issues were relegated to a secondary place in the campaign, although the Likud pounced on the ills of the giant Koor concern, which was affiliated with the Labor party via the Histadrut (Federation of Labor), and the attendant large-scale layoffs. Mapam, which had worked hard since its break with Labor to reassert itself as a socialist party whose chief concern was the worker, reaped the rewards of its endeavors, thanks in large measure to MK Yair Tzaban, its popular prophet of social justice.

Overall, though, in stark contrast to the pronouncements about the overriding importance of the elections, and combined spending by the parties estimated at $100 million, the campaign failed to catch fire. This was perhaps not surprising, since the two big parties had just completed four years of generally close and mutually beneficial cooperation in a national unity government. To see them suddenly attacking each other strained credibility. The by-now traditional TV debate between the leaders of Likud and Labor did little to enlighten the supposed quarter of a million undecided voters who were once more the primary target of the campaigns waged by the two major parties. The debate itself, which was finally held on October 23, a week before the election, had been the object of much bickering. The main stumbling blocks were disagreement over the moderator and the Shamir camp's insistence that the questions be submitted to the participants in advance, a stipulation that the Peres camp rejected outright and on which Shamir yielded. A word count made after the debate found that the moderator, Dan Shilon, a well-known radio and TV personality, had spoken more words than either of the two debaters.

The uprising finally impinged directly on the campaign in a brutal and tragic manner. On the evening of October 30, about 36 hours before the polls opened, a young ultra-Orthodox mother and her three infant children were burned to death when the interurban bus on which they were traveling was firebombed in Jericho. Immediately after the election results became known, Shimon Peres claimed that this incident had cost Labor three seats—a contention intended to take the onus off Peres for Labor's second-place finish, but which was obviously impossible to prove. At all events, when Peres failed to turn up at Labor's final campaign rally in Pardes Katz, and rumors flew that he had decided not to make a public appearance for fear of violence against him by hotheads in the wake of the bus outrage, his aides let it be known that he was visiting casualties of the attack. Rabin, for his part, took the unusual step of ordering the gutted hulk of the bus removed without allowing media access, leading Ariel Sharon and others to accuse the defense minister of acting out of electoral considerations, but Rabin said he had been guided by reasons of national morale and a desire not to enflame passions in the territories. On election day itself, a car carrying Likud activists was hit with a gasoline bomb in East Jerusalem, and one woman suffered serious burns. Such incidents were not likely to induce Israelis to respond to Yasir Arafat's eve-of-election plea that they should vote for "peace-seeking" parties. Both Likud and Labor rejected Arafat's attempt to intervene in the elections. Earlier, Arafat had addressed a similar call to Israeli Arabs.

ELECTION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The fragmented outcome of the election, and especially the cynical horse-trading that characterized the coalition negotiations, prompted renewed calls for a change in the country's electoral system. (In June a private member's bill to modify the

ELECTIONS TO THE 12TH KNESSET
(November 1, 1988)
AND 11TH KNESSET (July 23, 1984)

	1988	1984
Eligible voters	2,894,267	2,654,613
Valid votes cast[a]	2,283,123	2,073,321
Valid votes cast for parties not qualifying[a]	55,505	58,978
Valid votes counting in allocation of seats[b]	2,227,618	2,014,343
Quota per Knesset seat[b]	18,563	15,312

[a] Only lists receiving at least 1 percent of the valid votes cast—i.e., 22,831 in 1988—are entitled to share in the allocation of seats.
[b] The quotient for one Knesset seat is the number of valid votes cast for the lists qualifying—i.e., 2,227,618 in 1988—divided by 120 (the number of Knesset seats). Thus the quotient in 1988 was 18,563.

Party	*Popular Vote (%)*		*Net Gain or Loss*	*Knesset Seats*		
	1988	*1984*		*1988*	*1984*	*Net Gain or Loss*
Likud	709,305 (31.1)	661,302 (31.9)	−(0.8)	40	41	−1
Alignment[a]	685,363 (30.0)	724,074 (31.9)	−(1.9)	39	44	−5
Sephardi Torah Guardians (Shas)	107,709 (4.7)	63,605 (3.06)	+(1.64)	6	4	+2
Agudat Israel	102,714 (4.5)	36,079 (1.7)	+(2.8)	5	2	+3
Citizens Rights and Peace Movement	97,513 (4.3)	49,698 (2.4)	+(1.9)	5	3	+2
National Religious	89,720 (3.9)	73,530 (3.5)	+(0.4)	5	4	+1
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality	84,032 (3.7)	69,815 (3.36)	+(0.34)	4	4	—
Tehiya[b]	70,730 (3.1)	83,037 (4.0)	−(0.9)	3	5	−2
Mapam[a]	56,345 (2.5)	— —	—	3	—	—
Tzomet[b]	45,489 (2.0)	— —	—	2	—	—
Moledet	44,174 (1.9)	— —	—	2	—	—
Shinui	39,538 (1.7)	54,747 (2.6)	−(0.9)	2	3	−1
Degel Hatorah	34,279 (1.5)	— —	—	2	—	—
Progressive List for Peace	33,695 (1.5)	38,012 (1.8)	−(0.3)	1	2	−1
Arab Democratic party	27,012 (1.2)	— —	—	1	—	—
Pensioners	16,674 (0.7)	— —	—	—	—	—
Meimad	15,783 (0.7)	— —	—	—	—	—
Derech Eretz	4,253 (0.2)	— —	—	—	—	—
Le'or	4,182 (0.2)	— —	—	—	—	—
Just Society	3,222 (0.1)	— —	—	—	—	—
Yishai	2,947 (0.1)	— —	—	—	—	—
Ma'as	2,838 (0.1)	— —	—	—	—	—
Tarshish	1,654 (0.07)	— —	—	—	—	—
Quiet Force	1,579 (0.07)	1,472 (0.07)	—	—	—	—
Veterans	1,018 (0.04)	— —	—	—	—	—
Yemenites Union	909 (0.04)	— —	—	—	—	—
Achdut	446 (0.02)	733 (0.035)	−(0.015)	—	—	—

[a] In 1984 the Labor Alignment included Mapam. Ezer Weizman's Yahad party, which won 3 seats in 1984, merged with Labor and its candidates were part of the Alignment list in 1988.

[b] In 1984 Tehiya and Tzomet ran together on a single list.

absolute proportional system, sponsored by the Knesset's Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, passed its first reading by 69–37—the first time such a proposal had garnered the 61-vote absolute majority required to amend the law. However, the bill was then effectively buried in the same Law Committee whose chairman, Eli Kulas from the Likud, bowed to pressure from Prime Minister Shamir to table the legislation because of objections by the religious parties.)

The big loser in the election was Shimon Peres, and the big winner was the ultra-Orthodox parties. Peres, who was the centerpiece of Labor's election ads no less than a presidential candidate in the United States and ran what amounted to a single-issue campaign on the "peace" question, lost or at least failed to win his fourth straight election. (Rabin also appeared on TV with some frequency, but others, such as the party's "new faces" or Histadrut secretary-general Israel Kesar, were rarely if ever seen.) Calls in Labor for Peres's replacement as party leader that were voiced immediately after the results became known were soon muted, but the real power in the party passed almost palpably into the hands of Yitzhak Rabin. It was Rabin who called the shots in the coalition bargaining that ensued, Rabin who virtually coerced Peres into accepting a portfolio he did not want, and Rabin who, together with Yitzhak Shamir, created the second consecutive national unity government—ensuring in the process his retention of the key defense portfolio.

The 18 seats won by religious lists, a dramatic gain of 50 percent as compared with 1984, restored the numerical representation religious parties had enjoyed in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, there was a crucial difference. At that time religious Zionist parties, led by the NRP, had obtained about two-thirds of all the religious votes. In 1988 the situation was more than reversed: 13 of the 18 Knesset seats secured by religious lists were won by *haredi*, or ultra-Orthodox, parties that espoused a fundamentalist approach to religion and a non-Zionist if not anti-Zionist world view. The three ultra-Orthodox parties that entered the Knesset—Shas, Agudat Israel, and Degel Hatorah—received almost 75 percent of the votes cast for religious parties, an improvement of nearly a third over the combined 1984 *haredi* showing. Manifestly, a sea change had occurred in the religious sector. The spectacular performance by the religious lists, with Shas becoming the third largest faction in the House, came as an even more severe jolt to the nonreligious sector, because the polls had consistently predicted that the religious bloc would not better its 1984 representation. (The pollsters somewhat lamely explained—after the fact—that the *haredi* population refused to participate in polls.)

The Likud, with just over 31 percent of the votes cast, remained the country's largest party, though just barely. Nothing better exemplified the political atomization in the country than the fact that even the leading party won less than a third of the popular vote. A comparative analysis of voting patterns in 1984 and 1988 by the Central Bureau of Statistics showed that, while the Likud held its ground overall in the Jewish urban sector (obtaining about 35 percent of the total vote in the cities and large towns), its support in the development towns declined by 5 percent. This was more than accounted for by the gains recorded in that sector by religious parties, particularly Shas and Agudat Israel, which took 21 percent of the vote of this largely underprivileged and largely Asian-African population, more than double their 1984 performance and only 2 percent less than Labor.

Labor lost ground almost everywhere. In the Jewish urban centers its percentage of the popular vote declined from 34 percent in 1984 to 30 percent in 1988; in the moshavim, from 42 percent to 34 percent; and in the kibbutzim, from 79 percent to 55 percent, this due to the separate appearance of Mapam, which took 28 percent of the kibbutz vote. Labor also suffered a falloff among the non-Jewish population, obtaining 17 percent of the votes of Israel's Arabs, down from 23 percent in 1984. The turnout in the Arab sector was comparatively low (about 74 percent), and although Israel's Arabs possessed the potential to elect 12 MKs (they constituted 18 percent of the country's population, but the majority were below the voting age of 18) and thus bring about a drastic realignment in the Knesset, the three parties identified with the country's Arab population returned only half that number, the same as in 1984. Likewise, as in 1984, one of every three votes cast in non-Jewish locales went to the Communists, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.

The small parties to the left of Labor—the CRM, Mapam, and Shinui—returned ten MKs, with the CRM nearly doubling its 1984 vote, and Mapam, with three MKs, succeeding beyond its own best hopes. Overall, however, the combined Labor-Left bloc decreased by 4 Knesset seats, from 59 to 55, as compared with 1984.

On the other side of the spectrum, the parties to the right of Likud—Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet—increased their representation in the House from six to seven MKs (and would have had eight had Tzomet and Moledet signed a surplus-vote agreement). The ultranationalist parties obtained 50,000 more votes than in 1984, increasing their strength throughout the country. Indeed, the only sphere that disappointed the Right was the one area in which they had felt confident of success—the army. Even though the Likud and the small right-wing parties together garnered more than half the votes in the IDF, and the parties to the right of the Likud outperformed the parties to the left of Labor by 16 percent to 11 percent, the votes were broadly distributed so that Tehiya, which had counted on the army vote for a fourth seat, had to settle for three.

Forming a Government

The one overriding fact that triggered the political wheeling and dealing of the 50 days following the election was that, of the 27 lists that had run, no fewer than 15 entered the Knesset, 6 of them with no more than two MKs. Furthermore, Labor and Likud had finished in a virtual dead heat, with the Likud one key seat ahead. Broadly speaking, the results were as inconclusive as they had been in 1984, and the religious bloc, especially the ultra-Orthodox parties, held the key to a narrow coalition, whether led by Likud or Labor. No one was more keenly aware of this situation and its ramifications than the ultra-Orthodox parties.

In the last analysis, however, the ultrareligious bloc overreached itself, and a series of ironic twists and reversals ensued. The inordinate terms put forward by the *haredi* parties, especially Agudat Israel, under the prodding of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, for joining a narrow coalition, spurred the overwhelming majority of organized American Jewry—affiliated with the Reform and Conservative movements—to mount an intensive lobbying campaign vis-à-vis the Israeli political establishment and triggered a secular backlash within Israel. The growing debate about whether

Diaspora Jewry had the "right" to express itself on key topics regarding Israel (see also AJYB 1989, pp. 424–425) was for all practical purposes resolved when the postelection lobbying of the American Jewish leadership played an instrumental, if indirect, role in the formation of the second national unity government; and not only the "Who is a Jew?" amendment but virtually all religious legislation was shelved for the foreseeable future.

The squabble between the Israeli political leadership and American Jewry over the religious issue occurred while the PLO was engaged in diplomacy geared to translate the *intifada* into political gains, including the start of a dialogue with the United States. Jerusalem's intense preoccupation with the complexities of coalition making, and the estrangement between Israel and the American Jewish leadership over the religious question, meant that Israel's ability to respond forcefully to events in the international arena suffered. Finally, the concrete onset of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, perceived by Prime Minister-designate Yitzhak Shamir as inimical in the extreme to Israeli interests, was seized upon by him as sufficient cause to abandon any notion of forming a right-wing–religious coalition and to make concessions to Labor in order to ensure the creation of a second national unity government, thus effectively putting the ultra-Orthodox bloc in the position of a fifth wheel.

Things looked somewhat different in the immediate aftermath of the election. The announced aversion of Likud and particularly Labor to another national unity government, as an opening gambit at any rate, automatically made the ultra-Orthodox parties kingmakers. The Aguda and Shas, controlling 11 seats between them, wasted little time in stating their price—in the form of monetary allocations and religious legislation—for joining a coalition. In an effort to extract additional concessions, they played both ends against the middle, negotiating with both Likud and Labor even though they were known to be more inclined to join a Likud-led government. Compounding the situation was the unbridled, and unconcealed, enmity between Shas and the Aguda. This mutual rancor derived from a feud dating back to 18th-century Eastern Europe between *hassidim* and *mitnagdim*, groups personified two centuries later by Rabbi Schneerson (the Lubavitcher Rebbe) and Rabbi Schach, a Shas mentor, respectively. Also part of the equation was the ethnic factor—Sephardim vs. Ashkenazim. (The third ultra-Orthodox party, Degel Hatorah, ostensibly associated with Shas, seemed to espouse more dovish views than either Aguda or Shas, and with only two seats was less peremptory in its demands.)

The demands of the ultra-Orthodox parties, and the apparent readiness of Peres and Shamir to accommodate them (some on the Left urged Peres to take advantage of the rivalries within the ultra-Orthodox camp and form a coalition with part of the religious bloc, even if this entailed certain concessions in the religious sphere) raised fears of "Khomeinism" among Israel's secular majority. Abba Eban encapsulated what many felt when he lashed out at the ultrareligious and ultranationalist worldviews that seemed to hold the key to a new Israeli government. Speaking at a ceremony sponsored by the Jerusalem Foundation, Eban (still formally an MK) declared: "Prophetic Judaism and classical Zionism as expressed in the Declaration of Independence are now challenged by superstition, intolerance, political unilateralism, xenophobia and adventurism which take us far away from the world in which Israel's flag first went aloft in its own name and pride 40 years ago."

President Chaim Herzog, also reportedly alarmed by the sweeping *haredi* demands and a mounting secular backlash, took the unusual move of holding informal meetings with representatives of the parties that would form the 12th Knesset even before the Central Elections Committee published the official results of the vote. This was the first of several unorthodox steps on Herzog's part in an effort to bring about what he believed was the only viable solution that could break the deadlock and mute the religious-secular cacophony—the formation of a second Likud-Labor coalition. Herzog also let it be known that his office had been deluged with calls and cables urging national unity and a change in the electoral system—70,000 such appeals would eventually reach the president. Herzog, while barred from actively intervening in politics, thus implicitly lent his support to a mass rally held in Tel Aviv on November 12, calling for an overhaul of the system.

On November 14, four days after the official publication of the election results and after holding formal consultations with all the parties elected to the 12th Knesset, Herzog announced that, since a majority of their representatives (including both Shas and the Aguda) had recommended that the Likud candidate form the new government, and since the Likud was the largest Knesset faction, he was accordingly entrusting Yitzhak Shamir with the task.

Herzog took the opportunity of the announcement to urge "a thorough examination of the Election Law in order to ensure the public its full democratic rights." The president also indicated his own preference when he noted that the "will of the people," as he understood it, "suggests a longing for unity in the face of the hazards that lie in wait for us from without and the threat of a schism from within." He also voiced his concern regarding the dangers facing both "our society's Zionist character" and "the unity of the Jewish people," pointing especially to the "unprecedented attack . . . [launched] on a segment of the population because of its religious character." In his reply, Prime Minister Shamir agreed that a "national unity government . . . can [still] provide an answer to the country's needs and problems." He also referred specifically to "the voices of concern and apprehension that are reaching us from diaspora Jewry, especially from U.S. Jewry . . . on the issue of [the "Who is a Jew?"] legislation."

Indeed, as early as November 9, 27 national Jewish organizations in the United States had issued a joint statement warning that passage of the amendment to the Law of Return, which was being demanded by elements among the ultra-Orthodox as a condition for joining a coalition, would do "enormous damage, actual and symbolic" to Diaspora Jewry. (The so-called Who is a Jew? amendment, which was periodically submitted to the Knesset and routinely defeated—most recently five months earlier, on June 14, by a vote of 60–53—would bar non-Orthodox converts to Judaism from gaining automatic entry to Israel under the Law of Return, thus implicitly but effectively delegitimizing Judaism's Conservative and Reform streams.) With the publication of the statement by the American Jewish groups, the battle line was definitively drawn between the Judaism that was dominant in the pluralistic American society and the establishment Judaism of the Israeli polity. The statement by the American Jewish groups took as its point of departure a reaffirmation of American Jewry's "devotion to the State and the people of Israel" and stressed that "we are one people, with a single destiny." It continued:

> We reject any effort to divide our people by legislative action of the Knesset. All Jews, including those of us who are not citizens of Israel, are affected by the possibility of a change in the definition of Who is a Jew under Israel law, either through amending the Law of Return or adoption of the Rabbinical Courts bill. [The latter would give the Orthodox rabbinical courts absolute sovereignty in all personal status matters, without the possibility of recourse to the civil courts.]

These were but two of the demands of the religious parties that would be agreed to by the Likud in the following weeks before Shamir made a last-minute switch and opted for a coalition with Labor—a move that infuriated the religious parties and left scars that would not easily heal. Other demands were for ministerial portfolios including education (a portfolio sought by both Shas and the NRP), housing, interior, labor, and religious affairs; the chairmanship of the powerful Knesset Finance Committee and a series of other appointments at the rank of deputy minister; "budgetary parity" in education and large-scale allocations to various *haredi* institutions, at an estimated cost of NIS 500 million to the Treasury; a law enabling local municipalities to regulate the opening of businesses on the Sabbath and holy days; a law, based on a British Mandate ordinance of 1919, under which religious conversion would require the approval of the head of the community which the convert was joining—i.e., the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate in the case of Jews; a law restricting missionary activity; a law prohibiting damage to burial sites (aimed at archaeological digs); a law granting amnesty to the members of the Jewish terrorist underground still in prison and to other Israelis who had attacked Palestinians in situations of "security distress" (a proposal also supported by MKs from the ultranationalist lists); passage of the "pork law"; enforcement of the abortions law; a commitment from the Likud not to change the electoral system; and assurance that the status quo pertaining to the Sabbath and to the drafting of yeshivah students would be upheld. Agudat Israel also let it be known that it had been promised the chairmanship of the State Lottery, whose revenues were earmarked for various deserving institutions.

Shamir found himself in deep water when it emerged that some of the demands put forward by Likud's natural allies in the ultranationalist camp were incompatible with ultra-Orthodox conditions. In the realm of military service, former chief of staff Rafael Eitan's small Tzomet party was vehement in its insistence that exemptions granted to yeshivah students be drastically reduced if not eliminated altogether. The ultranationalists' demand for new settlements in the occupied territories would add hundreds of millions of shekels to the "bill" submitted by the religious parties. Even within his own ranks Shamir faced patronage problems, notably how to divide the two senior portfolios of defense and foreign affairs among Ariel Sharon, David Levy, and Shamir's close ally Moshe Arens.

LABOR-LIKUD TALKS

It was in large measure to extricate himself from this mass of mutually irreconcilable claims and counterclaims that Shamir invited the Alignment to hold talks on the possible re-formation of the national unity government. The first meeting between the two sides, attended by both Shamir and Peres, took place on November 15—the same day, as it happened, on which the PLO declared the "State of Palestine" in Algiers.

Yet these negotiations too immediately floundered due to conflicting demands and personal animosities. Shamir would not agree to another rotation in the premiership and refused even to entertain the possibility of Peres's returning to the Foreign Ministry, a stance for which he found a perhaps not unexpected ally in Labor's Yitzhak Rabin. In an Israel TV interview on November 16, Rabin stunned the Peres camp by proposing not only that the Likud-Labor coalition be reconstituted under Shamir without rotation, but that the Likud should be given "a chance to implement its peace plan" and that to this end, for the sake of harmony, it would be preferable if the Likud held the foreign-affairs portfolio as well as the premiership. Peres was relegated to the Treasury. Rabin had consulted with no one in the party before making public his audacious proposal, but once a figure of his standing had revealed his terms to the entire nation, they could not easily be retracted.

However, another full month was required before Shamir accepted even this scheme. In the meantime, opposition in the American Jewish community to the "Who is a Jew?" amendment—which Shamir had assured Agudat Israel would be passed within six weeks of the government's installation—was fast becoming a groundswell. The *Jerusalem Post* reported that Israel's ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arad, who was the immediate target of the outraged reaction of American Jews, had taken the unusual move of attempting to intervene in internal policy-making. "I implore you to discuss and reassess the grave repercussions which the law would have on the relations between Israel and the Jewish community, and as a direct consequence, the ramifications on our standing in the United States," Arad cabled Shamir and Peres. Nor did the American Jewish community confine its protests to the United States or to backroom diplomacy, as in the past. In an effort to prevent what they feared would be an irrevocable schism, with unforeseeable consequences for both Israel and the entire Jewish people, the American Jewish leadership intervened openly in the formation of an Israeli government.

A large ad in the Israeli Hebrew press on November 21 declaring that "the unity of the Jewish people is in the balance" called on "all Members of Knesset and the political leadership in Israel not to pass any legislation that would change the definition of 'who is a Jew.' " The ad asserted bluntly, "Your activity will determine the future relationship between the people of Israel and the Jewish people in the diaspora." The signatories were the United Jewish Appeal of the United States and Canada, the Conference of Jewish Federations of North America, and the United Israel Appeal. On the same day a delegation of these organizations arrived in Israel for meetings with Israeli political and religious leaders. A communiqué issued by the Prime Minister's Office following Shamir's talk with the group (November 22) noted that they had expressed their "grave concern" at the proposed legislation and had "asked the prime minister to remove the issue from the political agenda." Shamir had replied that "there is no question whatsoever of disqualifying any Jew" and had attempted to reduce the issue to a mere technicality, devoid of implications: "The matter under consideration," he noted, "is the registration of converts from abroad." Two other high-powered delegations also arrived in Israel to lobby against the amendment.

On November 24, Labor's Leadership Bureau decided that no basis existed for entering into negotiations with the Likud on the formation of a new government and that any such negotiations would require the bureau's prior approval. Peres and his aides continued to hold contacts with the religious parties and came under fire from the Likud for trying to form a government even though the president had entrusted that task to Shamir. Again, the main beneficiaries of the competition were the religious parties.

On November 30, six days after its initial decision, Labor's Leadership Bureau voted—against the recommendation of both Peres and Rabin—to reject another offer by Prime Minister Shamir to enter into negotiations on forming a government in which Shamir would hold the premiership for the full four-year period. The vote was 61–57 with one abstention. The general bewilderment at the course of events was indicated by the conflicting analyses of what the vote meant. Some commentators read it as a blow to the veteran leadership, while others thought that Peres had engineered the outcome in order to improve his bargaining position vis-à-vis the Likud by playing "hard to get" and enabling him to demand a higher price for acquiescence—specifically, a rotation agreement.

It then emerged that Peres and his confidant, the newly elected MK Dr. Yosef Beilin, had concluded a secret deal with Agudat Israel which, while insufficient to enable Peres to form a government, would preclude a Shamir government without Labor. At a stormy meeting of Labor's outgoing ministers on December 2, an outraged Yitzhak Rabin pulled out two documents which he said were the secret agreements cooked up by Peres and Beilin with the Aguda behind the backs of the party's leadership and without its authorization. Peres's concessions to Agudat Israel rivaled those of Shamir, including a pledge to recommend favorably to the party's Central Committee legislation to amend the Law of Return, with a timetable for its implementation.

On December 5, Shamir asked for and received from President Herzog an additional three weeks to form a government. In his statement granting Shamir the extension, Herzog gave voice to the "sense of frustration, helplessness, humiliation and shame, as well as grave concern," that he said was felt by the "great majority" of Israelis in the face of the coalition negotiations. According to *Ha'aretz*, Herzog held intensive contacts with political leaders and private talks with both Peres and Labor-party secretary-general Uzi Baram, imploring them to overcome factional and party differences and resume negotiations with the Likud for a "unity" government. By this stage, Peres was more than willing, as it was clear that he could not form a government, but Baram was steadfast in his principled objection (he would later decline a ministerial portfolio for the same reason). Thus, as bickering among the religious parties themselves continued—the latest snag was that both the Aguda and Degel Hatorah insisted on heading a promised new Education Ministry department that was to control the ultra-Orthodox school system—and Shamir seemed ready to pay whatever price was demanded for joining the coalition, Labor's Central Committee voted on December 8 by a 2–1 margin (637–348) to renew the coalition talks with the Likud. President Herzog's public and private endeavors were instrumental in this development.

Nevertheless, two additional weeks were required to complete the negotiations—the very period in which the dramatic U.S.-PLO rapprochement was played out. Among the stumbling blocks that the Likud and Labor teams ran up against were Labor's insistence on receiving the chairmanship of the Knesset's Finance Committee in order to ensure a harmonious rapport with the Finance Ministry which Peres was destined to head; Labor's refusal to accept Likud's consent to the Tehiya plan for the establishment of ten settlements a year in the occupied territories (a major problem in the Likud-Labor talks was that until the very end the Likud wanted to retain the option of setting up a religious–right-wing coalition and had given dozens of undertakings to the parties in question which were unacceptable to the Alignment); and Labor's demand to retain the education portfolio, which Shamir had already earmarked for the NRP.

The one issue that was studiously avoided by Likud and Labor was the *intifada*. Yet it was Yasir Arafat's iteration of Washington's conditions for the start of a U.S.-PLO dialogue and Shultz's announcement on December 14 that such a dialogue would begin that provided the final catalyst for the conclusion of the coalition talks and the formation of a second consecutive unity government.

Symbolically, December 14 also saw another significant stage in the battle of U.S. Jewry against the mooted amendment to the Law of Return, a matter that was not resolved until the signing of the Likud-Labor coalition agreement five days later. On that day a petition decrying the amendment, sponsored by the Council of Jewish Federations and signed by 100,000 North American Jews, was presented to Prime Minister Shamir by a representative delegation from 12 American Jewish communities. When Shamir resurfaced 48 hours after disappearing from public view—in the immediate aftermath of Shultz's announcement—to rail against the American move, he was determined to conclude the coalition-making process and set up the broad government that he believed Israel needed. Such a coalition was essential, he told the Knesset when he presented the government for its approval the following week, in order to rebuff "the massive propaganda and diplomatic offensive being conducted against Israel in the international diplomatic arena by the terrorist organizations and their friends and supporters."

To rope in Labor, Shamir agreed to the establishment of eight new settlements instead of the 40 he had promised Tehiya; Labor received the chairmanship of the Finance Committee; and a series of checks and balances was instituted in order to ensure that no major policy decisions could be made by Likud without Labor's consent. A so-called parity committee composed of the three senior ministers of each party was to be established to oversee major policy decisions. This informal but institutionalized body would supplement both the 26-member cabinet and the 12-member inner cabinet. Likud and Labor agreed that, in the event of the government's being toppled by a vote of no confidence in the Knesset, neither party would attempt to form a new narrow-based government, but that a bill would be submitted jointly to dissolve the House and hold an election within 100 days. It was further stipulated that Prime Minister Shamir could not fire a Labor minister without first consulting with Vice Premier Shimon Peres. The coalition agreement was signed on December 19.

Stormy sessions ensued when the two parties' central committees convened to ratify the accord. On December 20, the Likud Central Committee approved the coalition agreement by a margin of 56–44 percent, though not before Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Modai—both of whom stood to lose out in terms of prestigious ministerial portfolios in a broad coalition—had castigated Shamir for breaking written contractual agreements with the religious parties and for showing "moral turpitude" in not forming a narrow government. Labor's Central Committee, meeting the following day, easily approved the coalition agreement despite the impassioned opposition of the party's young doves, led by Secretary-General Uzi Baram, but the meeting degenerated into cacophonous name-calling when it emerged that Peres had failed to name a single woman among his party's cabinet ministers.

The ultra-Orthodox parties hurled a good deal of invective at Shamir, and Degel Hatorah actually initiated court proceedings over the Likud's "breach of contract"; while it dropped the case, the party refused to enter the coalition. Both Shas and Agudat Israel soon swallowed their pride and joined the coalition, as did the NRP, all hoping to cash in on their pledges from Shamir even though the rules of the game had suddenly changed. The ultranationalist bloc (from which only Tehiya had finalized an agreement with the Likud) joined the left-wing parties in the opposition—which totaled fewer MKs than there were ministers in the cabinet.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The Basic Guidelines of the new government, as presented for the Knesset's ratification by Prime Minister Shamir on December 22, were virtually a replay of the 1984 policy principles, despite the developments of the intervening years, particularly in the occupied territories. Following the most inconclusive election in the country's history and hard on the heels of bitterly divisive and rancorous coalition negotiations, Shamir declared that "we urgently need national unity." Israel, he pronounced, would "spare no effort" to advance the peace process, which could come about "only through direct dialogue." A peace settlement would have to ensure Israel's security—which ruled out "a complete withdrawal to the suffocating borders of 1967"—while enabling "the Arab inhabitants of Eretz-Israel . . . to conduct their affairs with as much freedom as possible." In the same vein, Shamir called on "the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District" to desist from "violent means [which] will achieve nothing" and to join Israel in "seeking to create conditions of peaceful coexistence" that would "assure liberty and prosperity for you and your children."

At the same time, the prime minister asserted that the Jewish settlements in the territories "fulfill an important role in the realm of defense and in preventing the establishment of a PLO state in Eretz-Israel," apparently unwittingly contradicting himself, however, when he added that it was "imperative for the IDF and the [other] security branches to guaranteee their security." Shamir pledged that "we will expand settlement throughout Eretz-Israel." He also took the opportunity to express the government's disagreement with the U.S. decision to launch a dialogue with the PLO. "We continue to hope that the U.S. will reconsider its decision," he said, while lauding the "unprecedented developments" in Israeli-U.S. bilateral relations during the Reagan years.

On the "Who is a Jew?" question, Shamir described American Jewry as "a faithful and vital ally" but also reiterated his view that no more was involved than "registering converts." Even though he had signed an agreement with Agudat Israel pledging to pass the amendment to the Law of Return within six weeks, Shamir said that "false impressions" had been created that had generated concern among Diaspora Jewry. "It goes without saying," he said, "that there is no intention whatsoever of delegitimizing any Jew." He urged "all streams and elements" in the Diaspora to make a "special effort," adding that "with good will it is possible to find a basis on which we can all unite."

Although the 12th Knesset contained no fewer than 38 new members, including 7 from the Likud and 14 from Labor, the composition of the cabinet presented by Prime Minister Shamir evoked a sense of *déjà vu*, since the majority of the ministers had served in the outgoing government, many holding the same posts. Among the newcomers were Shas's Rabbi Arye Deri, aged 29—the youngest cabinet minister in the country's history (he was not an MK)—who took the helm at the powerful Interior Ministry from which his Shas colleague Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz, now relegated to the small Absorption Ministry, had resigned under the previous government for reasons of conscience; and the Likud's Dan Meridor, the new minister of justice, who, along with Binyamin Begin, Benjamin Netanyahu, Roni Milo, and Ehud Olmert was one of the so-called "princes" in the party who came from veteran

Herut families. Milo and Olmert also assumed ministerial rank for the first time, Milo heading a brand-new Ministry of Environmental Protection and Olmert given responsibility for the "Israeli-Arab sector." Labor, for all its vaunted overhaul and "young" image, fielded only two new ministers, neither of whom could by any stretch of the imagination be termed "a new face" (Avraham Katz-Oz, the outgoing deputy agriculture minister, took over that portfolio, and Rafael Edri, a veteran party functionary, was named minister without portfolio). In the NRP a mini-upheaval occurred when, on December 25, the party's Central Committee chose Zevulun Hammer, from the party's moderate wing, by a large margin over the party's number-one candidate in the elections, the hawkish Avner Shaki, to serve as religious affairs minister, the same post he had held in the outgoing government.

Within three days of the cabinet's installment, the coalition agreement was broken. The framers of that document, evidently seeking to achieve hyper-parity, had provided for deputy ministers from the Likud to serve in the finance and defense ministries, both held by Labor, and for a deputy minister from Labor to serve in the Foreign Ministry, held by a Likud appointee. However, Defense Minister Rabin balked at this arrangement, and the new cabinet, meeting for the first time on December 25, appointed Likud MK Benjamin Netanyahu, former ambassador to the UN, as deputy foreign minister and Peres's confidant, MK Yossi Beilin, as deputy finance minister. The cabinet also created the Ministry for Environmental Protection and appointed 11 of the 12 members of the inner cabinet (up from 10 in the previous government), 6 each from Likud and Labor to ensure perfect balance. The Likud appointees, besides Shamir, were Arens, Levy, Sharon, Modai, and Nissim; while Labor went with Peres, Rabin, Navon, Bar-Lev, and Weizman. The sixth Labor member was not appointed, as Peres had not yet decided between Moshe Shahal and Mordechai Gur. (Shahal later got the appointment.) On December 26, Peres suffered a setback within his own party when his candidate for chairman of the Knesset caucus, MK David Libai, was beaten by Haim Ramon, one of the young doves in the party who had opposed Labor's entry into the national unity government.

National Security

The deleterious impact of the *intifada* on Israel's national security was direct and immediate, with the indirect and long-term consequences not yet clear.

The first to be affected were reserve soldiers in combat units. On April 11, the deputy chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak, told reporters that such reservists would serve up to 62 days in 1988—double the normal yearly call-up—with most of the time allotted to duty in the occupied territories. Clearly this would affect the scheduled training program for the reserve forces, Barak explained, but the arrangement would result in minimal harm to the training and maneuvers of the regular forces. Barak said that the first four months of the uprising had already cost the IDF tens of millions of shekels which had not been taken account of in budgetary

THE NATIONAL UNITY CABINET

(installed on December 22, 1988)

Prime Minister	Yitzhak Shamir (Likud-Herut)
Vice Premier & Finance Minister	Shimon Peres (Labor)
Deputy Premier & Minister of Education and Culture	Yitzhak Navon (Labor)
Deputy Premier & Minister of Construction and Housing	David Levy (Likud-Herut)
Agriculture	Avraham Katz-Oz (Labor)
Communications	Gad Yaakobi (Labor)
Defense	Yitzhak Rabin (Labor)
Economy and Planning	Yitzhak Modai (Likud-Liberals)
Energy and Infrastructure	Moshe Shahal (Labor)
Environmental Protection[1]	Roni Milo (Likud-Herut)
Foreign Affairs	Moshe Arens (Likud-Herut)
Health	Yaakov Tzur (Labor)
Immigrant Absorption	Yitzhak Peretz (Shas)
Industry and Trade	Ariel Sharon (Likud-Herut)
Interior	Arye Deri (Shas)
Justice	Dan Meridor (Likud-Herut)
Labor and Social Affairs	Yitzhak Shamir[2]
Police	Haim Bar-Lev (Labor)
Religious Affairs	Yitzhak Shamir[3]
Science and Development	Ezer Weizman (Labor-Yahad)
Tourism	Gideon Patt (Likud-Liberals)
Transport	Moshe Katzav (Likud-Herut)
Without Portfolio[3]	Rafael Edri (Labor) Mordechai Gur (Labor Moshe Nissim (Likud-Liberals) Ehud Olmert (Likud-Herut)

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[1] The establishment of this new ministry was ratified by the Knesset on December 27.

[2] Rabbi Moshe Ze'ev Feldman from Agudat Israel—which traditionally refused to participate in the cabinet—was appointed deputy minister for labor and social affairs on December 25 to run the ministry on a day-to-day basis, although Prime Minister Shamir formally bore ministerial responsibility for its functioning.

[3] On December 27, the Knesset endorsed Zevulun Hammer (NRP) as religious affairs minister and Avner Shaki (NRP) as minister without portfolio.

planning. His hope was that the cost of putting down the *intifada* would not affect the army's procurement and development plans.

However, in May, Maj. Gen. Uri Saguy, the chief of the Ground Forces Command (GFC), was quoted in the IDF's weekly *Bamahaneh* as stating that the ongoing deployment in the territories had "seriously impaired the basic-training level" of the IDF and that only a decline in the intensity of the uprising would enable the GFC to "stabilize the training schedule for the regular army." Two months later, the head of the Logistics Branch, Maj. Gen. Menahem Einan, stated that if the IDF did not receive a "special supplement" to its current budget "as compensation for expenses arising from the *intifada*," he would "recommend that the IDF's weapons procurement program be halted." Einan said that the IDF lacked funds to achieve even its "minimum essential goals" and warned against concentrating inordinately on the events in the territories and in southern Lebanon at the expense of maintaining war readiness.

Indeed, a major concern of the High Command was that the Arab states would perceive Israel's reaction to the uprising—the deliberate refusal to quell it swiftly and brutally using full-scale battlefield means—as a sign of weakness. This might undermine a pillar of Israel's national-security doctrine—the maintenance of a credible deterrence vis-à-vis the Arab states. In the territories themselves, the behavior of the population, their readiness to confront fully armed troops with stones, and in some cases to attack them at close quarters, showed that the Palestinians had overcome a fear barrier, with a concomitant erosion of Israeli deterrent capability. The IDF's response was to impose ever more stringent punitive measures. Furthermore, Israeli military planners would have to add to their various war scenarios the distinct possibility that the inhabitants of the territories would stage mass demonstrations and engage in various forms of violence during a full-scale war, forcing the IDF to commit troops to this "front" and reducing its potential for maneuver in the territories.

Already in 1988, General Barak told the Press Club on December 4, the IDF had committed an average of 10,000 troops per day to the territories, accounting for 3.5 million workdays of soldiers and officers. Barak added that the IDF's deployment in the territories was adversely affecting the training continuity of regular units and military exercises for the reserves. Nevertheless, he said, "We are convinced that the IDF's combat ability has not been harmed."

Barak and others on the General Staff also dismissed the phenomenon of refusal to serve in the territories for reasons of conscience as insignificant. Yesh Gvul (There Is a Border/Limit), the group formed during the Lebanon War, again took the lead among organizations advocating refusal to serve in the territories, maintaining a support system for those who were jailed for their action. Although only several dozen persons formally refused to do reserve duty in the territories, serving military-prison terms of up to a month—in some cases more than once—many others avoided duty in the territories through internal arrangements with their unit commanders, serving elsewhere instead. Toward the end of the year it was reported that the police were conducting a secret criminal investigation into the activities of Yesh Gvul on suspicion that the group was engaged in unlawful incitement. According to a local Jerusalem paper, the investigation had been ordered by the attorney general following a request by the legal adviser of the Shin Bet. The action was taken after Yesh Gvul published a booklet instructing soldiers how to proceed if conscience prevented them from serving in the territories. Left-wing MKs, most of whom disagreed with the tactics of Yesh Gvul, demanded that the investigation be halted, calling Yesh Gvul a legitimate protest group. On December 28, two of the organization's activists were interrogated by the police.

The debate over the territories also led to quasi-protest movements from within the establishment. At the end of March, a group of 34 major generals, 86 brigadier generals, 115 colonels—all retired from the IDF—and some 200 experts in related spheres formed the Council for Peace and Security, headed by former chief of military intelligence Aharon Yariv. This group, which claimed to be nonpartisan but was identified in the public mind with the Labor party, had as its slogan: "Israel's security depends on the IDF and not on the territories." The council ran ads in the Israeli press calling for a distinction to be drawn between a "security border" and a "political border." In their view, the continued occupation of the territories undermined the IDF's war preparedness, eroded the national consensus which was essential in a genuine war situation, and, by reducing the prospects for peace, heightened the likelihood of war. In August the inevitable countergroup was formed. As its name—Officers and Academics for Security and Peace—suggested, this group, which included another former chief of intelligence, MK Yehoshua Saguy (Likud), placed "security ahead of peace." The aim of this body was to convince the public of the "vital importance of Judea, Samaria, Gaza and the Golan Heights for Israel's security."

A public-opinion survey on national security sponsored by Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (of which Aharon Yariv was the director) found that 57 percent favored the annexation to Israel of the West Bank and Gaza (up from 54 percent in 1986)—part of what the survey directors (headed by Prof. Asher Arian of Tel Aviv University) described as "a somewhat more right-wing tendency" in the country as compared with the previous poll two years earlier. (The survey, which was published June 1, was conducted six months earlier, during the initial, mass-demonstrations stage of the *intifada*.) The proportion of those who thought Israeli policy in the territories was too soft was up by 6 percent from 1986 and stood at 51 percent. Overall, the survey concluded, while Israelis continued to believe "by a very large margin" that the country could successfully overcome the threats it faced, "clear evidence" existed of an "erosion of that confidence" as compared with the earlier poll.

Israelis' confidence may have been boosted by the launching, on September 19, of Ofek-1, described officially in a press release issued by Israel Aircraft Industries as "an experimental technological satellite," and by MK Prof. Yuval Ne'eman, chairman of the Israel Space Agency, as Israel's "calling card to the space age." The

150-kilogram octagonally shaped satellite, lifted into space by a three-stage Shavit rocket, orbited the earth elliptically once every 90 minutes, from a perigee of 250 km. (over the Middle East) to an apogee of 1,000 km. Israel thus joined a select group of countries with satellite-launching capability. According to Ne'eman, Ofek-1 was a strictly civilian project and was not a spy satellite. It was expected to burn up after some weeks in space, though not before feeding Israeli scientists a wealth of data. According to Reuven Pedatzur, a defense affairs analyst for *Ha'aretz*, with the launching of Ofek-1 Israel showed for the first time that it possessed medium-range ballistic missile capability.

LEBANON

Ballistic missiles could be of no help, however, in combating the numerous attacks and infiltration attempts in and from Lebanon in 1988. Security personnel pointed to the *intifada* to account for the upsurge in hostile activity from Lebanon during the year. The thinking was that the PLO and others wanted to demonstrate their solidarity with the uprising, and perhaps open a "second front" by stepping up their activity in Lebanon (as well as from Egypt and Jordan). Thus 1988 saw more than 630 incidents involving the IDF or the Southern Lebanon Army (SLA), the Israeli-supported militia in the security zone. (On November 7, SLA commander Gen. Antoine Lahad was seriously wounded when he was shot at close range by a 21-year-old woman from the Lebanese Communist party.) There were 24 infiltration attempts across the border from Lebanon into northern Israel, all of which were foiled either in the Israeli-declared "security zone" in southern Lebanon or at the security fence along the border; this compared with 10 attempts in 1987. Five of the forays were carried out by Yasir Arafat's Fatah organization, but no Fatah squads were involved in such incidents after November 24, as Arafat moved toward a dialogue with the United States. Katyushas were also fired sporadically into upper Galilee, and in one such incident (March 3), five persons were hurt when a rocket hit a house.

As in previous years, the Israel Air Force was the spearhead of antiterrorist activity in Lebanon. Besides the standard targets, on August 8, the IAF bombed a Voice of Palestine radio station in southern Lebanon that had been broadcasting instructions to the leadership of the *intifada*. The Israel Navy was also active, sinking or intercepting a number of vessels with terrorists aboard.

Israeli ground forces were more active in 1988 than at any time since the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon in June 1985, and as a result sustained more fatalities. Three Israeli paratroopers, two of them officers, were killed and 17 others wounded in a two-tiered IDF sweep in southern Lebanon on May 2-4, aimed at restoring Israel's deterrent capability in the area following a series of attacks on the IDF and the SLA. The sweep operation included an attack on the village of Maidoun, some 3 kilometers north of the security zone in the Beka'a Valley, in an area occupied by Syrian forces and large numbers of Hezballah gunmen, including hundreds of Iranians. The village had been deserted by its inhabitants and transformed by Hezballah into a heavily fortified stronghold. All the IDF casualties in the operation occurred in the heavy fighting that erupted in Maidoun. After the raid, which received worldwide publicity when ABC-TV interrupted its regular programming to announce that 2,500 Israeli troops had entered Lebanon—a figure which turned out to be highly exaggerated—it emerged that Defense Minister Rabin had not informed anyone in the cabinet about the operation. Ministers from both Labor and Likud were critical of this state of affairs and called for a review of the procedures for decision making on military operations—particularly if the possibility, however hypothetical, existed of intervention by Syrian forces. Rabin said the raid had been carried out within the parameters of ongoing government policy and therefore needed no special approval.

Rabin himself was critical of the IDF's performance in the army's first deep-penetration raid since the early stages of the Lebanon War. On the night of December 8, navy commandos, along with troops from the elite Golani infantry brigade, struck at a base of Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front/General Command organization situated northeast of Damour, 19 kilometers south of Beirut. The troops were put ashore from the sea and were airlifted out the next morning by helicopter after killing some 20 terrorists, wounding dozens, and destroying a training site and an ammunition dump. An Israeli battalion commander was killed in the raid and three soldiers were wounded. Four Israeli soldiers were missing when Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, concerned about a possible clash with Syrian troops in broad daylight, gave the order to take the main force out. The four were later located and extricated in a daring helicopter operation. Shomron was criticized for violating a hallowed IDF tradition of never leaving soldiers behind in enemy territory. Rabin was quoted as telling the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee: "If I had known how the operation in Lebanon would develop, I would not have authorized it."

On December 18, the IDF announced that three days earlier yet another force had ventured outside the security zone, in the area of Tibnin, this time returning with four prisoners, including two senior commanders from the Believers Resistance Front, a radical Shi'ite group believed to have been involved in the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in 1986. Two of the four suspects were released on December 17 following their interrogation.

Other incidents in which Israeli soldiers were killed included the following: On February 4, two 19-year-old paratroopers, Eliezer Sheffer, a yeshivah student from Herzliyah, and Avshalom Bashri, from Moshav Kfar Zeitim, fell in a gun battle with terrorists on the Israel-Lebanon border near Kibbutz Yiftah; on February 22, Sgt. Gavriel Permutti, aged 20, from Herzliyah, and Cpl. Amir Siedner, aged 19, from Jerusalem, were killed and two other soldiers were wounded when their tank hit a powerful roadside bomb, responsibility for the attack being claimed by the Believers Resistance Front; and in the year's worst single outrage, eight soldiers were killed—ranging in age from 19 to 44 and in rank from private to major—and seven wounded, on October 19, when a Hezballah suicide car-bomber managed to get his vehicle to a point near the border checkpoint just outside Metullah. Two days after the car-bomb attack, the IAF struck heavily at Hezballah and Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon, and on the following day it was announced that the gang responsible for the attack had been captured following intensive intelligence work by the security forces aided by the SLA.

This and other incidents that followed in the coming days, evidently motivated by the impending Israeli and U.S. elections and the scheduled Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers, elicited calls for Israel to expand the security zone. However, this idea was rejected by Defense Minister Rabin, who told the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee on October 25 that to enlarge the zone would be counterproductive because it would exacerbate relations with the local population and upset the "delicate balance" in southern Lebanon.

SECURITY TRIALS

Two trials relating to national security were in the news in 1988. The trial of Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona Nuclear Research Center who was accused of passing top-secret information about the facility to the London *Sunday Times*, was concluded. (For the background, see AJYB 1989, pp. 390–392, and AJYB 1988, pp. 373–375.) Following additional testimony, including that of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, one of the founders of the country's nuclear-research program, and by Prof. George Quester, of the University of Maryland, an expert on international nuclear policy, Vanunu was convicted of the charges against him on March 24 and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment on March 27. The sentence was two years less than what the prosecution had demanded and 37 years less than the total maximum accumulated prison term that could have been handed down separately for each count of aggravated espionage, treason, and disclosing state secrets.

The entire seven-month trial was held *in camera*, and only one page of the 60-page verdict was made public. This made it clear that the judges had rejected the defense's argument that Vanunu had acted from ideological motives because, as they wrote, "some of the most appalling crimes in human history were perpetrated for ideological reasons," and "the danger posed by ideological criminals is perhaps even greater than that of other criminals." It was also noted that the very fact of Vanunu's having given information to an unauthorized source constituted a crime, irrespective of whether the information itself was correct. The judges explained their decision not to impose the full sentence requested by the prosecution by citing mitigating circumstances in Vanunu's favor: his full cooperation with the investigators, the fact that he had been held in total isolation since his arrest and was likely to remain so, and "traces of remorse" in Vanunu's final statement. On March 28, Vanunu's lawyer appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court.

On January 10, it was disclosed that a 42-year-old Tel Aviv businessman, Shabtai Kalmanovitch, had been arrested by the Shin Bet on December 23, 1987, on suspicion of engaging in espionage for the Soviet Union. Kalmanovitch, well-known in high social and political circles, had immigrated to Israel from Lithuania in 1971. In the 1970s he had been involved with the most senior levels in Israel that dealt with Soviet Jewry, and in his subsequent career as an international financier he had established contacts with cabinet ministers and former ranking military personnel. The news of his arrest stunned not a few members of the Israeli political establishment. On December 15, following a three-month trial held *in camera*, Kalmanovitch was sentenced to a nine-year prison term in a plea-bargaining deal in which he confessed to spying for the Soviet Union and having contact with a KGB agent.

International Relations

Israel had to cope with severe criticism in 1988 for its activities in the territories, but oddly, those voices were loudest from Israel's allies among the Western democracies, whereas countries in the Eastern bloc, traditionally hostile to Israel, muted their criticism and moved rapidly toward a normalization of relations.

UNITED STATES

Relations with Washington were dominated in the first half of the year by the peace initiative of Secretary of State George Shultz (see above for the details). The mission encountered fierce opposition from Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the Likud and died a lingering death. Washington's year-end decision to talk to the PLO—a move whose logic contradicted the essence of the Shultz plan but seemed more in harmony with the unfolding events generated by the *intifada*—was hotly disputed by most of the Israeli political establishment.

Overall, as in past years, the attitude underlying U.S. policy toward Israel could be described as much bark but very little bite. The barking was once again triggered by Israeli actions in the territories, but was louder than in past years due to the uprising. Thus, the year began with the United States protesting Israel's deportation of Palestinians, voting in favor of a UN Security Council resolution warning Israel against carrying out expulsions (January 5), and then abstaining (January 14) in a council resolution condemning the expulsion of nine Palestinians which was passed 14–0. Following the first vote, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing "regret and disappointment" at the U.S. stance on the resolution, "which does not contribute to the reestablishment of calm or to a furthering of the peace process." Foreign Minister Shimon Peres saw the vote as a "grave deviation" from the traditional U.S. position. However, in a typical pattern, Secretary of State Shultz himself assuaged such concerns, thus neutralizing whatever the intended effect of the U.S. vote had been, when he told a Washington press conference that "the U.S. regards its friendship and the strength of its relationship with Israel as a key and unshakable relationship. No one should interpret a vote as meaning anything else."

Shultz also took the opportunity to note that while it was manifestly Israel's "duty to maintain law and order" in the territories, Washington believed that this could be accomplished "without the use of lethal means." Late in the month the State Department expressed its concern over the new Israeli riot-control measures announced by Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, reiterating that Israel could achieve its goal by employing "humane measures which do not result in civilian casualties."

A rare concrete step taken by the State Department—an "advisory" cautioning tourists not to visit the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, issued on the eve of the Passover-Easter holiday season—infuriated Tourism (and Justice) Minister Avraham Sharir. He accused the United States of "once again stabbing tourism to Israel in the back."

In mid-April, following three visits by Secretary of State Shultz to the region in pursuit of his peace mission, the United States stepped up its rhetoric regarding Israeli actions in suppressing the *intifada*. Speaking at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, U.S. ambassador to Israel Thomas Pickering asserted that if Israel wished to continue enjoying close ties with the United States, it was "critical" for "the primacy of the rule of law" to be upheld in the territories. In Washington, the State Department condemned the deportation of eight more Palestinians on April 11, an action which, in the U.S. view, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949; however, in the Security Council, the United States vetoed a resolution calling on Israel to allow the deportees to return.

The most stinging attack to date on Israeli policy—and the bluntest warning of the possible consequences—came a week after the IDF had issued deportation orders to 25 more Palestinians. On August 23, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead told Oded Eran, a senior official in the Israeli embassy in Washington, that the United States considered expulsion an "unduly harsh punishment under any circumstances." If Israel did not "reconsider" the newly issued orders, or "refrain from carrying them out," and in general change its position on this issue, Whitehead said, "damage to our bilateral relations will occur." In response, Foreign Minister Peres stated that no "policy of deportation" existed, "only individual cases" necessitated by the security situation. (Nonetheless, there were no more deportations in 1988, although the orders against the 25 were not revoked.)

In mid-September—halfway between the collapse of Secretary of State Shultz's peace initiative and his decision to start talks with the PLO—the secretary took the opportunity of a speech marking the tenth anniversary of the Camp David accords to sum up the Reagan administration's policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While rejecting the idea of an independent Palestinian state, Shultz also ruled out Israel's retention of all the territories. Israel, he said, "must be prepared to withdraw—as Resolution 242 says—from territories occupied in the [1967 war]." On Israeli measures to suppress the uprising, the secretary of state acknowledged that even though it was Israel's "responsibility to maintain law and order" in the territories, this must be achieved within certain parameters of behavior. Specifically, Shultz asserted that the United States would "vigorously" oppose attempts to carry out a "transfer" of Arabs from the territories, and especially to Jordan, which had a "strong national identity of its own" and therefore was "not a Palestinian state." (Shultz was responding to calls from ultranationalist circles in Israel to solve the issue of the territories by declaring Jordan the Palestinian "homeland," since the majority of its population was already of Palestinian origin.) The secretary of state was unusually blunt in his criticism of some of the more severe measures resorted to by Israel in the territories, and of the logic underlying them: "[Israel] cannot claim there is no one to talk to, while suppressing political expression [in the territories] and arresting or deporting those who speak out—even those who speak in moderate terms."

Prime Minister Shamir played out his part in the ritual by responding that at bottom the United States and Israel agreed on the substantive goal—Shultz, he pointed out, had affirmed Israel's "right and duty" to restore order in the territories—but disagreed over how that goal should be achieved. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, in contrast, called Shultz's speech "very balanced."

Peres's successor as foreign minister, Moshe Arens, saw fit to take Israel's major ally to task in his first public statement following his confirmation. On December 23, Arens said that the U.S. decision to hold a dialogue with the PLO, "the leading terrorist organization in the past 25 years," would only generate more extremism and hence more violence. The previous day, President Reagan had sent Shamir a message (not made public until December 28) explaining the U.S. move and stressing that "nothing in this decision should be construed as weakening the United States' commitment to Israel's security." Reagan also took the opportunity to encapsulate his perception of U.S.-Israeli relations under his administration:

> Building on our friendship and strengthening the close ties that bind us have been among my proudest achievements as president. . . . I am confident that through our joint efforts nothing can destroy the mutual trust, confidence and commitment we have built, and that the next U.S. administration will move quickly to work with your government toward our mutual goals.

Traditionally, many of those "mutual goals" centered on security and strategy, and despite the fundamental differences over policy in the territories, relations at the military-defense level remained strong in 1988. The Iran-*contra* affair was finally wiped off the agenda between the two countries when an agreement was signed (announced March 28) formalizing Jerusalem's cooperation with the U.S. independent counsel investigating the matter. The terms of the agreement were not divulged, but the hope was expressed that it would assure continued cooperation "to the mutual satisfaction of both sides."

Mutual satisfaction, particularly on the Israeli side, was also expressed at the signing, on April 21, Israel's 40th Independence Day, of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the two countries at ceremonies held in Jerusalem and Washington. The document broke little if any new ground. Its primary purpose was to reaffirm "the close relationship" between the two countries "based upon common goals, interests and values," and Israel's designation "as a major non-NATO ally of the United States." A White House statement explained that the agreement, valid for five years with an option for further five-year renewals, "formalizes and perpetuates the bilateral U.S. and Israeli consultative groups that meet periodically to discuss joint military-security assistance and economic development questions." However, a phone conversation between Reagan and Shamir to mark the signing was canceled for "technical" reasons, and observers noted that Washington had hardly gone out of its way to publicize the event. Shamir however, cited the new MOA—which was signed despite the virtual demise of Shultz's peace initiative and despite the volatile situation in the territories following the assassination five days earlier of the PLO's Abu Jihad—as proof of the enduring quality of "this unique partnership in common values and interests and in the desire for peace."

The MOA stated explicitly that the Joint Israel-U.S. Political-Military Group was responsible, among other tasks, for planning "joint exercises" between the armed forces of the two countries. One such exercise was held in July with the participation of the Israel Navy and vessels from the U.S. Sixth Fleet, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *Eisenhower*. At a ceremony marking the conclusion of the maneuvers, Sixth Fleet commander Rear Admiral Kendall Moranville said he had "been given assurances" that U.S. marines would conduct land maneuvers in Israel "in the near future."

In November U.S. secretary of defense Frank Carlucci paid a three-day visit to Israel for talks on bilateral military and strategic cooperation and regional developments. Carlucci said that the continuing U.S. military and other support for Israel was a "clear sign to Israel's adversaries that there is no military option." Carlucci was returning a visit to the United States by Defense Minister Rabin in June during which the two countries signed an agreement for the joint development (with Washington to underwrite 80 percent of the $130-million price tag) of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile, an Israeli concept deriving from the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") project in which Israel had agreed to take part. (When Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost visited Israel in June, he said Washington was concerned about the burgeoning Middle East missile race, particularly China's sale of medium-range missiles to Saudi Arabia. Earlier in the year, the director-general of the Prime Minister's Office, Yosef Ben-Aharon, had made a veiled threat that Israel would attack the missiles in Saudi Arabia, leading President Reagan, Egyptian president Mubarak, and others to ask Israel to show restraint. A statement from Prime Minister Shamir said that Israel did not plan to strike at the missiles but was concerned about their deployment on Saudi soil.) Carlucci, at all events, said he had been impressed by the "high level of proficiency and morale" he found in the IDF and added that the level of cooperation between the two defense establishments "could not be better."

WESTERN EUROPE

This was hardly the case in Israel's relations with much of Western Europe in 1988. Governments of countries traditionally friendly to Israel expressed their intense disapproval of the IDF's handling of the uprising in the territories, often in deeds as well as words, and nightly TV images of the *intifada* caused Israel's popularity to plummet in public-opinion polls.

In January British minister of state for foreign affairs David Mellors, visiting the Gaza Strip, castigated an IDF officer for his behavior and told the BBC that conditions in Gaza were "an affront to civilized values." The following month, the leader of the British Labor party, Neil Kinnock, accused the IDF of using dumdum bullets (designed to explode internally) against Palestinians in the territories, a charge that was "categorically" denied by both the IDF and Israeli government officials. In July Israeli spokesmen pointed to Britain's huge arms deal with Saudi Arabia, while maintaining an arms boycott vis-à-vis Israel, as proof that the British stand on the Middle East was unbalanced. A better atmosphere prevailed when Foreign Minister Peres met with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (September 14), with the two agreeing that PLO chairman Arafat had still not demonstrated that he was serious about moving toward peace. A weeklong visit by British tourism minister John Lee (he arrived October 28) was welcomed by Israel, particularly after the Arab League had issued a statement warning that the visit would be considered a "provocation" against the Arab world and could produce "negative repercussions for Arab-British interests."

Following a 24-hour visit (January 23–24), West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher told a press conference in Jerusalem that the European Community (EC)—which he currently chaired—considered it "urgent" to find a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and this could be done by convening an international conference. In the course of his visit Genscher met with seven prominent Palestinians from the territories, who handed him a letter urging "international protection" for the Palestinians against Israeli policy in the territories.

A visit to France by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres (September 23–24) took place not long after French foreign minister Roland Dumas had met with PLO chief Yasir Arafat during the latter's visit to Strasbourg to address the European Parliament. Dumas briefed Peres, who also met with President François Mitterrand, on the meeting. President Chaim Herzog, making the first state visit by an Israeli head of state to France (October 17–21), devoted much of his time to explaining the situation in the territories. He also visited the Normandy coast, where he had landed as a soldier in the British expeditionary force on D-Day, June 6, 1944.

Netherlands prime minister Ruud Lubbers expressed his country's "concern" at Israeli actions and policies in the territories during a three-day visit in July, the first ever by a Dutch premier. Lubbers, who was accompanied by Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, expressed Holland's "commitment to the Jewish people and the future of Israel," but also called for an international peace conference and urged

Israel to recognize Palestinian rights. Another major talking point between the two sides concerned the Israeli decision to seek direct flights from the USSR to Israel for new immigrants. The Dutch, who represented Israeli interests in Moscow and hence issued Israeli visas to Jews wishing to leave the Soviet Union, opposed the Israeli decision because it abridged freedom of choice. The two countries agreed to form a committee to study the matter. The Dutch foreign minister met with a group of leading PLO supporters from the territories and toured the Kalandia refugee camp near Jerusalem.

A blunt message was received from Foreign Minister Sten Andersson of Sweden during a two-day visit (March 7–9). Following a tour of Bethlehem and the adjacent Deheishe refugee camp, he told reporters that he did not see how Israel could continue to exist without solving the Palestinian problem. Andersson also met with nine leading Palestinians from the territories and was at loggerheads with his Israeli interlocutors on the question of PLO participation in an international conference.

On his return home following a visit to Italy (February 15–17), Prime Minister Shamir said that Israel's image in the Italian media is "very poor," but that "when one digs deeper, one reaches the conclusion that the media do not reflect the true state of public opinion." *Ha'aretz*'s Rome correspondent described Shamir's talks with Italian leaders, dominated by the issue of the occupied territories, as "a polite dialogue of the deaf."

Some scheduled visits did not take place at all due to the *intifada*, particularly in the early part of the year when the mass violence, and consequently the mass-media coverage, were at their height. Belgium canceled planned visits to Israel by its defense minister and a purchasing mission. A Swiss Army mission did likewise. Two Dutch high schools refused to host a youth delegation organized by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. In January the Foreign Ministry condemned as "totally unjustified and extremely offensive" a statement attributed to Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of Greece in which he spoke of Israel's "fascist occupation." Even the Norwegian ambassador to Israel, Torleiv Anda, had to be berated—by Deputy Foreign Minister Yosef Beilin—after he drew a comparison between German actions in Norway in World War II and IDF measures in the territories. Anda, who had been incarcerated in Buchenwald, told Beilin he regretted making the remark, which, he said, had been distorted and misunderstood.

Concrete economic damage was inflicted on some branches of Israeli agriculture, notably flower growing, by the European Parliament's repeated postponement of ratification of trade protocols with Israel. As a result of the inaction, Israeli exporters were forced to continue paying high customs levies, which severely reduced their income and undercut their competitive ability. Although technical reasons were cited, an angry Prime Minister Shamir told the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee in January, after the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on Israel to desist from its "reprisals" against the Palestinians in the territories, that the real reason for the delay was political and was tantamount to "blackmail."

One demand of the Europeans which Israel had thus far refused to accept was to allow residents of the territories to export agricultural produce independently of Israel. It was not until October 12, after Palestinian farmers in the territories were permitted to export citrus fruit under their own label and independently of the Israeli marketing mechanism, that the European Parliament ratified the protocols. In December the first such shipment—"Gaza Top" grapefruits—was sent to Europe where it would compete with Israeli produce.

EASTERN EUROPE

Israel's relations with Eastern Europe continued to develop rapidly, despite the moral and material support the countries of that region had traditionally proffered to the Arabs in general and the PLO in particular. The major event in the continuing Israeli-Soviet rapprochement was the arrival in Moscow of an Israeli consular delegation on July 28. The six-member team was headed by a career diplomat, Russian-born Meron Gordon, plucked from his current posting in Rome, and included Yaakov Kedmi, formerly Yasha Kazakov, a former refusenik and one of the initiators of the emigration movement among Soviet Jewry in the 1970s. Like their Soviet counterparts who had been in Israel since July 1987 (AJYB 1989, p. 406), the Israeli diplomats were officially in the USSR (where they were hosted by the Netherlands embassy) solely for the technical purpose of inspecting the former Israeli embassy building in Moscow. Israel had been paying rent on the building, reportedly $100,000 a year, since it was shut down 21 years earlier after relations were severed by the Russians. At the end of October the Soviets approved the posting of a ranking Israeli diplomat, Arie Levin, the head of the Foreign Ministry's research section, to head the consular mission, a move seen as an implicit upgrading of its diplomatic status.

Israel's stock in the Soviet Union got a further boost as a result of two events late in the year. On December 2, a Soviet airplane, hijacked during an internal Russian flight, landed at Ben-Gurion Airport. Israel's smooth handling of the crisis, including the detention and deportation to the USSR of the hijackers (none of them Jewish) the next day, won high praise from Moscow and produced a diplomatic breakthrough in the form of a meeting between Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Arie Levin. The Tass news agency quoted Shevardnadze as thanking Israel for its "goodwill" and lauded the "norms of civilized intergovernmental relations" displayed during the incident. Several days later Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev personally thanked Israel's UN envoy, Yochanan Bein, for Jerusalem's help, during a reception at the UN in New York. The Soviet consular mission in Israel was also involved in dealing with the crisis.

On December 11, an Israel Air Force Boeing 707 landed in Yerevan, the capital of the Armenian Republic, carrying a rescue team and medical personnel to help in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake. The mission was led by Brig. Gen.

Aharon Vardi, head of the IDF's Civil Defense Corps. A second team, comprising 46 military and civilian medical personnel, arrived five days later and set up a field hospital at Kirovakan, where they treated some 2,400 persons in two weeks. The Israeli efforts drew praise in *Izvestia* and from Soviet officials.

On September 30, Israel and Poland moved a step closer to diplomatic relations when each country's "interests section" was elevated to independent status. The upgrading was announced in New York in a meeting between Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his Polish counterpart, Tadeusz Olechowski. Earlier in the year, the head of the Israeli mission in Warsaw, Mordechai Palzur, had had occasion to protest a statement by Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban that Israel's handling of the uprising in the occupied territories was an insult to the memory of the Warsaw Ghetto defenders. The Polish statement came just days after 2,000 Jewish youths from Israel and the Diaspora, joined by Education Minister Yitzhak Navon, Justice Minister Avraham Sharir, Jewish Agency chairman Simcha Dinitz, six MKs, and dozens of other Israeli officials participated in a "March of the Living" at Auschwitz-Birkenau to mark the start of weeklong ceremonies and events commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto uprising 45 years earlier. It was the first visit to Poland by elected Israeli representatives in 20 years; in another first, Israel Radio broadcast the event live.

Israel's relations with Hungary moved forward. On March 14, the two countries established interests offices in Budapest and Tel Aviv, and on May 8, Foreign Minister Peres became the most senior Israeli official to visit an Eastern bloc country (other than Romania) since 1967, when he arrived in Budapest for talks with Prime Minister Karoly Grosz and Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi. However, neither this visit nor one by Prime Minister Shamir in mid-September produced a further breakthrough in relations in 1988. For their part, the Hungarians dispatched Church Affairs Minister Imre Miklos to Israel in September, and the following month Tourism Minister Avraham Sharir and Hungarian Trade Minister Miklos Andriko signed a tourism agreement during the latter's visit to Israel. About 30,000 Israelis visited Hungary in 1988.

Other notable events in 1988 included the visit to Belgrade in August by Jewish Agency chairman Simcha Dinitz for a meeting with Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar, the first visit by a senior Israeli political figure to Yugoslavia in 20 years; and the first meeting of its kind between Foreign Minister Peres and his Czech counterpart, Bohuslav Chnoupek, held in September at UN headquarters in New York. Relations with Bucharest continued to flourish: in May, Romanian deputy premier Nikolai Konstantin visited Israel and in a meeting with Prime Minister Shamir the two countries agreed to arrange mutual visits by cabinet ministers. Industry and Trade Minister Ariel Sharon visited Romania in July, and in November he and his Romanian counterpart, Johan Ongor, signed various trade protocols during the latter's visit to Israel. (Sharon also visited Poland and Bulgaria in 1988, but on an unofficial basis.)

AFRICA, ASIA, LATIN AMERICA

On December 23, Kenya became the fifth African state to renew diplomatic relations with Israel in recent years. The Kenyan Foreign Ministry explained that the move followed the PLO's acceptance of "the two crucial United Nations resolutions leading to Middle East peace through direct negotiations." Extensive economic ties between Kenya and Israel had been maintained since Nairobi broke relations in 1973. Another African country, Zaire, went public—at a press conference on June 29 in Jerusalem, called by Foreign Ministry director-general Avraham Tamir and Zaire's ambassador to Israel, Lamponda Wa Botende—with a list of its disappointed expectations from its renewal of relations with Israel. In July Israel showed that it had gotten the message when Tamir signed a protocol in Zaire assuring additional Israeli military aid, an $8 million loan, and agricultural help.

In Asia the picture was mixed. In March Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India personally prohibited his country's Davis Cup tennis team from playing in Israel as a protest against Israeli "atrocities" in the territories. However, in July India agreed to upgrade the level of the head of Israel's legation in the country from deputy consul to consul.

In February Foreign and Trade Minister Bill Hayden of Australia signed a trade agreement during a three-day visit to Israel and urged Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, which he called "a demographic time-bomb."

Foreign Minister Sousuke Uno of Japan, on a Middle East tour in June, became the highest-ranking official from his country ever to visit Israel. His 24-hour stay (June 26–27) included meetings with the president, the prime minister, and the vice-premier as well as visits to East Jerusalem and refugee camps. Foreign Ministry director-general Tamir said Israel could not accept Japan's linkage of investments and joint projects with intensified peace efforts. In a message to Shamir (July 4), Foreign Minister Uno described his visit as "moving" and "most beneficial for further political dialogues between our two countries."

Ties with China inched forward. In March, the leader of the left-wing Mapam party, Elazar Granot, paid an official visit to China, noting that Mapam was the first Zionist party ever invited to send a representative to that country. In September Foreign Minister Peres met at the UN in New York with his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichan, and was told that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries depended on progress toward peace in the Middle East. A Chinese trade mission visited Israel in October, followed in November by the arrival of a permanent tourism representative.

Relations with Latin America continued strong, unaffected by the *intifada*. Visitors to Israel in 1988 included the commander of the Argentinian army, Gen. Jose Dantecaridi, in January; Colombian defense minister Gen. Rafael Samudio Molina, in October, who signed a deal worth $200 million for 13 Israeli-made Kfir jet fighters; and Bolivian foreign minister Guillermo Bedregal Gutierrez, in December.

Israel's skeptical view of the UN was reinforced when the world body's under secretary-general, Marrack Goulding, said in January, following a visit to the occupied territories in order to prepare a report for the Security Council, that the violence there was the result of Israeli policies which had engendered "despair and hopelessness." Goulding met with Foreign Minister Peres, but Prime Minister Shamir rejected a request for a meeting on the ground that Goulding was interfering in Israel's internal affairs. The report itself, issued by UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in January, accused the IDF of using "disproportionate force" to put down disturbances in the territories and called on Israel "to change its position as to the applicability" of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the areas.

EGYPT

Developments in two spheres—the Palestinian uprising and the Taba arbitration talks—dominated relations between Israel and Egypt in 1988. On May 15, in Geneva, a five-member panel of international arbitrators, including one representative each from Egypt and Israel, began deliberating on the Taba issue after last-ditch compromise efforts by U.S. State Department legal adviser Abraham Sofaer had failed. (Taba, a tiny and nonstrategic strip of coastline just south of Eilat, on which stood an Israeli luxury hotel and a holiday village, was the last unresolved territorial element in the implementation of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.) Talks between Israel and Egypt aimed at working out a solution both sides could live with continued, largely at the behest of the United States, which feared that the arbitrators' decision—which was binding—might spark a crisis in relations between the two countries. However, the politics of national unity proved a major stumbling block in the compromise efforts, the Likud and Alignment advocating diametrically opposed approaches to the problem. The director-general of the Foreign Ministry wanted to accept the U.S. proposal, which took as its starting point Egyptian sovereignty over Taba, and extract maximum concessions in the field; while the director-general of the Prime Minister's Office refused to concede Egyptian sovereignty and espoused what was, at bottom, an all-or-nothing approach.

On September 29—one month before the Knesset elections—the arbitration panel, as expected, basically gave all to Egypt and nothing to Israel. After an initial flurry of mutual recriminations over "who had lost Taba," Labor and Likud tacitly agreed not to make the matter a campaign issue. Two months to the day after the arbitration decision, Israeli and Egyptian representatives, meeting in Rome at the headquarters of the Sinai Multinational Force, reached agreement on the technical implementation of the decision. On December 15, as stipulated in the accord, Israeli and Egyptian military teams began "construction of the boundary pillars of the recognized international boundary" as determined by the arbitrators.

As it had been during the Lebanon War, official Egyptian reaction to Israel's handling of the uprising in the territories was relatively muted. Sporadic protests were made by President Hosni Mubarak and other senior officials, and the Egyptian embassy in Tel Aviv did not hold its traditional reception on Egypt's national day (although the Israeli chargé d'affaires in Cairo was invited to the official reception there). But when Egypt recognized the "State of Palestine" declared by the Palestine National Council in mid-November, Foreign Minister Peres himself summoned Egyptian ambassador to Israel Muhammad Bassiouny to his office and, according to a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry, informed him "that Egypt's recognition of the Palestinian state as declared in Algiers is not consistent with the principle of a negotiated settlement of the conflict to which both Egypt and Israel are committed." Peres expressed his "regret" at Cairo's move and asked Bassiouny to convey Israel's "concern at this development" to the Egyptian government.

In the meantime, diplomatic relations proceeded at lower levels: on September 19, the new Israeli ambassador to Egypt, Prof. Shimon Shamir, an orientalist from Tel Aviv University, presented his credentials to President Mubarak. He was then invited for a private 90-minute meeting with the Egyptian leader, during which the peace process and bilateral relations were discussed.

The Economy

The economy slumped badly in 1988, particularly in the second half of the year, when recessionary indicators, including rising unemployment, became apparent. This was due in part to the *intifada*, which had both direct and indirect effects, and in part to the standstill approach adopted by the Treasury, where measures taken (or not taken) by Finance Minister Moshe Nissim were influenced by the fact that 1988 was an election year.

According to most estimates, the uprising in the territories caused a direct loss of at least 1.5 percent of the GNP, or about $600 million, as compared with economic performance in 1987. Of this, approximately a quarter was due to civilian workdays lost because of call-ups for reserve duty and operational military expenditures. Defense expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased for the first time since 1982 (the Lebanon War) and stood at 10.3 percent, which was 0.5 percent more than the state budget had allowed for. Following protracted discussions, the Treasury in September agreed to compensate the IDF to the tune of NIS 180 million for unbudgeted costs incurred in the *intifada*, even though the Defense Ministry estimated the actual cost to be in excess of NIS 400 million and had requested NIS 263 million.

Beyond this, the pervasive uncertainty caused by the government's vacillations in dealing with the peace process and with the *intifada* eroded confidence and created a climate that was not conducive to economic growth. The figures themselves could not tell the whole story since they did not take into account the high growth expectations that had been held for 1988 in various sectors, primarily because of events and programs which had been planned to coincide with Israel's 40th-anniversary celebrations. Hardest hit from this point of view was the tourism industry, which suffered a direct decrease of 15 percent in arrivals as compared with

1987 (1,169,000 in 1988 vs. 1,379,000 the previous year). In fact, the blow was even worse because the industry had invested in infrastructure and development in anticipation of a boom year, and because the decline was at its most intense in the peak summer months due to booking cancellations caused by media reports of the uprising's mass-demonstrations stage in the first quarter of the year.

Israeli "exports" to the occupied territories decreased by approximately 31 percent in real terms as compared with 1987. This was due to the drastic self-imposed economic slowdown in the territories and the boycotting of Israeli goods. The export of agricultural produce from Israel to the territories fell by some 60 percent, and factories in Israel which had manufactured products in high demand in the territories suffered. Overall, industrial production fell by more than 3 percent in 1988, following an increase of 5 percent in 1987 and 3.5 percent in 1986. One result was that the number of persons employed in industry declined by 3.5 percent, following a rise of 2 percent in 1987.

Particularly hard hit were the textile industry—a falloff of 15 percent in production—due in part to relatively high worker absenteeism; agriculture (a 7-percent production decline, caused in part by bad weather which nearly wiped out the avocado crop, after a growth of 8 percent in 1987); and construction (which managed to register a barely perceptible growth of about 1 percent, following a rise of 9 percent in 1987). All three sectors relied heavily on cheap labor from the territories. In January, Education Minister Yitzhak Navon ordered an emergency mobilization of high-school students "in order to help save the citrus crop," which was rotting due to the absence of workers from the territories. Labor and Social Affairs Minister Moshe Katzav authorized the import of about 550 workers from southern Lebanon for the harvest (citrus production was down 22 percent in 1988), alluding to the effect of the occupation on the original Zionist ethos when he declared that Jews must be encouraged to do manual labor. Indeed, some experts thought that, in the long term, *intifada*-related economic developments might prove salutary by forcing Israeli manufacturers to seek new markets for their products, both domestic and foreign, and by compelling labor-intensive industries such as construction to modernize and become more efficient, thus reducing housing costs and perhaps attracting more Israelis to an industry in which workers from the territories comprised about half the labor force.

Many Israelis found themselves forced out of the labor market altogether in 1988. When Finance Minister Nissim presented a budget of NIS 52.1 billion for fiscal year 1988–1989 on January 26 (with the uprising already six weeks old) in the Knesset, he made a virtue of restraint, arguing that since in 1987 his noninterventionist tactics had stimulated the business sector, generated higher exports, brought about increased investments, lowered inflation, and decreased unemployment, 1988 would see more of the same. The budget was passed on March 23, but virtually every Treasury forecast for 1988 turned out to be over-optimistic.

The GDP grew by only 1.5 percent, the lowest gain since 1982, as compared with increases of 5 percent in 1987 and 3–4 percent each in 1986 and 1985. Growth in the business sector was below 1 percent and was at a total standstill in the second half of the year. Private consumption, reflecting the living standard, rose by a modest 1.5 percent per capita, as compared with 7 percent in 1987 and 12 percent in 1986. Public consumption remained stable as compared with 1987, at about 3 percent (excluding defense imports). The overall unemployment rate stood at 6.4 percent at year's end, slightly higher than in 1987 (6.1 percent); however, in the second half of the year unemployment climbed to 7 percent (despite the shortfall in workers from the territories).

In June Histadrut's giant Koor concern, whose diverse firms employed one of every three Israeli industrial workers and accounted for 12 percent of the country's industrial product, announced losses of NIS 389 million for 1987, the worst single performance in Israeli industrial history. The conglomerate's managing director, Yeshayahu Gavish, had already resigned in March and been replaced by Benny Gaon, the successful director of another Histadrut enterprise, the Co-Op retail chain. Gaon, who likened Koor to "a plane without a pilot cruising aimlessly by night without a compass," launched a recovery program involving mass dismissals, plant closings, and the selling of assets.

One of the first problems Gaon faced was a liquidation threat by some of Koor's foreign creditors, including the U.S.-based Bankers Trust and Manufacturers Hanover Trust. On December 20, the Tel Aviv district court removed the danger of liquidation for at least a month, during which the sides were to endeavor to work out an arrangement acceptable to all parties involved. Explaining his decision, Judge Eliahu Winograd said that Koor's collapse would have a devastating ripple effect throughout the entire Israeli economy. In the meantime, the first to feel the effects of the concern's streamlining efforts were the workers, 4,760 of whom lost their jobs in the second half of the year as Koor-owned firms were scaled down, shut down, sold, or placed in receivership. Another labor-movement conglomerate, Milouot, comprising 13 food-processing plants in the country's north and owned by the kibbutz movement, was revealed to have debts of NIS 400 million.

Given this picture, it was perhaps not surprising that agricultural and industrial exports, excluding diamonds, were down by about 4 percent, due primarily to the steep decline in exports to the territories. Diamond exports rose by 2 percent, well below the increases of the previous three years. Civilian imports registered no change as compared with 1987. Nevertheless, imports of automobiles were up 21 percent as compared with 1987 and approached the peak year of 1983. All told, net civilian imports were higher by $2.8 billion than net exports, a 13-percent improvement as compared with 1987; the overall trade deficit stood at $5.3 billion, an 8-percent fall as compared with 1987, due to a drop in defense imports. Israel's total foreign debt at the end of 1988 was $24.4 billion, down by $1 billion from 1987. Export profitability showed a steady decline throughout the year, due in large part to the fixed exchange rate.

As the date of the general election approached, expectations of a devaluation of the shekel intensified, triggering mass purchasing of dollars and a call from Bank of Israel governor Michael Bruno for a devaluation. This trend was halted in the immediate aftermath of the election when Finance Minister Nissim—as he still was during the coalition negotiations—made it clear that he was against a devaluation. However, as those who had purchased dollars did not reconvert them to shekels, the banks faced an immediate liquidity crisis, and the interest rate for borrowers of "scarce" shekels soared to more than 30 percent. Shimon Peres, immediately upon his confirmation as finance minister, launched feverish meetings with representatives of the Histadrut and the Manufacturers Association in an effort to work out a package deal to spur economic growth. However, as it was widely believed that this would include a devaluation, another run on the dollar began which eventually totaled some $2.5 billion, most of it purchased by the business sector in the hope of an easy profit. At midday on December 12, the shekel was devalued by 5 percent against the dollar, but this failed to halt the dollar-buying spree as a second devaluation was expected. On December 29 (a Thursday), trading in foreign currency was halted for the remainder of the year. At midnight on December 31, the prices of basic commodities were hiked when the subsidies on them were slashed by 12–26 percent, the third such cut in 1988 (in May subsidies were reduced by 15–32 percent—for the first time since January 1987—and in October, less than a month before the elections, by 8–14 percent). Peres was to announce a new economic plan early in 1990.

The consumer price index for 1988 was 16.1 percent, down a full 3.6 percent from 1987, and including four months in which inflation was below 1 percent. The basket of goods that the Central Bureau of Statistics used to determine the CPI was revised in 1988—based on a survey of public consumption conducted in 1987—to make it conform with current Israeli expenditures. Thus the proportion allotted to most commodities or services was changed—the housing element decreased from 20 percent to 16.5 percent, clothing and shoes now accounted for 7.25 percent of the CPI basket, and so forth—and some new items were added, such as computers and VCRs. However, such calculations were largely irrelevant for the 634,000 Israelis who, the National Insurance Institute said, were below the poverty line, including nearly one of every three Israeli children, Jewish or Arab.

Extremism and Violence

In the view of some experts, the violence and extremism that had become increasingly pervasive in Israeli society were linked in some degree to Israel's suppression of the growing unrest in the occupied territories during the 1980s and particularly since the Lebanon War. One manifestation of these trends was the public's willingness to tolerate the dissemination of ideas that once were almost universally rejected as anathema. Thus, a public-opinion poll conducted in June by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University found that 49 percent of Jewish Israeli adults thought that "causing the Arabs from the territories to leave" would "allow the democratic and Jewish nature of Israeli society to be maintained." The "transfer option" was chosen by two-thirds of persons who said they would vote Likud and by one-third of persons who said they would vote Labor. Concluded Prof. Elihu Katz, the poll's scientific director, "The subject of transfer is no longer taboo; it has gained legitimacy, become a focus of public discussion and swept through the [political] right."

The appearance on the political stage of the Moledet (Homeland) party, headed by a retired major general, Rehavam Ze'evi, which openly espoused the "voluntary transfer" of the Arabs in the territories, helped to legitimize the idea as a topic of debate. Unlike Meir Kahane, Ze'evi was flesh of the flesh of the Israeli establishment—nowhere was this better seen than in President Herzog's meeting with Ze'evi at the President's Residence as part of the postelection process, in striking contrast to Herzog's refusal to receive Kahane under the same circumstances four years earlier. Significantly, his arguments drew not on an interpretation of the Torah and the forefathers of the Jewish people but, ostensibly, on the roots of Zionism and the founding fathers of the Jewish state.

In an article in *Ha'aretz* (August 17), Ze'evi sought to refute contentions that the transfer idea was immoral. After quoting David Ben-Gurion and mentioning past Labor luminaries such as Moshe Sharett and Berl Katznelson, Ze'evi wrote: "If [the transfer idea] is not moral, then the whole of Zionism and its realization in the course of more than a hundred years is not moral. The settlement enterprise in Eretz-Yisrael and our War of Independence are studded with operations in which Arabs were transferred from their villages." Yet underlying the cool rationalism in which Ze'evi couched his arguments was another message, indistinguishable from Kahane's appeal to dark passions. A week after the appearance of his article in *Ha'aretz*, Ze'evi told a meeting of about 300 supporters in Tel Aviv: "The Palestinians in Judea-Samaria and Gaza are a festering sore, and in order to finish it—this cancer—it must not be allowed to develop."

On the night of August 8, in the town of Ohr Yehuda, near Tel Aviv, three Arab workers from Gaza were burned to death when the shack they were sleeping in was torched after the door had been locked from the outside. (Workers from the territories were not allowed to remain in Israel overnight, but thousands slept in makeshift shelters, in abominable conditions, the authorities generally turning a blind eye to the phenomenon.) The incident touched off riots in Gaza and several local youths were arrested. Toward the end of August, three other Ohr Yehuda residents, aged 20, 21, and 31, were arrested on suspicion of committing arson and conspiracy to commit murder after firebombs were thrown at a Jewish home in the town. The three had evidently planned a replay of the August 8 attack but had backed off at the last minute and had tried to create a "provocation" for which Arabs would be blamed. The mayor of Ohr Yehuda, Yitzhak Bukozba, paid a condolence visit to the family of one of the three workers who were burned to death, in Gaza. There were several incidents in which Arabs were beaten by Jews in Tel Aviv during August.

According to police statistics for 1988, the incidence of serious crime rose by 28.8

percent, and crimes involving violence were up by 5.7 percent. Of the offenders arrested inside the Green Line, 66 percent were Jews, 27 percent were Israeli Arabs (well above their proportion in the population), and 6.5 percent were Palestinians from the territories. The preoccupation of the police with *intifada*-related matters, primarily in Jerusalem and in Galilee, meant that fewer efforts could be devoted to other urgent matters, such as the war on drugs or efforts to reduce road accidents.

Observers on the Left professed to see an indirect endorsement of extremism in President Herzog's continued commuting of prison terms meted out to the members of the Jewish terrorist underground. On April 1, Yitzhak Ganiram and Ira Rappaport were released from prison after Herzog reduced their sentences by five-and-a-half and four-and-a-half months, respectively, along with a one-third reduction for good behavior. In this as in all the previous instances, the president explained his action by noting that the two had expressed "sincere contrition." Barak Nir, one of the five underground members who remained in prison (three of them serving life sentences for murder, which Herzog had reduced to 24 years), finished serving his four-year term, after getting a third off, on April 26. A private member's bill to further reduce the sentences of the underground members in prison by legislative fiat was narrowly defeated (58–53) in the Knesset on June 14; a previous attempt, about half a year earlier, had gained the support of only 40 religious and right-wing MKs.

Prime Minister Shamir, who voted in favor of both bills, on August 1 received in his office a delegation of the "Temple Mount Faithful," a small but highly vocal ultranationalist group that sought to restore "Jewish sovereignty" on the Temple Mount. According to a press release issued by the prime minister's media adviser, Shamir told the delegation that "he respects the struggle and persistence of the Temple Mount Faithful" and called for East Jerusalem to be "massively settled with Jews." Shamir added: "I am sure that many of your demands will be fulfilled in the coming years."

Religious Issues

The usually dormant issue of the exemption from military service of yeshivah students made headlines in 1988, perhaps due to the increased call-ups of reservists to deal with the *intifada*. On June 12, the High Court of Justice ruled that the Defense Ministry was empowered to defer the military service of yeshivah students, an arrangement dating back to 1948. Critics charged that over time the original intention—"deferral"—had in fact become "evasion." In 1988 the situation was that no more than 2 percent of those who received such deferrals actually did military service at a later stage. A division-sized body of yeshivah students, totaling some 20,000, was thus in practice exempted from serving in the IDF; defense establishment sources estimated that within five years this number would grow to 30,000, or 5.5 percent of Israel's military strength. In July the proposals of a subcommittee of the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, headed by MK Rabbi

Menahem Hacohen (Labor), for slashing the number of yeshivah students eligible for draft exemptions, were endorsed by the committee's plenum. However, the prospects for passage of the legislation required to implement this plan were poor, particularly after the gains made by the ultra-Orthodox parties in the Knesset elections. In the aftermath of those elections, on November 29, with the coalition talks—and the demands of the religious bloc—at their height, thousands of people attended a rally organized by 66 senior reserve officers against draft exemptions. This was followed some days later by a counterdemonstration of hundreds of ultra-Orthodox Jews who had done military service.

Other issues involving the religious-secular rift also cropped up in 1988. In May the High Court of Justice ruled that a woman appointed to serve on a local Religious Council could in fact serve. The case was that of Leah Shakdiel, an Orthodox woman from the Negev development town of Yeroham, whose installation on the council had been held up solely because of her sex. On October 25, Shakdiel became the first woman in Israel ever to take part in the meeting of a Religious Council as a full member. The country's (Orthodox) rabbinical establishment, in the form of the Supreme Rabbinical Council, railed against the decision, as it did against another High Court ruling under which the new Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Tel Aviv was elected by a body including women members. (For additional details on both cases, see AJYB 1989, pp. 418–419.)

The indirect clash between the two court systems, the religious and the secular, was also in evidence on the vexed issue of personal status, on which neither the executive nor the legislative branch was able or willing to take a definitive stance. On January 31, the High Court of Justice decided by a vote of 4–1 to accept the announcement of the attorney general that, with the Shoshana Miller case as a precedent, he had no objections to the Interior Ministry's registering as Jews three recent immigrants converted abroad by Reform rabbis. (For additional background, see AJYB 1989, pp. 417–418.) The three, Gail Moscowitch from the United States and Julia and Claudio Varella, a Brazilian couple, became the first Reform converts to be registered as Israelis under the Law of Return (Shoshana Miller left Israel before receiving her ID card, although legal efforts were under way to have her name entered in the Israeli population registry). In the meantime, the High Court began hearing a petition by two "messianic Jews," Jerry and Shirley Beresford, new immigrants from Zimbabwe, whom the Interior Ministry had also refused to register as Jews under the Law of Return.

Efforts by Minister Without Portfolio Yitzhak Peretz (Shas; he had resigned as interior minister over the Shoshana Miller case) to block the introduction of summer daylight-saving time were thwarted when the cabinet voted on February 14 for five months of an extra hour of daylight (April 10–September 4). Peretz had wanted summer time to end on August 13, since on the following day—the first day of the Hebrew month of Elul—Sephardi Jews began reciting the predawn daily prayers of penitence preceding the High Holy Days, several weeks before Ashkenazi Jews.

A long-standing issue was finally and formally resolved when the cabinet on May

8 approved the leasing of the land on Mount Scopus on which the Mormons' Jerusalem Center for Near Eastern Studies had been built. The approval, by a vote of 11–4 (three religious ministers and Ariel Sharon), followed the government's acceptance of the contract with the Mormons under which they promised not to engage in missionary activity. The institution, a branch of Brigham Young University, had already begun operating. (See also AJYB 1989, p. 419.)

Israel and World Jewry

THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL

On January 25, the prosecution began a weeklong summation of its case against Ukrainian-born John Demjanjuk, a 68-year-old retired auto worker from Cleveland who had been extradited from the United States, accused of being the notorious "Ivan the Terrible" ("*Ivan Grozny*") of the Treblinka death camp, where some 850,000 Jews had perished. Demjanjuk was charged on four counts under Israel's Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law of 1950, which carried a maximum penalty of death. The defendant admitted all the facts of the case but denied that he was Ivan. (For further background and a summary of the trial proceedings, see AJYB 1988, pp. 405–406, and AJYB 1989, pp. 419–422.) The prosecution devoted considerable efforts to establishing the authenticity of the ID card which placed Demjanjuk at the SS training camp at Trawnicki and later at Sobibor, although it did not mention Treblinka.

On April 18, the tribunal—Supreme Court Justice Dov Levin and two district court judges, Dalia Dorner and Zvi Tal—pronounced John Demjanjuk guilty as charged on all four counts: crimes against humanity, crimes against the Jewish people, war crimes, and crimes against persecuted persons. Taking turns, the judges took ten hours to read the 444-page verdict, at the end of which Justice Levin declared: "Therefore we have found that the accused is 'Ivan the Terrible.' " The judgment was based "first and foremost on the testimonies and statements of the identifying witnesses," the judges wrote, backed up by the Trawnicki ID card and "the false alibi and other lies of the accused and his incriminating behavior and statements." The judgment was delivered in the defendant's absence: Demjanjuk remained in his cell, saying he had severe back pains. However, his immediate family was present, every seat in the courtroom was taken, and the world media were present in force.

A week later, on April 25, Demjanjuk was brought to the court in a wheelchair to hear sentence pronounced. Judge Zvi Tal, himself a Holocaust survivor, read out the verdict. "Even a thousand deaths will not atone for [the defendant's] deeds," he asserted. "For such crimes there is no statue of limitations and no forgiveness." Tal concluded:

> True, the accused is not Eichmann, he did not initiate the Holocaust and he did not organize the slaughter of millions. But he served as chief executioner and with

> his own hands killed tens of thousands and willingly tortured, humiliated, abused, debased and persecuted these wretched people. Therefore, for the crimes he committed and for which he was convicted, we sentence him to death. . . .

The rest—in which Judge Tal announced that the accused had the right, and under Israeli law in the case of the death penalty, the obligation, to appeal the verdict—was drowned out as the packed courtroom erupted into a grotesque crescendo of applause, cries of "Death!" curses directed at defense lawyer Yoram Sheftel, the frenzied singing of "I Believe in the Coming of the Messiah" and "*Am Yisrael Chai*" ("Israel Lives"), and even dancing.

On June 30, the final day permitted under the law, Demjanjuk's lawyers filed a formal appeal in the Supreme Court against both the sentence and the verdict. Among the points adduced in the 100-page appeal were "press incitement" and a "lynch atmosphere," hostile statements by cabinet ministers and other public figures, the bench's interference in the defense's cross-questioning, and the failure of some survivors to identify the defendant. The bottom line, Sheftel and Paul Chumak argued, was that their client's guilt had not been proved "beyond a reasonable doubt."

However, on November 29, just days before the Supreme Court was scheduled to begin hearing the appeal, one of the defense lawyers, Dov Eitan, a 53-year-old former judge, leaped to his death from a Jerusalem office building. At Eitan's funeral two days later, a 70-year-old Jerusalem man, Israel Yehezkeli, whose family had perished at Treblinka, threw acid at Sheftel, injuring him in his left eye. As a result of these events, the Supreme Court postponed the hearing of Demjanjuk's appeal for six months, rescheduling it for May 4, 1989.

IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL

In what Immigrant Absorption Minister Yaakov Tzur termed a "historic" decision, the Jewish Agency Board of Governors decided in February to accept the principles of a report recommending that the Israeli government assume full responsibility for all matters pertaining to the absorption of immigrants in Israel. The report had been drawn up by a committee chaired by Dr. Israel Katz, director of the Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, and the underlying aim of the recommendations was to streamline the absorption process by eliminating duplication and reducing bureaucracy.

In the meantime, the Absorption Ministry was hardly overburdened: according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 13,034 *olim*, or new immigrants, arrived in Israel in 1988, approximately the same number as in the previous year. Some 42 percent of these arrivals—virtually all of them from Western democracies—were classified as "potential immigrants." One country from which immigration did increase was Argentina, by about 50 percent, to 1,546 persons, a development that was attributed to that country's economic crisis.

Arrivals from Africa numbered 1,334, of whom about a third were from the South

African Jewish community. In Israel, the last of the vexed personal-status problems that had plagued another African community, the Ethiopian Jews, since their arrival via "Operation Moses," was apparently resolved, though not without a further intervention by the judiciary. On October 23, the High Court of Justice accepted the petition of the Ethiopians' Beta Yisrael organization and ordered the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Absorption Ministry to establish within 90 days the Institute for the Heritage of Ethiopian Jewry. The court was critical of the foot dragging of the authorities on this matter, since agreement had been reached some three years earlier on the institute's creation as part of an arrangement by which Ethiopian Jews could forego ritual immersion (thus symbolically "converting" to Judaism at the demand of the Orthodox rabbinical establishment) before being allowed to marry. Following the court's ruling, the Chief Rabbinate appointed Rabbi David Chelouche, Sephardi chief rabbi of Netanya, as the marriage registrar for Ethiopian Jews. In early December Rabbi Chelouche conducted the ceremony at which Shlomo Akale married Makdes Mekonen Hiale, signifying the official integration of the Ethiopian Jewish community in Israel.

Soviet Jewish *olim* accounted for 2,283 of the new immigrants in 1988, slightly more than in the previous year, but constituting only about 11.5 percent of all the Jews who left the USSR during the year. A number of leading Soviet Jewish activists arrived in 1988, and by year's end virtually all the longtime refuseniks and former Prisoners of Zion had left the USSR. Yosef Begun, a 16-year refusenik and former Prisoner of Zion, was accorded a gala welcome at Ben-Gurion Airport on January 19; in February he was given a check for $43,000 at a ceremony in the Prime Minister's Office, as a winner (along with Sen. Henry Jackson of the United States and France's Simone Veil) of the 1983 Defender of Jerusalem Prize awarded him at the time *in absentia*. The distinguished mathematician Prof. Alexander Yoffe, a 12-year refusenik who had been given a professorship by the Haifa Technion in 1978, arrived in February, as did Prof. Alexander Lerner, aged 74, a world-class cybernetics specialist, who was appointed professor emeritus by the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot, and Alexei Magarik, a 29-year-old cellist and Hebrew teacher, believed to be the last Prisoner of Zion—he had been released in September 1987. March saw the arrival of Prof. Nahum Meiman, aged 77, a physicist whose knowledge of "state secrets" had been cause enough for the Soviets to prohibit his leaving; Lev Shapiro, aged 48, an electrical engineer and 11-year refusenik; and Ari and Ludmilla Volvovsky, 14-year refuseniks whose 19-year-old daughter had preceded them to Israel by four months. In July Gershon Zvi Rosenstein, a 15-year refusenik and a biophysicist who was known as the Habad ultra-Orthodox movement's "chief of operations" in the USSR, came to Israel.

In May Israel's large (196,000-strong) Russian-Jewish community formed a body named the Zionist Forum of Soviet Jewry to promote the interests of Russian immigrants, newcomers, and veterans, and to present a united front vis-à-vis the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency. The chairman of the new group was Natan Sharansky, and the executive included such well-known figures as Ida Nudel, Yosef Begun, Rabbi Eliahu Essas, and Yuli Edelstein. Later in the year, Sharansky and Nudel were involved in an exchange with the new Jewish Agency treasurer, former Herut MK Meir Shetreet. When the two former Prisoners of Zion had some stinging words for immigrant-absorption arrangements, Shetreet labeled them "slanderers" and perhaps revealed something of the gut feelings of many Israelis when he suggested that the money earmarked for Soviet immigrants could be better spent in preventing veteran Israelis from becoming emigrants.

A controversial issue was the decision by the cabinet on June 19 (by a vote of 16–2 and three abstentions) to compel Jews leaving the USSR with Israeli visas to proceed directly to Israel, with Bucharest named as the likely transit stop. The idea behind the move was to put a stop to what Absorption Minister Yaakov Tzur, speaking in the Knesset a few days before the vote, described as the "disgrace" of the "dropout" phenomenon—Soviet Jews who upon arrival in Vienna opted for destinations other than Israel. (In Bucharest this option would not exist.) However, the new arrangements remained largely on paper as they were opposed by the Netherlands, which represented Israeli interests in Moscow and issued the Israeli visas, and by the Soviet Union itself.

The Jewish Agency Assembly, meeting in Jerusalem in early July, unanimously endorsed a resolution "welcom[ing] the government of Israel's decision and initiative to secure direct flights from the Soviet Union to Israel for Soviet Jews who request an exit permit in order to reach Israel." However, this was largely neutralized when the assembly, taking note of "the Soviet policy on behalf of family reunifications," urged other governments to press Moscow to abide by its commitment to the Helsinki accords and "other international agreements regarding the right to leave." Such accords precluded the possibility of compelling immigrants to proceed to a specific destination, such as Israel. Many leading American Jewish organizations also objected to the Israeli cabinet decision.

AMERICAN JEWRY

Several issues produced strains in the relations between the American Jewish community and the Israeli political establishment in 1988. The aftermath of the Knesset elections, when ultra-Orthodox elements demanded passage of the "Who is a Jew?" amendment to the Law of Return as part of their price for joining either a Likud or Labor coalition, caused alarm and consternation among the overwhelming majority of American Jewry. (See the section on the election campaign, above, and "Jewish Communal Affairs," elsewhere in this volume.) Participants in the First International Jewish Feminist Conference, organized by the American Jewish Congress and held in Jerusalem in November, took the opportunity to express their opposition to the proposed change in the Law of Return by holding a demonstration in front of the Prime Minister's Office. Such legislation, the conference said, "would have particularly serious ramifications for Jewish women" because "the conversion of women to Judaism by non-Orthodox rabbis would render them and their children ineligible for [Israeli] citizenship under the Law of Return."

In conjunction with its first world gathering, held in Jerusalem in July, the Conservative movement asked the High Court of Justice to order the Jerusalem Religious Council to overturn its recent decision to withhold a *kashrut* permit from the movement's local youth hostel. On the Tisha be'Av fast day the conference delegates demonstrated outside the headquarters of the Chief Rabbinate. The Conservative movement's Rabbinical Assembly, which ordained the first four graduates of its Seminary of Judaic Studies in Jerusalem during the conference, urged the Knesset to abolish the Chief Rabbinate on the ground that it was a body alien to the Jewish tradition.

Israel's handling of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories also aggravated relations, especially in the early part of the year when Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced a policy permitting soldiers to beat demonstrators with truncheons. The officially declared policy appalled large numbers of American Jews, and many American Jewish leaders felt compelled to break with tradition and speak out publicly against the Israeli military actions they saw nightly on the TV news. Among the leaders who spoke out were Bertram Gold, acting executive vice-president of the American Jewish Committee, who deplored the use of "brute force" which "evokes other times and places when it was used against us"; Hadassah president Ruth Popkin, who said she was having a "hard time believing Rabin would have said something like that. . . . That is not the Israeli way and it is not the Jewish way"; and four intellectuals—Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, the writer Irving Howe, the economist and former dean of Harvard University Henry Rosovsky, and the political scientist Michael Walzer—who sent a letter to the *New York Times* stating that they had "read with shame reports of house to house beatings of hundreds of people, leading to broken bones and hospitalization of the aged and children."

Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, fired off a cable to President Chaim Herzog in which he said he was "deeply troubled and pained" but could not "remain silent" in the face of a policy that was "self-defeating and, therefore, counterproductive." In a letter of response to Rabbi Schindler (January 25), President Herzog asserted that there had been "no order to beat indiscriminately," and that "steps [had] been taken to ensure" that any possible "divergences and irregularities" would not recur. Herzog then linked the events in the territories to "the wave of Khomeinism which threatens our area" and drew a comparison between Israeli actions and measures taken by other countries, both in the Middle East and by Western democracies such as Britain (in Northern Ireland) and the United States (Kent State, Watts County, and Newark). "The issue is a far wider one than that of Israel's image," Herzog wrote, adding that "the picture as reflected by the all too simplistic presentation on the television screens abroad evades the issue."

More blunt was the Israeli consul-general in New York, Moshe Yegar, who said that criticism of Israel by American Jews was an "unfriendly" act and belied protestations by such critics that they were "friends of Israel and strong Zionists." In an effort to tone down the debate, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and nine other groups, a total of 51 bodies, issued a somewhat equivocal statement, on the one hand supporting Israel's "legitimate efforts to oppose terrorism and violence" and accepting the concept that the uprising was part of the decades-long pattern in which "the Palestinian Arabs have been exploited and victimized by the Arab world"; but on the other hand noting that both President Herzog and Prime Minister Shamir had given "assurances . . . that the policy of restraint continues." The signatories said they had conveyed their "concern" to the Israeli government over "any departures in contradiction of this longstanding policy and practice."

In early March, when a delegation of the Presidents' Conference visited Israel, Prime Minister Shamir was on the eve of a crucial visit to Washington at the height of his efforts to stifle the peace initiative of Secretary of State Shultz. Shamir sought to convince the group that American Jewry must muzzle itself. American Jews, he told the 44-member mission, must not permit themselves "to be used in the campaign against us," irrespective of their opinions. Such criticism would play straight into the hands of Israel's enemies, Shamir warned, and the Arabs would turn it to their advantage by "driving a wedge between Israel and American Jewry" and ultimately between Israel and the United States. In an interview in the *Jerusalem Post* two days before his trip, Shamir reaffirmed the principle of nonintervention by the Diaspora in Israeli affairs: "Israel and its citizens alone must decide on fateful diplomatic and security matters."

At all events, on March 14, Shamir could well believe that his message had sunk in, and both he and the U.S. administration could believe that American Jewry was solidly behind him, as 3,000 young UJA fund-raisers gave him a resounding welcome at a banquet held in the Washington Hilton two days before his meeting with President Reagan. Shamir told the enthusiastic gathering that the violence in the territories was in fact an all-out "war," adding that only Israel's citizens could determine their destiny.

Other Domestic Matters

POPULATION

Israel's population stood at approximately 4,472,000 at the end of 1988, comprising 3,656,000 Jews (81.8 percent), 633,000 Muslims (14.2 percent), 105,000 Christians (2.3 percent), and 78,000 Druze and members of other faiths (1.7 percent). The total population increased by 1.5 percent, as compared with 1.7 percent in 1987.

Data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics in conjunction with Israel's 40th anniversary showed that the largest ethnic group among Israeli Jews was the Moroccan community, totaling 488,000 persons, followed by persons of Polish (297,000), Romanian (277,000), and Iraqi (266,000) origin. Those who warned of the so-called "demographic threat," notably a Committee on the Demographic Problem that was formed in August with the participation of former Foreign Ministry director-general David Kimche and former cabinet secretary Arye Naor, with the aim of countering the public's "terrible ignorance" in this area, pointed to the fact that in Israel and the territories combined, Arab children aged eight and under already outnumbered Jewish children by 40,000 (630,000 to 590,000), and that by the end of the century there would be more Arabs under the age of 18 than Jews (1.4 million to 1.3 million). Even in Israel proper, fully half the Muslim population was below the age of 17, and whereas the number of Jewish births in 1988 remained stable at 74 percent of the total, the number of Muslim births increased by 10 percent during the year due to the ongoing increase in the number of Muslim women of child-bearing age.

HEALTH-CARE CRISIS

In 1988 Israel's once vaunted public health-care system experienced the culmination of a deep structural crisis that had been building up for some years. A strike in early February—at a time when some medical professionals had already been "working to rule" for some time—by clerks, sanitation workers, and lab workers in 32 government hospitals, created chaotic and unsanitary conditions that lasted for the better part of the month. Doctors stepped up their sanctions in March, and hospital directors warned that the system was on the verge of collapse.

Doctors in hospitals run by Kupat Holim Clalit (the Histadrut-run medical insurance scheme which covered the majority of Israelis) performed only emergency operations. They were protesting the Treasury's refusal to accept a pay-raise agreement they had signed with the Kupat Holim management, which had triggered sanctions by surgeons in government-run hospitals who demanded equal terms. The feeling in the Labor party was that Finance Minister Moshe Nissim was out to "break" Kupat Holim, the Histadrut's flagship (all persons covered medically by Kupat Holim Clalit were compelled to become Histadrut members) for political purposes. By April, Kupat Holim hospitals were operating on a strictly emergency basis and the sanctions by doctors in government hospitals were in their fourth month. On June 5, the cabinet decided to establish a judicial commission to examine the entire structure of the health-care system and make recommendations.

In the meantime, the sanctions by hospital staff continued unabated, with doctors insisting on a permanent second-shift arrangement that would both eliminate the backlog of operations and other medical procedures and augment their salaries. Besides the hospital sanctions, services by Magen David Adom came to a near standstill as 900 MDA personnel protested the nonpayment of their wages, and 3,000 nurses began a "collective summer vacation" to prod the government into upholding an earlier agreement with them. On July 10, 12 MKs began a seven-day hunger strike to demonstrate their outrage at the government's "indifference to the collapsing health care system." On July 15 the doctors rejected a proposal for a temporary second shift, but did agree to enter into negotiations with the Health Ministry and gradually abandoned their sanctions. On October 6, doctors in the 14 Kupat Holim hospitals said they were returning to a normal schedule after getting a "commitment" from management that a second-shift schedule would soon be introduced. The following day a delegation of doctors from government hospitals met with Finance Minister Nissim to seek wage parity with their colleagues in Kupat Holim.

The restoration of regular hospital service came not a moment too soon, as September and October saw a polio scare and it was decided to vaccinate everyone in Israel and the territories below the age of 40. The polio virus was found in the sewage of 27 of 70 localities examined. The outbreak, which claimed one life and infected 11 other persons, and was apparently caused or exacerbated by the country's inadequate sewerage system, was officially declared over in mid-November, after nearly 3.5 million Israelis and another million people in the territories had been vaccinated.

ISRAELI ARABS

Israel's Arab population was in the news in 1988 primarily because of its declared solidarity—which sometimes went beyond mere words—with the uprising in the territories. (See the section on the *intifada*.) Various politicians and "security sources" warned of "irredentist tendencies" among the country's Arab population that were being intensified by the uprising. At a mass rally in Nazareth on January 23, Labor MK Abdel Wahab Darousha called Defense Minister Rabin a "murderer" and announced his resignation from the Labor party; he was later elected to the Knesset at the head of an all-Arab party. In March the Communist party's Nazareth-based daily *al-Ithihad* was shut down for a week by the Interior Ministry, ostensibly for publishing "inflammatory articles." However, as this measure was enacted six days before the annual Land Day general strike, some observers saw it as an attempt to prevent possible incitement connected with that day. Land Day itself was relatively quiet in Israel, in striking contrast to the situation in the territories.

That Israel's Arabs had legitimate grievances of their own was documented in a comprehensive report issued by the International Center for Peace in the Middle East. Summing up the results of a study conducted by a Jewish-Arab research team headed by Prof. Henry Rosenfeld of Haifa University, the report, entitled *The Condition and Status of the Arabs in Israel*, found that their condition was generally deplorable and their status second-class.

"Startling and alarming" was the report's description of the situation in the realm of social welfare. Fully 40 percent of all Israeli Arab families were found to be subsisting below the poverty line, with many homes lacking even the most basic facilities. (Following the polio outbreak, the deputy mayor of the Galilee village of Rama, Basep Ghattas, told a Technion symposium on the state of the country's sewerage systems that because the government had failed to approve building plans, public sanitation in Arab villages had deteriorated to "catastrophic" levels and the polio rate among Israeli Arabs was 17 times higher than among Israeli Jews.) The dropout rate from the educational system was 46 percent for Israeli Arab teenagers leaving school (despite the existence of the compulsory education law), as compared with 6.3 percent for Jewish teenagers. The disparity between the country's majority and minority population groups was equally pronounced in housing. While only 1.1 percent of Israeli Jews lived in conditions of severe overcrowding, in Arab locales the figure was 26.4 percent.

The report's most damning finding was that in many cases these conditions were the result of deliberate government policy which in practice resulted in discrimination. The lack of government-approved master plans for Arab villages had already been addressed in the Markowitz Report in 1987 (AJYB 1989, p. 429). In 1988, about 460 illegally constructed buildings, many of them dwellings, were demolished in the Arab sector. When 15 such structures were demolished in the village of Taibe on a single day, November 7, three days of rioting ensued, followed by a general strike of the country's entire Arab population on November 15. Israeli Arab leaders reiterated their long-standing contention that the government's land-expropriations policy, combined with the absence of master plans for towns and villages, had left the Arab population no choice but to build "illegal" homes. A statement released by the Interior Ministry on November 7 said that the structures that had been demolished in Taibe had been built "on agricultural land where construction is prohibited and thus constituted a provocation against the rule of law."

40TH-ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

The muted atmosphere in Israel caused by the *intifada* had its effect on the planned events and celebrations to mark the 40th anniversary of the state's establishment. Aggravating the gloomy mood was a steep decline in incoming tourism. In the evening of Independence Day some 45,000 people gathered at Ramat Gan National Stadium to view a pageant staged by the IDF which was also televised live. Among the winners of the Israel Prize for lifetime achievements—traditionally awarded on Independence Day evening—were Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek, the Talmud scholar Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, the educator and community activist Arye Lova Eliav, and the veteran singer Shoshana Damari. The original Declaration of Independence was on display at the Knesset, and in Tel Aviv the document's signing in 1948 was reenacted.

An extravaganza to mark the closing of the 40th-anniversary celebrations (October 13) was a performance at the foot of Masada of Mahler's Second (*Resurrection*)

Symphony by the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra under the baton of Zubin Mehta. Gregory Peck, Yves Montand, and other notables also took part. Four thousand tickets were available, from $150 and up, and the majority were sold abroad. The biggest scheduled event of all, a performance of Verdi's opera *Nabucco* outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem, at a cost of $11.5 million within the framework of the Israel Festival/Jerusalem, was canceled, reportedly because the *intifada* had deterred financial backers, though production problems were also cited.

Culture

THE ARTS

As part of the country's 40th-anniversary celebrations, the Tel Aviv Municipality and the Ministry of Education and Culture sponsored a Festival of Original Plays composed of seven new productions and eight revivals of classic Israeli dramas. The most controversial of the new works was Yehoshua Sobol's *Jerusalem Syndrome*, ostensibly about ultranationalist extremism during the Jewish revolt in 70 CE but with clear allusions to modern-day Israel. Sobol, some of whose plays, notably *A Jewish Soul* and *The Palestinian Woman*, had infuriated the Israeli Right in the past, said the new production was meant as a statement about nationalist fanaticism as such. When Herut and Tehiya hotheads tried to shout down the performers at a performance in Tel Aviv on January 9, fistfights and heated verbal exchanges broke out in the audience. About a week later both Sobol and Gedalia Besser, the artistic directors of the Haifa Municipal Theater, announced their resignation because of "unrelenting interference by politicians" in their work.

The year's major sustained cultural offering, the Israel Festival/Jerusalem (May 14–June 11), sold 100,000 tickets of the 130,000 available—a percentage that the festival's artistic director, Oded Kotler, said was more than creditable given the distinctly unfestive atmosphere generated by the Palestinian uprising, and nowhere more so (in Israel) than Jerusalem. The festival offerings included a Habimah production of *The Dybbuk* directed by Poland's Andrzej Wajda and a staging of the classic Yiddish play in dance form by the Maurice Bejart Ballet.

At the 5th International Jerusalem Film Festival, organized by the Israel Film Archive/Jerusalem Cinematheque, more than 100 films were screened in ten days (June 30–July 9). Filmmakers from Asia (including Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), Africa (Tanzania, Mali, and Senegal), and Eastern Europe (notably the USSR, which also sent an official delegation, the first Soviet cultural delegation to visit Israel since 1967) were represented. The 19 Israeli feature films released in 1988 drew about two million viewers, or 16 percent of the total number of tickets sold to films in Israel during the year (12.5 million). Two of the most interesting Israeli features were *Avia's Summer*, set in Palestine under the British Mandate, and based on the childhood experiences of the film's star and director, the veteran actress Gila

Almagor, who had already scored major local successes with book and stage versions; and *Because of That War*, a powerful documentary directed by Orna Ben-Dor Niv, relating the stories of two Holocaust survivors, one from Warsaw and the other from Salonika, and the devastating effect their wartime experiences had on their children, Yehuda Poliker, an Israeli rock star, and Ya'acov Gilad, a producer/songwriter who was Poliker's collaborator. In 1987 Poliker had released an extraordinary album called *Ashes and Dust* which sold 50,000 copies in Israel despite—or, some would say, because of—its theme: the Holocaust and its impact on the "second generation."

In October the Interior Ministry's Film and Theater Censorship Board banned Martin Scorsese's film *The Last Temptation of Christ* for screening in Israel. The vote was 16–3 and followed heavy pressure exerted by local Christian activists and pro-Israeli fundamentalist groups abroad. The producers and the local distributors were expected to appeal the banning to the Supreme Court.

A musical event that seemed to have carved out a solid niche for itself, both locally and internationally, was the Red Sea Jazz Festival, held in Eilat at the end of August. Some 15,000 tickets were sold for the four-day event, which featured 21 groups and individual artists, a third of them from abroad. In the realm of classical music, a major event was the first-ever visit to Israel by the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra, an event whose political overtones were unmistakable, given the cool relations between Israel and Austria since the Waldheim election. Jerusalemites accorded the orchestra no more than a "correct" reception—despite the fact that the guest conductor was Leonard Bernstein, an immensely popular figure in Israel—but in Tel Aviv, where the audiences were apparently less politically motivated, the orchestra's performances of Mahler's Sixth Symphony drew rapturous ovations.

JUDAICA

April saw the opening of a spacious new wing for Jewish ceremonial art at the Israel Museum, where viewers could marvel at the 500-year-old "Rothschild Miscellany" and rare items from the fabled Stieglitz collection. In June the museum exhibited part of the "Aleppo Codex," the earliest known manuscript of the full text of the Bible, compiled in Tiberias more than a thousand years ago. The "Codex" survived the upheavals in the Middle East over the centuries, being housed in Jerusalem, Cairo, and finally in Aleppo, Syria, where it was thought to have been destroyed when a mob set fire to the Aleppo synagogue in 1947, in the wake of the UN resolution to partition Palestine. However, although about a quarter of the priceless document had been ravaged, the remnant was smuggled into Israel via Turkey in 1958 and presented to then President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi.

The Second International Judaica Fair, held in May at the Jerusalem Convention Center, drew enthusiastic crowds to view ritual objects, manuscripts, paintings, and other items. The fair culminated in an auction conducted by Sotheby's at which collectors spent a total of about $1 million, including $92,000 for an 18th-century German spice box and $47,300 for an illuminated 1732 *ketubah* (marriage contract) from Padua—the highest price ever paid at auction for a *ketubah*.

On August 30, the Israel Museum announced that it had received from an anonymous donor a tiny ivory pomegranate, 1.68 inches high, which was apparently in use in King Solomon's Temple nearly three millennia ago—the first relic ever attributed to the First Temple. The pomegranate, which bore an incised inscription in ancient Hebrew script ("Belonging to the Temple of the Lord, holy to the priests"), was probably carried on a scepter as part of the Temple ritual. It was purchased as a gift to the museum for $550,000 by "an anonymous friend of Israel from Basel, Switzerland," in the words of a Tourism Ministry press release.

ARCHAEOLOGY

In April the Israel Museum mounted a major exhibition of finds from the Chalcolithic period in the area of present-day Israel. Many of the 6,000-year-old items were on public display for the first time. In October the Hebrew University of Jerusalem announced that a team headed by Prof. Amihai Mazar of the university's School of Archaeology and Prof. Pierre de Miroschejdi of the French Research Center in Jerusalem had discovered the remains of a 5,000-year-old temple near the town of Beit Shemesh, southwest of Jerusalem. The temple and its associated cultic objects were expected to help further the understanding of the development of religion and society in the area some 2,000 years before the appearance there of the people of Israel as a nation. The excavation was funded by the National Geographic Society.

In May the extensive ruins of the Roman and Byzantine city of Beit She'an, featuring a large and well-preserved Roman amphitheater, were officially opened to the public. Local promoters were heartened by forecasts that the site would eventually draw half a million tourists a year, who would provide a much-needed economic injection for a sleepy town best known as the home of Herut's David Levy and as a way station between the Jordan Rift Valley and the country's north—its strategic location, indeed, having been the reason for its importance to the ancients.

Egypt demanded that Israel give back all the archaeological finds, apparently numbering in the thousands, which it had removed from the Sinai desert during the Israeli occupation of the peninsula from 1967–1982. In the meantime, the *Jerusalem Post* reported, quoting the director of the Israeli Academic Center in Cairo, that Egypt was prohibiting Israeli archaeologists from conducting excavations in the Sinai and even from taking part in international digs.

Personalia

On February 23, President Chaim Herzog was reelected for a second (and final) five-year term by the Knesset, by a vote of 82–2 in a secret ballot. A surprisingly large number of MKs (18) chose to cast blank ballots. Herzog took the oath of allegiance on May 9, officially beginning his new term.

Two key appointments were made in the security sphere. On April 1, the interim Shin Bet director appointed following the resignation of Avraham Shalom in the wake of the No. 300 bus scandal was replaced by a permanent chief. The name of the Shin Bet's director would not be made public while he held office, but it was revealed that the interim head for 18 months had been Yosef Harmelin, who had previously headed the Shin Bet from 1964–1975. The resignation of Amiram Nir, the prime minister's antiterrorism adviser who was implicated in the Iran-*contra* affair, also took effect on April 1. Nir, who had been appointed by Shimon Peres and had held the post for more than three years, was replaced a month later by Col. Yigal Carmon, a former intelligence officer who had also served in the Civil Administration in the occupied territories. (On December 1, Nir, aged 38, was killed in a plane crash in Mexico.)

Changes also occurred in the Supreme Court. On April 26, Justice Menachem Eilon was named the court's deputy president, replacing Justice Miriam Ben-Porat who retired at the mandatory age of 70. However, Justice Ben-Porat did not remain inactive for long: on June 14, she was elected state comptroller by the Knesset (the vote was 67–16, and 13 abstentions), following the resignation from that post of Judge Yaakov Malz (May 15)—after only a year—in order to be appointed a Supreme Court justice. Ben-Porat took up her duties as state comptroller and ombudswoman on July 4.

Personalities who died during the year included Prof. Ze'ev Vilnai, an Israel Prize winner who was a renowned geographer, veteran guide, and prolific author about the Land of Israel, on January 21, aged 88; Ilona Feher, famed violin teacher whose pupils included Shlomo Mintz and Shmuel Ashkenazi, on February 1, aged 86; Rafi Nelson, colorful founder of the Eilat holiday village near Taba, on February 6, aged 58; Prof. Yosef Nedava, historian of the Revisionist movement and a founding member of the Greater Israel Movement and the Tehiya party, on February 18, aged 73; Yehoshua Rotenstreich, an eminent lawyer who served as chairman of the Israel Press Council and was a senior member of the commission of inquiry into the Pollard affair, on March 10, aged 78; Alexander Bein, Israel Prize laureate in Zionist historiography and Israel's first State Archivist (1956–1971), on June 21, aged 85; Ya'ir Hurvitz, a major Israeli poet of the 1970s and 1980s who was awarded the Alterman Prize and the Prime Minister's Prize for Creativity, on July 26, aged 49; Zerubavel Gilad, a veteran poet who wrote the "anthem" of the prestate Palmach underground, on August 12, aged 75; Prof. Akiva Ernst Simon, Israel Prize laureate for education and an activist in promoting Jewish-Arab coexistence, on August 18, aged 89; Siona Tagger, a veteran artist who blended Western impressionism with a distinctive vision of the orient, on June 15, aged 89; Prof. Shmuel Ettinger, renowned historian who carried out path-breaking studies of anti-Semitism, president of the Israel Historical Society, and director of the Center for Research and Documentation of East European Jewry, on September 22, aged 69; Oved Ben-Ami, a leading industrialist who was considered the father of the Israeli diamond industry and who founded the city of Netanya and served as its mayor for 42 years, on October 17, aged 83; Menachem Savidor, the Speaker of the 10th Knesset and a longtime Liberal-party activist, on November 2, aged 70; Baruch Venger, who presided over the growth of the Galilee development town of Carmiel to a booming city of 20,000, serving as mayor since 1973, on November 22, aged 58; and Bernard Cherrick, longtime vice-president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who was dubbed "Mr. University" for his tireless efforts on its behalf, on November 22, aged 74.

RALPH MANDEL

World Jewish Population, 1988

Updated Estimates

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS UPDATES, for the end of 1988, of the Jewish population estimates for the various countries of the world.[1] The estimates reflect some of the results of a prolonged and ongoing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry.[2] Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including replies to direct inquiries regarding current estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of a worldwide set of estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties. Information on the quality of the estimate for each country is provided below, through a simple accuracy rating scale.

Over 96 percent of world Jewry is concentrated in ten countries. The aggregate of these ten major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of the size of total world Jewry. The figures for 1988 have been updated from those for 1986 in accordance with the known or estimated changes in the interval—vital events (i.e., births and deaths), identificational changes (accessions and secessions), and migrations. In addition, some corrections have been introduced in the light of newly accrued information on Jewish population. Corresponding corrections have also been applied retrospectively to the 1986 figures, which appear below in revised summary (see table 1), so as to allow for comparison with the 1988 estimates.

The 1988 estimates were compiled in 1989, toward the end of the decade of the 1980s. By now, a new round of decennial population censuses is under way throughout the countries of the world. Those countries which include information on religion and/or ethnic group (or ancestry) in their census, specifying the Jews as a separate category, are expected to furnish updated counts of their self-declared Jews. The most important instance is the Soviet Union, which took its new census somewhat earlier, in January 1989, though no results by ethnic group (religion is not inquired into) had been released by the time of this writing. Other countries from which new census figures on national Jewish populations are expected include Canada, Brazil, Switzerland, South Africa, and Australia.

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[1] The previous estimates, as of 1986, were first published in AJYB, vol. 88, 1988, pp. 412–27, and reprinted in a condensed version in AJYB, vol. 89, 1989, pp. 433–41.

[2] Many of these activities have been carried out by, or in coordination with, the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

In addition, the world's largest Jewish population—that of the United States—will be investigated in 1990 by means of a scientifically designed national sample survey, under the auspices of the Council of Jewish Federations. The feasibility of Jewish-sponsored national sample surveys is being considered in other countries as well. Thus, while many of the estimates presented here for 1988 are updates ultimately traceable to data collections conducted around 1980 or even earlier, this new round of basic information intake is expected to provide the needed empirical data for several prominent Diaspora populations. This documentation will be duly taken into account in compiling our future sets of Jewish population estimates.

Israel took its latest census in 1983, but has constantly updated statistics of its Jewish population size.

Jewish Population Trends

Diaspora Jews are highly dispersed. In most countries their number is now rather small, and they constitute no more than a minute fraction of the entire population. Consequently, though Jews tend to cluster in large cities, they are greatly exposed to assimilation. While the assimilatory process leads to demographic losses for the Jewish population, there may also be gains through accession of persons who were born as non-Jews. It is the net balance of the identificational changes that matters demographically; in the longer run, though, the cohesion of a Diaspora population may be affected as well.[3]

The Jews in most countries of the Diaspora are demographically characterized by very low fertility, considerable outmarriage (which may involve losses of children to the Jewish population),[4] some other net assimilatory losses, and great aging. Since an increased proportion of elderly in the population usually implies not only many deceased but also a reduced proportion of persons of reproductive age—and therefore relatively fewer births—the aging of a population has the effect of reducing the birthrate and raising the death rate. There are differences in the levels of these demographic factors among the Jews in various regions and countries. In all major Diaspora populations, the joint balance of the natural and identificational changes is now close to nil or outrightly negative, with the Jewish deceased frequently outnumbering newborn Jews. These negative tendencies have been taken into account in updating the estimates of Jews in many countries.

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[3] A fuller discussion of the subject can be found in U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," AJYB, vol. 81, 1981, pp. 61–117. See also *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1984), by the same author.

[4] If less than half of the children of the outmarried are themselves Jews.

With regard to the balance of external migrations, there is no regularity among the various Diaspora populations or even in the same population over time. Where the migratory balance is positive—e.g., in North America—it counteracts or even outweighs any numerically negative influence of internal demographic developments. Where the migratory balance is negative, it may cause, or aggravate, the decrease of a Jewish population. In 1987–1988, the overall volume of international migrations of Jews was rather modest, primarily because of the restricted outflow of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

In contrast, Jews in Israel incur virtually no outmarriages and direct assimilatory losses. Moreover, until the early 1980s they tended to have a positive migration balance. They have a younger age structure than Diaspora Jews and the general populations of the developed countries and exhibit a fairly high level of fertility. The previously substantial fertility differentials between Jews in-gathered in Israel from Asia-Africa and Europe-America are no longer in evidence. Remarkably, European Jews in Israel have not participated in the drastic fertility decline that has characterized the developed nations and particularly the Diaspora Jews during the last few decades, but have actually raised their fertility somewhat. In recent years, both major origin groups among Israel's Jews have displayed a fertility level surpassing not only the vast majority of Diaspora Jewry but also the general populations in the developed countries.

In the overall demographic balance of World Jewry, the natural increase of Israel has, so far, made up for losses in the Diaspora. But such compensation will not be possible for much longer. As a consequence of the intensifying demographic deficit in the Diaspora, a trend for some reduction in the total number of the world's Jews may soon be setting in.[5] The relative share of Israel among world Jewry is on the increase.

Difficulties in Estimating Jewish Population Size in the Diaspora

Some of the difficulties involved in estimating the size of Jewish Diaspora populations are common to all aspects of the study of Diaspora demography.[6] They are mainly due to the great geographical scattering of Jews—a factor that makes multiple data collection mandatory but also hinders its feasibility; to their unusually strong demographic dynamics in many respects—migrations, social mobility, family formation patterns (including outmarriage), etc.; and to lacunae of available demographic information, which is deficient in both quantity and quality.

More specific difficulties in estimating the up-to-date size of Jewish populations are due to conceptual and measurement problems.

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[5] *Aliyah* and *yeridah*—immigration to, and emigration from, Israel—obviously constitute only internal transfers within the global Jewish framework.

[6] Reliable figures are currently forthcoming for the Jews of Israel from official statistics which need not be discussed here.

When mixed couples and households are not infrequent, it is necessary to distinguish between the "actually Jewish population" and the "enlarged Jewish population." The latter comprises also the non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.) of the Jews. However socially significant the non-Jewish household members (and more distant non-Jewish relatives) of the Jews may be, they should not be included in a count of Jews. The paradoxical situation that exists is that growth of an enlarged Jewish population may be associated with contraction of the respective actually Jewish population.

Another vexing problem is identificational changes among Jews. Under present conditions, there are Jews who have not formally embraced another religion, yet are either very estranged ("marginal") or have even become resolutely alienated from Judaism and the Jewish community and, if questioned, disclaim being Jews any longer. When a census or survey is taken which inquires into religion or ethnicity, these individuals have an opportunity to define their current status subjectively.[7] In general, the practice of self-determination is followed in all relevant censuses and surveys.[8] This applies to marginal individuals, converts to Judaism (although some of the conversions may be contested between the various ideological trends—Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform), and to all other persons who claim to be Jews. In estimating the size of a Jewish population, it is usual to include, in principle, all marginal individuals who have not ceased to be Jews.

Particular difficulties exist with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe, whose Jewish populations were drastically reduced during and after World War II. Prolonged antireligious policies in these countries have had a negative effect on the identity of genealogically Jewish persons, many of whom may have severed—insofar as it depends on themselves—all links with Jewishness. The resulting uncertainties have led to wishful thinking and account for the widely differing estimates of Jews that have been circulated for these countries.

Not a few Jews (like other persons) have some residential status in more than one country.[9] This may be due to business requirements, professional assignments in foreign countries, climatic differences between countries, migrants staying temporarily in prolonged transit, etc. The danger of double-counting or omissions is inherent in such situations. The situation is particularly critical regarding some countries in Central and tropical South America, Africa, and East Asia, where the relatively few Jews living permanently may be outnumbered by a floating Jewish population of people who are not tourists but who are in residence for temporary periods. As far as possible, we have tried to account for such persons only once, giving precedence to the usual country of residence.

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[7] Misreporting of Jews in official censuses is a different issue; see below.

[8] Persons who disclaim being Jews at some stage of life may change their minds later.

[9] The problem is even more acute with regard to residential status in more than one locality of the same country. This may adversely affect the accuracy of Jewish population reporting for individual countries through omissions or, more likely, double-counting.

Figures on Jews from population censuses are unavailable for most Diaspora communities, though they do exist for some important ones. Even where census statistics on Jews are forthcoming, they are usually scant, because the Jews are a small minority. There have been instances where detailed tabulations on Jews have been undertaken, through Jewish initiative, from official census material; examples are Canada, South Africa, and Argentina. In some countries serious problems exist, or are feared to exist, in the reporting of Jews as such: individuals may prefer not to describe themselves as Jews, or non-Jews may be erroneously included as Jews (as has happened in some Latin American countries). These problems require statistical evaluation whose feasibility and conclusiveness depend on the relevant information available.

Surveys are the only way of obtaining comprehensive information on Jewish population in the absence of official censuses. Jewish-sponsored surveys have the additional advantage of being able to inquire into matters of specifically Jewish interest, e.g., Jewish education, observances, and attitudes. However, since they address themselves to a small and scattered minority with identification problems, surveys are not easy to conduct competently and may encounter difficulties with regard to both coverage and response, especially with regard to marginal Jews. Again, these aspects require evaluation. Countrywide surveys have been undertaken in the United States, South Africa, France, Italy, Netherlands, etc. Local surveys have been carried out in many U.S. cities, in the United Kingdom, Latin America, Australia, etc. However, these local initiatives have so far been uncoordinated with regard to content and method.

In certain countries or localities, Jewish community registers include all, or the largest part, of the Jewish population. Often the same communities keep records of Jewish vital events—especially marriages performed with a Jewish ceremony and Jewish burials. However, communal registers tend to cover mixed households insufficiently. In addition, although the amount and quality of updating vary from place to place, community registers generally lag behind the actual situation of the respective Jewish populations.

Many estimates of Jewish populations for which no solid data from censuses or surveys exist are regrettably of unspecified or dubious source and methodology.

Besides the conceptual and measurement difficulties affecting the figures for a Jewish population at any base date, similar problems recur with regard to the updating information which should account for all the various types of changes in the time elapsed since that base date. For vital events and identificational changes, age-sex-specific models can be of use; these may be applied after studying the evolution of the respective or similar Jewish populations. With regard to the migratory balance in any updating interval, concrete information must be gathered, because of the above-mentioned irregularity, over time, in the intensity of many migratory streams.

Presentation of Data

The detailed estimates of Jewish population distribution in each continent (tables 2–6 below) refer to residents in countries with at least 100 Jews. A residual estimate of "other" Jews living in smaller communities, or staying temporarily in transit accommodations, supplements some of the continental totals. For each of the reported countries, the four columns in the table provide the United Nations estimate of midyear 1988 total population,[10] the estimated end-1988 Jewish population, the proportion of Jews per 1,000 of total population, and a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimates.

There is wide variation in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries it would be best to indicate a range (minimum-maximum) rather than a definite figure for the number of Jews. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. Yet, the figures actually indicated for most of the Diaspora countries should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely to the accuracy of the estimate.

ACCURACY RATING

The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each estimate are the nature of the base data, the recency of the base data, and the method of updating. A simple code combining these elements is used to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of the Jewish population figures reported in the detailed tables below. The code indicates different quality levels of the reported estimates: (A) base figure derived from countrywide census or relatively reliable Jewish population surveys; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the intervening period; (B) base figure derived from less accurate but recent countrywide Jewish population investigation; partial information on population movements in the intervening period; (C) base figure derived from less recent sources, and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of Jewish population in country; updating according to demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends; and (D) base figure essentially conjectural; no reliable updating procedure. In categories (A), (B), and (C), the years in which the base figures or important partial updates were obtained are also stated.

For countries whose Jewish population estimate of 1988 was not only updated but also revised in the light of improved information, the sign "X" is appended to the accuracy rating.

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[10] See United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, *Population and Vital Statistics Report: Data Available as of July 1, 1989*. Statistical Papers, ser. A, vol. 41, no. 3 (New York, 1989).

Distribution of World Jewish Population by Major Regions

Table 1 gives an overall picture for 1988 as compared to 1986. For 1986 the originally published estimates are presented along with somewhat revised figures that take into account, retrospectively, the corrections made in 1988 in certain country estimates, in the light of improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase of world Jewry's estimated size by 4,500. Some explanations are given below for the relevant countries.

The size of world Jewry at the end of 1988 is assessed at 12,979,000, or slightly below 13 million. According to the revised figures, the estimated growth between 1986 and 1988 was negligible—only 6,600 people, or about three per 10,000 annually. Despite all the imperfections in the estimates, it is clear that world Jewry is in the state of "zero population growth," with the natural increase in Israel compensating for demographic decline in the Diaspora.

The number of Jews in Israel rose from a figure of 3,562,500 in 1986 to 3,659,000 at the end of 1988, a change of +1.3 percent annually. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora declined from 9,409,900 (according to the revised figures) to 9,320,000, a change of -0.5 percent annually. These changes were almost entirely due to internal demographic evolution, since the net migratory balance between the Diaspora and Israel amounted to no more than 3,300 during these two years (Israel gained migrants on balance). By the end of 1988, Israel's Jews constituted about 28.2 percent of total world Jewry.

About half of the world's Jews reside in the Americas, with 46 percent in North America. Twenty-eight percent live in Asia—excluding the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey—nearly all of them in Israel. Europe—including the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey—accounts for 20 percent of the total. The proportions of the world's Jews who live in Africa and Oceania are very small.

Among the major geographical regions listed in table 1, the number of Jews in Israel—and, in consequence, in total Asia—increased by more than 2 percent in the two-year span 1987–1988. The total number of Jews estimated for North America virtually did not change. The total estimate for Oceania increased by nearly 3 percent. Most other regions sustained decreases in Jewish population size.

World Jewry constitutes about 2.5 per 1,000 of total world population. One in about 395 people in the world is a Jew.

Individual Countries

THE AMERICAS

In 1988 the total number of Jews in the American continents was somewhat less than six and a half million. The overwhelming majority (93 percent) reside in the United States and Canada, less than 1 percent live in Central America—including

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION, BY CONTINENTS AND MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS, 1986 AND 1988

Region	1986			1988		% Change 1986–1988
	Original	Revised				
		Abs. N.	Percent	Abs. N.	Percent	
Diaspora	9,405,400	9,409,900	72.5	9,320,000	71.8	−1.0
Israel	3,562,500	3,562,500	27.5	3,659,000	28.2	+2.6
World	12,967,900	12,972,400	100.0	12,979,000	100.0	+0.1
America,						
Total	6,454,700	6,453,200	49.8	6,447,600	49.7	−0.1
North[a]	6,010,000	6,010,000	46.3	6,010,000	46.3	0.0
Central	45,500	45,500	0.4	45,500	0.4	0.0
South	399,200	397,700	3.1	392,100	3.0	−1.4
Europe, Total	2,685,900	2,688,900	20.7	2,607,500[b]	20.1	−3.0
EC	1,005,100	1,005,100	7.7	1,000,400	7.7	−0.5
West, other	43,200	43,200	0.3	43,200	0.4	0.0
East and Balkans[c]	1,637,600	1,640,600	12.6	1,553,900	12.0	−5.3
Asia, Total	3,598,000	3,598,000	27.7	3,692,400	28.4	+2.6
Israel	3,562,500	3,562,500	27.5	3,659,000	28.2	+2.6
Rest[c]	35,500	35,500	0.3	33,400	0.2	−5.9
Africa, Total	145,200	145,200	1.1	141,900	1.1	−2.3
North	15,200	15,200	0.1	12,700	0.1	−16.4
Central	13,800	13,800	0.1	14,100	0.1	+2.1
South	116,200	116,200	0.9	115,100	0.9	−0.9
Oceania	84,100	87,100	0.7	89,600	0.7	+2.8

[a] U.S.A. and Canada.

[b] Including 10,000 Jews in transit.

[c] The Asian territories of USSR and Turkey are included in "East Europe and Balkans."

Mexico, and about 6 percent live in South America, where Argentina and Brazil have the largest Jewish communities (see table 2).

During the period reviewed here, 1986 to 1988, the balance of Jewish population changes in the United States as a whole probably was close to nil. Several local surveys taken in recent years provided evidence of very low "effectively Jewish" birthrates and of increasing aging among the Jewish population. Thus, it is possible that the influence of internal evolution on the size of U.S. Jewry may be negative, though there is no consensus with regard to this assessment. Any negative internal balance in U.S. Jewish population was generally offset by an undoubtedly positive balance of external migrations. In earlier years, the international migration balance of U.S. Jewry often resulted in actual increases of Jewish population size. However, the volume of Jewish international migration during most of the mid-1980s was very small, and only toward the end of 1988 did a significant increase begin to appear. The major determinant of these trends in recent years was the changing volume of Soviet Jewish immigration.

Our 1988 estimate of 5,700,000 Jews in the United States cautiously repeats the figures reported for the previous years, and differs slightly from the new estimates prepared by the research team of the North American Jewish Data Bank (NAJDB) which are reported elsewhere in this volume.[11] NAJDB estimated the U.S. Jewish population in 1986 at 5,814,000, including "under 2 percent" non-Jewish household members. This was very close to our own estimate of 5,700,000. For 1987, the NAJDB estimate was revised to 5,943,700, which was to be understood not as actual sudden growth but as a result of changes made in the figures for several local communities. For 1988, the NAJDB estimate was revised to 5,935,000, which again reflects corrections of data rather than actual decline. A nationwide sample survey of U.S. Jewry, scheduled for 1990—conducted by the NAJDB with the sponsorship of the Council of Jewish Federations—is expected to provide benchmark information and the basis for updates in subsequent years.

In Canada an official population census held in 1981 enumerated 296,425 Jews according to religion. If the persons are added who responded "Jewish" as a *single* reply to the census question on ethnic origin, while not indicating any religion (i.e., they were not Christians, etc.), the figure rises to 306,375. There were additional persons who did not indicate religion but mentioned "Jewish" as part of a *multiple* response to the question on ethnic origin. It is likely that some of them were merely thinking in terms of ancestry but did not actually consider themselves as Jews at the time of the census. By including a reasonable proportion of those who were identified in the census as Jews by multiple ethnicity only, a round total estimate of 310,000 was arrived at for 1981.

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[11] The new U.S. Jewish population estimates first appeared in Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband, and Jeffrey Scheckner, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1986," AJYB, vol. 87, 1987, pp. 164–91. The 1988 update, by the same authors, appeared in AJYB, vol. 89, 1989, pp. 233–52. See also U.O. Schmelz, *World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 32–36; U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends," AJYB, vol. 83, 1983, pp. 141–87; by the same authors, *Basic Trends in U.S. Jewish Demography*, Jewish Sociology Papers, American Jewish Committee (New York, 1988); and Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewish Demography: Inconsistencies That Challenge," in U.O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1985* (Jerusalem, 1989), pp. 23–42.

The population census held in Canada in 1986 provided new data on ethnic origins but not on religious groups. A total of 245,855 persons reported being Jewish as a *single* reply to the question on ethnic origin, as against 264,020 in the same category in 1981. A further 97,655 mentioned a Jewish origin as part of a *multiple* response to the 1986 question on ethnic origin, as compared to possibly 30,000 to 40,000 in 1981. Thus, a substantial increase in the number of Canadians reporting partially Jewish ancestry appeared to offset the decline in the number of those with a solely Jewish identification according to ethnic criteria. Changes in the wording of the relevant questions in the two censuses, no less than actual demographic and identificational trends, are responsible for these variations in the size of the Canadian "ethnically" Jewish population. It should be noted, too, that an unknown number of "ethnic" Jews identify with a non-Jewish religion. This occurs comparatively more frequently among those reporting multiple ethnic origins than among those identifying only with the Jewish ethnic group. (These "ethnic" Jews who identify with another religion are not included in our estimate.) Finally, census data suggest that about 9,000 Jews migrated to Canada between 1981 and 1986.

In the light of this admittedly partial evidence, and considering the increasingly aged Jewish population structure, it is suggested that a migratory surplus may have roughly offset the probably negative balance of internal evolution since the 1981 census. Consequently, the figure of 310,000 was adopted for 1988 as well. The next census, as of 1991, is again expected to include a question on religion, thus providing a better baseline for a revised estimate of Canada's Jewish population.

The estimate for Mexico has been kept unchanged at 35,000. While the official Mexican censuses have given widely varying figures—17,574 in 1950; 100,750 in 1960; 49,277 in 1970; 61,790 in 1980—it is generally admitted that the last three censuses erroneously included among the Jews many thousands of non-Jews living outside the known regions of Jewish residence in that country.

The Jewish population of Argentina is marked by a negative balance of internal evolution. In the past, the balance of external migrations was strongly negative; but since the restoration of a democratic regime, emigration has diminished and there has been some return migration. Assuming a moderately negative migratory balance, the estimate has been reduced from 224,000 in 1986 to 220,000 in 1988.

The official population census of Brazil in 1980 showed a figure of 91,795 Jews. Since it is possible that some Jews failed to declare themselves as such in the census, a corrected estimate of 100,000 was adopted for 1980, and has been kept unchanged for 1988, assuming that the overall balance of vital events and external migrations was close to zero. The 100,000 figure fits the admittedly rough estimates that are available for the size of local Jewish communities in Brazil.

On the strength of fragmentary information that is accumulating, the admittedly quite tentative estimates for Uruguay and Chile—as well as the figure for Peru—were reduced, while that for Venezuela was not changed.[12]

EUROPE

Of Europe's estimated 2,607,500 Jews, 40 percent live in Western Europe and 60 percent in Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries, including the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey (see table 3).

The twelve countries that form the European Community (EC) contain a total Jewish population of one million. Economic integration between these countries will be greatly enhanced after the end of 1992, following the implementation of existing treaties. This will most likely stimulate occupationally motivated geographical mobility, with possible effects on the distribution of Jews among the EC's different countries.

France has the largest Jewish population in Western Europe, estimated at 530,000. Monitoring of the plausible trends in the internal evolution and the external migrations of Jews in France —including a new study conducted in 1988 at the initiative of the Fonds Social Juif Unifié—suggests that there has been little net change in Jewish population size since the major survey that was taken in the 1970s.[13]

A reestimation of the size of British Jewry was carried out by the research unit of the Board of Deputies, based on an analysis of Jewish deaths during 1975–1979. The revised population figure for 1977 was 336,000 with a margin of error of +/− 34,000.[14] Allowing for an excess of deaths over births, some assimilatory losses, and emigration, the update for 1984, as elaborated by the board's research unit, came to 330,000. The update for 1986 was 326,000; continuation of the same trends suggests an estimate of 322,000 for 1988.

West Germany, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands each have Jewish populations ranging around 30,000. There is a tendency toward internal shrinkage of all these Jewries, but in some instances this is partly offset by immigration. The West German Jewish community records—which are among the most complete and up-to-date available—point to a modest Jewish population increase between 1986

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[12] For a more detailed discussion of the region's Jewish population trends, see U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demography of Latin American Jewry," AJYB, vol. 85, 1985, pp. 51–102. See also Sergio DellaPergola, "Demographic Trends of Latin American Jewry," in J. Laikin Elkin and G.W. Merks, eds., *The Jewish Presence in Latin America* (Boston, 1987), pp. 85–133.

[13] Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: socio-démographie et identité* (Jerusalem and Paris, 1984).

[14] Steven Haberman, Barry A. Kosmin, and Caren Levy, "Mortality Patterns of British Jews 1975–79: Insights and Applications for the Size and Structure of British Jewry," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, ser. A, 146, pt. 3, 1983, pp. 294–310.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE AMERICAS, 1988

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Canada	25,950,000	310,000	11.9	B 1981–86
United States	246,329,000	5,700,000	23.1	C 1986
Total Northern America		6,010,000		
Bahamas	244,000	300	1.2	C 1973
Costa Rica	2,851,000	2,000	0.7	C 1986
Cuba	10,402,000	700	0.1	D
Dominican Republic	6,867,000	100	0.0	D
Guatemala	8,681,000	800	0.1	A 1983
Jamaica	2,446,000	300	0.1	B 1988
Mexico	82,734,000	35,000	0.4	C 1980
Netherlands Antilles	188,000	400	2.1	D
Panama	2,322,000	3,800	1.6	C 1986
Puerto Rico	3,606,000	1,500	0.4	C 1986
Virgin Islands	110,000	300	2.7	C 1986
Other		300		D
Total Central America		45,500		
Argentina	31,963,000	220,000	6.9	C 1960–88
Bolivia	6,993,000	600	0.1	C 1986
Brazil	144,428,000	100,000	0.7	C 1980
Chile	12,748,000	15,000	1.2	C 1988 X
Colombia	30,241,000	6,500	0.2	C 1986
Ecuador	10,204,000	900	0.1	C 1985
Paraguay	4,039,000	900	0.2	C 1984
Peru	21,256,000	3,500	0.2	B 1985
Suriname	392,000	200	0.5	B 1986
Uruguay	3,060,000	24,500	8.0	D
Venezuela	18,751,000	20,000	1.1	D
Total Southern America		392,100		
Total		6,447,600		

and 1988. In Italy, until 1984, Jews were legally obliged to register with the local Jewish communities. Since then membership in the community has become voluntary. Although most Jews reconfirmed their membership, the looseness of the new legal framework may reduce both the completeness of the communal registers and, in the long run, the cohesion of the community.

Other EC member countries have smaller and, overall, slowly declining Jewish populations. An exception may be Spain, whose Jewish population is very tentatively estimated at 12,000.

Other Western European countries which are not EC members account for a cumulative Jewish population of 43,200. Among these, Switzerland's Jews are estimated at below 20,000. While there is evidence of a negative balance of births and deaths, connected with great aging and frequent outmarriage, immigration may have offset the internal losses. The Jewish populations in Scandinavian countries are, overall, numerically stable.

Eastern European Jewry is characterized by particularly low levels of effectively Jewish fertility, connected with a frequent and prolonged practice of outmarriage, and by heavy aging. The shrinking of the Jewish population in those countries must be comparatively rapid, therefore.

By far the largest Jewish population in Eastern Europe is concentrated in the Soviet Union, including its Asian territory. In 1987–1988, Jewish emigration from the USSR resumed and gained momentum: 8,100 Jews left in 1987 and 19,300 in 1988, as against only about 2,000 during 1985–1986. In the interim, the heavy deficit of internal population dynamics must have continued and even intensified, due to the great aging which is known to prevail. This can only have been exacerbated by the comparatively younger age composition of the emigrants.[15] On the strength of these considerations, the estimate has been reduced from 1,515,000 in 1986 to 1,435,000 in 1988.

Our estimates for Soviet Jewry are updates of the figures from three population censuses (1959, 1970, and 1979). These were rather consistent among themselves, considering the probable evolution in the intervals. Our reservation about Soviet Jewish population figures in previous AJYB volumes bears repeating: While some underreporting is not impossible, it cannot be quantified and should not be exaggerated. Data on nationalities from the Soviet Union's official population census, carried out in January 1989, will eventually provide a better basis for revised estimates of Jewish population size.

During the period reviewed here, the choice of country of destination by Jews leaving the Soviet Union followed the same pattern it had for the preceding few years. A minority went to Israel (12 percent of the total emigrants in 1987–1988), while a majority chose to settle in Western countries. However, because of the strong

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[15] U.O. Schmelz, "New Evidence on Basic Issues in the Demography of Soviet Jews," *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 16, no. 2, 1974, pp. 209–23. See also Mordechai Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry Since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure* (Westport, 1987).

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE, 1988

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Belgium	9,925,000	31,800	3.2	D
Denmark	5,130,000	6,500	1.3	C 1988
France	55,874,000	530,000	9.5	C 1972–88
Germany, West	61,199,000	33,000	0.5	B 1988
Great Britain	57,077,000	322,000	5.6	B 1988
Greece	10,013,000	4,900	0.5	B 1986
Ireland	3,538,000	1,900	0.5	B 1988
Italy	57,441,000	31,500	0.5	B 1986
Luxembourg	375,000	700	1.9	C 1970
Netherlands	14,758,000	25,800	1.7	C 1988
Portugal	10,408,000	300	0.0	B 1986
Spain	39,053,000	12,000	0.3	D
Total European Community		1,000,400		
Austria	7,595,000	6,300	0.8	A 1986
Finland	4,951,000	1,300	0.3	A 1987
Gibraltar	30,000	600	20.0	B 1981
Norway	4,196,000	1,000	0.2	A 1987
Sweden	8,436,000	15,000	1.8	C 1986
Switzerland	6,509,000	19,000	2.9	B 1980
Total other Western Europe		43,200		
Bulgaria	8,995,000	3,100	0.3	D
Czechoslovakia	15,620,000	8,000	0.5	D
Germany, East	16,666,000	500	0.0	D
Hungary	10,596,000	58,500	5.5	D
Poland	37,862,000	4,200	0.1	D
Romania	23,048,000	20,000	0.9	B 1988 X
Turkey[a]	52,422,000	20,000	0.4	C 1988
USSR[a]	283,682,000	1,435,000	5.1	C 1979
Yugoslavia	23,559,000	4,600	0.2	C 1986
Total Eastern Europe and Balkans		1,553,900		
In transit		10,000		A 1988
Total		2,607,500		

[a] Including Asian regions.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN ASIA, 1988

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Hong Kong	5,681,000	1,000	0.2	D
India	796,596,000	5,000	0.0	B 1981
Iran	52,522,000	20,000	0.4	D
Iraq	17,656,000	200	0.0	D
Israel	4,476,800[a]	3,659,000	817.3	A 1988
Japan	122,613,000	1,000	0.0	C 1988
Korea, South	41,975,000	100	0.0	D
Lebanon	2,827,000	100	0.0	D
Philippines	58,721,000	100	0.0	D
Singapore	2,647,000	300	0.1	C 1984
Syria	11,338,000	4,000	0.4	D
Thailand	54,536,000	300	0.0	D
Yemen	7,534,000	1,000	0.1	D
Other		300		D
Total		3,692,400		

[a] End 1988.

TABLE 5. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICA, 1988

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Egypt	51,897,000	200	0.0	C 1988
Ethiopia	47,882,000	12,000	0.2	D
Kenya	23,882,000	400	0.0	B 1988
Morocco	23,910,000	10,000	0.4	D
South Africa	33,747,000	114,000	3.4	C 1980
Tunisia	7,809,000	2,500	0.3	D
Zaire	33,458,000	400	0.0	D
Zambia	7,531,000	300	0.0	D
Zimbabwe	8,878,000	1,100	0.1	B 1988
Other		1,000		D
Total		141,900		

preference for settling in the United States and that country's selective immigration policies, there were more emigrants than available immigration permits. Consequently, by the end of 1988, about 10,000 Soviet Jews were in transit in temporary accommodations, mostly in Italy and Austria. The relevant figure is shown separately in table 3.

The Jewish populations in Hungary and Romania and the small remnants in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia are all reputed to be very overaged. Their inevitable numerical decline is reflected in reduced estimates.

The size of Hungarian Jewry—the largest in Eastern Europe outside the USSR—is quite insufficiently known. Our estimate only attempts to reflect the declining trend that prevails there too, according to the available indications. Comparatively large emigration of Jews continued to take place from Romania, whose Jewish population declined to 20,000 in 1988, according to the community records available there.

The Jewish population of Turkey, where a surplus of deaths over births is reported, has been estimated at about 20,000.

ASIA

Israel accounts for 99 percent of all the Jews in Asia, excluding the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey (see table 4). Israel's Jewish population grew over 1987–1988 by about 97,000. Nearly all this growth was due to natural increase, since the migration balance was very small (+3,300) in 1987–1988.

It is difficult to estimate the Jewish population of Iran for any given date, but it continues to dwindle. The updated estimate for 1988 has been put at 20,000.

In other Asian countries with smaller, long-standing communities—such as India and Syria—the Jewish population tends to decline slowly. Very small communities, partially of a transient character, exist in several countries of Southeast Asia.

AFRICA

About 142,000 Jews are estimated to remain now in Africa. The Republic of South Africa accounts for 80 percent of total Jews in that continent (see table 5).

In 1980, according to the official census, there were about 118,000 Jews among South Africa's white population.[16] Substantial Jewish emigration since then has been compensated in good part by Jewish immigration. Considering a moderately negative migration balance, and an incipient negative balance of internal changes, the Jewish population estimate for 1988 was reduced to 114,000.

According to recent reports, the Jews remaining in Ethiopia may be very roughly estimated at 12,000. The remnant of Moroccan and Tunisian Jewry continued to shrink through emigration. It should be pointed out, though, that not a few Jews have a foothold both in Morocco (or Tunisia) and in France, and their geographical attribution is uncertain.

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[16] Sergio DellaPergola and Allie A. Dubb, "South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile," AJYB, vol. 88, 1988, pp. 59–140.

OCEANIA

The major country of Jewish residence in Oceania (Australasia) is Australia, where 95 percent of the estimated total of nearly 90,000 Jews live (see table 6).

The estimate for Australian Jewry has been raised. The 1986 census of Australia, with an optional question on religion, enumerated 69,065 declared Jews. It also indicated that about 25 percent of the country's whole population either did not specify religion or stated explicitly that they had none. This large group must be assumed to contain some persons who identify in other ways as Jews. In addition, Australian Jewry has received migratory reinforcements during the last decade, especially from South Africa. At the same time, there are demographic problems linked to strong aging, low or negative natural increase, and assimilation. Therefore, we offer a provisional estimate of 85,000 for 1988—pending clarification of population trends since previous censuses.

The Jewish community in New Zealand—now estimated at 4,500 —attracted some immigrants, too, but incurred a negative migration balance with Australia.

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN OCEANIA, 1988

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Australia	16,532,000	85,000	5.1	C 1986 X
New Zealand	3,292,000	4,500	1.4	C 1988
Other		100		D
Total		89,600		

Dispersion and Concentration

Table 7 demonstrates the magnitude of Jewish dispersion. The individual countries listed above as each having at least 100 Jews are scattered over all the continents. More than half (43 out of 75 countries) have fewer than 5,000 Jews apiece.

In relative terms, too, the Jews are now thinly scattered nearly everywhere in the Diaspora. There is not a single Diaspora country where they amount even to 3

TABLE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S JEWS, BY NUMBER AND PROPORTION (PER 1,000 POPULATION) IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES, 1988

Number of Jews in Country	Jews per 1,000 Population					
	Total	Below 1	1–5	5–10	10–25	25+
				Number of Countries[a]		
Total	75	50	14	7	3	1
Below 1,000	25	20	4	—	1	—
1,000–5,000	18	16	2	—	—	—
5,000–10,000	5	4	1	—	—	—
10,000–50,000	16	9	6	1	—	—
50,000–100,000	2	—	—	2	—	—
100,000–1,000,000	6	1	1	3	1	—
1,000,000 and over	3	—	—	1	1	1
				Jewish Population Distribution (Absolute Numbers)		
Total	12,979,000[b]	367,300	257,100	2,675,000	6,010,600	3,659,000
Below 1,000	11,700	9,400	1,700	—	600	—
1,000–5,000	46,900	38,600	8,300	—	—	—
5,000–10,000	32,300	25,800	6,500	—	—	—
10,000–50,000	344,600	193,500	126,600	24,500	—	—
50,000–100,000	143,500	—	—	143,500	—	—
100,000–1,000,000	1,596,000	100,000	114,000	1,072,000	310,000	—
1,000,000 and over	10,794,000	—	—	1,435,000	5,700,000	3,659,000
				Jewish Population Distribution (Percent of World's Jews)		
Total	100.0	2.9	2.0	20.7	46.3	28.2
Below 1,000	0.1	0.1	0.0	—	0.0	—
1,000–5,000	0.4	0.3	0.1	—	—	—
5,000–10,000	0.2	0.2	0.0	—	—	—
10,000–50,000	2.7	1.5	1.0	0.2	—	—
50,000–100,000	1.1	—	—	1.1	—	—
100,000–1,000,000	12.3	0.8	0.9	8.3	2.4	—
1,000,000 and over	83.2	—	—	11.1	43.9	28.2

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[a] Excluding countries with fewer than 100 Jews.

[b] Total includes 10,000 Jews in transit in Europe.

TABLE 8. TEN COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATIONS, 1988

			% of Total Jewish Population			
		Jewish	In the Diaspora		In the World	
Rank	Country	Population	%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	United States	5,700,000	61.2	61.2	43.9	43.9
2	Israel	3,659,000	—	—	28.2	72.1
3	USSR	1,435,000	15.4	76.6	11.1	83.2
4	France	530,000	5.7	82.3	4.1	87.3
5	Great Britain	322,000	3.4	85.7	2.5	89.8
6	Canada	310,000	3.3	89.0	2.4	92.2
7	Argentina	220,000	2.4	91.4	1.7	93.9
8	South Africa	114,000	1.2	92.6	0.9	94.8
9	Brazil	100,000	1.1	93.7	0.8	95.6
10	Australia	85,000	0.9	94.6	0.6	96.2

percent of the total population. In most countries they constitute a far smaller fraction. Only three Diaspora countries have 10–25 Jews per 1,000 of total population; and only ten countries have more than 5 Jews per 1,000 of population. The respective ten countries are, in descending order of the proportion of their Jews (but regardless of the absolute number): United States (23.1), Gibraltar (20.0), Canada (11.9), France (9.5), Uruguay (8.0), Argentina (6.9), Great Britain (5.6), Hungary (5.5), USSR (5.1), and Australia (5.1). This list includes all the Diaspora countries with Jewries of 100,000 or more, except for South Africa and Brazil (in the latter's large population the Jews form only 0.7 per 1,000).

In the State of Israel, by contrast, the Jewish majority amounted to 81.7 percent in 1988, against 82.2 percent in 1986 (not including the Arab population of the administered areas).

While Jews are widely dispersed, they are also concentrated to some extent (see table 8). In 1988 over 96 percent of world Jewry lived in the ten countries with the largest Jewish populations; 83 percent lived in the three countries that have at least a million Jews each (United States, Israel, Soviet Union). Similarly, the United States alone accounted for over 61 percent of total Diaspora Jewry; two countries (United States and Soviet Union) for 77 percent; and the nine leading countries together comprised about 95 percent of the Diaspora Jewish population.

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